中国转型期腐败和反腐败问题研究(上篇)

本文分析了中国转型期腐败行为的类型，程度和发展演变趋势，并运用制度分析法剖析了诱发腐败的动机结构，机会结构和软约束机构，作者认为，经过艰苦探索，党和政府已经找到了在改革开放和建设社会主义现代化建设的新的历史条件下有效遏止腐败的新路，即依靠体制改革和制度创新从源头上预防和治理腐败并在这方面取得了可喜的成就，最后，笔者就中国下一步如何进行反腐败体制改革和制度创新，从治理和善治的角度提出了一整套政策性建议。     

权力腐败法律制约的有效性探究

权力腐败是人类所有社会的伴生物。目前中国社会正处于现代化建设新旧体制转轨的关键时期,权力腐败呈现一系列新的特点。相关法律制约制度机制的严重不足和缺失,是导致权力腐败高发的主要制度性因素。强化权力腐败法律制约的有效性制度机制建设,是制约权力腐败的最有效途径。     

中国经济模式与腐败问题

中国经济模式创造了中国奇迹,但是,它的某些制度安排却带有腐败的基因。加之,约束和监督方面的制度建设滞后于分权化和市场化的发展,以及受某些形式的腐败有益论的影响,中国经济模式正面临着系统性腐败的严峻挑战。因而,中国模式面临更新换代的压力。它的未来前景将取决于如何扬弃迄今为止能够成功地创造增长奇迹但却面临系统性腐败挑战的那些特殊制度安排。如何通过对这些制度的改革来推动中国模式的演进,是我们面临的一个时代课题。     

高校招投标机制的现状与完善——从制度反腐的角度分析

高校腐败案件频频发生,这严重损害了学校形象,不利于高校的持续健康发展。实践证明,体制的缺陷和制度管理的漏洞始终是腐败的主要根源,完善制度建设,强化制度反复乃是高校反腐当务之急,而高校招投标机制的建立及完善则是制度反腐的重要内容。为深入贯彻反腐倡廉,笔者在分析现行高校招标机制的基础上,提出了相应的完善措施。     

用制度管住权力 有效预防腐败

系统阐述了构建＂三项机制＂,系统防治腐败;健全＂六个机制＂,推进惩防体系建设;把权力关进制度的笼子,让制度笼子更坚固。提出要更加有效地预防腐败,发挥党风廉政建设责任制的优势,求真务实,注重实效,抓好落实;要坚持改革创新,加强反腐倡廉教育、廉政文化建设,健全完善制度;要在领导机制上强化对权力运行的制约和监督,有效预防和治理腐败。     

试论如何在政府采购中遏制腐败

制度和措施不健全、不完善的话 ,政府采购这个源头也容易诱发新的腐败。本文对如何在政府采购中有效地遏制腐败作了尝试性的探讨。笔者认为 ,要从三个环节入手来遏制住政府采购中的腐败 ,一是健全和完善政府采购监督机制 ,二是切实加强政府采购队伍建设 ,三是加快推进透明度建设。     

高校招投标机制的现状与完善——从制度反腐的角度分析

高校腐败案件频频发生,这严重损害了学校形象,不利于高校的持续健康发展.实践证明,体制的缺陷和制度管理的漏洞始终是腐败的主要根源.完善制度建设,强化制度反复乃是高校反腐当务之急,而高校招投标机制的建立及完善则是制度反腐的重要内容.为深入贯彻反腐倡廉,笔者在分析现行高校招标机制的基础上,提出了相应的完善措施.     

治理“亚腐败”的廉政文化对策

亚腐败一直是廉政建设的软肋,一般性的制度防腐难以抵制亚腐败。由于亚腐败的影响恶劣以及表现隐蔽,使得对于亚腐败的治理势在必行。廉政文化作为廉政建设的重要手段,对反腐倡廉的工作起到了重要的推进作用。本文通过简要介绍亚腐败的概念以及表现形式,分析廉政文化建设在治理亚腐败方面的可行性,并尝试性地给出了建设的具体对策。     

“村官”腐败问题探析

"村官"腐败严重侵害了农民的切身利益,损害了党和政府在群众中的威信,破坏了经济社会的发展和稳定。当前,必须按照中央关于加强惩治和预防腐败体系建设的要求,建立健全与社会主义市场经济体制相适应的融教育、制度、监督、改革、惩处于一体的农村党风廉政建设与反腐败工作新机制,有效地遏制"村官"腐败。     

公共经济学视角下的国企腐败治理机制研究

腐败是国之大敌,国企腐败更是腐败的重灾区,其腐败金额之高,涉及面之广让人触目惊心。如何从经济制度建设的角度约束此类腐败行为,以维护国家正常经济秩序和保障民众福祉,已经成为当前公共经济学的重要研究课题。文章从"经济人"假设、委托—代理理论、寻租理论以及新经济学理论四个角度来探讨国企腐败产生的根源,并在此基础上提出国企腐败制度建设要从内外两个方面加以治理,内部要建立"精英职业经理人"制度,外部要建立人大常委会主导的收支预算审计制度,以确保在不降低国企运行效率的前提下最大程度地抑制腐败。     

浅谈如何加强监管杜绝财务腐败

财务腐败是指一个单位因资金监管不到位出现漏洞,或单位的财务管理混乱、不规范而产生的奢侈浪费、挪用公款、贪污、国有资产流失等财务腐败行为。一个国家要保持政治稳定和经济发展,就必须认真解决腐败问题。要杜绝财务腐败的产生,就要从财务人员的自身素质建设、财务制度的建设、加强审计工作的力度等方面进行全面预防。     

Corruption and growth: The role of governance,public spending,and economic development

This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy.     

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

The prediction that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption has not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship by using firms' data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic freedom–corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyse this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our conjectures.     

The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection.     

Does corruption impede economic growth in Pakistan?

The present study reinvestigates the impact of corruption on economic growth by incorporating financial development and trade openness in growth model in case of Pakistan. We have used time series data over the period of 1987–2009. We have applied structural break unit root test to test the integrating order of the variables. The structural break cointegration has also been applied to examine the long run relationship between the variables.The long run relationship between the variables is validated in case of Pakistan. We find that corruption impedes economic growth. Financial development adds in economic growth. Trade openness stimulates economic growth. The causality analysis has exposed the feedback effect between corruption and economic growth and same inference is drawn for trade openness and corruption. Trade openness and economic growth are interdependent. Financial development Granger causes economic growth implying supply-side hypothesis in case of Pakistan.     

经济腐败的经济学分析

经济官员拥有着特权。这种特权在市场经济条件下,可能形成"政治市场",成为特殊商品,进而进行权钱交易。本文对经济腐败的成本收益进行了详细分析,并对经济腐败的风险成本与反经济腐败的对策进行了博弈分析。在对经济腐败决策模型和影响其风险决策的主要因素分析的基础上,提出经济腐败行为总是遵循"以最小腐败成本获取最大腐败收益"的经济学原则。因而,加大腐败者的经济腐败成本,可以减少经济腐败,从而降低经济腐败风险,并提出了加强经济腐败风险管理的对策。     

廉政建设的经济学思考及制度保障

本文主要运用现代经济学的理论和方法,从腐败行为的界定、腐败行为的产生、以及腐败行为对经济和社会的影响等方面进行分析,以期寻找加强党风廉政建设、预防和治理腐败的有效途径,为我国经济发展和完善社会主义市场经济体制服务。     

The effect of the Mahathir regime on the Malaysian economy

Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad is often credited with Malaysia's dramatic economic success post-1980. It is well known that the Mahathir regime installed centralized power in the Office of the Prime Minister (PM) and greatly extended state capacity through a far-reaching clientelist system. Prima Facie, the Malaysian experience appears to validate power centralization and state capacity as complementary to economic development. Though these changes did make Malaysia more susceptible to corruption, dramatically exhibited in 2015 with the 1MDB 5 billion dollar scandal, it has been argued that the clientelist political structure installed in Malaysia generally manages corruption at tolerable levels in order to provide the state the capacity needed to implement controls for economic development that began in the 1980s. While Malaysia experienced impressive economic growth during the Mahathir administration, our test using the Synthetic Control Method finds that GDP per capita fell well below what would have been expected under the governing structures in place in the 1970s, before Mahathir took office—a loss of approximately $4000 per capita below its potential. This study provides evidence of powerful negative economic consequences attributable to greater power centralization and enhanced state capacity inaugurated under Mahathir.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.