Banking Sector Performance in Latin America: Market Power versus Efficiency

Since the mid‐1990s the banking sector in the Latin American emerging markets has experienced profound changes due to financial liberalization, a significant increase in foreign investments, and greater merger activities often occurring following financial crises. The wave of consolidation and the rapid increase in market concentration that took place in most countries has generated concerns about the rise in banks' market power and its potential effects on consumers. This paper advances the existing literature by testing the market power (Structure–Conduct–Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X‐ and scale efficiency) hypotheses for a sample of over 2500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over 1997–2005. We use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique to obtain reliable efficiency measures. We produce evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. The findings are particularly robust for the largest banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Finally, capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining higher than normal profits for Latin American banks.     

Renegotiation in agency contracts, menus vs. simple contracts

The literature on contracts has shown that renegotiation in agency relationships generates efficiency losses when the principal leads the renegotiation. We show that contractual incompleteness may reduce such efficiency loss. This provides an explanation to the widespread use of simple contracts. We further point at the limited liability of the agent as a source of inefficiency when he leads the renegotiation; this latter result tempers the irrelevancy of contractual incompleteness demonstrated earlier in the literature. I thank E. Del Rey and the referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the EU RTN grant HPRN-CT-2000-00064 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game

Behavior in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthiness, important components of social capital. In the equilibrium of a trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would keep all of the returns. We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of changes to the game designed to increase cooperation and efficiency. We add a pre-play stage in which the investor receives a cheap-talk message from the allocator, observes the allocator's previous decision, or both. None of these changes alter the game's theoretical predictions. We find that allowing observation results in substantially higher cooperation and efficiency, but cheap talk has little effect.     

The transient and persistent efficiency of Italian and German universities: a stochastic frontier analysis

Despite measures on the European level to increase the compatibility between the higher education sectors, the recent literature exposes variations in their efficiencies. To gain insights into these differences, we split the efficiency term according to the two management levels each university is confronted with. We separate short-term and long-term efficiency while controlling for unobserved institution-specific heterogeneity. We argue that the first term reflects the efficiency of the individual universities working within the country, while the second term echoes the influence of the overall country-specific higher education structure. The cross-country comparison displays whether efficiency differences between countries are related to the individual performance of their universities or their higher education structure. This allows more purposeful policy recommendations and expands the literature regarding the efficiency of universities in a fundamental way. Choosing Italy and Germany as two important illustrative examples, we show that the Italian higher education sector exhibits a higher overall efficiency value. With the individual universities working at the upper bound of efficiency in both countries, the remaining inefficiency and the gap between the countries are caused by persistent, structural inefficiency. Future measures should hence aim at the country-specific structure and not solely at the activities of single universities.     

Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator

This paper develops the method of matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. A rigorous distribution theory for kernel-based matching is presented. The method of matching is extended to more general conditions than the ones assumed in the statistical literature on the topic. We focus on the method of propensity score matching and show that it is not necessarily better, in the sense of reducing the variance of the resulting estimator, to use the propensity score method even if propensity score is known. We extend the statistical literature on the propensity score by considering the case when it is estimated both parametrically and nonparametrically. We examine the benefits of separability and exclusion restrictions in improving the efficiency of the estimator. Our methods also apply to the econometric selection bias estimator.     

技术进步对中国就业影响的实证研究

选取1978—2008年中国30个省市的面板数据,运用DEA方法测算中国的全要素生产率及其分解项:技术变化与技术效率,并使用ARDL模型实证分析技术效率和技术变化对就业的影响。研究发现:技术效率无论是长期还是短期都对就业具有显著的抑制效应,但在短期中,技术变化当期对就业没有显著影响;而滞后期技术变化的改善也会对就业人数的增加产生抑制效应,同时,在长期中,技术变化对就业有着显著的促进效应,可以带动就业量的增加。     

Combining value averaging and Bollinger Band for an ETF trading strategy

The decision-making of investors is highly influenced by their feelings. According to behavioural finance, investor greed and fear would form irrational behaviour and affect their portfolio allocation. Although well-known mechanical investment strategy of dollar cost averaging (DCA) and value averaging (VA) could eliminate the problems of when to purchase, there are still some disadvantages to consider. For example, using a DCA strategy may be able to decrease volatility in portfolio so as to not effect investment decision, but it gives no rule for selling and may increase the opportunity cost of time if investors start deducted at peak prices. On the other hand, VA gives more aggressive sell signals to control the value of the portfolio to the level desired, but the investor may not have enough money purchase of a large number of shares in sharp decline period. Therefore, we use VA as main strategy and Bollinger Band as assist indicator for check for volatility for entry or exit. Through analysis and simulation, the new strategy we design does improve the performance during both bull and bear market periods.     

Fuel poverty in residential housing: providing financial support versus combatting substandard housing

Between 50 and 125 million Europeans are unable to afford the energy needed for adequate heating, cooking, light and use of appliances in the home. Tackling fuel poverty has thus become a public policy challenge. In this article, we assess the effectiveness of social energy subsidies and social housing to reduce fuel poverty. The literature reports that rising fuel prices, low incomes and energy-inefficient housing are the main causes of fuel poverty. Existing public policies focus mainly on price- and income-based measures to reduce fuel poverty, such as social energy subsidies. This type of policy is palliative as it does not permit to sustainably eradicate fuel poverty. Other policies aim to encourage renovation in order to improve energy efficiency. Those policies are curative as they sustainably reduce one cause of fuel poverty: energy inefficiency. In this article, we focus on another public policy to tackle fuel poverty: social housing. We believe that this policy could be preventive, as the literature reports the better energy efficiency of social housing. We use matching methods and find that living in social housing decreases fuel poverty by 5.4% to 9.1%. On the contrary, social energy subsidies have no effect on fuel poverty.     

Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals*

Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities—committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the “make or buy” literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization.     

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms have the incentive to sign a voluntary agreement (VA) to control polluting emissions even in the presence of free-riding by other firms in the industry. We consider a policy framework in which firms in a given industry decide whether or not to sign a VA proposed by an environmental regulator. We identify the features that a VA should possess in order to provide firms with an incentive to participate in the VA and to enhance its economic and environmental effectiveness. Under very general conditions on the shape of the demand schedule, we obtain the following results. First, a VA does not belong to the equilibrium of the coalition game when benefits from voluntary emission abatement are a pure public good, unless an industry emission target is set by the regulator. Second, in the presence of partial spillovers—i.e. when signatories obtain more benefits from the VA than non-signatories—a VA can belong to the equilibrium only if a minimum participation rule is guaranteed. Third, a VA with a minimum participation rule and a minimum mandatory emission abatement may improve welfare (and even industry profits) compared to a VA in which firms are free to set their own profit maximizing abatement level.     

Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?

This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.     

How efficient is maize production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe? A comparison of semiparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses

The controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe that redistributes commercially-owned farmland to smallholder households has caused concerns about the efficiency of agricultural production in the country. In this paper, we estimate the efficiency of resource use among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe when producing maize, the staple crop in the country. Using both a semiparametric model and a fully parametric stochastic frontier model, we find significant production shortfalls for smallholder maize production. While labor, capital, and land all significantly affect the total output, the estimated mean efficiency score for farms with less than 10 hectares of land (A1) appears to be under 0.75, and for the entire sample (A1 and A2) it ranges between 0.595 and 0.772. There clearly exists a great potential for maize farmers to improve the technical efficiency and increase the total output. Gender and age of the household head, access to extension services, and activities of other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. We also find that all farms operate under increasing returns to scale and that the technical efficiency score tends to increase with the level of output.     

同业业务发展能提升中国商业银行的效率吗*

本文采用Tobit面板模型，选取了2005—2013年中国16家上市商业银行为样本，研究同业业务发展对银行效率的影响。笔者通过随机前沿法（SFA）估计出银行的成本效率和盈利效率。从全样本的回归结果来看，银行发展同业业务对成本效率和盈利效率都有提升，但在不同时期和对不同类型的银行，影响效果存在差异。2005—2009年，无论是同业资产或同业负债业务对银行成本效率、盈利效率的提升作用都有限。2010年之后，同业负债对银行效率的提高有显著正向作用。不同规模的银行同业业务发展对效率的影响也不同。大型银行在2009年前后同业业务的发展对效率提升起到了较大的贡献作用。中小型商业银行在2005—2009年，无论是同业资产或同业负债业务都对银行成本效率、盈利效率提升作用有限。而在2010年之后，同业负债业务显著提高了银行的效率。     

Half a Century of Public Software Institutions: Open Source as a Solution to Hold‐Up Problem

We argue that the intrinsic inefficiency of proprietary software has historically created a space for alternative institutions that provide software as a public good. We discuss several sources of such inefficiency, focusing on one that has not been described in the literature: the underinvestment due to fear of hold‐up. An inefficient hold‐up occurs when a user of software must make complementary investments, when the return on such investments depends on future cooperation of the software vendor, and when contracting about a future relationship with the software vendor is not feasible. We also consider how the nature of the production function of software makes software cheaper to develop when the code is open to the end users. Our framework explains why open source dominates certain sectors of the software industry (e.g., programming languages), while being almost non existent in some other sectors (e.g., computer games). We then use our discussion of efficiency to examine the history of institutions for provision of public software from the early collaborative projects of the 1950s to the modern “open source” software institutions. We look at how such institutions have created a sustainable coalition for provision of software as a public good by organizing diverse individual incentives, both altruistic and profit‐seeking, providing open source products of tremendous commercial importance, which have come to dominate certain segments of the software industry.     

The sensitivity to key data imputations of recent estimates of income poverty and inequality in South Africa

Existing literature using South African censuses reports an increase in both poverty and inequality over the 1996 to 2001 period. This paper assesses the robustness of these results to a number of weaknesses in the personal income variable. We use a sequential regression multiple imputation approach to impute missing values and to explicitly assess the influence of implausible income values and different rules used to convert income that is measured in bands into point incomes. Overall our results for 1996 and 2001 confirm the major findings from the existing literature while generating more reliable confidence intervals for the key parameters of interest than are available elsewhere.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model of driving,gasoline use and vehicle fuel efficiency

The paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the endogenous determination of gasoline use, driving and vehicle fuel efficiency. Before vehicles are produced, their fuel efficiency can be chosen optimally. Once produced, their fuel efficiency cannot be changed. The model generates endogenously different short-run and long-run price elasticities of gasoline use, with their magnitudes well within the region of plausible estimates in the empirical literature. The paper shows that although raising gasoline taxes and tightening the CAFE standard both reduce gasoline use in the long run, they are different in terms of the transmission mechanism, magnitudes of responses and dynamic paths of key endogenous variables.     

Multinational firms,acquisitions and job tasks

We revisit the question how inward FDI and multinational ownership affect relative labor demand. Motivated by the recent literature that distinguish between skills and tasks, we argue that the impact of multinational and foreign ownership on the demand for labor is better captured by focusing on job tasks rather than education. We use Swedish matched employer–employee data and find that changes of local firms to both foreign and Swedish multinationals increase the relative demand for non-routine and interactive job tasks in the targeted local firms. Hence, in a high-income country, both inward and outward FDI have a task upgrading impact on local firms. The effect is primarily driven by wage effects leading to increased wage dispersion for workers with different non-routine and interactive task intensity. We also show that the effect is not the same as skill upgrading since dividing employees by educational attainment does not capture changes in the relative labor demand. Hence, our results suggest a new aspect of the labor market consequences of FDI.     

The impact of energy conservation on technology and economic growth

We present a model of growth driven by energy use and endogenous factor-augmenting technological change. Both the rate and direction of technological progress are endogenous. The model captures four main stylised facts: total energy use has increased; energy use per hour worked increased slightly; energy efficiency has improved; and the value share of energy in GDP has steadily fallen. We study how energy conservation policies affect growth over time and in the long run. Policies that reduce the level of energy use are distinguished from those that reduce the growth rate of energy inputs. Although these policies may stimulate innovation, they unambiguously depress output levels. The former policy has no impact on long-run growth; the latter reduces long-run growth both in the short run and in the long run.     

Do outsourcing services provided by agricultural cooperatives affect technical efficiency? Insights from tobacco farmers in China

In this study, we assess whether household outsourcing production tasks provided by tobacco cooperatives affect household technical efficiency, using the survey data from 449 households in Guizhou Province, China in 2014. The one-step estimation of the stochastic frontier production function is employed. We also use the instrumental variable approach to address the potential selection biases that may arise from unobserved factors that are correlated with both outsourcing service adoption and technical efficiency. The empirical results show that the farmers’ decision to outsource agricultural services provided by cooperatives has a positive effect on technical efficiency. The effects of outsourcing on technical efficiency are highly heterogeneous at different production stages. It is also interesting to note that the magnitudes of outsourcing effects on technical efficiency are similar between labor-intensive services and technology-intensive services.