Consumer Boycotts: Does Trust in Law-Making and Law-Enforcing Institutions Matter?

This article estimates the effects of trust in political and judicial institutions on individuals’ propensity to take part in consumer boycotts. In particular, this study disentangles the effects of institutional trust and quality. The analysis relies on data from the 2010 European Social Survey, which is a path breaking comparative study of how justice is perceived and allows a valid measure of judicial and political trust to be constructed. A two-step instrumental variable method was used to measure the effects of institutional trust, controlling for micro- and macro- level factors. The results indicate that trust in law-making institutions is negatively associated with boycott participation, whereas the relationship between judicial trust in institutions and an individual’s likelihood to boycott is U-shaped. The findings are robust to the introduction of social capital and sociodemographic variables.     

Shifting theories: partial perspectives on the household

There is a neglect of networks within cooperative conflict models,which arises because of the patriarchal households assumed.But households are not the same everywhere, because their structureis dependent upon social context, and they are a sub-systemof wider social relations and realities. Understanding households(in this paper female-headed households) requires us to studythe varied contexts in which households are situated and thesocial relations of individuals within these institutions. Usingcontributions from feminist economics and realist social theory,this paper shows how these frameworks can explain the diversityof social reality in household formations and relations.     

Trust,cultural norms and financial institutions in rural communities: the case of Cameroon

The success of the operations of formal and informal financial institutions (IFIs) hinges on a high degree of trust. The pivotal role of trust warrants careful analysis regarding its formation in these financial institutions. Using the case of Cameroon, the paper interrogates trust development between formal financial institutions and their clients, and between IFIs and their members. Trust formation occurs via certain cognitive trust-building processes: calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference processes. The paper argues that trust formation through these processes is predicated upon cultural values and beliefs. It is precisely because of cultural norms that traditional leaders play a role in ensuring that loans granted by formal financial institutions are repaid, thereby serving as principal actors in the functioning of financial capitalism in rural areas. The interplay between culture and financial institutions reconfigures the financial architecture in rural zones. Culture creates a social relational anthropology that is significant for how financial institutions operate.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学关于生产理论的比较——一个方法论的视角

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学的生产理论研究方法上存在三个方面本质区别:西方经济学的生产理论是以"经济人"假设为出发点,把劳动者仅仅作为生产要素研究;而马克思主义经济学的生产理论是以"历史的、现实的人"为出发点,把劳动者既看作生产要素,又作为生产主体来研究.西方经济学的生产理论只研究生产一般,因而使用价值(即效用)范畴是其研究的核心;而马克思主义经济学则不仅研究生产一般,更注重研究生产的具体社会形式,因而把价值范畴作为研究的核心.西方经济学用个体主义方法,把生产理论仅仅置于微观领域来研究,致使其理论体系在微观与宏观上形成脱节;而马克思主义经济学则运用唯物辩证法,在宏观和微观的有机联系中研究资本主义的生产和再生产问题.     

Bolivia’s Institutional Transformation: Contact Zones,Social Movements,and the Emergence of an Ethnic Class Consciousness

Over the past two decades, development economics has experienced a shift in focus from standard neoclassical analysis to institutions. While studying economic institutions is indeed important, evaluating their transformation and embeddedness is equally crucial for understanding and improving human wellbeing, especially in countries where market institutions are not fully developed. With that perspective in mind, we consider the importance of culture in the evolution of institutions in Bolivia by combining the concept of contact zones with old institutional economics (OIE). Contact zones refer to daily interactions in social spaces where culture and class meet and negotiate with each other. The contact zone between Bolivians and post-WWII development policies surfaced as an Andean collective memory, allowing for a possibility of social and political autonomy through the creation of an alternative to development, El Buen Vivir.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia

Trust is an important ingredient to improve economic performance and people's welfare by alleviating market failures caused by imperfect information, costly enforcement, or coordination failures. Using the World Values Survey 2018, we estimate the impact of village and district levels inequality on trust in institutions in Indonesia. We find that higher village level inequality has a negative effect only on trust in strangers, while higher district level inequality reduces trust in television, the press, the central government, the courts, and the police. The implication points to the importance of keeping inequality at the aggregate level in check to maintain people's trust in social, political and state institutions.     

Social Control of Corporate Power: Comment

Economic activity takes place within an institutional framework. The economy, like society, represents a complex of institutions, ranging from the smallest, such as the family, to the largest and most comprehensive, the state (Chavance 2009). Institutional economics offers a broad perspective that brings forward the concept of gender, since gender is a fundamental organizing principle of institutions (Jacobsen 2003). A focus on social provisioning, typical for both feminist as well as institutional economists, leads to a broader understanding of economic activity. This broader approach includes activities like caring and care labor that cannot be entirely understood in terms of individual choices. In this paper, I explore the relationships between care and the economy from the perspective of neoclassical, institutional, and feminist economic theory. Economic theories are a basis for public policies that have a major impact on people’s lives. I argue that changing the dominating economic perspective into feminist-institutional one would improve the situation of care providers, who would, in turn, contribute to the development of society and the economy.     

Agricultural innovation in less developed countries

We identify and elaborate some critical factors and mechanisms that foster the emergence of cooperative behavioral patterns. Through institutionalization, which solves social dilemmas through habituation, these factors and mechanisms provide the foundation of contingent cooperation and contextual trust in specific interaction ‘arenas’ and ‘meso’-sized ‘platforms’ (and related carrier groups) in these. This, then, may in turn support the emergence of general trust in the whole population, i.e., across all specific arenas and platforms. The emergence of institutions of cooperation may gain traction more easily in smaller arenas. This, and the transfer, spillover, or generalization to other arenas and platforms, is by no means determined, and the analytical foundation we offer permits to account for the different levels of cooperation, general trust, and socioeconomic performance observable in real-world economies (varieties of capitalisms). Directions of future research, as well as a policy focus, are provided as well.     

Economists on Darwin's theory of social evolution and human behaviour

Abstract

This article analyses Darwin's image among economists with a specific focus on his theory of social evolution as presented in the Descent of Man (1871). We propose an analysis of the way and context in which economists refer to Darwin, mention his name and quote his writings. It then appears that Darwin is most of the time viewed as a biologist only, who never developed his own theory of social evolution. He is thus quoted as a biologist who either borrowed concepts from economists who developed a theory of social evolution, or laid the basis for biological theory of social evolution developed by others, Spencer, in particular. It is only recently that eventually the twofold dimensions—biological and social—of Darwin's general theory of evolution are considered together by bioeconomists.     

Political and Social Economics: Beyond Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy

Economists face at least two problems when they try to go interdisciplinary. One is how to adapt their theory where the original set of assumptions may fail to apply. This is a particular problem for economists who carry the “default” neoclassical model around in their heads. This paper outlines a map for keeping track of assumptions when doing interdisciplinary work. A second problem is how to take a theory designed for one discipline and turn it into something intelligible to practitioners of another. One needs a common language, and it is argued that general systems theory might help, even though it is not a complete language. The map proposed here provides a unified way to compare and contrast the approaches of different orthodox and heterodox traditions and better see what problems they are most suited to addressing.     

非正式社会结构下民间信用演进与生命周期

在非正式制度为主导的农村非正式社会结构中,基于特殊信任主义的民间信用,其博弈主体由于交易域和社会交换域的关联博弈和基于声誉的私人契约执行机制,使得民间信用契约具有自我执行的内在机制.随着农村非正式社会结构的制度转型,使得特殊信任主义向一般信任主义演变,并促使中国民间信用制度沿着其生命周期轨迹发生适应性变迁.     

Emerging Consensus on Labour Market Institutions and Implications for Developing Countries: From the Debates in India

Abstract

This paper makes a critical intervention to on-going theoretical and policy debates in the economic analysis of labour market institutions (LMIs) in the context of recent debates in India. It focuses on the internal inconsistency of mainstream economic analyses of LMIs, in particular those based on the new institutional economics (NIE) approach, and what appears to be an emerging policy consensus on LMIs within the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The paper draws out the possible ideological parallels in these two developments, despite different intellectual origins and intentions of those engaged in these debates. A corresponding modification in policy debates in India is observed in the shifting perspectives from the Second National Commission on Labour (SNCL) to the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS). The apparent emerging consensus in both the theoretical literature and policy debates reveals the tendency for researchers to focus on labour market outcomes and phenomenal forms of LMIs rather than the structures, processes, agencies and relations that underpin them. While this can be seen as an advancement from the traditional distortionist-institutionalist dichotomy, the tendency of this consensus to explain the persistence of seemingly inefficient institutions within the micro-level choice theoretic framework and its appeal to policy agendas on good governance, social capital, trust and civil society, render it vulnerable to appropriation by the mainstream. The paper argues that the emerging consensus on LMIs is an inadequate framework to inform effective policy propositions, and highlights the scope and opportunity for a political economy alternative.     

Political and Social Economics: Beyond Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy

Economists face at least two problems when they try to go interdisciplinary. One is how to adapt their theory where the original set of assumptions may fail to apply. This is a particular problem for economists who carry the “default” neoclassical model around in their heads. This paper outlines a map for keeping track of assumptions when doing interdisciplinary work. A second problem is how to take a theory designed for one discipline and turn it into something intelligible to practitioners of another. One needs a common language, and it is argued that general systems theory might help, even though it is not a complete language. The map proposed here provides a unified way to compare and contrast the approaches of different orthodox and heterodox traditions and better see what problems they are most suited to addressing.

What do Russians think about transition?1

We use data from the 2006 round of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to describe perceptions of the Russian population about the transition process and the role of the state compared with that of free markets. We find that about one‐half of the Russian population is disappointed with transition and a large majority is in favour of high state regulation and state provision of goods and services. High demand for government regulation and increased state intervention coexists with a low level of trust in government institutions and recognition of high and rising levels of corruption. The findings are consistent with the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009) . In an environment with poor social capital, private business imposes negative externalities on the society and society chooses to demand more state regulation and tolerate corruption to reduce these externalities. We also find that individual perceptions of social capital and corruption co‐vary with the demand for regulation, as predicted by the theory.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

员工政治技能对建言行为的影响——组织信任、一般自我效能感的作用

政治技能是员工在组织中生存与发展的必要条件,鲜有研究探讨员工政治技能与个体行为倾向的关系。以华东与华北地区26家企业203名员工为被试,综合计划行为理论、印象管理理论、社会交换理论,采用多元回归统计方法探讨员工政治技能对建言行为的作用机制。结果表明:员工政治技能对组织信任、一般自我效能、建言行为有显著正向影响;组织信任、一般自我效能感对建言行为有显著正向影响;组织信任在员工政治技能与建言行为关系中起到中介作用;尽管一般自我效能感与政治技能与建言行为都显著相关,但并未在政治技能与建言行为中表现出所期望的中介效应。     

联结强度与技术创新模式：企业间信任的中介作用

关于合作关系对合作创新的影响,现有研究大多局限于单一的社会网络视角,对网络层次的关系特征如何通过双边层次的关系质量影响技术创新模式的过程欠缺机理性认识。结合社会网络、社会资本和知识转移理论,分析网络联结强度、企业间信任以及技术创新模式三者间关系。利用327份来自全国多地的制造及高新技术企业数据,采用结构方程模型检验方法对研究假设进行检验。结果表明：相对于经济型信任,强联结会带来更多情感型信任;情感型信任更有利于渐进式创新,经济型信任更有利于突破式创新;联结强度对渐进式创新的作用是通过情感型信任传递的,而联结强度对突破式创新的作用是通过经济型信任传递的。