INFORMATION OPACITY AND FITCH BOND RATINGS

We examine the marginal impact of Fitch ratings on the at‐issuance yields of industrial and utility bonds rated by Moody's and Standard & Poor's. We find that Fitch ratings reduce the yield premiums on information‐opaque bonds by about 30%, or 15 basis points. The finding is robust even when a Fitch rating exactly equals the two major ratings or their average. The findings suggest that Fitch ratings are not redundant but bring additional information to investors. Increased competition in the rating industry enhances the information efficiency of the bond market, and the existence of smaller rating agencies is economically justified.     

Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

The information content of three credit ratings: the case of European residential mortgage-backed securities

We assess the information content of three credit ratings for tranches of newly issued European residential mortgage-backed securities. We find that tranches rated by three credit rating agencies where the rating by Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Ratings Service or Fitch is inferior to Moody's lead to higher funding costs and reflects what we refer to as rating risk. Our results suggest that market participants do not view credit ratings by Fitch and S&P's as redundant despite the fact that both employ the same rating approach.     

THE EFFECT OF BOND RATING AGENCIES ON BOND RATING MODELS

This paper addresses the problem of bond rating discrepancies and their effect on bond rating prediction models. Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's now use modified ratings. Results of this study indicate that the two agencies disagree 58 percent of the time and that Moody's rates bonds significantly lower than S & P. In addition, the classification rates of the multiple discriminant analysis models decrease approximately 24 percentage points when the modified ratings are used.     

Split Ratings and Differences in Corporate Credit Rating Policy between Moody's and Standard & Poor's

This paper investigates split credit ratings awarded by Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P) to U.S. corporations. Bivariate probit model estimates, analyzing 5,238 firm‐year observations from dual‐rated S&P 500/400/600 index‐constituent corporations, indicate firm‐specific financial and governance characteristics predict split ratings. Large, profitable companies with enhanced interest coverage, a greater percentage of independent directors, and more institutional investment are less likely to receive splits. Moody's appears more conservative in its evaluations, assigning lower ratings to smaller, less profitable companies with low interest coverage. Moody's also associates external, independent constraints on managerial autonomy with a higher corporate credit standing relative to S&P.     

THE IMPACT OF SPLIT BOND RATINGS ON RISK PREMIA

Interest rates for bonds are negatively correlated with credit ratings assigned by agencies such as Moody's Investor Service and Standard & Poor's. Still in dispute is whether or not the ratings themselves convey information that is reflected in prices, hence interest rates in the bond markets. Disagreement between these two agencies' ratings leads to “split” ratings, and in this paper, the authors use the phenomenon of split ratings to assess whether or not ratings have a separate impact on bond prices. The results indicate that a downside split appears to have greater bond yield impact than an upside split. The findings are inconsistent with bond market efficiency, at least in the strong form. The market considers the quality of a split-rated bond to reflect the lower of the two ratings. Finally, the symmetry of the results with respect to the ratings agencies indicates that neither agency has more influence than the other in determining bond yields.     

The ordered qualitative model for credit rating transitions

Information on the expected changes in credit quality of obligors is contained in credit migration matrices which trace out the movements of firms across ratings categories in a given period of time and in a given group of bond issuers. The rating matrices provided by Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch became crucial inputs to many applications, including the assessment of risk on corporate credit portfolios (CreditVar) and credit derivatives pricing. We propose a factor probit model for modeling and prediction of credit rating matrices that are assumed to be stochastic and driven by a latent factor. The filtered latent factor path reveals the effect of the economic cycle on corporate credit ratings, and provides evidence in support of the PIT (point-in-time) rating philosophy. The factor probit model also yields the estimates of cross-sectional correlations in rating transitions that are documented empirically but not fully accounted for in the literature and in the regulatory rules established by the Basle Committee.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Competition in the credit rating Industry: Benefits for investors and issuers

We empirically investigate the benefits of multiple ratings not only at issuance of debt instruments but also during the subsequent monitoring phase. Using a record of monthly credit rating migration data on all U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch between 1985 and 2012 (154,600 tranches), our results provide empirical evidence that rating agencies put more effort in rating and outlook revisions when tranches have assigned multiple ratings. Furthermore, we see that in the case of multiple ratings, agencies do a better job in discriminating tranches with respect to default risk. On the downside, we observe a shift in collateral towards senior tranches and incentives for issuers to engage in rating shopping activities, but find no evidence that rating agencies exploit such behavior to attract more rating business. Our results contribute to the literature on information production of credit ratings and extend the perspective to the monitoring period after issuance.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices

This paper examines daily excess bond returns associated with announcements of additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, and to rating changes by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Reliably nonzero average excess bond returns are observed for additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List when an expectations model is used to classify additions as either expected or unexpected. Bond price effects are also observed for actual downgrade and upgrade announcements by rating agencies. Excluding announcements with concurrent disclosures weakens the results for downgrades, but not upgrades. The stock price effects of rating agency announcements are also examined and contrasted with the bond price effects.     

Intensified Competition and The Impact on Credit Ratings in the RMBS market

In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of intensified competition on rating quality in the credit rating market for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the period 2017–2020. We provide evidence that competition between large credit rating agencies (CRAs) (Moody's and Standard & Poor's) and newer smaller ones (Dominion Bond Rating Service Morningstar and Kroll Bond Rating Agency) creates credit rating inconsistencies in the RMBS market. While a credit rating should solely represent the underlying credit risk of a RMBS, irrespective of the competition in the market, our results show that this is not the case. When competitive pressure is higher, both large and small CRAs tend to adjust their rating standards (smaller CRAs react to large CRAs and vice versa).     

The Effect of Business and Financial Market Cycles on Credit Ratings: Evidence from the Last Two Decades

We analyze the effect of business and financial market cycles on credit ratings using a sample of firms from the Russell 3000 index that are rated by Standard and Poor's over the period 1986–2012. We also examine investor reaction to credit rating actions in different stages of business and financial market cycles. We document that credit rating agencies are influenced by business and financial market cycles; they assign lower credit ratings during downturns of business and financial market cycles and higher ratings during upturns. Our study is the first to find strong evidence of pro‐cyclicality in credit ratings using a long window. We also document stronger investor reaction to negative credit rating actions during downturns. Our results confirm theoretical predictions and inform regulators.     

Moody's and S&P Ratings: Are They Equivalent? Conservative Ratings and Split Rated Bond Yields

We examine the relative impact of Moody's and S&P ratings on bond yields and find that at issuance, yields on split rated bonds with superior Moody's ratings are about 8 basis points lower than yields on split rated bonds with superior S&P ratings. This suggests that investors differentiate between the two ratings and assign more weight to the ratings from Moody’s, the more conservative rating agency. Moody's becomes more conservative after 1998 and the impact of a superior Moody's rating becomes stronger. Furthermore, the differential impact of the two ratings is more pronounced for the more opaque Rule 144A issues.     

Market-implied ratings and their divergence from credit ratings

In this article, we investigate the divergence between credit ratings (CRs) and Moody's market-implied ratings (MIRs). Our evidence shows that rating gaps provide incremental information to the market regarding issuers' default risk over CRs alone in the short horizon and outperform CRs over extended horizons. The predictive ability of rating gaps is greater for more opaque and volatile issuers. Such predictability was more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis but weakened in the post–Dodd–Frank Act period. This finding is consistent with credit rating agencies’ efforts to improve their performance when facing regulatory pressure. Moreover, our analysis identifies rating-gap signals that do (do not) lead to subsequent Moody's actions to place issuers on negative outlook and watchlists. We find that negative signals from MIR gaps have a real economic impact on issuers’ fundamentals such as profitability, leverage, investment, and default risk, thus supporting the recovery-efforts hypothesis.     

Effect of credit rating changes on Australian stock returns

We study the impact credit rating revisions have on stock returns of Australian firms rated by Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Our evidence is consistent with that documented in the USA showing that only downgrades contain price‐relevant information. The reaction is most significant when the downgrade: (i) is unanticipated; (ii) is for an unregulated firm; and (iii) reduces the firm's rating by more than one category.     

Sovereign rating actions and the implied volatility of stock index options

This paper examines the interaction between the equity index option market and sovereign credit ratings. S&P and Moody's signals exhibit strong impact on option-implied volatility while Fitch's influence is less significant. Moody's downgrades reduce the market uncertainty over the rated countries' equity markets. Strong causal relationships are found between movements in the option-implied volatility and all credit signals released by S&P and Fitch, but only actual rating changes by Moody's, implying differences in rating agencies' policies. The presence of additional ratings tends to reduce market uncertainty. The findings highlight the importance of rating information in the price discovery process and offer policy implications.     

Prototype risk rating system

This paper explores the traditional and prevalent approach to credit risk assessment – the rating system. We first describe the rating systems of the two main credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Then we show how an internal rating system in a bank can be organized in order to rate creditors systematically. We suggest adopting a two-tier rating system. First, an obligor rating that can be easily mapped to a default probability bucket. Second, a facility rating that determines the loss parameters in case of default, such as (i) “loss given default” (LGD), which depends on the seniority of the facility and the quality of the gurantees, and (ii) “usage given default” (UGD) for loan commitments, which depends on the nature of the commitment and the rating history of the borrower.     

The intraday timing of rating changes

Using time stamps of Standard & Poor's rating changes, we examine the timing of rating changes in an intraday setting. Our evidence shows that although most rating changes occur during trading hours, the proportion of downgrades announced after regular trading hours is higher than that of upgrades. In addition, unexpected after-hour downgrades are associated with more negative stock returns and lower trading volume in comparison to those announced during trading hours. We also find that Standard & Poor's is more likely to announce downgrades after hours when downgrades are released on busy days with many concurrent rating announcements, when they concern financial firms, and when they are unexpected. In addition, Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR), an investor-paid credit rating agency, demonstrates a similar tendency in announcing downgrades after trading hours. This is the first study to document systematic differences in the timing of credit rating changes announced before and after the market closes. Our findings suggest that Standard & Poor's announces downgrades after trading hours to better disseminate information, and thus have important policy implications.     

Effects of Analysts’ Ratings on Insurer Stock Returns: Evidence of Asymmetric Responses

We examine the information value contained in insurer rating changes. Using a contemporary event study approach, we document an asymmetric reaction of stock prices to rating changes: downgrades cut share prices by approximately 7 percent but upgrades have little significant effect. This result varies across agencies as share prices react more strongly to A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's downgrades than to Moody's. We observe a similar asymmetric reaction to rating changes subject to a common rating benchmark. Finally, we find that prices fall most dramatically when a rating downgrade from one rating agency follows a downgrade from another agency.