The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers

We provide causal evidence that adverse capital shocks to banks affect their borrowers’ performance negatively. We use an exogenous shock to the U.S. banking system during the Russian crisis of Fall 1998 to separate the effect of borrowers’ demand of credit from the supply of credit by the banks. Firms that primarily relied on banks for capital suffered larger valuation losses during this period and subsequently experienced a higher decline in their capital expenditure and profitability as compared to firms that had access to the public-debt market. Consistent with an adverse shock to the supply of credit, crisis-affected banks decreased the quantity of their lending and increased loan interest rates in the post-crisis period significantly more than the unaffected banks. Our results suggest that the global integration of the financial sector can contribute to the propagation of financial shocks from one economy to another through the banking channel.     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

The valuation of a firm’s investment opportunities: a reduced form credit risk perspective

This paper develops a valuation model for a firm’s investment opportunities. Given standard market imperfections, we show that maximizing the firm’s equity value is consistent with the need to include a capital charge for an investment specific to a firm’s capital structure and in excess of the investment’s market determined risk. A reduced form credit risk perspective is taken to enable a continuous time implementation. This continuous time implementation is illustrated within the paper.      

Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.     

Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.     

Market Pricing of Deposit Insurance

We provide an approach to the market valuation of deposit insurance that is based on reduced-form methods for the pricing of fixed-income securities under default risk. By reference to bank debt prices as well as qualitative-response models of the probability of bank failure, we suggest how a risk-neutral valuation model for deposit insurance can be applied both to the calculation of fair-market deposit insurance premia and to the valuation of long-term claims against the insurer.     

A generalized coherent risk measure: The firm's perspective

This note extends the concept of a coherent risk measure to make it more consistent with a firm's capital budgeting perspective. A coherent risk measure defines the risk of a portfolio to be that amount of cash that must be added to the portfolio such that it becomes acceptable to a regulator. As such, a coherent risk measure implicitly assumes that the firm has already made its capital budgeting decision. Except for a cash infusion, the portfolio composition remains unchanged. We propose a generalized version of a coherent risk measure that also allows the portfolio composition to change as well. Once the investment decisions are fixed, our measure collapses to a coherent risk measure.     

Interest rate derivatives at commercial banks: An empirical investigation

I analyze the effects of bank characteristics and macroeconomic shocks on interest rate risk-management behavior of commercial banks. My findings are consistent with hedging theories based on cost of financial distress and costly external financing. Banks with higher probability of financial distress manage their interest rate risk more aggressively, both by means of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet instruments. As compared to the derivative users, the derivative non-user banks adopt conservative asset-liability management policies in tighter monetary policy regimes. Finally, I show that the derivative non-user bank's lending volume declines significantly with the contraction in the money supply. Derivative users, on the other hand, remain immune to the monetary policy shocks. My findings suggest that a potential benefit of derivatives usage is to minimize the effect of external shocks on a firm's operating policies.     

Are IPOs Really Underpriced?

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during thepast two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2,000IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvaluedat the offer price relative to valuations based on industrypeer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectionalregressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-dayreturns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvaluedIPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analystgrowth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projectedhigh growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while theirprofitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggestIPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts andpay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.