Efficiency in the international insurance industry: A cross-country comparison

The purpose of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on frontier efficiency measurement in the international insurance industry, a topic of great interest in the academic literature during the last several years. A broad efficiency comparison of 6462 insurers from 36 countries is conducted. Different methodologies, countries, organizational forms, and company sizes are compared, considering life and non-life insurers. We find a steady technical and cost efficiency growth in international insurance markets from 2002 to 2006, with large differences across countries. Denmark and Japan have the highest average efficiency, whereas the Philippines is the least efficient. Regarding organizational form, the results are not consistent with the expense preference hypothesis, which claims that mutuals should be less efficient than stocks due to higher agency costs. Only minor variations are found when comparing different frontier efficiency methodologies (data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis).     

Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors

This paper analyses investment strategies of three types of Dutch institutional investors - pension funds, life insurers and non-life insurers - over the period 1999-2005. We use balance sheet and cash flow data, including purchases and sales of equity, fixed income and real estate. We trace asset reallocations back to both active trading and revaluations and link investment decisions to firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Overall, our results indicate that all three investor types tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they buy past losers and sell past winners. Especially pension funds showed this behaviour in the most turbulent part of the sample - the crash of 2002 and early 2003 - implying that these institutions have a stabilising impact on financial markets when this is needed most. Life insurers tend to be contrarian traders when they have a high proportion of unit-linked policies, while non-life insurers are contrarian when they have a more risky business model.     

Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF NON-LIFE REINSURANCE MARKETING METHODS

Abstract: This paper extends the study of the relative cost efficiency of insurance delivery systems from the primary market to the market for non-life reinsurance services. As in the primary market for insurance services there are two predominant methods of marketing reinsurance services: reinsurers who rely on employees, termed direct writers, and those who rely on brokers.
An extensive literature relating to the primary market for non-life insurance consistently indicates that independent agency insurers have a cost disadvantage relative to exclusive agency insurers. This literature also suggests that independent agency insurers may supply superior service but a continuing erosion of the market share of independent agency insurers suggests that the perceived service differential is not valued sufficiently to offset the perceived cost differential.
The authors find evidence that, cet. par., broker supplied reinsurers operate with lower costs than direct reinsurers but we find less convincing evidence of a service differential favoring direct reinsurers. More significantly, we observe that the largest component of the traditional measure of the reinsurer's cost is the commission paid back to the primary insurer: the seemingly lower cost brokers provide a higher net cost product. Yet brokers thrive in the marketplace suggesting the existence of a product differentiated by service or quality. With the important caveat that measures of service are imperfect and data is limited, we find no evidence of a service differential.     

The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis

Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics.     

Corporate Governance and Efficiency: Evidence From U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This study examines the relation between corporate governance and the efficiency of the U.S. property–liability insurance industry during the period from 2000 to 2007. We find a significant relation between efficiency and corporate governance (board size, proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, proportion of financial experts on the audit committee, director tenure, proportion of block shareholding, average number of directorships, proportion of insiders on the board, and auditor dependence). We also find property–liability insurers have complied with the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) to a large extent. Although SOX achieved the goal of greater auditor independence and might have prevented Enron‐like scandals, it had some unexpected effects. For example, insurers became less efficient when they had more independent auditors because the insurers were unable to recoup the benefits of auditor independence.     

Effizienz und Eigentümerstruktur: Eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Lebensversicherungsmarktes

We provide new insights into the effect of ownership on efficiency by analyzing the German life insurance market over the period 2002–2005. Previous research on alternative organizational forms in the life insurance industry has focused on stock and mutual ownership only. Due to the uniqueness of the German insurance market, where privately-owned companies face competition by public insurers, we add to the recent literature the well known debate on public versus private ownership, by investigating stock, mutual and public ownership forms. Using traditional DEA, we calculate technical efficiency and cost efficiency scores to test the efficient structure hypothesis as well as the expense preference hypothesis. Our results give strong support to the latter, while we find no evidence that public ownership is an efficient corporate structure for life insurers. The group of stock firms dominates both, mutual and public insurers, although differences between stock and mutual companies are smaller than differences between stock and public firms. Analyzing within-group results, our findings suggest that high efficiency scores can be associated with certain firm characteristics which are publicly available: high returns on assets, low cancellation rates and low costs.     

State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

Solvency Ⅱ与C-ROSS非寿险保险风险最低资本要求比较研究——基于中国60家财产保险公司的经验证据

本文以非寿险业务保险风险最低资本要求为考察对象,研究了欧盟Solvency Ⅱ与中国C-ROSS的差异,并利用中国保险市场60家财险公司的经验数据,对两者之间的差异进行了实证和模拟分析。研究结果表明,Solvency Ⅱ和C-ROSS对中国财险公司保险风险最低资本要求存在差异。对于拥有传统业务结构的财险公司,Solvency Ⅱ对保险风险最低资本要求更高,但是这种差距随着公司业务规模的缩小而减弱;对于以经营某些专业险种为主的财险公司,主营业务险种对两者差异具有决定性影响。本文的研究结论详细解释了Solvency Ⅱ与C-ROSS在非寿险保险风险最低资本计算上的异同,对C-ROSS下一步的修订工作提供了一定的支持与参考。     

Multidimensional Screening in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the Rothschild–Stiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible.     

A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance

This study examines the effect of the state of the international reinsurance market on the demand for reinsurance by U.S. insurers using data from the years 1993 through 2000. Both the overall demand for reinsurance and the utilization of foreign reinsurance by U.S. insurers are explored. In addition to supporting the findings of prior literature related to the traditional motives for the corporate demand for insurance, evidence indicates that the state of the U.S. reinsurance industry impacts the amount of reinsurance demanded by U.S. insurers. The study also investigates reasons why U.S. insurers utilize a reinsurance program composed of both U.S. and foreign reinsurers. The results indicate that the decision to utilize some percentage of foreign reinsurance is driven primarily by the financial and operational characteristics of the ceding company such as firm size, group affiliation, and organizational form. However, no support is found for the hypothesis that possible differences between the foreign and U.S. reinsurance markets impact the decision to utilize foreign reinsurance.     

Market structure and the efficiency of European insurance companies: A stochastic frontier analysis

This paper is motivated by the progressive liberalisation of the European insurance market in recent years. It uses stochastic frontier analysis to estimate Flexible Fourier cost functions for European insurance companies. Separate frontiers are estimated for life, non-life and composite companies. We adopt a maximum likelihood approach to estimation in which the variance of both one-sided and two-sided error terms is modelled jointly with the frontiers. This approach allows us to simultaneously control for the impact of heteroskedasticity on the estimation of scale economies as well as estimating the effect of firm size and market structure on X-inefficiency. The study draws on Standard & Poor’s Eurothesys data set of financial reports for the period 1995 to 2001. This provides technical and non-technical accounts at year-end for life, non-life and composite insurance businesses in 14 major European countries. Our estimates suggest that over this period most European insurers were operating under conditions of decreasing costs (increasing returns to scale), and that company size and domestic market share were significant factors determining X-inefficiency. Larger firms, and those with high market shares, tend to have higher levels of cost inefficiency.     

COST EFFICIENCY IN AUSTRALIAN GENERAL INSURERS: A NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACH

Data envelopment analysis is used to calculate pure technical, scale, allocative and cost efficiency indices for a sample of forty-six Australian general insurers. The inputs used are labour, physical capital (in the form of both information technology and plant and equipment), and financial capital. The outputs are net premium revenues for housing-related, transport-related, indemnity-related, mortgage-related, and other insurance, along with invested assets. The results indicate that the major source of overall cost inefficiency would appear to be allocative inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency and that the largest 20% of insurers are significantly more efficient than the remaining firms. A second-stage analysis uses limited dependent variable regression techniques to relate efficiency scores to firm-specific information. Cost efficiency appears to be closely related to asset size but not to stock exchange listing or product diversification or specialization.     

„Insuring the Agents“ – Managerdisziplinierung und Rolle der D&;O-Versicherung als Instrument der Corporate Governance

Directors' and officers' (D&;O) insurance can play an important role in disciplining managers in the interest of the shareholders' goals. I investigate the current status of the discussion on D&;O insurance in Germany and the role of D&;O insurance as well as D&;O insurers as a corporate governance instrument. Using the agency theory, the paper argues that shareholders of large German corporations delegate the monitoring to the board (Aufsichtsrat), to the independent auditor, but also to D&;O insurers. Given the German Managed Governance system with a traditionally high degree of debt financing and bank control, the monitoring role of the D&;O insurers can therefore be interpreted as being similar to creditor monitoring.     

保险治理与公司违规——董事高管责任保险的治理效应研究

公司治理机制被认为是影响公司违规的重要因素,然而董事高管责任保险作为一种重要的外部治理机制,是否会影响公司违规尚未得到充分研究。本文研究发现董事高管责任保险显著降低公司违规概率,符合监督效应假说。经工具变量法、Heckman两阶段模型和倾向得分匹配法稳健性检验,上述结论依然成立。影响机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险显著降低了公司违规倾向,显著增加了违规后被稽查的概率,并降低了上市公司的第一类代理成本。对董事高管责任保险的监督职能做进一步分析发现:(1)董事高管责任保险对上市公司经营违规和领导人违规的监督效应更为显著,但对信息披露违规的治理作用并不显著;(2)董事高管责任保险发挥的监督职能与股权属性和保险机构股东治理存在替代效应,与外部审计师治理和董事长CEO二职分离存在互补效应;(3)分组检验结果表明,董事高管责任保险对公司违规的监督效应在外部监管环境较差或者公司内部信息透明度较高的情况下更加显著。本文既提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响公司违规的证据,同时也表明保险机构通过董事高管责任保险为中国资本市场提供了一种较为有效的公司外部治理机制。     

Foreign exchange exposure: Evidence from the U.S. insurance industry

We study the foreign exchange exposure of U.S. insurers. The evidence shows that no systematic difference exists in the currency risk profiles of life and non-life segments within the insurance industry. This suggests that life and non-life insurers have similar risk exposure management strategies arising from similar risk pooling and financial intermediary functions. The empirical results reveal that a sizable proportion of U.S. insurers are exposed to foreign exchange movements against the seven largest U.S. trade partners in insurance services (U.K., Japan, Switzerland, Netherlands, France, Germany and Canada). Significant operational and size effects are also documented and we find that the frequency of foreign exchange exposure increases with time horizon.     

Determinants of International Insurers' Participation in Foreign Non-Life Markets

Mirroring the trend in the broader marketplace, the global insurance industry is steadily moving toward increased liberalization and deregulation. This study seeks to develop the first empirical model that examines the importance of foreign market characteristics as they relate to the participation of international insurers in the non‐life business of those countries. The analysis reveals that market structure is an important factor in determining whether international insurers participate in a given foreign market. In addition, for markets that are not competitive, removing trade barriers would significantly improve the desirability of those countries as host markets. The results also suggest that countries with higher gross domestic product tend to attract more involvement from international insurers. While this research focuses on the markets of industrialized countries, the findings will provide significant implications for those emerging markets that have not yet collected relevant data on a number of the variables included in this study.     

Systemic risk of insurers around the globe

We study the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life insurers to systemic risk between 2000 and 2012. For our full sample period, we find systemic risk in the international insurance sector to be small. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to the fragility of the financial system peaked during the recent financial crisis. In our panel regressions, we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ leverage.     

Competition,efficiency and soundness in European life insurance markets

This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone indicator. We analyse 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation period 1999–2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.