Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

Bhattacharyya (2007 ) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high‐quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low‐quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone.     

Predicting dividends in log-linear present value models

In a present value model, high dividend yields imply that either future dividend growth must be low, or future discount rates must be high, or both. While previous studies have largely focused on the predictability of future returns from dividend yields, dividend yields also strongly predict future dividends, and the predictability of dividend growth is much stronger than the predictability of returns at a one-year horizon. Inference from annual regressions over the 1927–2000 sample imputes over 85% of the variation of log dividend yields to variations in dividend growth. Point estimates of the predictability of both dividend growth and discount rates are stronger when the 1990–2000 decade is omitted.     

Dividend signaling under economic adversity: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange

The signaling or information content hypothesis is amongst the most prominent theories attempting to explain dividend policy decisions. However, no research has, to date, examined the information content of dividends in conjunction with generalized economic adversity. With the majority of the western economies facing the tough reality of the economic recession since late 2007–early 2008, we focus on the possibility of asymmetrical dividend signaling effects between periods of stability and economic adversity. Using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), where earnings and dividend news are released simultaneously, we test the dividend signaling hypothesis and the interaction of earnings and dividends under both steady and adverse economic conditions. We document positive and significant average abnormal stock price returns around the dividend/earnings announcements. We also find a significant interaction between economic conditions and the information content of dividends. After testing the dividend signaling hypothesis under both stable and recessionary economic conditions we find that dividends have less information content than earnings in periods of growth and stability, but more in periods of economic adversity.     

Stock reaction to dividend savings of convertible preferred calls: Free cash flow or price pressure effects?

Calls of in-the-money convertible preferred stock typically induce dividend savings for the firm, since preferred dividends exceed common stock dividends. Prior research finds that these savings are negatively related to stock returns at call announcement and argues that the market expects managers to abuse the increased free cash flow. This paper finds that dividend savings are closely related to call size, suggesting other explanations. Larger calls experience a more negative announcement reaction. Consistent with temporary liquidity effects, there is a price reversal during the conversion period, which is greater for larger calls.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

CEO and CFO equity compensation and dividend payout over the firm lifecycle

We examine the separate and joint effects of CEO and CFO equity compensation on the dividend payout decision, taking into account changes in the relationship over the firm's lifecycle. Compensation contracts and dividend payout both are used to reduce agency costs, which change over a firm's lifecycle. Studies report a negative association between CEO equity compensation and dividend payout, suggesting a substitutionary relationship. Our results show that when the two are considered jointly, CFO equity compensation dominates CEO compensation, indicating the need for sophisticated financial expertise in the dividend decision. The relationship appears only in mature firms, signifying that agency problems are of most concern during the mature stage of the firm lifecycle.     

The investment opportunity set,director ownership,and corporate policies: evidence from an emerging market

This paper provides evidence of the association between a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), director ownership, and corporate policy choices. Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in an emerging Asian market, we find that the IOS theory has significant explanatory power in the financing, dividend, executive compensation, and leasing aspects of corporate policies. Growth firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios and dividend yields, pay higher cash compensation and bonus amounts to their top executives, and finance a higher proportion of their asset acquisitions through operating leases. We also find that director ownership moderates and counteracts the association between IOS and corporate policies. Our results are consistent with contracting theory predictions that high director ownership mitigates the need for incentive or bonus compensation plans in growth firms.     

The Effect of Behaviour Monitoring and Uncertainty on the Use of Performance-Contingent Compensation

The objective of this study is to examine the effects of control system characteristics and perceived environmental uncertainty on the relative use of performance-contingent compensation. The results, based on a survey of division managers, indicate that monitoring ability is negatively associated with the use of performance- contingent compensation. In addition, monitoring is found to moderate the relationship between uncertainty and compensation system design. Whereas in non-monitoring firms, higher levels of uncertainty are associated with increased use of performance-contingent compensation, in monitoring firms, higher levels of uncertainty are associated with decreased use of performance-contingent compensation. These results support agency theory arguments that compensation structure is determined at least in part by concerns for economic efficiency.     

The Association Between Dividends and Accruals Quality

This paper responds to a specific gap identified in the prior literature by examining whether dividend paying status and dividend size are associated with accruals quality, using three accruals‐based earnings quality proxies on a large sample of 2387 firm‐year observations over 17 years in a developing economy, South Africa. Univariate tests are also conducted to identify differences in characteristics between dividend and non‐dividend paying firms, and large and small dividend paying firms. The paper finds that dividend paying status is positively associated with accruals quality. This association remains robust over sub‐groups of firms that differ in size, growth, profitability, age, maturity, leverage, capital intensity and propensity to raise new capital. The prior literature is extended by using quintiles of dividend size to further investigate the association between dividend size and accruals quality. The findings include that larger dividend paying firms are associated with better accruals quality, and that this relationship is stronger among firms that pay average‐sized dividends. Additionally, there are significant differences in characteristics between dividend and non‐dividend paying firms and between large and small dividend paying firms. Based on these results, policymakers, regulators, legislators and boards may want to explore the use of dividend policy as a corporate governance mechanism.     

Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.     

The Impact of Dividend Covenants on Investment and Operating Performance

This paper examines the influence of dividend covenants in corporate bonds on investment and operating performance. Prior literature analytically demonstrates that by limiting dividend distribution to shareholders, dividend restrictions effectively place a minimum on investment expenditures. This suggests a positive relation between dividend covenants and investment. The literature also conjectures that the influence of dividend covenants on investment (1) mitigates the under‐investment problem associated with debt financing; or (2) exacerbates over‐investment. We empirically document that the presence of dividend covenants is associated with a higher level of investment and poorer future performance. Further analyses confirm that the higher level of investment is consistent with dividend covenants exacerbating over‐investment, not mitigating under‐investment. Our results shed light on the cost aspect of dividend covenants proposed in prior literature.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

Using a sample of 22,839 US firm-year observations over the 1991–2012 period, we find that high CSR firms pay more dividends than low CSR firms. The analysis of individual components of CSR provides strong support for this main finding: five of the six individual dimensions are also associated with high dividend payout. When analyzing the stability of dividend payout, our results show that socially irresponsible firms adjust dividends more rapidly than socially responsible firms do: dividend payout is more stable in high CSR firms. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions and model specifications, alternative measures of dividend, additional control, and several approaches to address endogeneity. Overall, our results are consistent with the expectation that high CSR firms may use dividend policy to manage the agency problems related to overinvestment in CSR.     

Comovements of earnings, dividends, and stock prices

We investigate the comovements of the log of earnings, dividends, and stock prices by testing for the number of common stochastic trends among these series. We find that the three series are cointegrated with a single cointegrating vector. Our findings collectively imply that (i) there is an equilibrium force that tends to keep these series together over time, (ii) changes in dividends are primarily influenced by changes in some measure of permanent earnings, and (iii) a substantial fraction of stock price movement is driven by neither earnings changes nor dividend changes. When we take into account the cointegration relationship, we find that the dynamic relationship between these variables is significantly affected. We present a common stochastic trends model of earnings, dividends, and stock prices, whose implications are broadly consistent with these findings.     

EVIDENCE ON HOW COMPANIES CHOOSE BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND OPEN-MARKET STOCK REPURCHASES

Dividends and open-market stock repurchases are by far the two most common mechanisms for distributing excess cash to shareholders. This article identifies and then tests three potentially important factors for the corporate choice between increasing cash dividends and initiating openmarket stock repurchases. More specifically, the authors argue that companies are more likely to distribute cash to investors through open-market repurchases than through dividend increases when (1) management believes its stock is undervalued, (2) management compensation packages include stock options, and (3) the company's stockholder base is dominated by institutional investors.
To test these three explanations, the authors use a matched-pair design in which each company announcing an open market repurchase program in a given year is matched with a comparable-size firm from the same industry that increased its cash dividends but did not initiate an open-market repurchase program. As predicted, the results suggest that equity undervaluation, management compensation, and the level of institutional holdings are all important contributors to corporate choices between dividend increases and open-market repurchases.     

The abnormal return associated with consecutive dividend increases

Several studies conclude that dividend changes that are seemingly predictable on a calendar basis attract abnormal returns. We study the abnormal returns associated with consecutive dividend increases to understand this puzzle. We use regression techniques to study the relation between the number of consecutive dividend increases and the abnormal return associated with the events. Further, we study whether this relation is sensitive to firm characteristics by partitioning the regressions by the characteristics that influence the abnormal return. Our results show that the abnormal returns associated with consecutive dividend increases decline at a diminishing rate and they do not disappear, consistent with the puzzle. In addition, the decline in returns is slowest among firms that are unprofitable, small, or have high payouts. These findings suggest that the abnormal returns persist because firms that are not expected to continue a dividend-increase streak based on their characteristics do so, surprising the market and perpetuating the abnormal return.     

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers’ payout choices with shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders’ preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income, can depend on the income tax consequences of dividends relative to those of long-term capital gains. To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the exogenous changes in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences following the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction result in predictable shifts in executive stock-based compensation and in managers’ payout choices. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive relation between the increased use of dividends in firms’ payouts and the increased (decreased) use of restricted stock (stock options) in executive compensation, particularly for firms with a greater percentage ownership by individual investors and with lower costs associated with modifying the structure of their compensation plans. Our investigation of the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.     

Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend Decisions in REITs?

Conflict of interest between shareholders (principal) and managers (agent) is a potential weakness of the modern corporate form. Various monitoring mechanisms—pay for performance compensation schemes, mix of cash compensation and long term compensation, the independence of the board of directors, the market for takeovers, and capital structure—have been developed to discipline management and motivate them to maximize shareholder wealth. We test the hypothesis that dividend payout levels reflect the quality of and motivation for managerial decision making and are a function of performance and monitoring effectiveness. Consistent with this hypothesis, our analyses indicate that dividend payout, and dividend yield are functions of corporate performance, board structure, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership of company shares.     

Macroeconomic risk and the cross-section of stock returns

We develop a conditional version of the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) using the conditioning variable from the cointegrating relation among macroeconomic variables (dividend yield, term spread, default spread, and short-term interest rate). Our conditioning variable has a strong power to predict market excess returns in the presence of competing predictive variables. In addition, our conditional CCAPM performs approximately as well as Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model in explaining the cross-section of the Fama and French 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. Our specification shows that value stocks are riskier than growth stocks in bad times, supporting the risk-based story.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.