The Licensing of Barbers in the USA

Barbering is one of the earliest professions to be licensed in the USA. This article discusses the origins of barber licensing, as well as its current status and scope, and then estimates the effects that such licensing has had on barbers' earnings. To estimate these effects we use micro‐level data from the 2000 US Census along with several measures of the strictness of state licensing of barbers. Our results suggest that certain licensing provisions may have increased barber earnings by between 11 and 22 per cent. The magnitude of our estimates is somewhat higher than those found in studies examining the effects of licensing in similar professions.     

Technology Exploitation Paths: Combining Technological and Complementary Resources in New Product Development and Licensing

Technological resources in the form of patents, trade secrets, and know‐how have become key assets for modern enterprises. This paper addresses a critical issue in technology and innovation management, namely, the commercial exploitation of technological resources resulting from research and development (R&D) investments. Extracting economic value from these resources by maximizing the benefits for shareholders is an extremely challenging task because technological resources are intangible, idiosyncratic, uncertain, predominantly tacit, and with poorly defined property rights. In their attempt to extract the maximum value from their technological resources, firms increasingly combine their internal exploitation through new product development (NPD) with external exploitation through licensing. However, most existing studies on NPD and technology licensing have treated the two exploitation paths independently and in isolation, which has resulted in two separate research streams using different theories and addressing different managerial challenges. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to filling this gap by developing and testing a comprehensive conceptual framework that simultaneously considers the antecedents affecting the successful implementation of NPD and licensing strategies as well as their consequences on firm profitability. The paper in particular investigates the effects of the interplay between technological resources and three types of complementary resources, marketing, manufacturing, and relational. We test the model using structural equation modeling on a sample of 733 Spanish manufacturing firms observed from 2003 to 2007. The data provide support for the existence of different paths to market firm technologies: an internal path, whereby the ownership of technological resources fully explains NPD performance, and an external path, whereby high intensity of marketing and relational resources reinforces the positive effect of technological resources on licensing performance. This sustains the relevance of the resource‐based value‐enhancing effects of complementary resources in licensing, as opposed to the motivation‐reducing effects advanced by transaction cost‐based literature. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows a substitution effect between NPD and licensing, whereby their simultaneous pursuit at intense levels is associated with lower profit margins. This provides evidence of the much theorized, but seldom tested, rent dissipation effect. These findings offer several contributions to research on licensing, NPD, open innovation, and the resource‐based view of the firm. On a managerial level, they suggest that achieving maximum value from proprietary technologies may not entail exploiting them both through external and internal paths. Managers are also informed that the resource combinations that enhance licensing performance include marketing and relational resources.     

Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?

Occupational licensing regulations require workers in many different professions to obtain a special permit to work legally in their chosen field. Although professional associations argue that the only goal of professional licensing is to protect the public, occupational regulation may also reduce competition: for example, by reducing entry. This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union.

     

The impacts of academic patenting and licensing on knowledge production and diffusion: a test of the anti-commons effect in Taiwan

This paper empirically examines the emerging anti-commons effect of academic patenting and licensing on knowledge production and diffusion in Taiwan. Through a dataset of 229 Taiwanese academic patent inventors, the results reveal that the anti-commons effect is not significant as expected. However, this effect has becomes more vivid in application-oriented research and disclosure delay while academic patent inventors have involved more in licensing activities. Programs to encourage academic licensing should be aware of the side effects on academic knowledge production and diffusion.     

There and Back Again: The De‐Licensing and Re‐Licensing of Barbers in Alabama

The economic effects of occupational licensing remain an understudied topic, but even less is known about the effects of the removal of licensing legislation. In this article, we take advantage of a natural experiment that occurred in the state of Alabama. Alabama was the last state to begin licensing barbers in 1973 and also the only state to de‐license barbers (in 1983). Relying on data from 1974 to 1994, we find evidence that barber de‐licensing reduced the average annual earnings of barbers as well as the number of cosmetologist employees per million residents in Alabama, although not all our results are statistically significant. We also find evidence that de‐licensing resulted in small increases in the number of barber shops and decreases in the number of cosmetology shops in Alabama. In recent decades, a number of attempts have been made to re‐license the occupation — most recently with a barber licensing bill that became law in September 2013. The result is that barbering in Alabama is once again a licensed occupation. Our limited evidence suggests that the re‐licensing of barbers in Alabama may already have had an effect on pay and on the number of barber shops.     

The Labor‐Market Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws in Nursing

We study the labor‐market impacts of occupational licensing laws on nursing, an economically important occupation. States adopted licensing of registered and practical nurses at different times, which allows us to estimate the effects of licensing on wages and participation for each nursing profession. We find that licensure raised wages by 5 to 10 percent but there is no evidence that it reduced overall participation. Additionally, we show that licensure equalizes wages within the occupation with minority wages rising faster than nonminority wages; however, licensing had a negative but not statistically significant impact on the participation of minorities in nursing.     

Modularity and intellectual property protection

Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state‐sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact of modularity on IP protection by formally modeling the threat of expropriation by agents. The principal has three options to address this threat: trust, licensing, and paying agents to stay loyal. We show how the principal can influence the value of these options by modularizing the system and by hiring clans of agents, thus exploiting relationships among them. Extensions address screening and signaling in hiring, the effects of an imperfect legal system, and social norms of fairness. We illustrate our arguments with examples from practice.© 2014 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Building product diversification through contractual R&D agreements

Firms engage in contractual R&D agreements for several reasons, including product innovation motives, firm performance goals, and technological diversification. This article demonstrates that firms also might enter into external collaborations to penetrate new markets. This study therefore explores both the effects and the strategic risks of contractual R&D agreements and their related knowledge structures for a firm's capacity to diversify into new markets. Drawing on a novel panel data set obtained from 102 Fortune high‐tech firms, the authors demonstrate that strategic alliances enable knowledge‐integrated firms to penetrate new businesses; however, these organizations should be cautious about engaging in licensing‐in agreements, which have negative effects on product diversification.     

Introduction to the RIO Special Issue on Antitrust and the Platform Economy

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

     

Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.     

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.      

Licensing information goods

A significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis. Patent holders, however, may face a dynamic problem, namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable-goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side. Licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem. There are situations, however, where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent (the case of information goods) or due to compulsory patenting laws. We study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations. Relative to the existing literature, we obtain the following main results: (i) all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation; (ii) royalty licensing may be superior to fixed-fee or auction licensing from the licensor's point of view; (iii) social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales; (iv) even for non-drastic innovations, the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation (before the innovation was discovered).     

Unionization structure, licensing and innovation

We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union.     

The influence of firm and industry characteristics on returns from technology licensing deals: evidence from the US computer and pharmaceutical sectors

This study examines the relationships between firm and industry characteristics and firms' abnormal stock market returns accompanying the announcement of technology licensing deals. In particular, I examine the fit among firms' licensing activities, their resource endowments, and their industry context, and develop hypotheses on its impact on abnormal stock market returns after licensing deals. Analyzing 11 years of inward and outward licensing transactions in the US computer and pharmaceutical industries between 1990 and 2000, I find support for my argument that while firms profit from both inward and outward licensing, the magnitude of such profits is determined by licensing firms' resource endowments, and that these determinants have a different impact in different industry contexts. Understanding these relationships helps explain when firms should use licensing to exploit their proprietary technologies and make better predictions about the impact of licensing transactions on firm performance.     

Occupational Regulation in the European Union: Coverage and Wage Effects

We present the first EU‐wide study on the prevalence and labour market impact of occupational regulation in the European Union. Drawing on a new EU Survey of Regulated Occupations, we find that licensing affects about 22 per cent of workers in the European Union, although there is significant variability across member states and occupations. On average, licensing is associated with a 4 per cent higher hourly wage. Using decomposition techniques we show that rent capture accounts for one‐third of this effect and the remainder is attributed to signalling. We find considerable heterogeneity in the wage gains by occupation and level of educational attainment. Finally, occupational licensing increases wage inequality. After accounting for composition effects, licensing increases the standard deviation of wages by about 0.02 log points.     

The Structure of Licensing Contracts

Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related versus unrelated parties. We offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross-industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights.     

Deals not done: Sources of failure in the market for ideas

Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, congestion, lack of market safety) to deal outcomes. We disaggregate the licensing process into three stages and find that, although lack of market thickness and deal failure are correlated in the first stage, they are not in the latter stages, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which negotiations over intellectual property often occur. In contrast, market safety is only salient in the final stage. Several commonly referenced bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, particularly in the second stage. Also, universities and firms differ in the stage during which they are most likely to experience deal failure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investigating the Influence of Technology Inflows on Technology Outflows in Open Innovation Processes: A Longitudinal Analysis

The open innovation (OI) paradigm emphasizes the importance of integrating inbound and outbound flows of technology to increase a firm's innovation performance. While the synergies between technology inflows and outflows have been discussed in conceptual OI articles, the majority of empirical studies have typically focused on either the inward or the outward dimension of OI. According to recent reviews of OI literature, there is a need for further research that takes an integrated perspective on this topic and studies the combination of the inbound and outbound dimensions of OI. This paper follows these calls by focusing on technology licensing as the main contractual form for OI, and by investigating the relationship between technology in‐licensing and out‐licensing activities at the firm level of analysis. In particular, this paper argues that technology in‐licensing positively influences the volume of technology out‐licensing through two mechanisms. The first—resource‐based—occurs because in‐licensing investments expand and enrich the firm's technology base, thus increasing its value and, as a result, creating more opportunities for out‐licensing. The second—capabilities‐based—occurs because, due to commonalities between technology in‐licensing and out‐licensing in terms of performed tasks and required skills, repeated execution of in‐licensing transactions contributes to the development of higher out‐licensing capabilities and, as a result, increase out‐licensing volume. These arguments are tested using a panel dataset of 837 Spanish manufacturing firms over the period 1998–2007. Consistent with the predictions, the empirical analysis shows that higher investments in in‐licensing and more extensive in‐licensing experience lead to superior volumes of technology out‐licensing. These results contribute to research on OI and licensing, by empirically showing the existence of positive interactions between technology inflows and outflows and of synergies in the development of absorptive and desorptive capacities.     

Guest Editors' Introduction to Special Issue. Turnaround in Asia: Laying the Foundation for Understanding this Unique Domain

Turnaround is a subject that is receiving increasing attention from researchers, managers and consultants. However, the subject has received minimal examination in Asia, with studies usually focusing more on the external environment or macroeconomic issues and less on the management of Asian firms themselves. This lack of examination has persisted despite the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, which pushed many firms into significant decline. Thus, this special issue will provide a baseline for examining this topic more closely. This introduction presents ten papers of this special issue of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management on firm turnaround in Asia. This paper also suggests key research questions for future examinations of the topic of firm turnaround in and around Asia.     

Patent pools in 5G: The principles for facilitating pool licensing

Patent pools collect patents from multiple patentees and license them out as a package. They offer one-stop-shop licensing efficiencies, reduce transaction costs, and increase the predictability of the licensing environment for the benefit of innovation diffusion. However, pools failed to take off for previous cellular standards. This article analyses both retrospectively the reasons for such failures and prospectively what makes the 5G environment more conductive to pool formation and licensing. Avanci, a patent pool for licensing cellular standards in the Internet of Things (IoT), is a significant development but has limited licensing coverage so far. The article then recommends five policy principles to facilitate pool licensing in the IoT. They include recognising that only enough upstream SEP owners need to join the 5G pool to create a market signalling effect. Some vertically integrated SEP owners may remain outsiders, and some bilateral licensing may co-exist without damaging the pool's success. To encourage upstream SEP owners to join the pool, they should be allowed to set ‘high enough’ royalty rates and divide pools' royalties among members under value proportionality rules. 5G pools must also be flexible and adopt different licensing programs that consider the specificities of each IoT market. Finally, pool administrators should consult with IoT implementers before establishing licensing programs for them and have infringement legal standing if everything else fails. These principles would go a long way in spurring the broader use of 5G pool licensing for a more efficient, straightforward, and predictable IoT licensing environment.