Market‐based estimates of implicit government guarantees in European financial institutions

I exploit the price differential of credit default swap (CDS) contracts written on debts with different levels of seniority to measure the implicit government guarantees enjoyed by European financial institutions from 2005 to 2013. I determine that the aggregate guarantee increased substantially during the recent financial crises and peaked at an average of 89 bps in 2011. My analysis suggests that the extent of implicit support depends on the type of financial institutions and there exists a eurozone effect. Further investigation of feedback relationship shows that the guarantee implicitly offered by a government positively ‘Granger causes’ the sovereign's default risk.     

The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks

This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks.     

The impact of government ownership on bank risk

We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ownership on bank risk. We distinguish between default risk (likelihood of creditors’ losses) and operating risk (likelihood of negative equity). Our analysis is based on the joint use of issuer ratings, a synthetic measure of a bank’s probability of default, and individual ratings, which omit the influence of any external support and focus on a bank’s operating risk. We report two main results. First, government-owned banks (GOBs) have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking. Second, GOBs’ operating risk and governmental protection tend to increase in election years. These results are consistent with the idea that GOBs pursue political goals and have important policy implications for recently nationalized European banks.     

Default Risk Estimation,Bank Credit Risk,and Corporate Governance

This study explores the relationship between credit risks of banks and the corporate governance structures of these banks from the perspective of creditors. The cumulative default probabilities are estimated for a sample of US commercial and savings banks to measure their risk taking behavior. The results show that one year and five year cumulative default probabilities are time‐varying, with a significant jump observed in the year prior to the financial crisis of 2008–09. Generally speaking, corporate governance structures have a greater impact on US commercial banks than on savings institutions. We provide evidence that, after controlling for firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger boards and older CFOs are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels. Lower ownership by institutional investors and more independent boards also have lower credit risk levels, although these effects are somewhat less significant. For all the banks in our sample, large board size, older CFO, and less busy directors are associated with lower credit risk levels. When we restrict the sample to consider the joint effects of the governance variables, the results on board size and busy directors are maintained.     

Large EU banks’ capital and liquidity: Relationship and impact on credit default swap spreads

This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005–2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.     

Government interventions and default risk: Does one size fit all?

We examine the effectiveness of the financial sector rescue packages provided by the national governments during the 2008 financial crisis. This study questions the implicit assumption that government interventions have an uniform effect on the default risk of individual banks. After testing the results for sensitivity, our main findings suggest that there exists a significant negative relationship between the announcement of the financial sector rescue packages and the daily change of the credit default premium. However, quantile regressions show that the effectiveness of these packages differs across banks: most interventions do not decrease the risk of intermediate to low-risk banks, while they do reduce the risk of high-risk banks. Besides, we find that interventions aimed at specific financial institutions are more effective in restraining banking risk than broad interventions taken to stabilize the financial market as a whole.     

Impacts of the financial crisis on eurozone sovereign CDS spreads

We study the variation of sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs) of eurozone countries, their persistence and co-movements, with particular attention given to the impact of the financial crisis. Specifically, using a dual fractional integration model, we test the evidence of long memory for CDSs of ten eurozone countries. Our analysis reveals that price discovery processes satisfy the minimum requirements for a weak form of efficiency for sovereign CDS markets, even during the crisis. In contrast, we document the spreading out of persistent CDS uncertainty among the peripheral economies with its outbreak. We provide evidence that CDS uncertainty has implications for the pricing of sovereign risk including that of core countries in the crisis period. Finally, we present the potential spillover effects utilizing a dynamic conditional correlation model and show that, with the collapse of Lehman, the probability of a contagion increased across all countries and became more explicit for peripheral economies as the sovereign crisis took on a new dimension.     

Systemic risk in the European sovereign and banking system

We investigate the systemic risk of the European sovereign and banking system during 2008–2013. We utilize a conditional measure of systemic risk that reflects market perceptions and can be intuitively interpreted as an entity’s conditional joint probability of default, given the hypothetical default of other entities. The measure of systemic risk is applicable to high dimensions and not only incorporates individual default risk characteristics but also captures the underlying interdependent relations between sovereigns and banks in a multivariate setting. In empirical applications, our results reveal significant time variation in systemic risk spillover effects for the sovereign and banking system. We find that systemic risk is mainly driven by risk premiums coupled with a steady increase in physical default risk.     

Asset correlations and bank capital adequacy

This paper addresses the estimation of confidence sets for asset correlations used in credit risk portfolio models. Research on the estimation of asset correlations using endogenous probabilities of default estimations has focused on the impact of concentration risk factors, such as firm size and industry. The empirical evidence from Italian small- and medium-size companies show that the assumptions underlying the Basel Committee regulatory capital risk weight function are not substantiated. The regulatory impact is that the capital adequacy is significantly compromised, driving an adverse selection, which favors the worst companies, and transferring the procyclical effects from firms to banks.     

The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises

European banks became a source of risk to global financial markets during the financial crisis and attention to the European banking sector increased during the sovereign debt crisis. To measure the systemic risk of European banks, we calculate a distress insurance premium (DIP), which integrates the characteristics of bank size, probability of default, and correlation. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around €500 billion. We find that this was largely due to sovereign default risk. The DIP methodology is also used to measure the systemic contribution of individual banks. This approach identifies the large systemically important European banks, but Italian and Spanish banks as a group notably increased in systemic importance during the sample period. Bank-specific fundamentals like capital-asset ratios predict the one-year-ahead systemic risk contributions.     

Assessing systemic risk using interbank exposures in the global banking system

This paper contributes to the literature on systemic risk by examining the network structure of bilateral exposures in the global banking system. The global interbank market constitutes a major part of the global banking system. The market has a hierarchical network structure, composed of the national or jurisdictional area's local markets and the cross-border interbank market. First, we estimate the bilateral exposures matrix using aggregate financial data on loans and deposits from Bankscope and analyze the interconnectedness in the market using network centrality measures. Subsequently, for the model analysis, we apply the Eisenberg–Noe framework to a multi-period setting. In this framework, bank defaults are classified into stand-alone defaults and contagious defaults. The banks in our sample (i.e., the top 202 banks with more than $50 billion in total assets) comprise a major part of this global banking system. The main findings are as follows: The theoretical network analysis using network centrality measures showed that most of the banks designated as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) play a central role in the global interbank market. The theoretical default analysis showed a few contagious defaults triggered by the basic defaults during and after the global financial crisis. Our stress test proved that many G-SIBs theoretically caused 1–6 contagious defaults. Our methodology would assist in the development of a monitoring system by the respective supervisory authorities as well as in the implementation of bank-internal stress tests of default contagion.     

Systemic Bank Risk in Brazil: A Comprehensive Simulation of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign and Inter-Bank Risks

In this study we present a comprehensive forward‐looking portfolio simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, private sector and Sovereign credit risk, and inter‐bank default risk. In order to produce better integrated risk assessment for banks and systemic risk assessments for financial systems, we argue that reasonably detailed modeling of bank asset and liability structures, loan portfolio credit quality, and loan concentrations by sector, region and type, as well as a number of financial and economic environment risk drivers, is required. Sovereign and inter‐bank default risks are increasingly important in the current economic environment and their inclusion is an important model extension. This extended model is demonstrated through an application to both individual Brazilian banks (i.e., 28 of the largest banks) and groups of banks (i.e., the Brazilian banking system) as of December 2004. When omitting Sovereign risk, our analysis indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1‐year horizon. This low default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian banks, but also reflects the banks' adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest rate spreads. We note that none of the banks which we modeled failed during the very stressful 2007‐2008 period, consistent with our results. Our results also show that a commonly used approach of aggregating all banks into one single bank, for purposes of undertaking a systemic banking system risk assessment, results in a misestimate of both the probability and the cost of systemic banking system failures. Once Sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government securities reach 10% (or higher), we find that several banks could fail during the same time period. These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower, or type of borrower, which has a non‐zero probability of default (e.g., the Government of Brazil). Our analysis also indicates that, in the event of a Sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for assessing bank asset, liability, loan portfolio structure and correlated market and credit (private sector, Sovereign, and inter‐bank) default risk for banks and banking systems. We conclude that such forward‐looking risk assessment methodologies for assessing multiple correlated risks, combined with the targeted collection of specific types of data on bank portfolios, have the potential to better quantify overall bank and banking system risk levels, which can assist bank management, bank regulators, Sovereigns, rating agencies, and investors to make better informed and proactive risk management and investment decisions.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

Incorporating Collateral Value Uncertainty in Loss Given Default Estimates and Loan-to-value Ratios

We present a model of risky debt in which collateral value is correlated with the possibility of default. The model is then used to study the expected loss given default, primarily as a function of collateral. The results obtained could prove useful for estimating losses given default in many popular models of credit risk which assume them constant. We also examine the problem of determining sufficient collateral to secure a loan to a desired extent. In addition to bank practitioners, regulators might find our analysis useful in reviewing banks’ lending standards relative to current collateral values. In particular, the current proposals for The New (Basel) Capital Accord involve options for the use of banks’ own loss given default estimates which might benefit from the analysis in this paper.     

Using extreme value theory to estimate the likelihood of banking sector failure

Abstract

The growing interest in management of credit risk and estimation of default probabilities has given rise to a range of more or less elaborate credit risk models. While these models work well for non-financial firms they are usually not very successful in capturing the financial strength of banks. As an answer to this, Hall and Miles suggest a simple approach of estimating bank failure probabilities based solely on their stock prices. This paper suggests an extension to the Hall and Miles model using extreme value theory and applies the extended model to the Swedish banking sector around the banking crisis of the early 1990s. The extended model captures very well the increased likelihood of a systemic banking sector failure around the peak of the crisis and it produces default probabilities that are more stable, more realistic and more consistent with Moody’s and Fitch rating implied default rates than probabilities from the original Hall and Miles model.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

小微企业风险测度、不良容忍度及其风险控制研究

本文以违约概率为小微企业风险的测度标准,建立了基于财务与非财务因素的小微企业风险计量模型。计量结果表明:除流动比率等少数指标外,大部分财务指标对判断小微企业违约概率不具有显著性;非财务因素中,反映小微企业资金状况的存贷比率指标具有较高的显著性,这说明现阶段部分商业银行在小微企业审查审批和贷后管理过程中将小微企业资金结算情况作为风险评价的重要依据,具有一定的科学性和准确性;小微企业的下游客户集中程度对判断小微企业违约概率也有较大的显著性,这说明小微企业的销售渠道是评价小微企业风险程度的重要要素。