Oligopolistic markets with sequential search and production cost uncertainty

This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non‐monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.     

A search cost model of obfuscation

This article develops models in which obfuscation is individually rational for oligopolistic firms. Firms sell a homogeneous good to rational consumers who incur search costs to learn prices. Search costs are endogenized by allowing obfuscation—firms have an unobservable action that increases the time needed to learn their price. One model involves search costs convex in shopping time. We show that slight convexity can dramatically alter the equilibrium price distribution. A second model examines an informational linkage between current and future search costs: consumers are uncertain about a component of search costs. Here, a signal‐jamming mechanism can lead to equilibrium obfuscation.     

Consumer search and dynamic price dispersion: an application to gasoline markets

This article studies the role of imperfect information in explaining price dispersion. We use a new panel data set on the U.S. retail gasoline industry and propose a new test of temporal price dispersion to establish the importance of consumer search. We show that price rankings vary significantly over time; however, they are more stable among stations at the same street intersection. We establish the equilibrium relationships between price dispersion and key variables from consumer search models. Price dispersion increases with the number of firms in the market, decreases with the production cost, and increases with search costs.     

The Wealth Effects of Reducing Private Placement Resale Restrictions

Recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission reduced resale restrictions on Rule 144 private placements from 12 months to 6 months with the intention of lowering the cost of equity capital for issuing firms. In Canada, similar regulatory changes were adopted several years ago, providing a unique opportunity to test the wealth effects of reducing private placement resale restrictions. We find that shortening resale restrictions reduces the liquidity portion of offer price discounts, and thus lowers the cost of equity capital for issuing firms, but has no significant effect on announcement‐period abnormal returns after controlling for issuer type. However, there is a fundamental shift in the types of firms making private placements of common stock after the legislation‐induced easing of resale restrictions. Specifically, we find that smaller firms and firms with greater information asymmetry are less likely to issue privately placed common stock after the legislative change, suggesting that the easing of resale restrictions reduces the costly signal that helps to overcome the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem.     

Leadership based on asymmetric information

Rational players, unconstrained by contracts or formal authority, choose to follow a better‐informed leader, whose action reveals part of her information. If the leader satisfies a credibility condition, then the unique nondegenerate equilibrium solves distinct shirking and coordination problems and achieves the first best. If credibility fails, as is more likely for a large organization, then followers ignore the leader, and equilibria are very inefficient. Appointing multiple leaders, or a high‐cost leader, can restore credibility. If players invest privately in information, then a leader often appears endogenously. The equilibrium concept is an original extension of sequential equilibrium to continuous states.     

Equilibrium Price Dispersion in the Insurance Market

We consider price dispersion under nonsequential consumer search when a finite number of firms exists. We assume that firms have the same production technology. We find that single‐price equilibrium exists only when it is the highest possible price (monopoly price). Price dispersion is possible in equilibrium only when firms use mixed strategies. We also find that increased competition may increase price dispersion and the intensity of consumer search while reducing the expected profits of firms. The number of firms in the long run is increasing regarding expected market demand and decreasing regarding production cost and entry cost. We reinterpret some empirical observations reported in the literature.     

Sequential location games

We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and—under some additional restrictions—hump‐shaped and U‐shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner‐take‐all competition, trade‐offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.     

Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities

We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.     

Prices and heterogeneous search costs

We study price formation in a model of consumer search for differentiated products in which consumers have heterogeneous search costs. We provide conditions under which a pure‐strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Search costs affect two margins—the intensive search margin (or search intensity) and the extensive search margin (or the decision to search rather than to not search at all). These two margins affect the elasticity of demand in opposite directions and whether lower search costs result in higher or lower prices depends on the properties of the search cost density.     

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.     

Ordered search

I present an ordered‐search model that, in contrast with random‐search models, yields an intuitively appealing equilibrium in which there is price dispersion, prices and profits decline in the order of search and consumers with lower search costs search longer and obtain better deals. These features of the search equilibrium hold regardless of whether consumers are informed of prices prior to searching.     

Household Debt Overhang and Unemployment

We use a labor‐search model to explain why the worst employment slumps often follow expansions of household debt. We find that households protected by limited liability suffer from a household‐debt‐overhang problem that leads them to require high wages to work. Firms respond by posting high wages but few vacancies. This vacancy posting effect implies that high household debt leads to high unemployment. Even though households borrow from banks via bilaterally optimal contracts, the equilibrium level of household debt is inefficiently high due to a household‐debt externality. We analyze the role that a financial regulator can play in mitigating this externality.     

Predicting Long‐Term Financial Returns: VAR versus DSGE Model—A Horse Race

This paper considers a U.S. institutional investor who is implementing a long‐term portfolio allocation using forecasts of financial returns. We compare the predictive performance of two competing macrofinance models—an unrestricted vector autoRegression (VAR) and a fully‐structural dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—for horizons up to 15 years. Although the performances are similar for short horizons, the DSGE model outperforms the VAR at forecasting financial returns in the long term. This model also generates substantially higher Sharpe ratios. Although it contains fewer unknown parameters, it benefits from economically grounded restrictions that help anchor financial returns in the long term.     

Where is the GE? Consumption Dynamics in DSGEs

We offer a partial equilibrium perspective on the behavior of consumption in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We consider a benchmark dynamic general equilibrium model and show that a standard calibration implies that the real interest rate is essentially fixed. One manifestation of this feature is that, with separable preferences, the reaction of consumption to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks is flat: the random‐walk permanent income hypothesis holds almost exactly, pretty much as in a partial equilibrium consumption‐savings problem. These results help explain the prominent role of aggregate demand, and how it is achieved, in modern DSGE analysis.     

An approximate dynamic programming approach to solving dynamic oligopoly models

In this article, we introduce a new method to approximate Markov perfect equilibrium in large‐scale Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style dynamic oligopoly models that are not amenable to exact solution due to the curse of dimensionality. The method is based on an algorithm that iterates an approximate best response operator using an approximate dynamic programming approach. The method, based on mathematical programming, approximates the value function with a linear combination of basis functions. We provide results that lend theoretical support to our approach. We introduce a rich yet tractable set of basis functions, and test our method on important classes of models. Our results suggest that the approach we propose significantly expands the set of dynamic oligopoly models that can be analyzed computationally.     

The Cost of Capital of Cross‐listed Firms

This paper analyses the cost of capital of firms with foreign equity listings. Our purpose is to shed light on the question whether international and domestic asset pricing models yield a different estimate of the cost of capital for cross‐listed stocks. We distinguish between (i) the multifactor ICAPM of Solnik (1979) and Sercu (1980) including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and (ii) the single factor domestic CAPM. We test for the significance of the cost of capital differential in a sample of 336 cross‐listed stocks from nine countries in the period 1980–99. Our hypothesis is that the cost of capital differential is substantial for firms with international listings, as these are often large multinationals with a strong international orientation. We find that the asset pricing models yield a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital for only 12% of the cross‐listed companies. The size of the cost of capital differential is around 50 basis points for the US, 80 basis points for the UK and 100 basis points for France.     

Disagreement and Learning: Dynamic Patterns of Trade

The empirical evidence on investor disagreement and trading volume is difficult to reconcile in standard rational expectations models. We develop a dynamic model in which investors disagree about the interpretation of public information. We obtain a closed‐form linear equilibrium that allows us to study which restrictions on the disagreement process yield empirically observed volume and return dynamics. We show that when investors have infrequent but major disagreements, there is positive autocorrelation in volume and positive correlation between volume and volatility. We also derive novel empirical predictions that relate the degree and frequency of disagreement to volume and volatility dynamics.     

Takeovers,market monitoring,and international corporate governance

We theoretically and empirically examine the role of international takeover markets in curtailing dominant shareholder moral hazard for firms with higher value‐added from acquisitions. In equilibrium, such firms strategically list shares in the markets of their targets and voluntarily dilute dominant shareholder control through capital‐raising events to lower their expected acquisition costs. Empirical tests, using a sample of foreign firms cross‐listing on U.S. stock exchanges during 1990–2003, support the framework. We find a strong influence of post‐listing dilution of dominant shareholder control through capital‐raising events on the likelihood of acquisitions and their cost to the acquirers, in both U.S. and non‐U.S. markets.     

Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

This paper introduces a new hand‐collected data set that tracks restrictions on shareholder rights at approximately 1,000 firms from 1978 to 1989. In conjunction with the 1990 to 2006 IRRC data, we track shareholder rights over 30 years. Most governance changes occurred during the 1980s. We find a robustly negative association between restrictions on shareholder rights (using G‐Index as a proxy) and Tobin's Q. The negative association only appears after judicial approval of antitakeover defenses in the 1985 landmark Delaware Supreme Court decision of Moran v. Household. This decision was an unanticipated exogenous shock that increased the importance of shareholder rights.     

Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets

We present a thought‐provoking study of two monetary models: the cash‐in‐advance and the Lagos and Wright ( 2005 ) models. The different approaches to modeling money—reduced form versus explicit role—induce neither fundamental theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies, and shocks, both models reduce to equilibrium difference equations that coincide unless price distortions are differentially imposed on cash prices, across models. Equal distortions support equally large welfare costs of inflation. Performance differences stem from unequal assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the differential modeling of the monetary exchange process.