Institutions,quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education

This paper contributes to the literature on integovernmental competition in two ways. First, the institutional setting within which public services are delivered is analyzed with respect to the impact on the quality of services provided. Previous studies have measured competition only in terms of governmental structure, ignoring the issue of service quality and the potential for differentiating local governmental jurisdictions along quality dimensions. Second, the outcome of competition is defined in terms of service quality. Previous studies generally have measured the outcome of competition by examining the fiscal effects of fragmentation and accountability through service costs or tax revenue impacts. School districts were used to empirically test quality competition. Student academic performance was modeled as a function of control variables and the degree of competition from neighboring school districts. Academic performance in public schools was positively associated with the performance of neighboring districts, although the effect was small. These findings, however, suggest that strategies to strengthen interjurisdictional competition may be useful in enhancing public service quality.     

Competition and waiting times in hospital markets

This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.     

Hospital Mergers with Regulated Prices

We study the effects of a hospital merger in a spatial competition framework where semi‐altruistic hospitals choose quality and cost‐containment effort. Whereas a merger always leads to higher average cost efficiency, the effect on quality provision depends on the strategic nature of quality competition, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism and the effectiveness of cost‐containment effort. If qualities are strategic complements, then a merger leads to lower quality for all hospitals. If qualities are strategic substitutes, then a merger leads to higher quality for at least one hospital, and might also yield higher average quality provision and increased patient utility.     

Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital

Abstract. Hospital markets are often characterized by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of heterogeneous objectives of hospitals on quality differentiation, profits and overall welfare in a price‐regulated duopoly with exogenous symmetric locations. In contrast to other studies on mixed duopolies, this paper shows that, in this framework, privatization of the public hospital may increase overall welfare. This holds if the public hospital is similar to the private hospital or less efficient and competition is low. The main driving force is the single‐regulated price which induces under‐provision (over‐provision) of quality of the more (less) efficient hospital compared with the first best. However, if the public hospital is sufficiently more efficient and competition is fierce, a mixed duopoly outperforms both a private and a public duopoly due to an equilibrium price below (above) the price of the private (public) duopoly. This medium price discourages over‐provision of quality of the less efficient hospital and – together with the non‐profit objective – encourages an increase in quality of the more efficient public hospital.     

School competition and the quality of education: introducing market incentives into public services

Existing research indicates that introducing school choice and competition into the public education system might improve the quality of schooling. Yet, up to date most empirical work on school choice has concentrated on developed countries and it is far from obvious that the experience of these countries can be of any guidance for transition economies. Our work intends to fill this gap. We concentrate on the case of Poland. We argue that in Poland, school choice and competition tends to improve average education quality and efficiency of public education expenditure.     

Competition Among Italian Junior‐Secondary Schools: A Variance‐Decomposition Empirical Analysis

The public economic theory emphasizes the potential role of competition in fostering the performance of educational systems. The rationale for pro‐competitive policies in education (i.e. vouchers, charter schools, tax deductions) is that schools can improve their quality responding to ‘pressures’ from nearby competitors. The objective of this paper is to analyze the potential relationship between (i) competition among schools and (ii) students’ achievement in Italy. While previous studies used OECD‐Pisa data for this purpose, here a new dataset about Italian schools has been employed: about 19,000 students in 150 schools constitute the sample. The reference framework is the idea that the presence of more schools in a certain area, and/or the proportion of students enrolled in private schools, should raise the performance of schools operating in that area through a ‘competition effect’. A multilevel strategy, which allows separating between‐areas variance in achievement scores, is employed. The findings support the view that competition has an impact, albeit little, on students’ achievement, and such competitive pressure is due to the number of schools, no matter if public or private.     

The puzzle of quality upgrading of Chinese exports from the trade liberalization perspective

Trade liberalization could accelerate the process of quality upgrading through the competition effect. However, that the quality of Chinese exports exhibits an opposite performance pattern is puzzling. The present paper uses a framework based on multiproduct firms to analyse the mechanism of how the product quality of exports is affected by trade liberalization to explain this puzzle. The model includes two major mechanisms: the competition effect and the market effect. There is a huge gap in the influence on the product quality of exports between a decrease in tariff barriers and non‐tariff barriers: firms' product quality increases (decreases) when non‐tariff barriers (tariff barriers) fall. The data of Chinese firms from 2001 to 2011 supports this conclusion. Further research reveals that the influence of trade liberalization on the product quality of exports in China varies among different types of firms.     

International Technology Transfer and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effect of international technology transfer in a quality model. A foreign innovator with a new quality product can license its innovation to the domestic firm(s) via a fixed fee. Findings show that the foreign innovator will license exclusively to the high‐quality firm under Bertrand competition, whereas it may exclusively license to the high‐quality firm, the low‐quality firm, or non‐exclusively to both firms under Cournot competition. Non‐exclusive licensing is necessarily welfare‐enhancing whereas exclusive licensing is welfare‐reducing if the quality of the new technology is not sufficiently superior to that of the domestic ones.     

人工智能、侵蚀性竞争和行业质量阶梯

本文采用国际机器人联合会提供的工业机器人跨国跨行业安装数据，考察了人工智能对行业质量阶梯的影响与作用机制，并在此基础上探究了侵蚀性竞争的调节作用及其引致的质量集聚效应。研究结果发现，人工智能显著缩短了行业质量阶梯，提升了产品质量，且这一作用在一系列检验后依然稳健；基于内生中介效应模型的结果表明，人工智能对质量阶梯的影响是通过增加中间品使用、提高生产率和改变资本密集度实现的。侵蚀性竞争的存在，不仅负向调节了人工智能对行业质量阶梯的作用，还引发了质量维度上的地理转移现象，导致高质量产品的产销活动转变为以高质量国家为中心进行的区域性活动。探究人工智能对行业质量阶梯的影响，既有助于厘清人工智能的经济效应，也有助于提升产品国际竞争力，助推贸易高质量发展。     

Information quality choice and information disclosure in oligopoly

In this paper, we provide a framework to analyze the information disclosure and information quality choice in the oligopoly in which one firm has the opportunity to choose her information quality flexibly and then decide her information disclosure rule after she has observed her information.We find that in the Cournot (Bertrand)competition, when the goods are substitutes (complements) and the degree of substitution (complement) is small enough, the firm will choose the maximal information quality. However, if the degree of substitution (complement) is large enough, the information quality is some intermediate value. On the other hand, in the Cournot (Bertrand) competition, when the goods are complements (substitutes), the maximal information quality will be chosen. We also find that the Fully Revealing case in which the probability of information disclosure is one will occur in (i) the Cournot competition with sufficiently small degree of substitution; (ii) the Cournot competition when goods are complements; (iii) the Bertrand competition when goods are substitutes; (iv) the Bertrand competition with sufficiently small degree of complements. Moreover, we show that the No Revealing case in which the probability of information disclosure is zero will never show up.     

Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?

This paper investigates whether increased import competition leads firms to engage in incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading using Chilean manufacturing firm‐product data and measuring product quality with unit values (prices). We identify causal effects of import competition using an effective trade barrier measure – transport costs – as instruments for import penetration ratios across industries. Transport costs have a negative and significant effect on product quality. The evidence suggests that estimated unit value increases capture product quality upgrading, imports’ competition effects drive quality upgrading, and benefits depend on firms’ industrial specialization. Easier access to intermediate inputs also fosters quality upgrading.     

Product market competition,R&D composition and growth

We revisit the relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth in a model where horizontal and vertical innovations simultaneously occur. We show that competition exerts an important effect on the composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal). In fact, when product market competition gets more intense, a larger fraction of R&D is engaged in improving the quality of products; this occurs at the expense of a lower rate of horizontal innovation. This effect, which is absent in the basic endogenous growth model with only vertical innovations, may overturn the inverse relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth found in prior theoretical models.     

县际竞争和公共教育财政资源配置——基于空间经济计量研究

根据Moran’s I检验发现,公共教育财政资源地区配置上存在显著空间自相关性,即邻近县之间在配置公共教育财政资源上会互相影响,存在策略性行动,表明县际竞争的存在。此外,县级竞争力强弱受到诸多因素的影响。人均GDP、第二产业劳动力人数、人均居住面积对县级人均教育经费总支出的影响是正面显著的,而少数民族人口比率的影响是负面显著,非农业人口比率的影响是倒U型关系,外省迁入人口和本地适龄人口的影响是非线性的。在估计方法上,空间误差模型比OLS模型要好。     

The Presence of Multinational Banks and the Supply and Quality of Credit in Emerging Economies

Barriers to entry for multinational banks (MNBs) have been reduced in many countries. This paper studies the effect of the presence of MNBs on the supply and quality of credit in emerging economies. This study uses data from the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. The results indicate that the credit supply declines in response to increased competition from MNBs. However, the adverse effect of MNBs on the credit supply is less pronounced when the presence of MNBs is larger. The paper also provides some tentative results on the effect of MNBs on the quality of loans. The results suggest that banks shift their portfolios away from loans as a result of increased international financial competition, thereby reducing default risk, which is also reflected in a negative relationship between MNB presence and the chance of a banking crisis occurring.     

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.     

Can neighbourhoods change the decisions of youth on the margins of university participation?

Abstract This paper uses the Youth in Transition Survey (YITS) to estimate the relationship between neighbourhoods and university participation among Canadian youth. Neighbourhood quality is proxied by the fraction of neighbourhood adults with a Bachelor's degree. The estimated effect is identified using neighbourhood variation within high schools. The paper also tests whether the effects differ by family background and children’s reading skills. Neighbourhoods do not affect university participation among youth drawn from the tails of the socio‐economic distribution. Neighbourhoods have the largest effect on youth drawn from the middle of the socio‐economic distribution who also have above median reading skills.     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Competition and educational quality: evidence from the Netherlands

Little evidence is available for the effect of competition on educational quality as only a few countries allow large-scale competition. In the Netherlands, free parental choice has been present since the beginning of the twentieth century and can be characterized as a full voucher program with 100 % funding. Based on micro panel data for the Netherlands, we show that there is a relation between competition and educational outcomes in secondary education, but that it is often negative and small, sometimes insignificant but never positive. This effect is larger for small and medium-sized schools and for schools that do not have a Protestant or Catholic denomination.     

Does quality influence choice of general practitioner? An analysis of matched doctor–patient panel data

The impact of quality on the demand facing health care providers has important implications for the industrial organization of health care markets. In this paper we study the consumers' choice of general practitioner (GP), assuming they are unable to observe the true quality of GP services. A panel data set for 484 Norwegian GPs, with summary information on their patient stocks, renders the opportunity to identify and measure the impact of GP quality on the demand, accounting for patient health heterogeneity. We apply a multi-equation model in the LISREL format, with GP quality and patient health as latent determinants of demand for GP services. Patient excess mortality rate at the GP level is one indicator of quality. Our results indicate that GP quality has a clear positive effect on demand, even when patient heterogeneity is accounted for.     

Market structure and communicable diseases

Abstract.  Communicable diseases pose a formidable challenge for public policy. Using numerical simulations, we show under which scenarios a monopolist's price and prevalence paths converge to a non-zero steady state. In contrast, a planner typically eradicates the disease. If eradication is impossible, the planner subsidizes treatments as long as the prevalence can be controlled. Drug resistance exacerbates the welfare difference between monopoly and first best outcomes. Nevertheless, because the negative externalities from resistance compete with the positive externalities of treatment, a mixed competition/monopoly regime may perform better than competition alone. This result has important implications for the design of many drug patents.