Web2.0环境下网络效应对价值共创的影响机理研究

Web2.0环境下,众多网络平台注重用户参与、交流互动与开放共享,为生产者、消费者等多主体协同参与价值共创提供了条件。为了深入探究网络外部性效应对Web 2.0价值共创模式的影响,研究构建了考虑网络效应的网络平台双边用户参与价值共创的理论模型,模型均衡解表明,消费者参与Web2.0网络平台进行价值共创会增加产品或服务的附加价值,提升消费者满意度,提高消费者对产品或服务的认知价值,进而吸引更多消费者参与价值共创,而消费者数量的增加会进一步提高该服务的价值,并吸引更多商户参与,由此产生正向网络外部性效应。建立了分析消费者剩余的经济模型,剖析了Web2.0环境下消费者无法参与价值分配却仍愿意参与价值共创的内在驱动因素。     

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.     

Who you are or whom you know? Consumption interdependences in social networks

This paper presents an analysis of whether a consumer's decision to switch from one mobile phone provider to another is driven by individual consumer characteristics or by actions of other consumers in her social network. Such consumption interdependences are estimated using a unique dataset, which contains transaction data based on anonymized call records from a large European mobile phone carrier to approximate a consumer's social network. Results show that network effects have an important impact on consumers’ switching decisions: switching decisions are interdependent between consumers who interact with each other and this interdependence increases in the closeness between two consumers as measured by the calling data. In other words, if a subscriber switches carriers, she is also affecting the switching probabilities of other individuals in her social circle. The paper argues that such an approach is of high relevance to both switching of providers and to the adoption of new products.     

The invoicing currency choice model of export enterprises assuming joint utility maximization and analysis of the factors influencing selection

Based on the assumption of joint utility maximization, an exporting currency unit pricing model was established, which consists of the local currency, producer's currency, and vehicle currency. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulation and partial least squares (PLS) regression were used to analyze currency weights. Results suggest that when a producer's currency is devalued relative to a local currency, if the demand elasticity of the importer is large, the local currency will primarily be used; if the bargaining power of the importer is strong, the producer's currency will primarily be used. Among these factors, the bargaining power of the exporter has the greatest influence, followed by the demand elasticity of the importer and the exporting country's exchange rate.     

Should Mobile Marketers Collect Data Other Than Geo‐Location?*

We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third‐degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo‐location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher‐quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns. In equilibrium, both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality, while only one acquires data if the data quality is low. Firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and/or when data are precise. Although social welfare (weakly) improves, consumers can be harmed.     

Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.     

市场不确定性下的电影保底发行模式抉择机制探究

随着近年来不断增大的社交网络影响,电影市场中影片发行方式开始显现出其规避风险的特性.基于市场不确定性所带来的收益风险,在保底发行模式下考虑了一个电影制片方及一个影片发行方的多阶段博弈模型.研究发现,相较于传统的分账发行模式而言,保底发行模式牺牲了制片方的部分期望收益,但能够有效降低其市场风险.部分市场风险通过保底发行模式被转嫁给发行方,但同时,该模式为发行方带来更高的期望收益.此外,市场不确定性的提高会打击制片方的运营信心并使其降低前期努力投入,但是会促使发行方增加其努力投入以提高影片的最终票房.     

Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer

If, for all prices, income distribution is optimal for a planner with a social welfare function, then aggregate demand is the same as that of a single “representative consumer” whose preferences over aggregate consumption are the same as the planner's. This paper shows that the converse is false. Aggregate demand may be the demand function of a representative consumer although the income distribution is not optimal for any social welfare function. The representative consumer may be Pareto inconsistent, preferring situation A to B when all the actual consumers prefer B to A. We give conditions under which existence of a representative consumer implies that the income distribution satisfies first order conditions for optimality. Satisfying the first order optimality conditions for an additively separable social welfare function is essentially equivalent to aggregate demand for every pair of consumers having a symmetric Slutsky matrix.     

Product Liability: Beyond Class Action

Can punitive product liability enhance economic efficiency? A very simple economic theory, assuming that the probability and the degree of product dissatisfaction are functions only of the producer's not of the consumer's effort, is modelled and analysed in this paper. The qualitative conclusion hinges critically upon whether the legal liability is reflected on price determination. If the price of the product is insensitive to product liability legislation, then punitive liability beyond the class action (i.e., compensatory payments more than proportional representation of potentially dissatisfied consumers) can induce socially desirable levels of effort exerted by the producer firm. This affirmative effect disappears if the price fully reflects all the expected legal liabilities, whereby punitive liability tends to reduce economic efficiency by encouraging costly lawsuit.     

Resource and Waste Taxation in the Theory of the Firm with Recycling Activities

The management of solid waste has become an urgent problem in nations with a great population density. Accordingly, waste reduction through source reduction and recycling has become increasingly important. Our purpose is to show how prevention, recycling and disposal of waste could be part of a theory of the firm. We first derive efficient production functions from production processes with waste as a by-product. Waste obtained as new scrap can partially be recycled by using additional inputs in order to cut back the purchase of virgin material. Waste not completely recyclable will leave the firm as disposal which also entails cost to the firm. We use the dual cost function approach to develop a theory of the firm under solid residual management.Since the producer does not bear the full cost of disposal, there will be a bias toward virgin materials and away from recycling. The goal of the government is to stimulate the firms to recycle with respect to the preservation of exhaustible resources. An incentive to recycle is a tax on resources or on waste. In order to determine the tax levels the government maximizes welfare subject to the dynamic constraint for decumulation of land fill for waste deposits. This gives the user cost and its time profile for taxing waste disposal or virgin material.In a comparative statics analysis we compare the effect of taxes on waste vs. virgin material on effort to produce in a resource saving manner, on the quantity of recycled material, on output, and on the reduction of waste. Since the impact of environmental regulation on employment is important, our model detects seven effects on labor demand as part of resource conservation policy. We finally carry out a comparative statics analysis of waste intensive firms operating in different market structures. Of interest is the impact of a resource or waste taxation on market volume, on the number of firms, on resource saving effort, and on profit.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

Should refusal to sell be illegal?

We analyse a private firm's decision of whether to refuse to sell to a particular group of consumers whose interaction with other consumers generates negative externalities. The literature has rarely incorporated this motive directly into the firm's profit-maximisation problem. Discriminatory refusal-to-sell policies can increase profits and consumer utility among those affected by the negative externality. Of course it also reduces utility among consumers who are refused, raising the possibility of an indeterminate effect on social welfare. We obtain a stark and rather surprising result: The refusal-to-sell policy is socially optimal whenever it is individually optimal for a profit-maximising firm to adopt such a policy. No legislation or regulation is required from a social-welfare perspective (under the assumptions used in the specification of the social welfare function). We prove this result analytically for the case of linear demand functions. Numerical simulations show that the result also holds for constant-price-elasticity demand functions.     

EXCESSIVE COMPETITION ON HEADLINE PRICES

In a variety of purchasing situations, consumers may focus primarily on headline prices, disregarding the full costs associated with acquiring and maintaining a product or service contract. Even when this is the case, the literature has delineated various circumstances where intense competition can protect consumers through the so-called “waterbed effect.” In this article, we however show that when consumers have context-dependent preferences, competition may rather exacerbate their and society's harm by distorting product choice and provision. Then, consumer protection policy must sufficiently constrain hidden fees so that competition, along with high-quality firms' incentives to educate consumers, can restore efficiency.     

Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one. The monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market, except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform, in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform. The market allocation is constraint-efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers. An increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition. As a result, the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In contrast, an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms.     

WEALTH AS A SIGNAL IN THE SEARCH MODEL OF MONEY*

This article investigates the possibility that wealth (holdings of money) serves as a signal of the ability to produce high‐quality products for agents who cannot directly observe the quality of the products. A producer's wealth may advertise past success in selling products to agents who knew the producer's ability and thus signal its ability. This analysis shows that such signaling effects may arise in equilibrium and may lead to more unequal distributions of wealth and lower welfare than would otherwise arise.     

Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus

We study wage determination in the Jovanovic model of matching, relaxing the standard assumption that wages continuously adjust to reflect on-the-job performance and studying aggregation of ex-ante heterogeneous career paths. We assume that workers have no bargaining power and consider an equilibrium where individual workers' age-earnings profiles are piecewise constant, reflecting their outside earning opportunities at each point in time. Turnover results from employers' firing decisions rather than from workers' quitting decisions, and the equilibrium delivers realistic cross-sectional and time-series implications. Employees receive only a portion rather than the whole of the ex-ante producer's surplus from established matches, and have individual incentives to lobby for increased job security. Inefficiently low aggregate turnover may result if such lobbying efforts are successful.     

Consumer well-being in a future of accelerating novelty

Novel goods and ideas are introduced to today’s consumers with increasing frequency. This phenomenon is perhaps most notable in the apparel industry, which in recent decades has seen the rise of “fast fashion” and an accelerating rate of novel style introductions from semi-annual to semi-weekly. In this paper I study the potential for this type of accelerating novelty to have a negative impact on consumer well-being. I analyze a simple theoretical model of consumer behavior in which consumers with a preference for novelty decide how fast to replace their fashion goods before and after an innovation which accelerates the rate at which new goods become available. In the basic model, where consumers update their goods based on their intrinsic preference for novelty, the novelty-accelerating innovation is not welfare-decreasing. However, when the model is extended in realistic ways, I find that there are at least three conditions under which the innovation may decrease welfare by increasing the extent of sub-optimal replacement: if there are external costs of updating to a newer good; if the consumers are boundedly rational and exhibit present bias; or if consumers’ replacement decisions reflect an arms race for social status. My results in these model extensions provide an economic foundation for rising popular concern about undesirable social effects of “fast fashion.” I also discuss the implications of these results for future patterns of consumption, which are likely to reflect still more accelerated novelty and possibly the expansion of fashion behavior to a broader range of consumption settings.     

Standardization in electronic money

Abstract

Electronic money services are provided by the combination of Integrated Circuit (IC) cards and terminals. The compatibility of different brands of electronic money can be enabled by firms' joint adoption of standard terminals. In this paper, we analyse the effect of achieving compatibility among different brands of electronic money. We show that, if the unit production cost of a standard terminal is not so much different from that of a non-standard one, firms' joint adoption of standard terminals will increase the total sales of IC cards and the network size of terminals, thus raising consumers' surplus and firms' profits. On the other hand, if the unit cost of a standard terminal is so high that firms are discouraged from voluntarily adopting standard ones, the government may employ subsides to enhance efficiency. However, if the duty of implementing standardization is placed solely on the firms without subsidies, all the agents, including consumers and retailers, will be left worse off.     

碳税再循环分配效应演化博弈研究

促进企业低碳生产和消费者绿色消费,是在社会经济高质量发展条件下实现碳达峰、碳中和目标的充分保障。构建由地方政府、企业和居民多主体构成的碳税再循环系统,结合当前中国国民收入水平和低碳经济发展状况,利用三方演化博弈理论研究多主体策略选择的演化过程,并应用Python程序设计语言对整个演化过程进行数值仿真,探究地方政府不同的补贴策略、产品的收入需求弹性和需求价格弹性等变量对碳税再循环分配效应的影响。研究结果表明：在低碳补贴和收入补贴策略之间,地方政府实施前者更能够促进居民绿色消费和企业低碳生产,但实施后者有利于改善收入不平等问题,同时产品的收入需求弹性和需求价格弹性差异也会影响地方政府碳税返还政策的效果。     

Corporate Social Responsibility and International Competition: A Welfare Analysis

This paper examines the welfare implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in international markets under imperfect competition. Based on a stylized model of an import‐competing duopolistic market, we show the feasibility of moving toward tariff reductions when both domestic and foreign firms launch CSR initiatives in that their payoffs include not only individual profits, but also the benefits of consumers. For the case where the foreign exporter unilaterally adopts the consumer‐oriented CSR as a strategy, there is a rent‐shifting effect because the foreign firm's payoff increases whereas the domestic firm's profit decreases. In response, the importing country's government raises its tariff on the foreign product. If, instead, the domestic firm adopts the CSR strategy unilaterally, the rent‐shifting effect disappears and both the competing firms’ payoffs increase. We further identify the conditions under which the CSR initiatives of the firms constitute the dominant strategy, leading to a Pareto efficient outcome at which the firms’ payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfare are at their maximum levels.