电信竞争、呼叫外部性与接听方付费

该文扩展了 Joen-Laffont-Tirole(2002)文章的模型,考察了在呼叫方与接听方合作决定通话长度条件下电信运营商的竞争策略.当引入接听方付费和呼叫外部性的假设进入电信竞争模型时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商制定的呼叫价格与接听价格仍然随着网络替代程度的增加而减少,但是电信运营商不再能够利用接入费来进行合谋.在非线性定价条件下,电信运营商竞争策略是制定使消费者剩余最大化的呼叫价格与接听价格,然后利用固定费榨取消费者剩余.在基于网络的价格歧视条件下,与 Joen-Laffont-Tirole(2002)模型相比较,由于通话时间由消费者合作决定,因此电信运营商将通过固定费进行市场份额的争夺,从而导致按边际成本定价,网络联接并没有因为电信运营商的竞争策略而发生中断.     

电信竞争、呼叫外部性与接听方付费

本文扩展了Joen—Laffont—Tirole（2002）文章的模型，考察了在呼叫方与接听方合作决定通话长度条件下电信运营商的竞争策略。当引入接听方付费和呼叫外部性的假设进入电信竞争模型时，在线性定价条件下，电信运营商制定的呼叫价格与接听价格仍然随着网络替代程度的增加而减少，但是电信运营商不再能够利用接入费来进行合谋。在非线性定价条件下，电信运营商竞争策略是制定使消费者剩余最大化的呼叫价格与接听价格，然后利用固定费榨取消费者剩余。在基于网络的价格歧视条件下，与Joen—Laffont-Tirole（2002）模型相比较，由于通话时间由消费者合作决定。因此电信运营商将通过固定费进行市场份额的争夺，从而导致按边际成本定价。网络联接并没有因为电信运营商的竞争策略而发生中断。     

价格歧视理论与网络经济定价策略

通过对价格歧视理论进行分析,指出消费者需求弹性、消费者效用差别是影响歧视定价的重要因素,而影响消费者需求弹性和消费者效用差别的各种因素是在网络经济条件下制定价格策略时需要考虑的主要因素。由此,网络经济条件下通过市场调查分析消费者的消费行为成为制定网络经济价格策略的重要措施,政府应当对价格进行适当管理和规范。     

互联网接入价格机制研究

互联网“俱乐部”产品、外部性的两面性等特征导致了网络拥塞出现的可能性。在互联网基础设施巨额固定投资的压力下,利用价格手段来实现有限网络资源的有效配置,成为目前比较可行的方法。文章通过提出基于差别产品的两部定价机制为解决网络拥塞问题构建一种简单和有效的价格体系。在垄断竞争市场下,这种定价体系不但可以实现网络外部效用的内部化,同时也能够增进社会福利。     

基于混合策略的电信企业竞合博弈分析

随着3G时代的到来,以及电信产业的重组,我国移动通信市场已经由双寡头竞争形成新移动与新联通、新电信三寡头竞争的格局。三大运营商无法通过合作博弈的共谋方式实现自身利益最大化。在竞争压力下,为了扩大市场份额,争夺客户,价格战不断上演,给运营商乃至我国电信产业的发展带来了巨大的危害。本文运用博弈论的原理,建立三人、三维博弈模型,从产品、价格、服务三个维度研究三个电信运营商的动态博弈行为。分析博弈特点和电信运营企业的竞争策略。论证了移动、联通、电信三大寡头在电信重组和3G时代到来的时刻,放弃价格战,提供更好的产品,更加优惠的价格,更加优质的服务,才能更好的占有市场。     

接入定价与电信网络竞争理论研究述评

世界各国的电信产业都在进行放松规制、引入竞争的市场化改革,多网竞争的局面在形成发展。在数网并存的市场结构下,是否有对接入双方都具有激励作用的接入定价是推动电信业互联互通工作正常开展的关键。文章从对等网络竞争、非对等网络竞争两个方面系统地梳理了电信产业的接入定价与网络竞争理论的主要研究成果,并指出了该理论对解决我国当前电信产业接入定价和网络竞争问题的启示作用,最后对未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

电信市场无序竞争如何了

经过几年来的电信业体制改革,我国在基础电信领域逐渐形成了电信、移动、联通、铁通、网通等几大运营集团公司相互竞争的市场格局,极大地促进了我国电信业的发展,给广大客户带来了真正的实惠,也推进了社会的信息化进程。但随着电信市场的日益开放,各运营商之间为了提高市场份额赢得利润,相互之间的竞争日益激烈,竞争手段层出不穷,竞争方式目不暇接,     

论电信服务品牌的培育

随着我国电信产品同质化,同业运营商之间的竞争愈来愈激烈,运营商意识到不能再单纯依靠广告、网络能力和价格差异来吸引客户,而是依靠资源优势,不断改进服务质量,创造服务品牌来支撑企业的可持续发展。然而服务品牌战略的实施进展缓慢。因此结合服务品牌的相关理论,分析我国电信运营业服务品牌现状,对我国电信运营服务品牌的培育提出对策是电信业发展的当务之急。     

中国电信业的发展现状、问题及解决对策

中国电信业在由国家垄断逐渐转向多家电信运营商共同竞争的有效竞争过程中,出现了对消费者、同行业企业利益的侵占,破坏电信市场的有序竞争及阻碍整个行业设备更新和技术进步等问题。针对这些问题,提出电信业在今后走向有效竞争的发展中,应当从价格规制、法律政策规制及非对称管制等方面对电信业发展进行调整,以促进中国电信业整体的有序发展。     

从双边市场看网间结算和收费方式

本文利用近些年发展起来的双边市场理论,讨论互联定价和收费方式选择问题。本文认为,作为一种网间转移支付手段,网间结算价格的主要作用是将通话外部性内部化,从而实现主叫市场和接听市场的最优定价或最优通话水平。     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

Tacit Collusion and Non–uniform Prices

This article examines the possibility of building a tacit agreement between price–setters that yields non–uniform pricing. It is shown that firms with market power may restrict competition not only by alternating between periods of high prices and low prices (Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)), but also by always charging different prices and taking turns in being the monopolist. In contrast with the existing literature, price variability is not due to imperfect monitoring, stochastic demand or short–run pricing rigidity but it is a pure supply side effect. The author provides the necessary conditions to have collusion with non–uniform pricing, and shows that the latter dominates a fixed price solution. In terms of competition policy this result confirms that no price parallelism is not, per se , a signal of no collusion.     

Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.     

垂直差异化与合谋稳定性关系分析

市场行为中的默契合谋能使企业获得超额利润,现存的关于生产同质品和差异化产品的经验性研究经常能发现默契合谋的证据.在现实经济的默契合谋行为中,不同的成本结构适用于不同的经济环境或者不同的行业、产业分析,也直接影响着合谋和背离合谋所得的利润,对合谋稳定性有着重要的影响.在垂直差异化的不同成本(固定成本、可变成本)结构下,企业参与竞争的不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和伯川德竞争)对合谋稳定性的影响也是有差异的.     

Limit pricing,conjectural variation and entry

The paper investigates the relationship of the degree of tacit collusion among existing sellers on industry price when a threat of entry exists. A general model is developed which allows comparison of two seemingly unrelated strands of the limit pricing literature.     

The impact of experience on prices and profits in experimental duopoly markets

Experimental posted price duopoly markets, wherein differentiated products were sold under conditions of incomplete information, were designed to explore the impact of experience on prices and profits. Two types of markets were run simultaneously. One type involved participants with previous experience in similar markets, while the other involved inexperienced subjects facing the same pricing decisions as their experienced counterparts. Probit analysis of the resulting data indicated significant relationships between experience and achieving equilibria predicted by tacit collusion. The results reinforce the growing realization that experience may be an important consideration in experimental tests of static market equilibria models.     

Tacit collusion in housing markets: the case of Santiago,Chile

In this article, using a detailed micro-database from Santiago, Chile, the potential existence of tacit collusion in housing markets is investigated. In order to perform the test, Santiago’s housing market is split into four different submarkets using hedonic price analysis and household’s socioeconomics characteristics. Then, using a GMM panel data model, regressions are run for each submarket, correlating industry’s markups with the aggregate level of activity. The main finding is that low and middle income submarkets present higher average markups and a pro-cyclical behaviour. This finding is consistent with a market where participants do not face capacity constraints and behave strategically to sustain tacit collusion during increasing demand periods.     

发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析

本文构建一个简单的非对称信息模型,分析发展中国家特定的普遍服务问题。在模型中,政府与垄断企业的非对称信息产生于在农村提供服务的边际成本,最优普遍服务政策可以用两种规制手段即资费和网络投资来实现。本文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析,得出的结论是：在实施区别定价时,与完全信息相比,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且减小相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但这是以网络覆盖面积的减小为代价。模型结果还表明,合谋的成胁会弱化企业的激励。有意思的是,在这两种定价机制下,企业和纳税人这两种不同的利益集团均有同规制者合谋的动机。实际上,纳税人利益集团的存在,强化了规制者和企业之间的防止合谋约束,并且为了减少规制者同纳税人利益集团的合谋收益,即使规制者具有高成本信息,也会使配置结果扭曲。     

Can industry regulators learn collusion structures from information-efficient asset markets?

This note combines a dynamic industrial organization model, in which an industry is subject to exogenous processes of market-size and collusion structure, with a consumption-based asset pricing model for the shares in the industry’s firms. Three main findings emerge for our model under the assumption of information-efficient asset markets. First, the volatility of a firm’s share price is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s market-size. Second, the volatility of a firm’s price-dividend ratio is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s collusion structure whereby high (resp. low) ratios indicate less (resp. more) collusion. Third, for non-volatile collusion structures the price-dividend ratio is constant across different collusion structures.