Convergence in the Americas: Some Lessons from the DR‐CAFTA Process

The proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas is a major cause for concern as it might fragment or inhibit the emergence of a hemispheric trading system. In addition to establishing a free trade area between the US and six countries in Latin America, the DR‐CAFTA consolidates a set of trade arrangements among those six Latin American countries. The approaches and techniques employed to achieve this consolidation should be studied by policy analysts and negotiators of broader hemispheric‐wide negotiations since the DR‐CAFTA is in fact a microcosm of the spaghetti bowl of trade agreements now existing in the Americas. This paper points out the potential consequences of the proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas and provides an analysis of the convergence techniques and approaches used in the DR‐CAFTA, in particular in the areas of market access and rules of origin.     

RTAs' Proliferation and Trade‐diversion Effects: Evidence of the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Phenomenon

This paper investigates the trade‐diversion effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs), so‐called spaghetti bowl phenomenon (SBP), in multilateral trade. The SBP is due to the proliferation of RTAs. Thus, I investigate the relationship between the number of RTAs concluded by a country and the additional trade value attributed to a RTA. Using bilateral trade data in a sample of 119 countries, from 1995 to 2012, my main finding reveals a negative trade effect between them, confirming the existence of SBP in multilateral trade. However, results could not conclude the evidence of a negative effect of overlapping RTAs, involving the existence of SBP, within North–North, North–South or South–South trade. But, the additional trade value attributed to a RTA concluded with EU countries or US seems to confirm significantly a trade‐diversion effect because of the number of RTAs signed by these countries.     

Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade

This paper addresses the final steps to global free trade – what they might look like, what sort of political economy forces might drive them, and what the WTO might do to help. Two facts form the point of departure: (1) Regionalism is here to stay; world trade is regulated by a motley assortment of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements; (2) this motley assortment is not the best way to organise world trade. Moving to global duty‐free trade will require a multilateralisation of regionalism. This paper presents the political economy logic of trade liberalisation and uses it to structure a narrative of world trade liberalisation since 1947. The logic is then used to project the world tariff map in 2010, arguing that the pattern will be marked by fractals – fuzzy, leaky trade blocs made up of fuzzy, leaky sub‐blocs (fuzzy since the proliferation of FTAs makes it impossible to draw sharp lines around the Big‐3 trade blocs, and leaky since some FTAs create free trade ‘canals’ linking the Big‐3 blocs). The paper then presents a novel political economy mechanism – spaghetti bowls as building blocs – whereby offshoring creates a force that encourages the multilateralisation of regionalism. Finally, the paper suggests three things the WTO might do to help multilateralise regionalism.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements

This paper uses a model of horizontal multinational enterprises to explore the relationship between transportation costs and trade policy cooperation. Tariffs have the effect of attracting foreign direct investment to the benefit of consumers in the host country. As transport costs fall, the incentive to impose tariffs falls and the benefits to cooperation rise. Thus, in a repeated game in which cooperation is limited by a self-enforcement constraint, a reduction in transport costs facilitates free trade. This logic is applied to a three-country model to examine preferential trade agreements. It is found that if any country is too distant from the others, then global free trade is not attainable. Rather, if two of the countries are within a critical distance of each other and distant from the third country, then the unique outcome is an exclusive free trade agreement between the two adjacent countries. Thus, the model predicts a strong regional bias in preferential trade agreements.     

Third‐country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements

Does regionalism negatively impact non‐members? To answer this question, we examine the effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on imports from non‐members and the tariffs that they face. Using data from six RTAs in Latin America and Europe, we do not find evidence that implementation of the regional agreements is associated with trade diversion from third countries to regional members. Using detailed industry data on preference margins and most‐favoured nation (MFN) tariffs for three trade agreements in Latin America over 12 years, we find that greater preference margins do not significantly reduce imports from third countries. We also look at the effect of preferences on external tariffs. We find evidence that preferential tariff reduction tends to precede the reduction of external MFN tariffs in a given sector, offering evidence of tariff complementarity. Overall, the results suggest that regionalism does not significantly harm non‐members.     

国外自由贸易协定研究新进展

在国际经济学的传统视野中,自由贸易协定曾经一度占据贸易自由化研究领域的核心地位。但当第二波区域主义抬头之时,传统的理论范式和方法论面对区域贸易模式变化、双边贸易协定增加、非成员国福利损益、国内政治因素制约以及多形式一体化共存等新现象的解释,显得无能为力。文章就自由贸易协定研究方面的新问题,对当前学界的主要观点与研究思路进行梳理,并从理论研究与经验实证两个方面对国外主要研究成果加以整理,以期对该领域的进一步研究有所裨益。     

Do Economic Integration Agreements Actually Work? Issues in Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism

This paper argues that the ‘competitive liberalisation’ of national governments of the past several decades has created a ‘market’ for regional economic integration agreements (EIAs). Evidence shows that countries that have selected into EIAs – such as free trade agreements – have ‘chosen well’ in the sense that the same economic characteristics that explain and predict bilateral EIAs also explain and predict bilateral trade flows. We show that previous ex post empirical evaluations of the effects of EIAs on trade have tended to underestimate the effects due to ignoring the (endogenous) self‐selection bias of country pairs into EIAs. Accounting for this bias, we find that European economic integration had a much larger impact on trade over the period 1960–2000 than previously found, and other more recent EIAs have had economically and statistically significant effects on members’ trade. The results shed further light on understanding the causes and consequences of the growth of regionalism.     

美国的双边自由贸易协定与环境问题

从进入21世纪以来,美国积极投入到双边自由贸易协定的谈判之中,并且已取得了令人瞩目的成果。在这些协定中都设有专门的“环境”一章来协调签字国之间的环境问题。本文分析了美国将贸易政策的重心转向双边自由贸易协定的原因,以美澳自由贸易协定为例介绍了“环境”部分的内容,并分析了美国在双边自由贸易协定中规定环境条款的原因,以及对我国的启示。     

Trade Negotiations in the Americas and What They Mean for You

The United States is engaged in two huge trade negotiations—the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—that will have a profound impact on our economy and on the world trade system. These agreements can be an important template for new rules governing world trade, and they address some important new areas, such as regulatory issues. However, if they are to be a good template, U.S. negotiators have to alter some of their proposals, and these new agreements have to prohibit predatory trade practices, such as currency manipulation.     

How Does Free Trade Become Institutionalised? An Expected Utility Model of the Chrétien Era

This paper seeks to go beyond the question of ‘why free trade?’ and pursues issues related to the tendency for controversial free trade agreements to become institutionalised. In other words, why do opponents of free trade not mobilise to overturn it? Even more puzzling, why do opposition parties, which had opposed passage of free trade in the first place, not undo liberalisation undertaken by their predecessors upon coming to power? Rather than seek reversal, it is not uncommon for free trade opponents, upon assuming control of the government, to deepen liberalisation initiatives, hence serving to institutionalise the very policies they had decried vigorously. Seven sections make up this study. It begins with a statement of the basic puzzle and an illustration in the recent Canadian context. The second section is a theoretical discussion of opposition parties and free trade. An expected utility model, based on the limits of rent‐seeking, is introduced in the third and fourth sections, to explain institutionalised free trade. The fifth section provides the background to the case at hand, that is, the evolution of free trade as a politico‐economic issue in Canada. The sixth section applies the expected utility model to the superficially puzzling case of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's dramatic about‐face on the issue of trade liberalisation after coming to power. In the final section, the contributions of the model are reviewed, along with directions for future research.     

中国自贸区建设现状及其对策研究

近年来,中国加快了自贸区建设的推进速度,截至2019年底,已签订了17个自贸协定。相对而言,中国签订的自贸协定规则覆盖面还比较小、规则标准还比较低。与此同时,以CPTPP、USMCA协定为代表的高标准自贸协定,形成了数字贸易规则、知识产权规则、国有企业规则等多个非传统领域规则。我国应坚持长期宏观战略利益高于短期经济利益、先广覆盖后高标准价值导向和大型新兴经济体与发达经济体自贸谈判并重的原则,从组织上建立直属于最高决策机构的高标准自贸区战略机构、加强对非传统领域议题的整理与研究、建立针对新规则的损益衡量指标体系、健全高标准自贸区谈判的产业受损补偿机制,加快推进我国高标准自贸区建设。     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

International Labour and Environmental Standards Agreements: Is This Fair Trade?

Labour and environmental standards agreements are two contentious proposals that have contributed to the failure of the WTO to launch a new round of trade liberalisation discussions and have prevented the US President from obtaining fast‐track negotiating authority. Proponents of the agreements have been able to win substantial political support by arguing that standardised rules on labour practices and environmental regulations is the only way to assure that international trade remains fair. Although there are widespread demands for ‘fair trade,’ there remains a lack of understanding as to what fairness means exactly. Recently, a comprehensive catalogue of fairness principles was presented by Suranovic (2000). This paper will analyse the proposals for labour and environmental standards with respect to these fairness principles in order to characterise how fairness is used by supporters of these policies. The paper will also show that by using different fairness principles, opponents of these policies can argue that these same policies are unfair. The fact that reasonable notions of fairness can be applied by both opponents and proponents of these agreements highlights difficulties with fairness, per se, as a useful guide to policy. The paper uses this contentious issue to highlight the conceptual difficulties of proposals for fair trade.     

The EU's Free–trade Agreements with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?

Since the middle of the1990s the EU has vigorously pursued a policy of replacing non– reciprocal preferences for the developing countries in the Mediterranean, Latin America and with South Africa, with bilateral free–trade agreements. This article examines the content of these agreements and the empirical evidence on their likely effects and concludes that they are ‘broad’ but ‘shallow’ agreements. The static effect are likely to be very small or negative while the potential dynamic gains are problematic, especially regarding the concept of a ‘lock in’ to trade liberalisation, unless there are greater commitments to trade related issues by both sides and especially by the EU.     

Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes

An enduring puzzle in international economics is why trade interventions are biased in favor of import-competing rather than export sectors and therefore restrict trade. In this paper, we show that if the government's objective reflects a concern for inequality then trade policy generally exhibits an anti-trade bias. Importantly, under neutral assumptions, the mechanism that we analyze generates the anti-trade bias independently of whether factors are specific or mobile across sectors. The mechanism also generates an anti-trade bias between large countries even after they sign reciprocal trade agreements that eliminate any terms-of-trade motivation for the use of trade protection.     

Carbon,Trade Policy and Carbon Free Trade Areas

This paper discusses both the potential contribution that trade policy initiatives can make towards the achievement of significant global carbon emissions reduction and the potential impacts of proposals now circulating for carbon reduction motivated geographical trade arrangements, including carbon‐free trade areas. We first suggest that trade policy is likely to be a relatively minor consideration in climate change containment. The dominant influence on carbon emissions globally for the next several decades will be growth more than trade and its composition, and in turn, the size of trade seemingly matters more than its composition given differences in emission intensity between tradables and non‐tradables. We then note that differences in emissions intensity across countries are larger than across products or sectors and so issues of country discrimination in trade policy (and violations of MFN) arise. We next discuss both unilateral and regional carbon motivated trade policy arrangements, including three potential variants of carbon emission reduction based free trade area arrangements. One is regional trade agreements with varying types of trade preferences towards low carbon‐intensive products, low carbon new technologies and inputs to low carbon processes. A second is the use of joint border measures against third parties to counteract anti‐competitive effects from groups of countries taking on deeper emission reduction commitments. A third is third‐country trade barriers along with free trade or other regional trade agreements as penalty mechanisms to pressure other countries to join emission‐reducing environmental agreements. We differentiate among the objectives, forms and possible impacts of each variant. We also speculate as to how the world trading system may evolve in the next few decades as trade policy potentially becomes increasingly dominated by environmental concerns. We suggest that the future evolution of the trading system will likely be with environmentally motivated arrangements acting as an overlay on prevailing trade and financial arrangements in the WTO and IMF, and eventually movement to linked global trade and environmental policy bargaining.     

Mergers and acquisitions & trade: A global value chain analysis

The present paper deals with how the insertion in international trade and global value chains (GVCs) of countries affects their capacity of attracting foreign mergers and acquisitions (M&As). To this end, we combine data for bilateral M&As and trade in value added for the period 2001–15 and estimate an augmented gravity equation. Results indicate that trade openness per se does not favour M&As. Nevertheless, bilateral free trade agreements, heterogeneity of destinations (sources) for exports (imports) of intermediate and final goods, and position and participation in global value chains are relevant for explaining bilateral M&As. Moreover, their role is significantly different depending on the level of development of the home and host countries.     

Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network approach

In our work, we have analysed the effect of the hub‐and‐spoke nature of free trade agreements (FTA s) on trade. Contrary to previous analyses, we have considered the effects of the country's position in the FTA network on the bilateral trade of the hub country. We have conducted an in‐depth analysis of the global network of FTA s, focusing particularly on its evolution in the last 15 years. We have utilised a panel data set covering the period 1960–2010 to investigate the effects of the hub‐and‐spoke on trade. Our results show that the countries that are more connected to FTA s export more than those that are less involved, although not all the partner countries you can connect with are the same. An increase in the number of spokes that have no link between them has, on average, a negative effect on the trade of the hub, which indicates that signing FTA s with every country is not the optimal strategy for increasing trade. However, if we consider the way new FTA s change the relative position of a country, we can see that if new FTA s make the country more central or less constrained in the network, these new agreements have a strongly positive and significant pro‐trade effect.