A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance

A model is presented in which demand deposits backed by fractional currency reserves and public insurance can be beneficial. The model uses Samuelson's pure consumption-loans model. The case for demand deposits, reserves, and deposit insurance rests on costs of illiquidity and incomplete information. The effect of deposit insurance depends upon how, and at what cost, the government meets its insurer's obligation — something which is not specified in practice. It remains possible that demand deposits and deposit insurance are a distortion, and reserve requirements serve only to limit the size of this distortion.     

Risk management of non-maturing liabilities

Risk management of non-maturing liabilities is a relatively unstudied issue of significant practical importance. Non-maturing liabilities include most of the traditional deposit accounts like demand deposits, savings accounts and short time deposits and form the basis of the funding of depository institutions. Therefore, the asset and liability management of depository institutions depends crucially on an accurate understanding of the liquidity risk and interest rate risk profile of these deposits.In this paper we propose a stochastic three-factor model as general quantitative framework for liquidity risk and interest rate risk management for non-maturing liabilities. It consists of three building blocks: market rates, deposit rates and deposit volumes. We give a detailed model specification and present algorithms for simulation and calibration. Our approach to liquidity risk management is based on the term structure of liquidity, a concept which forecasts for a specified period and probability what amount of cash is available for investment. For interest rate risk management we compute the value, the risk profile and the replicating bond portfolio of non-maturing liabilities using arbitrage-free pricing under a variance-minimizing measure. The proposed methodology is demonstrated by means of a case study: the risk management of savings accounts.     

The demand for and supply of deposits by credit unions: The Caisses Populaires' case reply and comments

Smith points out rightly that the symbol R refers to two different, though each time well defined, concepts in Chateau's (1980) article in this Journal. His claim, however, that this leads to a misspecification of the theoretical model is erroneous, and is refuted. Further it is shown explicitly under which conditions the maximization of expected utility of reserves is consistent with balance-sheet growth. For the Caisses' system acting within the Quebec institutional and regulatory environment, the growth-cum-managerial-discretion model is theoretically appealing, as well as supported by the available empirical evidence.     

Money,interest, inflation and growth in Turkey

This paper estimates a two equation model of inflation and growth in Turkey over the period 1950–1977. Inflation is determined by the difference between the rates of change in nominal money supply and real money demand. The short-run growth function consists of an expectations augmented Phillips curve, to which a credit availability effect is added. Under Turkey's disequilibrium institutional interest rate and exchange control systems, the real supply of domestic credit is determined, in large part, by real money demand which is, in turn, influenced by the real deposit rate of interest. The central bank can use both the nominal money supply and the nominal deposit rate of interest as policy instruments for stabilisation purposes.     

Measuring interest rate sensitivity of consumer depositors

The impetus for the deregulation of consumer deposits presumed that institutions need flexibility in setting rates to control deposit levels. Previous research indicated that institutions may find varying levels of sensitivity of depositors which will make it difficult to predict volume response. This study examined the timed response of interest rate changes on deposit volume changes. Using available time series techniques, it found that volume response varied with market characteristics as well as money market conditions. In some markets, deposit volume responded significantly to interest rate differentials, while in others the deposits were insensitive to small differentials. Thus, an institution is well advised to study its particular deposit market before implementing a liability rate strategy.     

The arbitrage-free valuation and hedging of demand deposits and credit card loans

Using a market segmentation argument, this paper uses the interest rate derivative's arbitrage-free methodology to value both demand deposit liabilities and credit card loan balances in markets where deposits/loan rates may be determined under imperfect competition. In this context, these financial instruments are shown to be equivalent to a particular interest rate swap, where the principal depends on the past history of market rates. Solutions are obtained which are independent of any particular model for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates.     

Time deposit supply in the Brunner-Meltzer model

In this paper we shoe that some critical statements by Friedman and Froewiss about the Brunner-Meltzer model, particularly regarding the supply of time deposits, are based on a misinterpretation of Brunner and Meltzer's money supply and credit supply process. Admittedly, the process of time deposit supply is not extensively dealt with in the discussions on the model. We try to bridge this gap to some extent by analyzing time deposit rate setting of profit-maximizing banks using the Brunner-Meltzer model.     

Stochastic reserve losses,bank credit expansion and Bayesian information

In standard bank credit expansion models the optimal amount of new demand deposits to create is derived for a given level of uncertainty of reserves losses. In this paper, I analyze in detail, the microeconomics of bank credit expansion in which the degree of uncertainty is a decision variable for the bank to determine. First, the role of information in adjusting the bank's expected profit is established and its impact on demand deposit creation is discussed. I then derive the optimal demand for information and its comparative static behavior is examined. Finally, I discuss the major implications of considering the level of uncertainty as a decision variable in the bank credit expansion literature.     

银行理财产品收益率市场化演进机制研究——基于修正Hotelling模型的理论分析与实证检验

本文利用修正的Hotelling模型对我国银行理财产品收益率的市场化演进机制进行了理论分析,并使用2005至2019年的银行理财产品历史数据进行了实证检验,得到了一系列结论。第一,收益率落后的“输家”银行下期将以更大的相对幅度提高其收益率,呈现出“输家”追赶“赢家”的锦标赛竞争机制。第二,上述竞争机制受到“输家”银行排名、不同银行之间收益率差距和监管政策的影响。“输家”银行排名越靠后、不同银行之间的收益率差距越大,那么,下期“输家”银行提高其理财产品收益率的相对幅度就越大,不同银行之间的竞争行为就越强烈;与之相对的,监管政策越严,则不同银行之间的竞争强度越弱。本文的研究结论对进一步深入理解我国存款市场化利率的形成机制、加强对商业银行的监管和引导有一定的借鉴和启示意义。     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Portfolio analysis of asset and liability management in small-, medium- and large-sized banks

The paper presents an analysis of the commercial banking firm based on Markowitz portfolio analysis. A bank is treated as a portfolio of five banking assets and three banking liabilities. The average rate of return and risk of each asset and liability is estimated empirically for groups of banks categorized by size — small, medium and large. Banks' rates return on equity are defined as the weighted average of the assets' rates of return less the liabilities' rates of return. Quadratic programming is used to delineate the set of banking portfolios which have the maximum rate of return on equity at each level of risk.     

银行理财产品收益率市场化演进机制研究——基于修正Hotelling模型的理论分析与实证检验

本文利用修正的Hotelling模型对我国银行理财产品收益率的市场化演进机制进行了理论分析,并使用2005至2019年的银行理财产品历史数据进行了实证检验,得到了一系列结论。第一,收益率落后的“输家”银行下期将以更大的相对幅度提高其收益率,呈现出“输家”追赶“赢家”的锦标赛竞争机制。第二,上述竞争机制受到“输家”银行排名、不同银行之间收益率差距和监管政策的影响。“输家”银行排名越靠后、不同银行之间的收益率差距越大,那么,下期“输家”银行提高其理财产品收益率的相对幅度就越大,不同银行之间的竞争行为就越强烈;与之相对的,监管政策越严,则不同银行之间的竞争强度越弱。本文的研究结论对进一步深入理解我国存款市场化利率的形成机制、加强对商业银行的监管和引导有一定的借鉴和启示意义。     

The NOW account experiment and the demand for money

The authors use the NOW account experience in New England from 1972 to 1978 to estimate the responsiveness of the demand for money to interest payments on checkable accounts. Such an estimate is important in considering the effects on the demand for money of nationwide NOW's and of variations in interest rates on transactions balances in the future. With New England as the experimental region and the rest of the United States as a control group, the authors develop a cross-section, time-series framework to isolate and to estimate the interest rate responsiveness of money demand while accounting for effects of income, interest rates, and gradual adjustment.     

Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan

On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find, however, that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline.     

Bank suspension of convertibility

A banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their.deposit holdings. Suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system's response to a banking panic. When depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments, a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses, conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments. Banks, with superior information about the investments, can signal to depositors, by suspending convertibility, that continuation of the long-term investments is mutually beneficial.     

Pricing,operating efficiency,and profitability among large commercial banks

This study uses statistical cost accounting techniques to examine the relationship between bank profitability and two dimensions of operating performance — pricing and operating efficiency. The traditional statistical cost accounting model, which relates a firm's income to its asset and liability mix, is expanded to account for differences in market structure, regional demand and supply conditions, and macroeconomics factors. The study focuses on large (above $500 million in domestic deposits) banks, comparing a sample of relatively profitable banks against a matched group of much less profitable banks over the period 1970–1977. After allowing for regional supply and demand factors, the high and low-profit banks are estimated to earn equal market rates of return on individual assets and liabilities. There is virtually no evidence that differential prices are an important discriminator between the two bank groups. Some evidence is found that the high-earnings banks experience lower operating costs on some liabilities, but the opposite is true with respect to selected asset items. After taxes are taken into account, however, any such cost differentials virtually disappear. Overall, there is no compelling evidence that high-profit banks are characterized by greater operating efficiency than their low-earnings counterparts. This finding is consistent with the view that over time, and especially among relatively large banks, information flows and competitive pressures act to reduce operating efficiency differences that may appear in the short run.     

存贷相联与银行的本质——基于KRS模型的扩展

作为集吸收公众存款和发放贷款于一身的金融中介,银行在整个金融体系中始终处于关键地位.既有文献对银行特质性问题进行了深入探讨,本文在KRS模型的基础上,进一步从理论上研究了活期存款、贷款承诺和定期贷款这三者之间的协同效应,认为金融功能的一体化是银行的本质所在,并结合20世纪90年代以来美国银行业转型的事实进行了初步实证考察,由此提出银行制度边界的命题.     

Collateralization,leverage, and stressed expected loss

We describe a general equilibrium model with a banking system in which the deposit bank collects deposits from households and the merchant bank provides funds to firms. The merchant bank borrows collateralized short-term funds from the deposit bank. In an economic downturn, as the value of collateral decreases, the merchant bank must sell assets on short notice, reinforcing the crisis, and defaults if its cash buffer is insufficient. The deposit bank suffers from losses because of the depreciated assets. If the value of the deposit bank's assets is insufficient to cover deposits, it also defaults. Deposits are insured by the government, with a premium paid by the deposit bank equal to its expected loss on the deposits. We define the bank's capital shortfall in the crisis as the expected loss on deposits under stress. We calibrate the model on the U.S. economy and show how this measure of stressed expected loss behaves for different calibrations of the model. A 40% decline of the securities market would induce a loss of 12.5% in the ex-ante value of deposits.     

侵权立法对责任保险市场的影响机制

责任保险赖以存在及发展的基础在于完善的法律体系,尤其是侵权责任法.一国侵权责任法的不断完善,不仅有利于公民和法人承担责任,同时也会增加公众的维权和自我保护意识,从而刺激责任保险市场的需求与供给.本文采用CHH模型,通过侵权责任扩张与责任保险危机问题,分析了侵权立法对责任保险市场的影响机制,并基于美国责任保险市场发展模式...