The Use of Performance‐based Remuneration: High versus Low‐growth Firms

This study analyses the CEO remuneration structure and level for 100 Australian‐listed entities. Consistent with expectations, it finds that high‐growth firms pay their CEOs a greater proportion of performance‐based pay, when equity‐based rewards only are considered. High‐growth firms also place greater reliance on market and/or non‐financial performance standards for the award of performance‐based pay. The extent to which performance‐based remuneration is used as a component of CEO pay is positively associated with firm size and growth options. Other potential determinants of performance‐based pay, such as financial performance, are not significantly associated with the use of performance‐based remuneration.     

Has Adoption of IFRS Increased Non–North American Institutional Investment in the Canadian Stock Markets?

We investigate whether non–North American (non‐NA) institutional investment in firms listed on the Canadian stock markets increased between the pre‐ and post‐IFRS adoption periods relative to such investment in firms listed on the U.S. stock markets. Prior to IFRS adoption, Canada had high‐quality financial reporting standards that were similar to the U.S. standards. As consequences of IFRS adoption, Canadian financial statements became more comparable with European and other IFRS country financial statements and less comparable with neighboring U.S. financial statements. Thus, a question of interest is whether the enhanced comparability with non‐NA companies was beneficial in terms of attracting non‐NA investment to Canadian companies versus U.S. companies. We find that there was no significant change in non‐NA institutional investment in Canadian firms relative to U.S. firms for the very largest (fifth quintile) and for smaller (first, second, and third quintiles) Canadian companies. However, intermediate‐sized Canadian companies in the fourth size quintile lost non‐NA institutional investment relative to their U.S. peer companies, suggesting that non‐NA investors cared more about comparability with U.S. peer companies than non‐NA peer companies for companies in this size quintile.     

Interlock Concentration and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Value Implications of Interlock

From the perspective of information commonalities among firms with director interlock relationships, this study mainly investigates the outcomes of earnings forecasts by analysts who choose to concentrate on interlocked firms (analysts following both a firm and its interlocked partner firm in their research portfolio). Using interlocked A‐share firms listed in the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2013 as samples, we empirically find that analysts who concentrate on interlocked firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who do not. In additional analysis, we also find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide superior earnings forecast quality for other non‐interlocked firms in their research portfolios. Finally, through examining the market reaction to interlocked firms, we find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide new information and improve information efficiency for the capital market.     

Factors Influencing Dividend Policy Decisions of Nasdaq Firms

This study reports the results of a 1999 survey of Nasdaq‐listed firms. Respondents provided information about the importance of 22 different factors that influence their dividend policy. Our results suggest that many managers of Nasdaq firms make dividend decisions consistent with Lintner's (1956) survey results and model. The results also show significant differences between the manager responses of financial and non‐financial firms on nine of the 22 factors. This finding implies the presence of industry effects on dividend policy decisions. In general, the same factors that are important to Nasdaq firms are also important to NYSE firms.     

The Long‐Term Effect of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on Cross‐Listing Premia

This paper uses a triple difference approach to assess whether the adoption of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act predicts long‐term changes in cross‐listing premia of affected foreign firms. I measure cross‐listing premia as the difference between the Tobin's q of a cross‐listed company and a non‐cross‐listed company from the same country matched on propensity to cross‐list (first difference). I find that average premia for firms cross‐listed on levels 2 or 3 (subject to SOX) declined in the year of SOX adoption (2002) and remained significantly below their pre‐SOX level through year‐end 2005 (second difference). Firms listed on levels 2 or 3, which are subject to SOX, experienced larger declines in premia than firms listed on levels 1 or 4, which are not subject to SOX (third difference). The estimated decline is 0.15–0.20 depending on specification. Riskier firms and firms from high‐disclosing and high‐GDP countries suffered larger post‐SOX declines. Firm size predicts smaller declines in premia in well‐governed countries. Faster‐growing firms in poorly‐governed countries experienced smaller declines in premia. The results are robust to the use of different before‐and‐after periods; the use of annual, quarterly, or monthly data; the use of individual companies' Tobin's q's instead of matched pairs, and different regression specifications. The overall evidence is consistent with the view that SOX negatively affected cross‐listed premia, and particularly hurt riskier firms and firms from well‐governed countries, while perhaps helping high‐growth firms from poorly‐governed countries. At the same time, after‐SOX, level‐23 firms continue to enjoy a substantial premium, estimated at about 0.32.     

Mean Reversion in Profitability for Non‐listed Firms

The presence of mean reversion in profitability at the firm level is important for valuation and prediction of growth and earnings. We investigate the mean reversion in accounting profitability for Norwegian non‐listed firms for the period 1988–2006. We find a mean reversion rate of about 0.44 per year. This is higher than found in other studies. We also find that small firms have a higher mean reversion rate than large firms. Our results should have important practical implications for the difficult task of valuing non‐listed firms. Previously, price‐to‐book ratios have been used to investigate changes in profitability over time for listed firms. We examine bankruptcy risk as an alternative variable for unlisted firms. We find that bankruptcy risk may help explain changes in profitability, but the results are not as strong as found in previous work.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Does the financial analysts' usage of non-financial information influence the analysts' forecast accuracy? Some evidence from the Belgian sell-side financial analyst

This paper examines whether the use of non-financial information by sell-side financial analysts influences the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. The research findings, based on a survey of Belgian financial analysts, suggest that financial analysts who use more forward-looking information and more internal-structure information offer more accurate forecasts. Furthermore, the listed Belgian firms examined in this study have improved their non-financial information reporting over time. However, neither the frequency nor the quantity of non-financial information mentioned by financial analysts in their reports appears to have increased over time.     

The Impact of AASB 8 Operating Segments on Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Australian Evidence

This paper evaluates the impact of firms’ adoption of AASB 8 segment disclosure rules on analysts’ earnings forecasts. It examines whether providing more disaggregated segment information following the adoption of AASB 8 is associated with an increase in analysts’ ability to forecast earnings. We find that analysts’ earnings forecasts have not improved significantly after adopting AASB 8 in Australia, regardless of whether firms disclosed more disaggregated segment information. Our use of control firms provides assurance that the results are due to AASB 8 and not to some other events concurrent with the adoption of AASB 8. Overall, our results imply that the benefits associated with the management approach as experienced by financial analysts in the United States have not been realised by financial analysts in Australia. This suggests that the successful adoption of an accounting standard in one country should not be the justification for recommending adoption in other countries. Further, our results raise questions about whether the enhanced disclosures required in the new standard are more for the other users of financial statements, such as investors, rather than analysts.     

Earnings management and firm financial motives: A financial investigation of UK listed firms

This study focuses on the investigation of motives for and characteristics of UK firms that engage in earnings management activities. It concentrates particularly on the provision of voluntary accounting disclosures, the violation of debt covenants, management compensation, and on the equity and debt capital needs of firms and their relation with the use of earnings management. The study examines also the earnings management inclination of firms that seek to meet or exceed financial analysts' forecasts. The findings generally indicate that firms with low profitability and high leverage measures are likely to use earnings management. Also, firms that are in equity and debt capital need and are close to debt covenant violation also appear to be inclined to employ earnings management practices. Likewise, firms tend to use earnings management to improve their financial numbers and subsequently reinforce their compensation and meet and/or exceed financial analysts' earnings forecasts. In contrast, the study shows that firms that provide voluntary accounting disclosures appear to be less inclined to make use of earnings management.     

Australian evidence on analysts' cash flow forecasts: issuance,accuracy and usefulness

This study examines the factors affecting the issuance, accuracy and usefulness of analysts' cash flow forecasts (CFFs) in Australia. Given the economic importance of the mining industry in Australia, we find that analysts are likely to provide CFFs for mining firms with poor financial health and high default risk. In contrast, analysts' provision of CFFs increases with the degree of financial health for non‐mining firms. The determinants of the issuance and accuracy of analysts' CFFs also differ in pre‐ and post‐IFRS adoption periods. Our results add new evidence on the effect of IFRS adoption on analysts' cash flow forecasting behaviours.     

The Importance of Corporate Foreign Debt in Managing Exchange Rate Exposures in Non‐Financial Companies

This empirical study of the exchange rate exposure management of Danish non‐financial firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange shows that debt denominated in foreign currency (‘foreign debt’) is a very important alternative to the use of currency derivatives. The results show that the relative importance of foreign debt is positively related to (1) the extent of foreign subsidiaries, (2) the relative value of assets in place, and (3) the debt ratio. The pivotal role of time horizon is emphasised. These findings are important to firms in other countries with open economies.     

The effect of cross‐listing on insider trading returns

Holding privileged positions within firms, insiders can acquire excessive private benefits based on their informational advantage. The bonding hypothesis suggests that this can be prevented when a firm is cross‐listed on an exchange with higher regulatory and legal costs compared with its home exchange. When cross‐listed insiders buy and sell shares, the returns earned are lower than in domestic firms. This difference is attributable to the increased shareholder protection in cross‐listed firms that constrains the extraction of private benefits, such that when cross‐listed insiders trade, they trade for non‐informational reasons.     

The Informational Role of Short Sellers: The Evidence from Short Sellers’ Reports on US‐Listed Chinese Firms

Using US‐listed Chinese firms as the setting, this paper studies a novel channel through which investors can acquire information about firms’ financial reporting quality, that is, the reports published voluntarily by short sellers. I find that short sellers tend to target firms that have financial reporting red flags and that exhibit ‘good’ operating performance and stock valuations. Targeted firms experience an average three‐day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of ?6.4%, and ?13.6% for initial coverage of the firm, and the CARs are more negative when the reports allege more severe misconduct of the firms. Non‐targeted firms also experience losses in value following short seller reports, especially when they hire the same non‐Big 4 auditors as targeted firms and when their earnings quality is poor. In comparison, analysts fail to perform proper due diligence and are much less effective than short sellers in exposing misreporting risk in Chinese firms.     

Effective derivative hedging and initial public offering long‐run performance

We investigate the role of corporate currency risk management through the use of financial derivatives in influencing the long‐run performance of a sample of Australian resources companies. We find that derivative users generally outperformed nonderivative users in the 5‐year period following listing. Effective derivative users consistently outperformed the nonhedgers. Furthermore, within the population of derivative users, effective derivative users tended to perform better than ineffective hedgers. Our results indicate that effective financial risk management plays a role in long‐run IPO performance.     

How Representative Are Firms That Are Cross‐Listed in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality

We provide evidence on the characteristics of local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings for firms cross‐listing on U.S. exchanges relative to a matched sample of foreign firms currently not cross‐listing in the United States to investigate whether U.S. listing is associated with differences in accounting data reported in local markets. We find that cross‐listed firms differ in terms of the time‐series properties of earnings and accruals, and the degree of association between accounting data and share prices. Cross‐listed firms appear to be less aggressive in terms of earnings management and report accounting data that are more conservative, take account of bad news in a more timely manner, and are more strongly associated with share price. Furthermore, the differences appear to result partially from changes around cross‐listing and partially from differences in accounting quality before listing. We do not observe a similar pattern for firms cross‐listed on other non‐U.S. exchanges or on the U.S. over‐the‐counter market, suggesting a unique quality to cross‐listing on U.S. exchanges.