Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior

Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political overseer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than they would otherwise. The incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). The article urges that careful thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls seek to correct firm biases. The article proposes measures that focus rewards to regulators on outcomes rather than outputs as a way to help ameliorate regulatory biases.     

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS

Most studies of the impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement assume that once the agreement is in place, it will remain in place. Some common theories of trade and of special interest groups' influences upon government policy call these assumptions into question. If ratification of the agreement represents a loss for some import-competing special interest groups, the loss likely will be only of a battle in a war that continues. Attempts to abridge the effects of the agreement may succeed even if the agreement itself is not abridged. U.S. special interest groups rather than their Mexican counterparts will make the majority of these attempts.     

Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.     

Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation

This paper describes interactions between agents who sometimes choose as individuals and sometimes as members of teams. Choosing as a member of a team entails not only being motivated by the team's objective, but also a distinctive pattern of reasoning: an agent who “team reasons” computes, and chooses her component in, aprofile evaluated using the team's objective function. It is not assumed that a given agent team reasons for a particular team; there may be more than one team, and which she reasons for is here treated probabilistically. Ordinary reasoning is a special case in which the team is a singleton. The framework therefore encompasses interactions paradigmatic in the theory of co-operative behaviour in which agents may choose either for the group of for themselves. The hypothesis that people may team reason if and when they are group motivated can, it is shown, explain some puzzling aspects of co-operative behaviour in a new way.     

Do political connections decrease the accuracy of stock analysts' recommendations in the Chinese stock market?

This paper studies the association between the accuracy of analysts' recommendations and political connections in the Chinese stock market. As most brokerage firms in China are state-owned, it raises concerns about conflicts of interest among their employed analysts issuing recommendations for Chinese state-owned enterprises. Based on 8469 analysts' recommendations with different ratings for both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises from 74 brokerage firms, we document that analysts' recommendations are less accurate for Chinese state-owned enterprises, which supports the hypothesis that conflicts of interest create recommendation biases. Political connections encourage analysts to be more optimistic on SOEs and even to generate misleading “Buy” and “Hold” recommendations. Our results demonstrate the existence of an optimism bias among politically connected analysts on state-owned enterprises in China.     

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY WITH GEOGRAPHICAL AND INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISPERSION: EVIDENCE FROM RWANDA

It is not known to what extent welfare measures result from seasonal and geographical price differences rather than from differences in living standards across households. Using data from Rwanda in 1983, we show that the change in mean living standard indicators caused by local and seasonal price deflation is moderately significant at every quarter. By contrast, the differences in poverty measures caused by this deflation can be considerable, for chronic as well as transient or seasonal poverty indicators. Thus, poverty monitoring and anti-poverty targeting can be badly affected by inaccurate deflation of living standard data. Moreover, when measuring seasonal poverty, the deflation based on regional prices instead of local prices only partially corrects for spatial price dispersion. Using annual local prices instead of quarterly local prices only yields a partial deflation, which distorts the measure of poverty fluctuations across seasons and biases estimates of annual and chronic poverty.     

Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent

In a delegation problem, an uninformed principal delegates decision‐making powers to a biased and possibly ignorant agent. The principal cannot use monetary payments but can restrict the set of the agent's choices. I show that in the general case, the principal may offer a disconnected set of choices. In a setting with arbitrary bias the uncertainty principle holds—the principal benefits as the likelihood that the agent is informed increases. When the bias is constant, I show that the ally principle holds—the principal benefits as the bias becomes smaller. Finally, when the likelihood of the agent being informed is determined by the agent's effort, then for small biases the principal benefits from limiting the agent's choice. When the agent is sufficiently biased, the principal gives more choice to the agent, so as to to improve incentives for information acquisition.     

JUST A BIG MISUNDERSTANDING? BIAS AND BAYESIAN AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

I present a model of affective polarization—growth in hostility over time between two parties—via quasi-Bayesian inference. In the model, two agents repeatedly choose actions. Each choice is based on a balance of concerns for private interests and the social good. More weight is put on private interests when an agent's character is intrinsically more self-serving and when the other agent is believed to be more self-serving. Each agent Bayesian updates about the other's character, and dislikes the other more when she is perceived as more self-serving. I characterize the effects on growth in dislike of three biases: a prior bias against the other agent's character, the false consensus bias, and limited strategic thinking. Prior bias against the other's character remains constant or declines over time, and actions do not diverge. The other two biases cause actions to become more extreme over time and repeatedly be “worse” than expected, causing mutual growth in dislike, that is, affective polarization. The magnitude of dislike can become arbitrarily large—even when both players are arbitrarily “good” (unselfish). The results imply that seemingly irrelevant cognitive biases can be an important cause of the devolution of relationships, in politics and beyond, and that subtlety and unawareness of bias can be key factors driving the degree of polarization.     

Dynamics of inductive inference in a unified framework

We present a model of inductive inference that includes, as special cases, Bayesian reasoning, case-based reasoning, and rule-based reasoning. This unified framework allows us to examine how the various modes of inductive inference can be combined and how their relative weights change endogenously. For example, we establish conditions under which an agent who does not know the structure of the data generating process will decrease, over the course of her reasoning, the weight of credence put on Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian reasoning. We illustrate circumstances under which probabilistic models are used until an unexpected outcome occurs, whereupon the agent resorts to more basic reasoning techniques, such as case-based and rule-based reasoning, until enough data are gathered to formulate a new probabilistic model.     

THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT*

It is widely believed that the free-rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that benefit the public at large may defeat a candidate who depends on the support of special interests. Moreover, even if the latter candidate can win, he must use a publicity strategy which allows any voter to hear of proposals that benefit groups other than the voter's.     

股权结构与股权代理成本关系的实证研究——基于2011年创业板上市公司的数据研究

公司治理的基础是股权结构,核心问题就是如何降低代理成本,但是由于特殊的历史原因,我国股权分置制度存在的弊端严重影响着公司治理。根据代理理论,股权代理成本可以划分为管理层与股东之间利益冲突引起的第一类代理成本和控股股东与中小股东之间利益冲突引起的第二类代理成本。所以本文就基于股权分置改革后的视角,以2011年创业板上市公司为样本,采用理论与实证相结合的分析方法来分析股权结构与股权代理成本之间的关系,得出股权集中度可以降低第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本;股权制衡度在一定程度上可以降低第二类代理成本,但会提高第一类代理成本;负债也会有助于降低第一类代理成本;而管理层和机构投资者持股并未起到降低代理成本的作用。     

An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behaviour when formulating plans. Gul and Pesendorfer's theory of temptation and self-control is a key building block. The main result is a representation theorem that generalizes (the dynamic version of) Anscombe–Aumann's theorem so that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are subjective. The model can accommodate updating biases analogous to those observed by psychologists.     

ALTRUISM AND BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS*

The central theoretical achievement of classical and neoclassical economics is the demonstration, summed up by Adam Smiths metaphor of the invisible hand, that the interaction of selfish economic agents may produce a mutually beneficial, and Pareto-optimal outcome. The assumption that economic agents are selfish has been criticised both as empirically inaccurate (Margolis, 1982; Quiggin, 1987) and as likely to generate anti-social attitudes in those who hold it (Marwell and Ames, 1981). There has, therefore, been considerable interest in economic behaviour and policy analysis when agents are altruistic.     

Unilateral CVA for CDS in a contagion model with stochastic pre-intensity and interest

Price of a financial derivative with unilateral counterparty credit risk equals to the price of an otherwise risk-free derivative minus a credit value adjustment (CVA) component, which can be seen as a call option on investor's NPV with strike 0. Thus modeling volatility of NPV is the foundation for CVA valuation. This paper assumes that default times of counterparty and reference firm follow a special contagion model with stochastic pre-intensities that allows for explicit formulas for default probabilities. Stochastic interest rate is also incorporated to account for positive correlation between pre-intensity and interest. Survival measure approach is employed to calculate NPV of a risk-free CDS, and semi-analytical solution for CVA is obtained through affine specifications. Numerical analysis shows that contagion has more significant impact on CVA than diffusion of pre-intensities, and the positive correlation between interest and reference firm's pre-intensity has monotonic decreasing impact on CVA.     

A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who made different choices, in which case he can compare their choices and choose accordingly. A novel feature of the model is that agents observe not only the choices made by others, but also some information about the process that led them to those choices. We study two cases: In the first, an agent notes whether the observed agent imitated others or whether he actually compared the available alternatives. In the second, an agent notes whether the observed agent’s decision was hasty or not. It is shown that in equilibrium the probability of making a mistake is higher in the second case and that the existence of these nonstandard “neuro” observations systematically biases the equilibrium distribution of choices.     

SOFT MONEY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

We analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft‐money loopholes. The politician chooses between two policy options. We define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions. Any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic. A ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap. The results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v. FEC.     

Aggregation of expert opinions

Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We investigate how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken. We show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents' signals are sufficiently accurate or when the number of informed agents becomes large. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents.     

Development Policy Lending, Conditionality, and Ownership: A Dynamic Agency Model Perspective

Is the World Bank's Development Policy Lending likely to enhance ownership and have greater effectiveness than structural adjustment? We specify a dynamic common agency model in which a government considering economic reform faces domestic opposition from interest groups. The dynamic specification, which is original in the context of policy reforms supported by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), is essential to allow the strength of special interest groups to arise endogenously during the reform process. We show that conditionality may alter the country's political equilibrium and lead to higher social welfare. However, under certain circumstances which depend on country‐specific circumstances, conditional assistance could lead to lower social welfare. Thus, for conditionality not to be inconsistent with ownership, its design must be appropriate to the country circumstances and directly affect the domestic political constraint.     

THE LIQUIDITY TRAP,THE REAL BALANCE EFFECT,AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE*

This article studies the behavior of the economy and the efficacy of monetary policy under zero nominal interest rates using a model with population growth that nests, as a special case, the conventional specification in which there is a single infinitely lived representative agent. The article shows that with a growing population, monetary policy has distributional consequences that give rise to a real balance effect, thereby eliminating the liquidity trap. These same distributional effects, however, can also work to make many agents much worse off under zero nominal interest rates than they are when the nominal interest rate is positive.