Distortionary company car taxation: deadweight losses through increased car ownership

We analyse the effects of distortionary company car taxation through increased household car consumption for the Netherlands. We use several identification strategies and demonstrate that for about 20 % of households company car possession increases car ownership. The annual welfare loss of distortionary company taxation through increased car ownership is generally rather small, maximally €120 per company car, and much less than the welfare loss through increased expenditure on the company car. However, for policies that exempt households from paying tax on their company car, the annual deadweight loss is likely higher. Our first-best tax policy recommendation is to increase company car tax rates. However, our current results suggest that a second-best policy, which keeps average company car taxation constant but which reduces the marginal tax on cheaper cars and increases the marginal tax on expensive cars, would be welfare improving as overconsumption of company cars will be reduced.     

Preferences for alternative fuel vehicles of company car drivers

Costs of car ownership for company cars drivers and private car owners are very different. Car use, car choice decisions and preferences for car characteristics may therefore differ substantially between these two markets. In this paper, we present results of a study on the preferences of company car drivers for alternative fuel vehicles and their characteristics, based on data from an online stated choice experiment in the Netherlands. Results show that, assuming current car characteristics, preferences for alternative fuel vehicles, and for electric and fuel cell cars in particular, are substantially lower than those for the conventional technology. Limited driving ranges, long recharge/refuelling times and limited availability of refuelling opportunities, are to a large extent responsible for this. Preferences for alternative fuel vehicles increase considerably with improvements on these aspects, especially for the hybrid and flexifuel car. Under the current company car tax system in the Netherlands, which favours cleaner technologies, these two car types are even preferred to the conventional technology, assuming equal catalogue prices and personal monthly cost contributions. Comparing results with those from a similar choice experiment among private car owners shows that willingness to pay patterns for AFV improvements regarding driving range, recharge and refuelling times, fuel availability and diversity in AFV supply, are considerably different for company car drivers than for private car owners. Company and private car drivers may therefore react (very) differently to future improvements in AFV technology and fuel availability. We finally show that preferences of company car drivers for fuel cell and electric cars depend to a large extent on annual mileage. Market share simulations show that potential early adopters of electric and fuel cell cars can be found among people with a relatively low annual mileage.     

Transport Taxes with Multiple Trip Purposes

A congestible urban transport system is considered in which cars and buses are used for commuting and non‐commuting trips. Commuting is a strict complement to taxable labour supply. The optimal tax structure for raising a given amount of government revenue is examined for the cases where differentiation of transport tolls between trip purposes is and is not possible. An application to Belgian urban environments shows that optimal toll differentiation produces significant efficiency improvements. Without differentiation, reforming transport taxes generates substantial gains only when the labour tax can be reduced.     

Green Tax Reform in an Oligopolistic Industry

OECD countries reduce or eliminate certain taxes when they introduce new environmental taxes. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the incidence of such green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry. The paper shows that a rise in taxes could result in the expansion of the aggregate pollution in the presence of a large technology gap. The paper further shows that the government loses tax revenue as a result of the green tax reform if it continues to apply the same environmental standard. This implies that the government needs to raise environmental standards to keep the existing level of public spending after a green tax reform.     

Political competition,tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.     

Costly Tax Enforcement and Financial Repression

Using an overlapping generations production‐economy model characterized by financial repression, purposeful government expenditures and cost of tax collection, we analyse whether financial repression can be explained by the cost of raising taxes. We show that with public expenditures affecting utility of the agents, modest costs of tax collection tend to result in financial repression being pursued as an optimal policy by the consolidated government. However, when public expenditures are purposeless, the above result only holds for relatively higher costs of tax collection. But, more importantly, costs of tax collection cannot produce a monotonic increase in the reserve requirements. What are critical, in this regard, are the weights the consumer assigns to the public good in the utility function and the size of the government.     

Poverty alleviation and tax policy

This paper examines public good provision and tax policy—optimal non-linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation—when the government departs from purely welfarist objective function and seeks to minimise poverty. This assumption reflects much policy discussion and may help understand some divergences of practical tax policy from lessons in optimal tax analysis. In contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (J. Public Econom. 6 (1976) 55), it may be optimal to use differentiated commodity tax rates, including the taxation of savings, even if preferences are separable in goods and leisure. The optimal effective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the distribution may be negative, suggesting that wage subsidy schemes can be optimal. Finally, optimal provision of a public good is analysed under poverty minimisation.     

Economic integration and tax policy with endogenous foreign firm ownership

This paper analyses the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model where corporate taxation is motivated by the desire to tax profits accruing to foreigners and the number of foreign owned firms is endogenous. Increasing economic integration is modeled as a decline in trade costs or tariffs. It turns out that declining trade costs lead to increasing profit taxes if the government may use import tariffs. If tariffs are not available, declining trade costs induce profit taxes to decline as well. A mandatory reduction in tariffs also triggers profit tax reductions. We conclude that the existence of foreign firm ownership may fail to prevent profit taxes from declining as economic integration proceeds.     

OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION,DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY,AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

An interest income tax and a publicly provided private good are introduced into the Hamada overlapping-generations model consisting of heterogeneous individuals where the government can use a wage-income tax, an identical lump-sum transfer, and the public debt. Two interesting problems are studied: (a) what relation exists between the optimal interest rate and the population-growth rate and (b) how dynamic efficiency affects the optimal-decision rules of taxes and the publicly provided good. We show that (i) if the government can (not) tax the interest income, then the optimal interest rate is (not) equal to the population-growth rate, (ii) without the availability of the interest tax the difference between these two rates is mainly caused by the income-distribution effect of the public debt and (iii) the dynamic efficiency effects on the optimal rules of the wage tax and the publicly provided good depend on not only such a difference but also the average substitute-complement relations among leisure, the second-period consumption and the publicly provided good.     

Optimal taxation and cross-price effects on labor supply: Estimates of the optimal gas tax

This study estimates parameters necessary to calculate the optimal second-best gasoline tax, most notably the cross-price elasticity between gasoline and leisure. Prior theoretical work indicates the importance of this elasticity, but despite this, almost none of the prior studies of commodity taxation (and none of the studies on second-best environmental regulation) actually estimate it. Using household data, we find that gasoline is a relative complement to leisure, and thus that the optimal gasoline tax is significantly higher than marginal damages-the opposite of the result suggested by the bulk of the prior literature. Indeed, even if there were no externalities at all associated with gasoline, the optimal tax rate would still be almost equal to the average gas tax rate in the U.S. Following this approach to estimate cross-price elasticities with leisure could strongly influence estimates of optimal rates for other important commodity or pollution taxes.     

Optimal income taxation with human capital accumulation and limited record keeping

This paper characterizes optimal income taxes in a dynamic economy where human capital is unobservable and the government is restricted to use taxes that depend only on current income. I show that unobservability of human capital tends to decrease the labor wedge, while the effect on the human capital wedge is uncertain. I also analyze the relationship between optimal taxes in economies with and without endogenous human capital and identify two qualitative reasons why the optimal tax codes will differ. I perform numerical simulations to calculate the quantitative relevance of endogenous human capital formation for optimal tax policy. I find that endogenous human capital lowers marginal tax rates by about 9% on average, as compared with a static model without human capital.     

Energy Tax and Competition in Energy Efficiency: The Case of Consumer Durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of anenergy tax on technical improvements and on prices ofconsumer durables induced by strategic competition inenergy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised thisdoes in principle not affect the producers of carsbecause the motorist pays for it in terms of a highercost of using the car. This, however, affects the unitsales of car producers because of substitution towardsother modes of transportation. A second element ofreaction to energy price variation is an indirect oneand relates to the effect of energy prices ontechnology. Competition forces car producers todevelop more energy efficient cars in order to reducethe cost of using a car. This indirect effect canpartly offset the direct effect of higher energyprices on demand if it is profitable for theautomobile industry to engineer more energy efficientequipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy taxon energy efficiency and on the price of a durablegood. This will be done within the framework of aduopoly competing in prices and in the energyefficiency of its products. The government chooses awelfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive toinnovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stagedecision process in which the duopolists first decideabout energy efficiency and then compete in prices.     

Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments

This paper investigates the welfare effects of brain-drain taxes levied by non-benevolent governments, whereby a country collects a tax from skilled emigrants but potentially wastes a sizable portion of the revenue. Using a model in which taxes are chosen to maximize expected political rents, I show that the availability of a brain-drain tax increases a weighted sum of citizen utilities. However, the government's optimal brain-drain tax is found to be higher than the level that maximizes this weighted sum. In another model, a brain-drain tax is found to be desirable when governments use public good expenditures to compete for mobile residents.     

The effectiveness of gasoline taxation to manage air pollution

Higher gasoline taxes can be justified because cars cause significant local, regional, and global air pollution damages. This study examines whether charging higher taxes would result in significant emission reductions. Both experimental survey data and actual behavior in Southern California and Connecticut are evaluated to explore whether people would change their driving behavior in response to higher gasoline prices. Both sets of results reveal that drivers are price inelastic in the short run (−0.4 to −0.6) and long run (−0.5 to −0.7). Imposing environmental surcharges on gasoline will result in only a small reduction in driving and thus only a small improvement in the environment. Such taxes will place a heavy and clear burden on drivers, however, making gasoline taxes extremely unpopular. Finally, the study finds that the income elasticity of gasoline is low (0.1–0.2) so that the gas tax will fall heavily on the poor.     

Fiscal Policy and $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ Emissions of New Passenger Cars in the EU

To what extent have national fiscal policies contributed to the decarbonisation of newly sold passenger cars? We construct a simple model that generates predictions regarding the effect of fiscal policies on average \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of new cars, and then test the model empirically. Our empirical strategy combines a diverse series of data. First, we use a large database of vehicle-specific taxes in 15 EU countries over 2001–2010 to construct a measure for the vehicle registration and annual road tax levels, and separately, for the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) sensitivity of these taxes. We find that for many countries the fiscal policies have become more sensitive to \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of new cars. We then use these constructed measures to estimate the effect of fiscal policies on the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of the new car fleet. The increased \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\)-sensitivity of registration taxes have reduced the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emission intensity of the average new car by 1.3 %, partly through an induced increase of the share of diesel-fuelled cars by 6.5 percentage points. Higher fuel taxes lead to the purchase of more fuel efficient cars, but higher diesel fuel taxes also decrease the share of (more fuel efficient) diesel cars; higher annual road taxes have no or an adverse effect.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

Vertical externalities in tax setting: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes

A common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property. Consequently, state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent. Our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes. For example, a 10-cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3.2-cent increase in the state tax rate.     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

The relationship between tax rates and tax revenues in eurozone member countries - exploring the Laffer curve

We estimate Laffer Curves for direct and indirect taxes for each Eurozone country, using panel data from 1995 to 2011, by means of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models. We choose the three taxes that contribute the most to the government tax revenue: the value added tax (VAT), the corporate income tax (CT), and the labour income tax (LT). From our estimated significant parameters, which have the expected signs according to the Laffer Curve theory, we obtained a maximum/optimal tax rate for VAT for Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia and for the majority of the Eurozone countries for direct taxes. We also take into consideration the business cycle. Many countries do not present differences in regime, and when they do, the optimal tax rate is higher during recessions. Finally, we compare the observed tax rates in 2012 to the estimated optimal tax rates, to assess if the 2012 policy was located at the prohibitive range of the Laffer Curve. Our results are important for the discussions about fiscal discipline and harmonization in the Eurozone, since they exhibit important disparities between countries and taxes. We can see that, especially for CT and LT, there is a strong divide between the values of the optimal maximum tax rates for Eastern European countries and Western European economies. Additionally, the economic and financial conditions of each country also influence the value for the tax rate.     

Optimal Fiscal Policies,Congestion and Over‐entry*

By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.