雷贝拉唑三联疗法治疗幽门螺杆菌阳性消化性溃疡的效果评价

目的探讨幽门螺杆菌（Hp）阳性消化性溃疡应用雷贝拉唑三联疗法治疗的效果。方法选取2013年1月至2014年2月我院收治的Hp阳性消化性溃疡患者64例,随机分成两组,各32例。观察组患者给予雷贝拉唑、阿莫西林、克拉霉素三联疗法治疗1周,再行替普瑞酮联合雷贝拉唑巩固治疗5周;对照组患者给予奥美拉唑、阿莫西林、克拉霉素治疗1周,再行替普瑞酮联合奥美拉唑巩固治疗5周。结果观察组患者Hp根除率为90.6%、溃疡愈合率为87.5%、总有效率为93.8%,明显高于对照组的65.6%、62.5%、75.0%,差异均有统计学意义（均P〈0.05）。结论雷贝拉唑三联疗法治疗Hp阳性消化性溃疡,可更好地根除Hp,提高患者的溃疡愈合率及总有效率,临床效果较好。     

复方大黄制剂结合三联疗法治疗幽门螺杆菌感染疗效观察

目的观察中西医结合根除幽门螺杆菌的疗效。方法经胃镜和组织学检查,选择120例HP阳性的消化性溃疡或慢性萎缩性胃炎患者,随机分为两组,对照组采用标准三联疗法,治疗组采用标准三联的同时口服复方大黄制剂,疗程为1周,4周后复查胃镜及14C尿素呼气试验或快速尿素酶试验。结果中西医结合治疗组的根除率及胃镜组织学治愈好转率较标准三联对照组均有明显的提高,并有统计学意义,P〈0.05。结论复方大黄制剂可以提高幽门螺杆菌的根除率,并且促进胃炎、消化性溃疡患者的组织学修复,不良反应少。     

左氧氟沙星三联疗法与阿莫西林三联疗法治疗消化性溃疡疗效比较

目的比较左氧氟沙星三联疗法与阿莫西林三联疗法治疗消化性溃疡的临床疗效,证实左氧氟沙星三联疗法的临床价值。方法以我院治疗的消化性溃疡患者108例,将其分为两组,观察组使用左氧氟沙星联合奥美拉唑和呋喃唑酮进行治疗;对照组使用阿莫西林联合奥美拉唑和呋喃唑酮进行治疗。对两组研究对象的临床疗效、不良反应等临床数据进行比较,并进行统计学分析。结果观察组总有效率为92.6%(50/54),优于对照组83.3%(45/54)的总有效率,且具有显著差异性(P<0.05);观察组与对照组在不良反应发生率比较无明显差异(P>0.05)。结论在消化性溃疡的治疗中左氧氟沙星三联疗法较阿莫西林三联疗法具有有效率高、不良反应发生率低等优势,适于临床推广使用。     

奥美拉唑联合立止血治疗消化性溃疡出血32例临床分析

目的探讨奥美拉唑联合立止血治疗消化性溃疡出血的治疗效果。方法临床统计了60例消化性溃疡出血患者,随机分为治疗组32例,对照组28例。治疗组行奥美拉唑联合立止血治疗;对照组行雷尼替丁联合氨甲苯酸治疗,观察两组患者的疗效和不良反应。结果治疗组中显效率50.00%总有效率96.88%,显著高于对照组的显效率28.57%和总有效率71.43%。结论奥美拉唑联合立止血治疗消化性溃疡出血疗效显著。     

四联疗法治疗幽门螺杆菌阳性消化性溃疡临床疗效分析

目的分析研究四联疗法治疗幽门螺杆菌阳性消化性溃疡的临床疗效及安全性。方法将64例幽门螺杆菌阳性消化性溃疡患者随机分两组各32例,观察组采用四联疗法,对照组采用三联疗法。结果观察组有效率为93.75%,对照组有效率为81.25%,两组比较差异有统计学意义(P<0.05);观察组Hp根除率为96.88%,对照组为组81.25%(P<0.05);两组均未见明显不良反应发生。结论四联疗法治疗幽门螺杆菌阳性消化性溃疡,Hp根除率高,患者顺应性好,且不良反应少,可在临床上推广应用。     

128例儿童胃镜检测结果分析及胃镜护理配合要点

目的探讨儿童胃镜检测结果及护理配合要点。方法 128例儿童由专科医生及护士相互配合行胃镜检查,同时取胃黏膜做HP感染检测。结果 128例患儿中,慢性浅表性胃炎62例（48.44%）,十二指肠球炎为30例（23.44%）,消化性溃疡36例（28.13%）,其中胃溃疡3例,十二指肠溃疡25例,复合型溃疡为8例;在慢性浅表性胃炎、消化性溃疡及十二指肠球炎中检测到HP感染,而且在十二指肠球炎检出率最高。结论儿童胃病中浅表性胃炎检出率最高,HP感染是小儿慢性胃炎及消化性溃疡的主要病因之一。儿童胃镜检查是一种安全、可靠的检查方法。     

左氧氟沙星三联疗法与阿莫西林三联疗法治疗消化性溃疡的临床疗效

目的探讨左氧氟沙星三联疗法与阿莫西林三联疗法治疗消化性溃疡的临床疗效。方法选取我院收治的消化性溃疡患者124例,将其随机分为两组,治疗组患者采用左氧氟沙星三联疗法,对照组患者采用阿莫西林三联疗法;比较两组患者的临床疗效及不良反应。结果治疗组患者总有效率为90.3%,明显优于对照组患者的83.9%,组间比较差异有统计学意义(P<0.05);治疗组不良反应发生率为8.1%,对照组不良反应发生率为11.3%,两组比较差异无统计学意义(P>0.05)。结论左氧氟沙星三联疗法治疗消化性溃疡的临床疗效明显,具有安全、经济、不良反应少等优点。     

左氧氟沙星与甲硝唑治疗幽门螺杆菌相关性胃炎的疗效比较

目的评价左氧氟沙星与甲硝唑治疗幽门螺杆菌相关性胃炎的疗效。方法选择2011年1月至2014年1月我院收治的80例Hp相关性胃炎患者,按照随机数字法来将其分为两组,对照组给予甲硝唑片,治疗组给予盐酸左氧氟沙星片,两组患者并联合采用奥美拉唑肠溶片和阿莫西林分散片治疗。结果治疗组总有效率为90.0%;对照组总有效率为75.0%。两组比较有明显差异,有统计学意义(P<0.05)。结论阿莫西林+奥美拉唑+左氧氟沙星根除Hp能够取得较好的疗效,且不良反应少、能较好地根除Hp。     

小儿消化性溃疡的临床分析

目的探讨小儿消化性溃疡的临床表现、治疗方法及效果。方法对本组38例患儿均合理祛除诱发因素,如进食无刺激性、低糖食物,纠正饮食习惯,消除心理紧张情绪,对生活时间和学习时间进行合理安排。同时,还要采取甲硝唑、胃黏膜保护剂、奥美拉唑、枸橼酸铋钾、质子泵抑制剂等药物治疗,治疗疗程6~8周,同时再进行抗休克治疗、补充水电解质,并止血、止痛。结果本组38例消化性溃疡患儿在治疗后,行胃、十二指肠钡餐复查,发现患儿原来的不良临床症状完全消失,溃疡完全愈合,无不良反应及并发症。结论由于小儿消化性溃疡临床表现不典型,病因呈多样性,医护人员应及时对患儿进行有效检查,避免由于漏诊、误诊而延误治疗。     

常用质子泵抑制剂治疗消化性溃疡疗效分析

目的 研究四种常用质子泵抑制剂治疗消化性溃疡的治疗效果及药费水平.方法 选取2011年1月～2012年12月在我院门诊诊治的160例消化性溃疡患者,随机分为四组,分别给予兰索拉唑、奥美拉唑、雷贝拉唑、泮托拉唑进行治疗.观察记录各组患者的治疗效果及药费水平.结果 雷贝拉唑、泮托拉唑组疗效较好,兰索拉唑、奥美拉唑组疗效较差,且少数患者出现不良反应,但其差异无统计学意义（P＞0.05）.治疗费用奥美拉唑组最低,雷贝拉唑组最高,其差异有统计学意义（P＜0.01）.结论 四种质子泵抑制剂各有利弊,应根据患者病情和经济水平选用合适的药物进行治疗.     

企业诚信意识与思想政治工作调研及对策思考

在对福建省企业诚信意识与思想政治工作调研的基础上,提出构建可操作的“三层次四模块”诚信意识培育新模式,推进人本化管理理念的渗透,加强人文关怀和心理疏导,以实现思想政治工作诚信意识培育的目标。     

中国经济的内外均衡与财税改革

我国经常项目持续的大规模顺差,给国民经济的健康发展带来一系列的不利影响。在前人研究的基础上,通过对各种影响因素进行分类拆解,本文试图从理论和实证角度说明长期的储蓄-消费失衡是造成我国贸易顺差的一个重要原因,而其背后的根本原因是由于企业可支配收入相对于劳动者报酬不断提高带来的收入结构和储蓄结构失衡。我国当前企业未分配收入大幅增长的原因可以归结为企业利润率"虚高"和国企"不分红"问题。只有从体制上解决这个问题,才能使储蓄降低到适当的水平,通过拉动内需消除我国过大的贸易顺差,从根本上解决内外经济比例失衡问题。     

森林资源规划设计调查总结与反思

森林资源规划设计调查是为国家、地区及森林经营单位制定林业方针政策,编制林业区划、规划、计划,指导林业生产而提供基础资源数据,为实现森林资源合理经营、科学管理、永续利用、持续发展,充分发挥森林生态效益、经济效益、社会效益服务。森林资源调查的任务是全面查清森林资源数量、质量变化及其消长变化状况、规律,进行综合分析和评价,准确提供所需有关森林资源调查成果资料。基于森林资源二类调查的重要性和今后调查工作顺利开展的需要,调查之后的总结与反思尤为重要。     

美国、日本产业政策:比较分析与启示

现阶段,在吸取美国、日本经验的基础上,我国产业结构调整应主要依靠市场机制进行调节,同时辅之以宏观政策,尽快使我国的产业结构优化,即产业结构的合理化、高级化。     

Classical and Neoclassical harmonies and dissonances

Abstract

Proofs are given that only singularly can real 1750 – 2007 competitive price ratios be ‘natural', in the sense of being invariant under changes in demand tastes. Proofs are given that both 1750 – 1870 discrete technologies or 1890 – 2007 continuum technologies, with convexity properties sufficient for arbitrage-proof supply-demand equilibria, will be ‘intertemporally Pareto optimal', immune to leaving any deadweight (inefficient) losses on the table. Sraffa (1960), ignoring the vast post-1945 linear and non-linear programming mathematical literature of Danzig, Kuhn-Tucker-Bellman, von Neumann, Ramsey literature does not quite arrive at attainable distribution solutions. Where it tolerates increasing or decreasing returns to scale, there can be no competitive equilibria. When its matrix equations do obey first-degree-homogeneous functions, the book's stress on Basics or non-Basics is an irrelevancy leading to bizarre novel interpretations of Ricardo.

Old age overtakes us all. Alas, Sraffs's proposed critique of twentieth century political economy we will never be able to know.     

Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Within and Across Boundaries and Shorelines: Ensemble of Darwin's Finches and Human Transaction Types

Synopsis: In the most famous example of the biological process of adaptive radiation, two forces explain the fourteen distinct species of Darwin's finches on the Galápagos and Cocos Islands: First, populations adapt to their respective distinct ecological environments. Second, previously separated populations come in contact and may adapt to mitigate inter-species competition. The result is a complex pattern of homogeneity and heterogeneity among the birds, both on a single island and across islands. This pattern reflects the finches' adaptations both to the distinct ecological conditions created by the visible shorelines that separate the islands' niches and to the finches' own less-visible cultural and societal shorelines. The New Institutional Economics highlights the fact that human institutional infrastructures also exhibit complex homogeneities and heterogeneities, as we adapt those infrastructures to accomplish the tasks at hand in distinct geographic and societal contexts. Mixes of both state enforcement and self-enforcement, through inter-temporal, inter-issue, and inter-actor linkages, provide support and enforcement for transactions; and those mixes differ across transactions and across states. When transactions occur across state or cultural shorelines, institutional infrastructures must be flexible enough to accommodate those differences, without allowing the differences to become disguised protectionism or barriers to competition. These issues contribute to many of the regulatory disputes associated with ‘globalization’. We briefly consider two concrete recent examples: (1) the European Union–United States ‘Safe Harbor’ Agreement that regulates firms' policies toward Internet-data privacy; and (2) international trade policy negotiations over regulation of ‘geographical indications’ (for example, Champagne or Roquefort) as means of assuring product quality for processed foods. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Sen and Commons on Markets and Freedom

Amartya Sen's enlarged conception of freedom has augmented the scope of economic analysis but it also has had the surprising effect of being more supportive of the free market than conventional welfare economics. It is argued here that a comparison of Sen's position with that of the American institutionalist, J R Commons, highlights some problems with Sen's approach and points to possible ways in which they might be addressed.     

Globalization and taxation: Theory and evidence

We construct a theoretical model to capture the compensation and efficiency effects of globalization in a set up where the redistributive tax rate is chosen by the median voter. The model predicts that the two alternative modes of globalization- trade liberalization and financial openness- could potentially have different effects on taxation. We then provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and the alternative modes of globalization using a large cross-country panel data set. On average, globalization is associated with lower taxation but there is some evidence that in countries with high capital-labor ratio, globalization is associated with increased taxation. We make a distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization and find a strong negative relationship between taxation and de jure measures of globalization. The results for de facto measures of globalization are mixed.     

Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence

We provide a framework to interpret the recent literature on financial development and inequality. In many developing countries, access to funding and financial services by firms and households is still very skewed. Recent evidence suggests that poor access does not only reflect economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by established interests in unequal countries. Captured reforms deepen rather than broaden access, as small elites obtain most of the benefits while risks are socialized. Financial liberalization motivated to increase access may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to political backlash against reforms. Thus financial reforms may succeed only if matched by a buildup in oversight institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 748–773.     

The Performance of Public and Private Enterprise under Conditions of Active and Passive Ownership and Competition and Monopoly

Privatisation is driven by the belief that public ownership is cost inefficient, in particular under monopoly. However, some theoretical and empirical studies have questioned whether privatisation will necessarily lead to efficiency gains. This paper focuses on the impact of ownership when owners can be either active or passive. Active owners decide on output, whereas passive owners delegate this decision to a risk-averse manager. It turns out that managerial slack as reflected in the marginal costs will actually be the same or higher in a private monopoly than under public ownership. The impact of entry is theoretically ambiguous, but an increased number of firms in an oligopoly may lead to lower efficiency.