Value creation from asset sales: New evidence from bond and stock markets

This paper examines the influence of capital structure change on the value creation from asset sales. We find significant positive equity and debt excess returns are concentrated in the subsample of highly leveraged firms that use the proceeds to retire debt. Low leverage firms display no consistent significant excess equity or bond returns. The existent literature has focused on efficiency redistribution, increase in focus, and access to capital for investment as the primary drivers of value creation from asset sales and agency costs as a major factor that mitigates this value creation. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the primary driver of value creation is from capital structure change for highly leveraged firms.     

Financial Distress and Corporate Performance

This study finds that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors in industry downturns. Specifically, firms in the top leverage decile in industries that experience output contractions see their sales decline by 26 percent more than do firms in the bottom leverage decile. A similar decline takes place in the market value of equity. These findings are consistent with the view that the indirect costs of financial distress are significant and positive. Consistent with the theory that firms with specialized products are especially vulnerable to financial distress, we find that highly leveraged firms that engage in research and development suffer the most in economically distressed periods. We also find that the adverse consequences of leverage are more pronounced in concentrated industries.     

Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.     

Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.     

Debt enforcement,financial leverage,and product failures: Evidence from China and the United States

Building on capital structure and product market interactions, and the role of debt enforcement in leveraged firms' investments, we examine whether cross-country debt enforcement can produce different associations between financial leverage and product failures. Results show that different debt enforcement systems can generate opposite leverage effects. In countries with weak/nearly ineffective debt enforcement, financial leverage shows an incentive investment effect due to low default costs, and thus highly leveraged firms tend to invest more and are less likely to have product failures. Conversely, in countries with strict/effective debt enforcement, distressed companies tend to have an underinvestment effect and more product failures.     

A comparative analysis of leveraged recapitalization versus leveraged buyout as a takeover defense

Two types of defensive scheme—leveraged buyout (LBO) and leveraged recapitalization (LR)—are examined. In particular, this article examines (1) whether the two similar defensive tactics affect stockholder returns differently and (2) what firm attributes are associated with stockholder gains in LBO and LR announcements. This study finds that stocks of both LBO and LR firms, on average, exhibit significant positive abnormal returns during the announcement period, but that the latter experience substantially smaller returns than the former. This study further finds that while mitigation of agency problems associated with a firm's free cash flow is present for both LR and LBO firms, it is more pronounced for the LBO firms. These results provide evidence that a firm with higher free cash flow could benefit a greater reduction of agency costs by going private through a LBO plan than by remaining public through a LR plan.     

Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing

This article examines changes in supermarket prices in local markets following supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that prices rise following LBOs in local markets in which the LBO firm's rivals are also highly leveraged and that LBO firms have higher prices than their less leveraged rivals, suggesting that LBOs create incentives to raise prices. However, I also find that prices fall following LBOs in local markets in which rival firms have low leverage and are concentrated. These price drops are associated with LBO firms exiting the local market, suggesting that rivals attempt to “prey” on LBO chains.     

Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory

This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.     

How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed

This paper studies thirty-one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) that become financially, not economically, distressed. The net effect of the HLT and financial distress (from pretransaction to distress resolution, market- or industry-adjusted) is to increase value slightly. This finding strongly suggests that, overall, the HLTs of the late 1980s created value. We present quantitative and qualitative estimates of the (direct and indirect) costs of financial distress and their determinants. We estimate financial distress costs to be 10 to 20 percent of firm value. For a subset of firms that do not experience an adverse economic shock, financial distress costs are negligible.     

The influence of other comprehensive income on discretionary expenditures

Other comprehensive income items (OCI) increase and decrease book value and therefore indicate more or less firm value. It follows that OCI items, albeit transitory, may contribute to a wealth effect that influences expenditure decisions. In support, our regression results indicate an association between current year OCI and future discretionary financing, investing, and operating expenditures. However, we also find that OCI‐influenced expenditures are not associated with future profitability, suggesting such expenditures are not value creating. In further tests, we find that future discretionary expenditures are associated with both positive OCI and negative OCI for higher leveraged firms but only associated with positive OCI for lower leveraged firms. These results suggest that, for highly leveraged firms, positive OCI loosens debt constraints on future expenditures while negative OCI tightens debt constraints on future expenditures. For firms without debt constraints the results are suggestive of possible wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders.     

Heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on firm leverage and value

We empirically investigate the effect of financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies on firms using a comprehensive macroprudential policy dataset and corporate panel data across 35 countries. We find that tightening of macroprudential measures persistently curbs the leverage of firms, while loosening is related to the increase in leverage. We also find that this effect on leverage is heterogeneous across firms, as net macroprudential policy actions reduce the procyclicality of leverage more significantly for small firms and firms with high leverage. Also, we estimate the effect of macroprudential policies on firm value to evaluate potential policy trade-offs as the policies restrict the firms' access to credit during economic booms while protecting them from future financial crises. The effect of macroprudential policies on firm value is generally positive despite the policies' restrictive nature. Further, the effect on firm value is heterogeneous depending on firm characteristics: the positive effect becomes stronger as firms are less leveraged, but this positive effect is weaker for firms that grow faster, suggesting potential costs of macroprudential policies for these firms.     

Determinants of Bank Debt in a Continental Financial System: Evidence from Spanish Companies

We test hypotheses about the structure of corporate debt ownership and the use of bank debt by firms in a civil‐law country, Spain. We focus on bank debt effects in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, and on efficient versus inefficient firm liquidation. We find that the relation between growth opportunities and bank financing is not as strong as the one found in common‐law countries, that there is a positive relation between firm size and the proportion of bank debt used, and that firms closer to bankruptcy and highly leveraged are more likely to use bank debt.     

Responsiveness of Auditors to the Audit Risk Standards: Unique Evidence from Big 4 Audit Firms

We examine the effect of changes in audit risk standards on the conduct of financial statement audits in a European setting. We investigate this by analysing the audit hours and audit fees for clients of Big 4 audit firms in Finland in 1996 and 2010. Our results show that audit firms became more sensitive to clients’ business risk due to the introduction of the new audit risk standards, with more audit hours allocated to owner-managed companies in 2010 than in 1996, and fewer audit hours allocated to low-risk clients in 2010 than in 1996. Also, the labour mix in the audit team changed for owner-managed companies, with a greater work load carried by junior auditors in 2010 than in 1996. Regarding the price of audit, we find an increase in audit fees for clients with high business risk, while audit fees remained at roughly the same level for low-risk clients. These findings should be of interest to the auditing profession and those involved in the development of auditing regulations.     

The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout (LBO) activity by comparing firms that have implemented LBOs to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, we find that firms that initiate LBOs can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. LBO firms also tend to be more diversified than firms which do not undertake LBOs. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g., those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do LBOs.     

The effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of R&D spending

This paper investigates the effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) spending for a sample of Canadian hi-tech and biopharmaceutical firms. U.S. GAAP adopts an immediate expensing rule for all R&D spending except for software development costs for which technological feasibility has been established. Contrary to the U.S., Canadian and international standard setters recommend capitalization if development costs meet certain criteria. Because those criteria are largely based on management judgment, capitalization of R&D spending is an accounting choice that can be used for income manipulation or signaling.Using a logit model, we examine how the decision to capitalize R&D spending is influenced by the cross-listing status and several other key firm characteristics that are well documented in the accounting literature. We find that the probability of capitalizing R&D spending increases for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in the software industry. The probability of capitalizing R&D spending also increases for firms that are more leveraged, more mature, and have higher level of cash flows from operations. However, the probability of capitalizing R&D spending decreases for larger corporations, firms with more concentrated ownership and highly profitable firms. Overall our results indicate a preference for Canadian firms in the software industry to emulate U.S. accounting practices for R&D spending. They also suggest that firms use the decision to capitalize or expense R&D spending as an earning management tool to either meet debt covenants or to smooth income.     

中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析

本文以 1999- 2 0 0 1年的年度财务报表中出现“会计差错更正”的A股上市公司为样本 ,研究了高报盈余的会计差错的动因。研究表明 ,高报盈余的会计差错有着明显的盈余管理的动机 ,当期利润低于上期 ,有较高的资产负债率 ,线下项目产生的收益高以及规模小和亏损的公司更容易产生高报盈余的错误。本文的研究发展了盈余管理研究的内容 ,为监管部门加强监管、防范上市公司操纵盈余、提高会计信息质量提供了经验证据     

Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

Firms’ share price reactions to The American Jobs Creation Act

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 permitted a one-time 85% dividend received deduction for repatriated foreign earnings. A stated purpose of this legislation was to permit companies to access foreign earnings domestically that would have been too costly previously because of repatriation taxation. Using a portfolio analysis we find that firms with large foreign asset balances experienced significantly positive returns during the legislative window for the Jobs Act, and that these findings also hold for sub-samples that are designated as financially constrained or highly leveraged. These results indicate that the market perceived passage of the Jobs Act as good news for those firms with the need, domestically, for these unrepatriated foreign earnings. We conclude that these findings are supportive of the policy intentions that formed the basis of the temporary reduction in the repatriation taxes.     

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FIRMS' DECISIONS TO RETIRE DEBT EARLY

We examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the decision to retire debt early. Other factors that have been linked to the debt retirement decision are also investigated, including leverage adjustment and the value associated with the immediate recognition of a loss for tax purposes on early retirement. Results indicate that firms that retire debt early have lower marginal tax rates than firms that do not retire debt early. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms are motivated to retire debt early by an incentive to reduce tax shields that cannot be used efficiently. Further, firms that retire debt early are more highly leveraged than firms that do not retire debt early. Evidence also suggests that some firms retire debt early at a loss to reduce currently taxable income.