电梯制造企业实施成本领先战略探讨

成本领先是企业在市场竞争中立足的重要武器,在复杂的国际形势和国内产业结构转型期,保持成本领先对于制造企业安全渡过寒冬意义重大。文章就电梯制造企业实施成本领先战略进行探讨,阐述电梯制造企业成本管理的现状,分析影响电梯制造企业成本的因素,同时提出实施成本领先战略的相关对策。电梯制造企业在低利润时期实施成本领先战略,发挥成本领先优势,在企业发展进程中具有重要的战略意义,也是其他制造企业需要进一步考虑的问题。     

基于协同效应的并购目标企业价值评估探讨

目标企业价值评估是企业并购成功与否的重要影响因素之一.并购协同效应是并购的主要动因,但是传统企业价值评估方法并未把并购协同效应对目标企业价值的影响考虑在内.因此,文章通过分析协同效应产生的动因及其对目标企业价值的影响,提出了考虑协同效应的并购目标企业价值评估的基本思路、公式及参数确定方法.     

供应链组织结构与其绩效关系分析

市场竞争已转化为供应链与供应链之间的竞争,节点企业的协同效应是构筑供应链竞争优势的关健所在,而供应链结构及其关系是其协同的基础,即结构与绩效存在密切关系,因此,研究供应链的结构特征可以发现其运行的规律,有助于企业制定恰当的运营模式和供应链战略.文章首先总结出影响SCM组织结构的三个因素:形式化,集中化和等级关系;然后依据这三个因素将供应链分为五种组织;最后深入地分析了SCM组织类型和组织绩效之间的关系.     

基于企业知识基础与产品范围匹配的可持续竞争优势来源问题探讨

根据企业能力理论,企业的可持续竞争优势来源于知识这种重要的战略性资源,而形成于有效利用知识的能力,具体表现为企业的知识基础与产品范围的匹配程度.本文认为,实现企业知识基础与产品范围相匹配的具体措施须结合企业的具体情况来考虑,但无外乎是对企业现有的知识存量和产品种类两者中的任一方面或者两方面进行调整.这样的调整会导致企业知识基础与产品范围之间的协同演化.     

企业经营的战略“制高点”—企业道德水平

由于买方市场日趋成熟,市场竞争日益加剧,企业经营已经不再仅仅满足于短期利润,而是考虑立足于可持续的竞争优势。文章分析了"企业经营"和"企业道德"之间的关系,论述了竞争和正直之间的相容性以及企业道德水平的高低对企业可持续竞争优势规模的影响,总结出企业道德水平是约束     

德州产业集群战略实施初探

经济全球化的今天,市场竞争已从企业发展战略向产业集群战略演化。产业集群通过协同效应显现出的竞争优势日益受到关注。产业集群战略是当前经济欠发达地区加快工业化步伐的最佳选择,对仍处于经济欠发达阶段的德州来说,实施产业集群战略具有可行性和必要性。要实现德州经济的快速发展,应采取切实措施,有效实施产业集群战略。     

德州产业集群战略实施初探

经济全球化的今天，市场竞争已从企业发展战略向产业集群战略演化。产业集群通过协同效应显现出的竞争优势日益受到关注。产业集群战略是当前经济欠发达地区加快工业化步伐的最佳选择，对仍处于经济欠发达阶段的德州来说，实施产业集群战略具有可行性和必要性。要实现德州经济的快速发展，应采取切实措施，有效实施产业集群战略。     

企业区位选择与空间集聚的博弈分析

针对完全竞争市场条件下无法从企业的区位选择导出空间集聚的问题,本文对Hotelling模型进行了扩展,并运用博弈论的思想对企业的空间分布和集聚情况进行了分析.在Hotelling模型基础上,是否考虑集聚收益对企业空间分布产生重要影响:不存在集聚收益下的企业选择只取决于消费者偏好;但是考虑集聚收益后,企业的空间集聚不仅取决于消费者偏好,而且商品价格、运费率、集聚强度和消费者收入均会产生重要影响.     

加快推进技术创新增强企业核心竞争能力

创新是一个企业搏击市场、迎接挑战、抢抓机遇、赢得发展的根本保证.一个先进企业要保持自己的领先优势,一个弱势企业要实现跨越式发展,缩小与先进企业的差距,关键在于创新.而技术创新作为市场竞争中的决定性因素,是所有创新中最有活力、最有直接作用的竞争手段.因此,技术创新对每一个企业都具有十分重要的意义.……     

加快推进技术创新增强企业核心竞争能力

创新是一个企业搏击市场、迎接挑战、抢抓机遇、赢得发展的根本保证.一个先进企业要保持自己的领先优势,一个弱势企业要实现跨越式发展,缩小与先进企业的差距,关键在于创新.而技术创新作为市场竞争中的决定性因素,是所有创新中最有活力、最有直接作用的竞争手段.因此,技术创新对每一个企业都具有十分重要的意义.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

An open economy general equilibrium model with heterogeneous producers, a homothetic utility function and endogenous elasticity

Recent monopolistic competition models have identified three main sources of the gains from trade: (1) the introduction of new varieties for consumers, (2) an improvement in efficiency through the exit of low-productivity firms, and (3) a reduction in firms’ markups through import competition. In this paper, we extend Feenstra (Economics Letters, 78(1):79–86, 2003) to develop a model with producers heterogeneous in productivity to capture these gains. Here, firm markups are decreasing with market share, and trade introduces new varieties to consumers and reduces the market share of domestic firms. This reduces markups and profits and forces low-productivity firms to exit. This pro-competitive effect on the distribution of productivity contrasts with the conventional export-driven mechanism in a constant elasticity setup. We can usefully extend this model for further study because of the homotheticity of the utility function and the tractability of the model.     

An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

Strategic R&D investment,competitive toughness and growth

We show, within a single industry, the possibility that R&D‐investment is non‐monotonically related to competitive toughness: increasing when competition is soft and decreasing when competition is tough. This possibility results from the combination of a Schumpeterian markup squeezing effect discouraging innovation, and a concentration effect spurring innovators. It is obtained in a sectoral model where the number of innovators is random and where non‐successful investors may remain productive. The result is extended to a multisectoral stochastic endogenous growth model with overlapping generations of consumers and firms, the number of which is endogenously determined in the capital market.     

The impact of special economic zones on producer services productivity: Evidence from China

Do Special Economic Zones (SEZs) promote the productivity of producer services, and what are the channels of the effect? To shed light on these questions, we collect a dataset of 1.46 million producer service firms on the basis of the Second Economic Census of China. We then use the dataset to prove the productivity advantages of producer service industry in the SEZs. Guided by a “new” new economic geography model, we estimate these advantages using the IV model and unconditional distribution characteristic-parameter correspondence method. Results imply that agglomeration effect is the source of the productivity advantages of the producer services in the SEZs. This effect is positively correlated with the local manufacturing scale. A high industrial relevancy between the producer services and the leading manufacturing industry in the SEZs results in a strong agglomeration effect. The preferential policy in the SEZs reduces the entry barrier for firms and attracts a high proportion of inefficient firms entering with the selection effect. This result has a negative impact on promoting the productivity of producer services. The conclusions are robust in different circumstances.     

空间双寡头竞争下的创新扩散——基于博弈论的模型

关于创新空间扩散的研究一直没有关注空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.本文在双人博弈的框架下构建了一个空间双寡头竞争模型,假定厂商已经拥有关于创新的信息,单纯地考察空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.结果表明,即使同质的厂商同时获得了创新的信息,在竞争的作用下,创新的采纳很少会同时进行.先采纳者具有先发优势,且随着运费率的下降,先发优势愈发得以强化.本文还分析了空间竞争和技术扩散反梯度现象间的关系,结论是空间竞争至少是反梯度现象产生的一个原因.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

The impact of e-commerce: It always benefits consumers, but may reduce social welfare

This paper investigates the impact of e-commerce on social welfare using a linear city model. Our model incorporates the diversity of consumers such that some can purchase the good via the Internet while others cannot. Our main result is as follows. The appearance of e-commerce enhances retail competition and always increases consumer surplus. However, total surplus does not necessarily improve. This is because the equilibrium market division between conventional stores and e-commerce is not socially optimal and efficiency loss of distribution accrues if the population of Internet shoppers is small and/or the cost of e-commerce is high. Our theoretical results indicate that the small e-commerce market share in the Japanese and US economies may result in welfare loss.     

The Impact of Product Market Competition on Employers’ Training Investments. Evidence from German Establishment Panel Data

According to different training theories the sign of the relationship between competition and training is ambiguous. Using a large panel data set of German manufacturing establishments, this paper investigates the impact of product market competition on training incidence and on the share of trained workers. In our empirical analysis, we use three indicators of product market competition which are the Herfindahl index, the number of firms at the 3-digit industry level and the price-cost margin. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, there is no statistically significant effect of product market competition on training.     

Commitment and Cost of Equity Capital: An Examination of Timely Balance Sheet Disclosure in Earnings Announcements

In this paper, I examine the relation between disclosure commitment and cost of equity capital using accelerated earnings announcement disclosures as a measure of commitment. In settings characterized by imperfect market competition, I find that firms which consistently disclose balance sheet detail in relatively timely earnings announcements have lower costs of capital compared to other firms. This result is statistically significant and economically meaningful, and is robust to various alternative measurements for cost of capital, and alternative designs addressing endogeneity and underlying information quality. Overall, this result is important because it highlights additional dimensions of disclosure commitment (consistency and timeliness), while incorporating important features from theoretical models (information quality and market competition). In particular, my results suggest that consistency and timeliness are salient features of firms' disclosure behavior that have predictable and robust relations with capital market outcomes. This result is robust to controlling for underlying information quality; however, consistent with theory, it is conditional on low levels of market competition.