Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

Footprints in the market: Hedge funds and the carry trade

This paper uses a new database provided by the Commodity and Futures Trading Commissions to examine the price impact of hedge fund carry trades in “hot” and “cold” markets. We find that hedge funds significantly increase their carry trade positions during hot markets (periods with very high currency returns). Consistent with currency overpricing, positions in hot markets are followed by exchange rate reversals. Optimism in the stock market seems to have a spillover effect on hedge fund speculation in the currency market: controlling for the variance risk premium fully accounts for the reversal effect. Overall, our results add to a growing body of empirical evidence that institutional demand can move asset prices.     

Hedge Fund Involvement in Convertible Securities

Convertible arbitrage hedge funds combine long positions in convertible securities with short positions in the underlying stock. In effect, hedge funds use their knowledge of the borrowing and short‐sale market to hedge themselves while distributing equity exposure to a large number of well‐diversified investors through their short positions. The authors argue that many “would‐be” equity issuers that would otherwise pay high costs in a secondary equity issue choose instead to issue convertible debt to hedge funds that in turn distribute equity exposure to institutional investors. This allows companies to receive “equity‐like” financing today at lower cost than a secondary equity offering. The authors' findings also suggest that more convertibles will be privately placed with hedge funds when issuer and market conditions suggest that shorting costs will be lower.     

REGULAR(IZED) HEDGE FUND CLONES

This article addresses the problem of portfolio construction in the context of efficient hedge fund investments replication. We propose a modification to the standard Sharpe “style analysis” by introducing a constraint on the asset weights 1‐norm and 2‐norm. This constraint regularizes the optimization problem, allows efficient selection of relevant factor's and has significant effects on the stability of the resulting asset mix and the risk–return characteristics of the replicating portfolio. The empirical results suggest that the norm‐constrained replicating portfolios exhibit significant correlations with their benchmarks, often higher than 0.9; have a fraction, which is about half to two‐thirds, of active positions relative to those determined through the standard method; and are obtained with turnover, which is in some instances about one‐fourth of that for the standard method.     

Can Companies Use Hedging Programs to Profit from the Market? Evidence from Gold Producers*

In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the hedging activities of 92 North American gold mining companies during the period 1989‐1999. The aim of the study was to answer two questions: (1) Did such hedging activities increase corporate cash flows? (2) And if yes, were such increases the result of management's ability to anticipate price movements when adjusting their hedge ratios? Although the author's answer to the first question is “yes,” their answer to the second is “no.” More specifically, the authors concluded that:

• ? During the 1989‐1999 period, the gold derivatives market was characterized by a persistent positive risk premium— that is, a positive spread between the forward price and the realized future spot price—that caused short forward positions to generate positive cash flows. The gold mining companies that hedged their future gold production realized an average total cash flow gain of $11 million, or $24 per ounce of gold hedged, per year, as compared to average annual net income of only $3.5 million. Because of the positive risk premium, short derivatives positions did not generate significant losses even during those subperiods of the study when the gold price increased.
• ? There was considerable volatility in corporate hedge ratios during the period of the study, which is consistent with managers incorporating market views into their hedging programs and attempting to time the market by hedging selectively. But after attempting to distinguish between derivatives activities designed to hedge and those designed to profit from a view, the authors conclude that corporate efforts to time the market through selective hedging were largely if not completely futile. In fact, the companies' adjustments of hedge ratios appeared to consistently lag instead of leading the market.

     

A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.     

Duration of poor performance and risk shifting by hedge fund managers

A typical hedge fund manager receives greater compensation after strong performance but does not lose compensation after weak performance, and therefore might take on more risk for the second half of the year after poor returns in the first half. We refer to this as “risk shifting.” However, continual risk shifting over a long period would likely make the fund too volatile to attract investors. We find that hedge funds with poor first-half-year performance do tend to increase risk during the second half-year. The effect is larger for funds that began the year “under water” and for smaller funds. The effect is smaller, however, if the poor performance lasts long.     

Connected Stocks

We connect stocks through their common active mutual fund owners. We show that the degree of shared ownership forecasts cross‐sectional variation in return correlation, controlling for exposure to systematic return factors, style and sector similarity, and many other pair characteristics. We argue that shared ownership causes this excess comovement based on evidence from a natural experiment—the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal. These results motivate a novel cross‐stock‐reversal trading strategy exploiting information contained in ownership connections. We show that long‐short hedge fund index returns covary negatively with this strategy, suggesting these funds may exacerbate this excess comovement.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Changing investment styles: style creep and style gaming in the hedge fund industry

Notwithstanding their common features, hedge funds remain an extremely diverse asset class. Information on fund styles is important for numerous purposes, such as portfolio construction, performance attribution and risk management. With fund self‐declaration being prone to (strategic) misclassification, return‐based taxonomies grouping funds along similarities in realized returns provide a useful alternative. We provide a consistent classification system of homogeneous groups of hedge funds based on self‐organizing maps. Whereas some fund categories such as managed futures are largely consistent in their self‐declared strategies, others, especially so‐called ‘equity hedge’ funds, display no or very limited return similarities. Furthermore, we also find evidence of fund managers performing undisclosed changes of their trading style over time. Those funds that misclassified themselves once are particularly likely to change their trading style again. Although style self‐declaration can, therefore, be quite misleading, our results indicate that hedge funds do not misdeclare their style strategically to improve their relative performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market risk exposure of merger arbitrage in Australia

We investigate the risk‐return characteristics of merger arbitrage in the Australian market for corporate control, whereby hedge fund managers acquire companies subject to a takeover offer. On average, a strategy of buying target companies and short‐selling bidders making scrip offers would have generated an annual return of 30 per cent from 1985 to 2008, excluding transaction costs, compared to the return on the broader market of 12 per cent. However, performance is not market neutral, being positively associated with market returns during downturns and inversely related to market movements during rising markets. The payoffs to this strategy are analogous to a short straddle, whereby the investor is short a call and put option at the same exercise price. These results are consistent with large‐sample evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom and have not previously been documented in Australia, in which prior evidence is based only on cash deals during the 1990s.     

Alumni social networks and hedge fund performance: Evidence from China

Based on unique data of Chinese private hedge funds, we first construct the “strong alumni” (alumni of the same school and the same major) social networks of private hedge fund managers, and examine the impact of alumni social networks on the performance of hedge funds in China. We build a series of alumni networks using the educational background information of 4734 private hedge funds, and perform an empirical analysis on a sample of 1115 private hedge funds products from 2010 to 2019. Different from previous findings of mutual funds, we find that more central network positions of hedge fund managers are associated with better risk-adjusted fund performance. Hedge fund managers with more central positions conduct more active investment styles and receive lower fund flows.¹ The results supplement the evidence that information advantages brought by central position in social networks can influence managers' investment styles, thus improve hedge fund performance.     

Optimal commodity asset allocation with a coherent market risk modeling

This paper fills a fundamental gap in commodity price risk management and optimal portfolio selection literatures by contributing a thorough reflection on trading risk modeling with a dynamic asset allocation process and under the supposition of illiquid and adverse market settings. This paper analyzes, from a portfolio managers' perspective, the performance of liquidity adjusted risk modeling in obtaining efficient and coherent investable commodity portfolios under normal and adverse market conditions. As such, the author argues that liquidity risk associated with the uncertainty of liquidating multiple commodity assets over given holding periods is a key factor in formalizing and measuring overall trading risk and is thus an important component to model, particularly in the wake of the repercussions of the recent 2008 financial crisis. To this end, this article proposes a practical technique for the quantification of liquidity trading risk for large portfolios that consist of multiple commodity assets and whereby the holding periods are adjusted according to the specific needs of each trading portfolio. Specifically, the paper proposes a robust technique to commodity optimal portfolio selection, in a liquidity-adjusted value-at-risk (L-VaR) framework, and particularly from the perspective of large portfolios that have both long and short positions or portfolios that consist of merely pure long trading positions. Moreover, in this paper, the author develops a portfolio selection model and an optimization-algorithm which allocates commodity assets by minimizing the L-VaR subject to applying credible operational and financial constraints based on fundamental asset management considerations. The empirical optimization results indicate that this alternate L-VaR technique can be regarded as a robust portfolio management tool and can have many uses and applications in real-world asset management practices and predominantly for fund managers with large commodity portfolios.     

A tale of feedback trading by hedge funds

This paper studies the extent of feedback trading at the factor level by hedge fund managers. We show that fund managers continuously adjust their exposure to different risk factors conditional on the recent performance of these factors. The majority of managers apply a positive feedback strategy, whereas the remaining managers use a negative feedback strategy. In addition, we find some evidence for factor timing ability, although managers appear to be more backward looking than forward looking. We show that positive feedback trading can be beneficial to fund performance in our setup. If managers applied the positive feedback strategy more aggressively, however, they could benefit more from it. As such, the “smart switching benchmark” can be used to assess the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds.     

Polynomial goal programming and the implicit higher moment preferences of US institutional investors in hedge funds

Polynomial goal programming (PGP) is a flexible method that allows investor preferences for different moments of the return distribution of financial assets to be included in the portfolio optimization. The method is intuitive and particularly suitable for incorporating investor preferences in higher moments of the return distribution. However, until now, PGP has not been able to meet its full potential because it requires quantification of “real” preference parameters towards those moments. To date, the chosen preference parameters have been selected somewhat “arbitrarily”. Our goal is to calculate implied sets of preference parameters using investors’ choices of and the importance they attribute to risk and performance measures. We use three groups of institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments—and derive implied sets of preference parameters in the context of a hedge fund portfolio optimization. To determine “real” preferences for the higher moments of the portfolio return distribution, we first fit implied preference parameters so that the PGP optimal portfolio is identical to the desired hedge fund portfolio. With the obtained economically justified sets of preference parameters, the well-established PGP framework can be employed more efficiently to derive allocations that satisfy institutional investor expectations for hedge fund investments. Furthermore, the implied preference parameters enable fund of hedge fund managers and other investment managers to derive optimal portfolio allocations based on specific investor expectations. Moreover, the importance of individual moments, as well as their marginal rates of substitution, can be assessed.     

Pre‐Issuance Hedging of Fixed‐Rate Debt

This article analyzes several corporate hedging strategies to manage interest rate risk on fixed‐rate debt prior to issuance. The authors start by considering these strategies using a highly stylized model: a binomial forward interest rate tree that, while simple in design, illustrates derivative pricing methodologies that are used in practice. Under a given rate volatility assumption, they demonstrate expected outcomes when entering a forward bond contract, a forward‐starting pay‐fixed interest swap, and a purchased option on that swap, as well as the “default” alternative of doing nothing. In principle, the decision of whether or not to hedge, as well as how to do so, depends on management's view of future interest rate volatility and degree of comfort with possible outcomes. The authors then assess the pros and cons of hedging strategies, with considerable emphasis on practical considerations. For example, while their theoretical model would allow an issuer to “lock” a specific debt issuance, in practice one can hedge only “benchmark” interest rate risk. The authors describe the use of both Treasury locks and forward‐starting swaps to address unexpected benchmark yield changes, and discuss how factors such as the time to issuance affect an issuer's choice of instrument. For instance, Treasury locks are typically used when the time to issuance is relatively short, while interest rate swaps are more common for longer times to issuance. The article also discusses circumstances in which a “do nothing” strategy may be preferable to other alternatives, as well as the disadvantages of issuing in advance. Finally, the authors describe the impact of financial accounting on different hedge strategies.     

Brealey,Myers, and Allen on Real Options

Real options are valuable sources of flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, corporate assets. The value of such options are generally not captured by the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) approach, but can be estimated using a variant of financial option pricing techniques. This article provides an overview of the basics of real option valuation by examining four important kinds of real options:

• 1 The option to make follow‐on investments. Companies often cite “strategic” value when taking on negative‐NPV projects. A close look at the payoffs from such projects reveals call options on follow‐on projects in addition to the immediate cash flows from the projects. Today's investments can generate tomorrow's opportunities.
• 2 The option to wait (and learn) before investing. This is equivalent to owning a call option on the investment project. The call is exercised when the firm commits to the project. But often it's better to defer a positive‐NPV project in order to keep the call alive. Deferral is most attractive when uncertainty is great and immediate project cash flows—which are lost or postponed by waiting—are small.
• 3 The option to abandon. The option to abandon a project provides partial insurance against failure. This is a put option; the put's exercise price is the value of the project's assets if sold or shifted to a more valuable use.
• 4 The option to vary the firm's output or its production methods. Companies often build flexibility into their production facilities so that they can use the cheapest raw materials or produce the most valuable set of outputs. In this case they effectively acquire the option to exchange one asset for another.

The authors also make the point that, in most applications, real‐option valuation methods are a complement to, not a substitute for, the DCF method. Indeed DCF, which is best suited to and usually sufficient for safe investments and “cash cow” assets, is typically the starting point for real‐option analyses. In such cases, DCF is used to generate the values of the “underlying assets”—that is, the projects when viewed without their options or sources of flexibility.     

The Icahn Manifesto

The title of this opening chapter in the author's new book on activist investors refers to Carl Icahn's solution to the “agency” problem faced by the shareholders of public companies in motivating corporate managers and boards to maximize firm value. During the 1960s and '70s, U.S. public companies tended to be run in ways designed to increase their size while minimizing their financial risk, with heavy emphasis on corporate diversification. Icahn successfully challenged corporate managers throughout the 1970s and 1980s by buying blocks of shares in companies he believed were undervalued and then demanding board seats and other changes in corporate governance and management. This article describes the evolution of Icahn as an investor. Starting by investing in undervalued, closed‐end mutual funds and then shorting shares of the stocks in the underlying portfolio, Icahn was able to get fund managers either to liquidate their funds (giving Icahn an arbitrage profit on his long mutual fund/short underlying stocks position) or take other steps to eliminate the “value gap.” After closing the value gaps within the limited universe of closed‐end mutual funds, Icahn turned his attention to the shares of companies trading for less than his perception of the value of their assets. As the author goes on to point out, the strategy that Icahn used with such powerful effect can be traced to the influence of the great value investor Benjamin Graham. Graham was a forceful advocate for the use of shareholder activism to bring about change in underperforming—and in that sense undervalued—companies. The first edition of Graham's investing classic, Security Analysis, published in 1934, devoted an entire chapter to the relationship between shareholders and management, which Graham described as “one of the strangest phenomena of American finance.”