第二价格密封招标中串谋预防机制研究

第二价格密封拍卖和招标机制作为一种可以使投标人"说真话"的机制受到理论界的广泛关注。本文研究了第二价格密封招标中,如何采用公开保留价机制对投标人平行串谋进行预防。首先建立了第二价格密封招标的串谋组织报价及利润分配机制,然后分析了存在串谋时招标人应采用的公开保留价定价机制,最后研究了串谋组织成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系。     

投标人参考点效应与最优公开保留价博弈分析

本文从行为经济学出发,用博弈论的方法研究存在参考点效应时,投标人在第一价格和第二价格密封招标中的报价策略以及招标人的最优公开保留价定价策略,并对不同招标方式下投标人的期望收益进行比较。本文给出存在参考点效应时招标最优公开保留价的定价公式,分析了参考点效应和投标人数对最优公开保留价的影响。研究表明,在采用公开保留价的情况下,考虑投标人参考点效应对报价策略的影响时,不同招标方式给投标人带来的期望收益是相等的,即此时招标支付等价性命题仍然成立。此外,随着投标人参考点效应的增强和投标人数的增加,招标人的最优公开保留价下降。     

进入成本对最优公开保留价影响的博弈分析

本文将拍卖中有关进入成本的研究内容进行扩展,将进入成本与最优公开保留价策略结合,对标准招标中存在同质和异质进入成本时的最优公开保留价定价问题进行了研究.经过研究,发现在公开保留价的情况下,不同进入成本对招标人的期望支出、投标人的期望效用以及社会净支出方面的影响是不同,从而招标的最优公开保留价定价策略也是不同的.当投标人之间存在同质进入成本时,招标公开保留价应与招标人的真实估价相同;当投标人之间存在异质进入成本时,招标最优公开保留价不应小于标准招标模型中的最优公开保留价.     

招标最低限价与公开保留价对防范串谋的共同作用

本文从防范投标人串谋的角度出发,将招标中的最优公开保留价和最低限价两种方式结合起来,通过一个离散的博弈模型,分析了第二价格密封招标中最低限价和公开保留价在防范串谋中的共同作用,经过研究发现最优公开保留价和最低限价对防范串谋方面所起作用,依赖于投标人的价值分布以及出现的可能性,另外还与投标人进行平行串谋时的成本有关。     

建设项目全过程跟踪审计方法探析

一、项目招投标阶段审计(一)工程项目招标方式审计:采用公开招标的,主要审查招标人是否在国家指定的报刊和信息网络上公开发布招标公告,招标公告内容是否完整;采取邀请招标的,要审查招标人是否向3家以上具备承担施工招标项目的能力、信誉良好的特定的法人或者其他组织发出投标邀请书,投标邀请书的内容是否完整;特殊情况采用定向方式的,须有公司总经理办公会讨论决定方可实施。(二)投标人资格审计:主要审计投标人资格条件是否达到招标文件对投标人资格的要求;是否具有独立订     

线性合同招标中投标人数的博弈模型研究

在线性合同的假设前提下，论文通过建立模型，求解博弈的贝叶斯均衡得到了风险中性的理性招标人的最优合同形式以及投标人的最优报价策略。最后，论文通过引入招标成本函数，进一步提出了对于招标人控制投标人数从而达到自身目标最优的策略。     

六招巧识“串通投标”

串通投标,是指招标人与投标人串通或者投标人之间相互串通,以共同提高或压低工程报价等形式达到中标目的。其实质是一种不正当竞争行为,不仅严重扰乱了公平、公正、公开的招投标秩序,而且也损害了招标人和大多数投标人的正当利益。串通投标最常见、最严重的后果是因各投标人哄抬报价导致中标价格超出     

析解串通投标罪

串通投标罪，是指投标人相互串通投标报价。损害招标人或者其他投标人利益；或者投标人与招标人串通投标，损害国家、集体、公民的合法利益，情节严重的行为。此种行为违背了政府进行招标采购的初衷，也损害到国家、公共利益及其他供应商的合法利益。《政府     

串通投标违法行为分析

<正>一串通投标的定义按照招标投标法有关规定理解:串通投标是指投标人之间或投标人与招标人之间,为了谋求特定的投标人中标、谋取个人或小团体的利益,互相串通,采用人为操纵投标报价等手段破坏公平竞争,损害国家利益、社会公共利益或者他人合法权益的一种违法犯罪行为。围标是串通投标的一种特殊现象,表现为参与某标段投标的多数投标人互相串通,其极端形式是参与某标段投标的所有投标人都互相串通,即俗称的"围死了"。二串通投标的有关法律法规规定串通投标的定义     

收、退投标保证金凭据要规范

根据财政部第十八号令——《政府采购货物和服务招标投标管理办法》第三十六条的规定，“投标人投标时，应当按照招标文件要求交纳投标保证金”。所谓投标保证金，是指投标人向招标人出具的，以一定金额表示的投标责任担保。投标保证金是为了保护招标人免遭因投标人的行为而蒙受的损失，并要求将其作为投标书的内容之一。     

Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions

Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India.     

Signaling in Takeover Auctions with Flexible Reserve Price

This paper develops a model of takeover auctions with a two‐step information acquisition process. It shows that the threat of extra information acquisition allows the existence of the signaling jump‐bidding equilibrium even when the seller is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous effect on the target's expected profit and that such an effect depends on the number of potential acquirers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

浅析合理低价法投标报价策略和方法

随着市场经济体制的不断完善,恶性竞争逐渐减少。本文通过阐述合理低价法的含义及与投标报价之间的关系,以及报价策略,分析投标报价决策和清单单价报价的技巧,同时提出相应的政策建议,进而为招投标管理提供参考依据。     

基于KMRW声誉模型的投标分析及风险规避策略

运用不完全重复博弈的KMRW声誉模型来研究建设工程招投标中投标人是如何进行串谋和竞争的,并提出避免串谋出现的解决策略。     

Can preemptive bidding in takeover auctions be socially optimal? Yes it can

This paper analyzes a model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auctions with entry costs. It shows that when the second bidder owns a fraction of the target firm preemptive jump bidding leads to a higher social surplus, improves the expected profit of both bidders and reduces the expected final price. Such a toehold also leads to higher jump bids. The model implies that preemptive bidding hurts the minority shareholders but benefits the large shareholder of the target firm.     

内资零售企业采购联盟与供应策略最优分析

内资零售企业建立战略联盟的动机是应对市场中激烈的竞争，建立采购联盟使内资零售企业的议价能力增强，采购价格下降，采购成本下降，企业利润空间扩大，增强企业竞争力。供应商根据零售企业的采购数量而采取的差别性价格，也使得其实现策略最优.     

Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.     

铁路投标施工组织设计的编制质量研究

投标施工组织设计在投标报价中的地位越来越被铁路施工企业所重视,施工企业在日趋激烈的招投标的竞争中,求生存,求发展,就必须注重投标施工组织设计的编制,提高投标人员的整体素质,使投标报价更趋合理,达到既能中标又能赢利的目的。本文探讨了在工程投标中,投标施工组织设计的特点、对投标报价的影响及目前所存在问题,提出了提高投标施工组织设计编制质量的具体建议。