学习《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》的体会

工程量清单就是由招标人提供工程数量，由投标人自主报价的一种计价行为；工程量清单计价模式是对原有定额计价模式的改革，其措施有“控制量、指导价、竞争费”。工程量清单计价要求投标单位根据市场行情和自身实力对工程量清单项目逐项报价，可以避免工程招标中的弄虚作假、暗箱操作等违规行为；工程量清单计价采用综合单价计价，实体和非实体分离，分部分项工程量清单项目是按综合实体划分，项目设默默置不含施工方法。实行工程量清单计价，有利于建筑市场公平竞争，有利于业主对投资的控制，有利于实现风险的合理分担。     

浅谈在工程量清单计价模式下建设单位在控制造价管理中的工作重点

工程量清单计价,是指由招标人按照国家统一的工程量计算规则提供工程量,由投标人自主报价的一种行为。招标人应该在施工图纸基础上,按照相应专业的工程量计算规则编制出工程量清单,投标人在招标人提供的工程量清单基础上,根据企业定额及相应技术规范要求自主报出相应清单的综合单价,并最终确定投标价格。因此,整个工程中有关工程造价的两个关键点一个是工程量,另外一个是综合单价及相应组价。对于建设单位。为了把工程建设好并能够合理地确定造价、控制造价,建设单位在管理中应抓好以下几个重要环节：     

谈影响工程量清单计价合理性的因素分析

工程量清单计价是指在工程量清单计价全过程中，招标人提供准确的工程量清单为平台，投标人以工程量清单为依据进行投标报价的活动。而工程量清单计价的合理性是指施工承包企业在投标报价时应符合《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》（以下简称《计价规范》）的要求，真正体现企业自主报价的原则。影响工程量清单计价合理性的因素主要有以下两方面：一是招标人提供工程量清单的质量；二是投标企业定额的建立。本文针对影响工程量清单计价合理性的因素进行了简要分析。     

试论工程量清单计价模式

推行工程量清单计价是“控制量、放开价、由企业自主报价、最终由市场形成价格,,的改革思路的体现。在工程量清单计价模式下工程造价由分部分项工程费、措施项目费、其他项目费、规费和税金等构成。采用工程量清单计价的一般工作程序为编制工程量清单、投标人依据工程量清单确定单价、确定投标总价、公开开标、评标定标、中标签订合同等。在这种模式下进行投标报价的关键是落实招投标法“三公”原则,以及“合理低价中价．不低于成本’’的原则。章最后提出了应注意的一些问题。     

工程量清单计价下的投标报价技巧

工程量清单计价，以招标人提供的工程量清单为依据，投标人分别对分部、分项工程，措施项目及其他项目进行报价，根据企业自主定价的原则，工程量清单报价从表达形式，组成内容和投标策略三个方面都体现了投标人通过市场竞争，自主形成价格这一特点。     

工程量清单报价的编制策略

■工程量清单是表现拟建工程的分部与分项工程项目,措施项目、其他项目名称和相应数量的明细清单,是一种用来表达工程计价项目的项目编码、项目名称和描述、单位、数量、单价、合价的表格。■工程量清单报价就是根据招标人提供工程量清单表格中的项目编码、项目名称和描述、单位、数量四个栏目,由投标人完成单价、合价两个栏目的报价。     

工程量清单的编制及报价

工程量清单计价是在建设工程招标投标中,招标人根据施工图纸,按照《建设工程量清单计价规范》计算工程量,并在招标文件中给出工程量清单,作为招标文件的重要组成部分,它反映了工程拟建情况,拟建数量,作为各投标人投标报价的共同基础。再由投标报价人依据招标文件中工程量清单和有关要求,结合施工现场情况,根据投标人自身的技术专长和管理水平,经营状况、机械配备以及合理的施工方案,按照企业定额或参照建设行政主管部门发布的现行消耗定额及价格信息,并考虑工程施工风险因素等进行自主报价的一种行为。这种投标方式较好地解决了“政府管理与…     

工程量清单面面观：新课题下的全新转变——工程量清单报价与施工企业经营转变的关系

工程量清单计价的含义 工程量清单——是表现拟建工程的分部分项工程项目、措施项目、其他项目名称及其相应工程数量的明细清单。 工程量清单计价——是指投标人完成由招标人提供的工程量清单所需的全部费用，包括分部分项工程费、措施项目费、其他项目费和规费、税金。 工程量清单计价方法——是指建设工程招投标中，招标人按照国家统一的工程量计算规则提供工程数量，由投标人依据工程量清单自主报价，并按照经评审低价中标的工程造价的计价方式。 工程量清单计价规范——是统一工程量清单编制、规范工程量清单计价的国家标准，调节建设工程招投标中使用清单计价的招标人、投标人双方利益的规范性文件；是我国在招投标工程中实行工程量清单计价的基础。参与招投标各方进行工程量清单计价应遵守的准则；是各级建设行政主管部门对工程造价计价活动进行监督管理的重要依据。     

浅析“工程量清单计价”的投标报价

“工程量清单计价”投标报价有利于规范业主在工程招投标中的计价行业，有利于规范建筑市场的秩序，是贯彻落实《招标投标法》的重要步骤。投标报价准确与否直接关系建设单位及施工单位的经济效益。要使有限的资金在各方面获取最大的收益，就必须对工程投标报价工作进行有效合理的控制，为此，介绍了“工程量清单计价”对投标报价的要求，提出了一些投标报价的策略，为保证施工企业的合理收入和建设单位的合理投资提供依据。     

工程量清单报价浅析

合理的报价模式是选择优秀施工承包商的保障，工程量清单报价是一套较科学的报价体系，该报价模式要求施工图纸设计深度到位，招标文件编制详实，既易于业主掌握单项工程报价、又易于企业编制综合单价及成本价的核算。     

On Strategic Quantity Bidding in Multiple Unit Auctions

Standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders' quantity decisions. Using a simple equilibrium model of bidding I analyze bidders' incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions. The main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions. Since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets, she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower-valuing bidders enter the set of winners. This prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions.     

浅议工程量清单计价招标方法

随着《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》的颁布实施,采用工程量清单计价更加能满足招标投标竞争定价和经评审合理低价中标的要求。相对于现行招投标计价方式,工程量清单计价能够更准确地反映工程的实际成本,有利于通过公开的竞争形成工程造价,同时工程量清单计价从技术上便于规范招投标入的计价行为,避免“暗箱操作”,增加透明度。由传统的工程招标方式向工程量清单招标法转变,还有很多问题值得关注和探讨,需要解决。     

工程造价改革助力中国海油中下游建设项目投资管控提升

随着工程造价市场化改革的不断深入,为更好发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用,近期住房和城乡建设部提出了我国工程造价改革方案,中国海洋石油集团公司积极响应.文章介绍了我国工程造价管理模式和计价模式的现状和中国海油中下游工程建设项目工程计价标准体系、工程造价定额体系和工程造价信息体系的建设现状,并从工程造价改革的主要任务改进...     

An Analysis of Resolution Trust Corporation Transactions: Auction Market Process and Pricing

This article describes the operations of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), examines the procedures it employs to resolve distressed Savings and Loan scenarios and investigates the pricing of transactions undertaken by the RTC. The RTC has been criticized for allegedly transferring properties to acquirers at "bargain" prices. The transactions involving publicly traded acquirers in RTC sales are examined from an auction theory perspective. Overall, there is little evidence that winning bidders experience stock price gains. There are, however, subsets of bidders for which the outcomes are predominantly negative. The only category of transactions which provide statistically significant gains to acquirers are Insured Deposit Transfers.     

A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy‐It‐Now: Theory and Evidence

In the ascending‐price auctions with Yahoo!‐type buy‐it‐now (BIN), we characterize and derive the closed‐form solution for the optimal bidding strategy of the bidders and the optimal BIN price of the seller when they are both risk‐averse. The seller is shown to be strictly better off with the BIN option, while the bidders are better off only when their valuation is high enough. The theory also implies that the expected transaction price is higher in an auction with an optimal BIN price than one without a BIN option. This prediction is confirmed by our data collected from Taiwan's Yahoo! auctions.     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

Price reaction functions and conjectural variations

Price conjectural variations are estimated to measure the degree of price competition in a product differentiated oligopoly. The empirical model is a simultaneous equation system of product demand and price reaction functions. Own and cross price demand elasticities are estimated in conjunction with the price conjectural variations and price reaction function elasticities. The conjectural variations are estimated for pairs of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal products using brand price and quantity data. The empirical results reject competitive brand pricing behavior in favor of independent or collusive pricing. Further, the hypothesis of a unique consistent conjecture is rejected.     

Joint pricing and procurement of fashion products in the existence of clearance markets

This paper focuses on the joint pricing and procurement of fashion products in the existence of clearance markets. It is assumed that the expected regular season demand is a linear decreasing function of the price and the end of period excess inventory is sold at a known discounted price in a clearance market where the demand is a random variable that follows a general distribution. It is shown that the expected profit function is unimodal and the optimal procurement quantity and price can be found from the first order conditions. Existence of a clearance market increases the profit, price, and the procurement quantity. In order to prove this, the optimal procurement and pricing policy of a price-setting retailer who does not have a clearance market is provided. As opposed to the literature, it is shown that the expected profit function of this problem is unimodal as well. A numerical study demonstrating the magnitude of the increase in profit, procurement quantity, and price is reported.     

Solving the Winner Determination Problem in a Divisible-Object Auction

In an auction of a divisible object, bidders' demand functions are often assumed to be nonincreasing, meaning that bidders are willing to pay less or the same price for every additional unit. Under this assumption, the optimal allocation that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue can be found using a greedy-based procedure. This article argues that situations may arise where a bidder may need to express her preferences through a nondecreasing demand function; when such a bidder is present in the auction, the greedy-based procedure does not guarantee the optimal allocation. Thus, this article proposes a mixed integer program that finds the optimal allocation in a divisible-object auction at which bidders submit their bids as arbitrary stepwise demand functions. The practical aspect of the mathematical program is presented by means of a simple yet illustrative example in a treasury bond auction setting. The results of the auctioneer's revenue are reported as a function of the number of bidders with nonincreasing and nondecreasing demand functions.