Bilateral Exchange Rates and Jobs

We study the labor market effects of realignment in fixed bilateral exchange rates, such as China's peg to the US dollar. We employ the open economy model by de Melo and Robinson to identify the core parameters of the real, trade side of the economy driving the unemployment effects of bilateral exchange rate realignment. A small open economy version of the model is explored analytically and a large multicountry version numerically. Analytics in the small open economy model show that unemployment effects of adjusting of a bilateral peg hinge on the fraction exported to and imported from the trading partner. A larger fraction exported to and a smaller fraction imported from the trading partner make it more likely that revaluation of a trading partner's currency has beneficial effects. Numerics in the large economy model show that Chinese revaluation can generate both positive and negative unemployment effects depending upon underlying parameter values. Adverse unemployment effects can go along with an improving trade balance.     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

Monetary stabilization in countries in transition

The best way to prevent hyperinflation when domestic prices are liberalized is to initiate the transition from a planned economy to a market economy with a currency reform. In the following period, moderate inflation and flexible exchange rates are suitable to facilitate relative price adjustments. Only after the bulk of alignments has been accomplished can a switch in the exchange rate regime be convenient. The nominal peg of a stable reference currency lowers the level and the variance of domestic inflation rates. The credibility of an exchange rate target may best be achieved by combining a currency board (objective sustainability) with a crawling peg (political sustainability). Price stability can be realized in the long run by reducing the annual depreciation rate in regular, preannounced steps.     

Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards

The paper models the choice between currency boards (CBs) and adjustable pegs (or managed floating). Countries adopting CBs have grown faster and inflated less on average than countries adopting other regimes. The explanation hinges on key features of CBs: policy discipline and inflation credibility. The authors find separating equilibria in which a weak government chooses a CB as a discipline device while a tough government chooses a standard peg for its policy flexibility. Paradoxically, the weak government can then outperform the tough government on average. In simulations performed, CBs welfare can exceed peg welfare even when unemployment persistence is strong.     

NEW ESTIMATION OF CHINA'S EXCHANGE RATE REGIME

Abstract. The present paper updates the question: what precisely is the exchange rate regime that China has put into place since 2005, when it announced a move away from the US dollar peg? Is it a basket anchor with the possibility of cumulatable daily appreciations, as was announced at the time? We apply to this question a new approach of estimating countries’ de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that has been used in the past to estimate implicit de facto currency weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the US dollar or some other single major currency. Because the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly follow variants of band‐basket‐crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. The synthesis adds a variable representing ‘exchange market pressure’ to the currency basket equation, whereby the degree of flexibility is estimated at the same time as the currency weights. This approach reveals that by mid‐2007, the RMB basket had switched a substantial part of the US dollar's weight onto the euro. The implication is that the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar during this period was due to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to any upward trend in the RMB relative to its basket.     

The structure of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the denomination of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. Three types of debt (nominal, indexed, and foreign) and two regimes (fixed and flexible) are considered. Indexed debt is insulated against unexpected inflation. The real (domestic‐currency) value of foreign debt is subject to valuation effects from real exchange rate shocks. The ‘fear‐of‐floating’ result, that foreign debt makes pegging more attractive, is shown to hold unambiguously only if the peg is fully credible. If the peg lacks credibility, a critical factor is the perceived likelihood of using the ‘escape clause’ of a switch to a float, which raises the costs of pegging. Foreign debt increases the temptation to resort to the escape clause, so when a peg is not fully credible (as is almost always the case in reality), pegging tends to be less attractive than floating in the presence of foreign debt.     

Real exchange rates: are they dominated by fundamental factors?

Using Bayesian model averaging, we determine which fundamental pair-wise differences suggested by the literature on optimum currency areas give the best explanation of medium-term variability of bilateral real exchange rates. The intercept in the best specification is statistically insignificant, implying that for a hypothetical pair of economies for which the differences were zero, the bilateral real exchange rate would not move. Thus, the ‘non-fundamental’ element of the medium-term real exchange rate variability is, in our sample at least, negligible on average. In other words, floating exchange rate does not in itself imply, on average, more real exchange rate variability in the medium term than an exchange rate peg.     

Optimal exchange rate policy for a small oil-exporting country: A dynamic general equilibrium perspective

This paper examines the choice of optimal exchange rate regime for an oil-exporting small open economy using a welfare-based model. The paper extends the standard New Keynesian Small Open Economy model to include three countries: a small oil-exporting country and two large foreign countries. The model also features three sectors: traded, non-traded, and primary-commodity (crude-oil). The sources of uncertainty are random monetary (demand), productivity (real), and real oil price (supply) shocks. Despite the absence of a non-oil traded sector in this primary-commodity economy, the welfare analysis suggests that flexible exchange rate regimes can reduce external shocks and consumption volatility given certain caveats about pricing-schemes. The analysis also suggests that a basket peg is more welfare-improving than a unilateral peg, as higher volatility of the anchor currency reduces consumer welfare.     

Choice of currency basket weights and its implications on trade balance

This paper seeks to find an optimal choice of currency basket weights for emerging economies that peg their currencies to a currency basket, and to examine the long-run relationship between the real exchange rates of a group of trading partners. A general equilibrium model is set up to establish an optimal set of currency basket weights, coupled with the choice of fiscal policy, to simultaneously stabilize trade balance and aggregate price level of an economy. This optimal set of weights is a weighted average of two sets of weights; each targets at one policy goal (stabilizing either balance of trade or aggregate price level) at a time. Empirical studies including vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and cointegration analysis on the long-run relationship between the Thai baht and the real exchange rates of its major trading partners are presented.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

Exchange Rate Movements and Unemployment in the EU Accession Countries—A Panel Analysis

According to the traditional “optimum currency area” approach, not much will be lost from a very hard peg to a currency union if there has been little reason for variations in the exchange rate. This paper takes a different approach, and highlights the fact that high exchange rate volatility may as well signal high costs for labor markets. The impact of exchange rate volatility on labor markets in the CEECs is put to the test, finding that volatility vis‐à‐vis the euro significantly increases unemployment. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility could be considered as a substitute for a removal of employment protection legislation. However, labor market reform could be argued to be an equally worthy strategy, backed up by central bank independence and the adoption of an anti‐inflation monetary policy rule.     

Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies: New Evidence from Treatment‐effect Estimations

The way central banks react to exchange market pressure is likely to affect the subsequent economic development and the associated economic costs. In a situation of currency pressure the central bank can in principle decide to let the currency float freely, to maintain the peg or to implement a managed float policy, i.e. a mix of depreciation and intervention. As the central bank's choices are subject to self selection and endogeneity, we use propensity score matching to adequately cope with these methodical challenges. We find that monetary authorities have two options to keep down the economic costs in terms of output, namely stabilizing the exchange rate or letting the currency float freely. In contrast, a managed float under currency pressure is accompanied by the worst possible outcome with an average loss of gross domestic product (GDP) between 5% and 6%.     

Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy

In a small‐open‐economy model with two tradables and one nontradable, if a price index of these three goods is stabilized and the exchange rate is flexible, conditions are obtained in the cases of two and of three or more factors for an export subsidy or an import tariff to result in currency appreciation. In the case of three or more factors, conditions are obtained under which either an export‐subsidy or an import‐tariff policy (or a combination) can take the place of a flexible exchange rate in accommodating the necessary resource allocation to an exogenous capital outflow, generalizing Keynes’s 1931 proposition.     

Incorporating daily market uncertainty data into a conventional short-run dynamic model: the case of the black-market exchange rate in Iran

The effect of market uncertainty on a country’s currency, while widely recognized, is either omitted from mainstream models or addressed using low-frequency series, which are typically subject to aggregation bias and substantial lags. In this article, we propose a new mixed-data sampling (MIDAS) modelling framework that enables us to incorporate the asymmetric daily effects of market uncertainty in a conventional monthly error correction model. We achieve this by proxying market uncertainty via the value of a ‘safe haven’ asset (gold) that investors reallocate towards in the face of heightened market risk. We apply the model to the Iranian black-market exchange rate, using a mix of the daily price of gold (28 June 2010–19 August 2018) and monthly data (July 2010-July 2018) on relative prices. Our results indicate that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds despite the recent unprecedented depreciations in the Iranian currency arising from several rounds of international sanctions. We also find that increased uncertainty can lead to instantaneous and substantial depreciations, whereas stabilization back towards the PPP path is much more sluggish.     

VEHICLE CURRENCY*

Historically, the world economy has been dominated by a single currency accepted in the exchange of goods and assets among countries. In recent decades, the U.S. dollar has played this role. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in the sense that agents in nondollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly using the U.S. dollar instead of using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies. A vehicle currency is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from a vehicle currency and show how it depends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We find that there can be significant welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency country.     

Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?

Following the East Asian crisis, a number of observers have advocated that small and open economies in Asia adopt an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments as well as the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? In order to answer this question, we consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore. While both of these economies share a number of broad similarities, the former operates a US dollar–linked currency board arrangement and the latter maintains an adjustable peg in the form of a monitoring band arrangement with the central parity based on an undisclosed trade–weighted currency basket.     

Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

Identification of a basket peg: the model specification controversy

A controversy has been triggered by the Chinese exchange rate regime shift from a single currency peg to an alleged basket peg. The controversy is about the specification of the model used to represent the basket as three models have been used: levels, log levels and first log differences. It is suggested that one way to confirm the validity or otherwise of a model is to use data on the special drawing rights exchange rate since the currency weights are known. The results show that the estimated weights are almost identical no matter which model and which numeraire is used. However, nonnested model selection criteria show that the best model is that written in levels, simply because this is what is used in practice by central banks adopting basket pegs.     

A survey of the literature on the optimal peg

It is widely agreed that floating is not an appropriate exchange rate policy for most developing countries, but in a world of generalized floating the question of exchange rate policy is not resolved by deciding to peg rather than to float: it is also necessary to decide to what to peg. This is the question of the ‘optimal peg’, on which a significant literature has emerged since 1976. The present paper provides a survey of that literature. Section 2 summarizes the principal papers. Section 3 compares the objectives and rules advocated by different authors. Section 4 evaluates the alternative approaches, arguing that in general the peg should be chosen to stabilize the nominal trade-weighted effective exchange rate. Section 5 considers whether this criterion points to the SDR as a satisfactory peg.