Do peer firms influence innovation?

Using a large sample of 4,545 US firms over the period 1968–2018, we find robust and significant positive peer effects on corporate innovation. Consistent with the need to keep ahead or abreast of rivals, we document an increase in peer firms’ influence with product market competition. Our further analyses show interesting leader–follower interactions with firms following or adopting innovation policies of counterparts perceived or likely to have superior information. This finding supports the information-based motives of mimicking. More importantly, we show that adopting peers’ innovation policies is associated with improvements in long-term innovation outputs and product market performance. Our results suggest that peer effects are a critical determinant of corporate innovation in addition to other factors examined so far in the literature.     

Information Transfer Effects of Bond Rating Downgrades

This paper investigates information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades measured by equity abnormal returns for industry portfolios. Industry rivals can be subject to two opposing effects, the contagion effect and the competition effect. We find that the net effect is strongly dependent on the original bond rating of the downgraded firm. For investment‐grade (speculative‐grade) firms, industry abnormal equity returns are negative (positive), which implies a predominant contagion (competition) effect. The analysis reveals a rich pattern of positive and negative correlations across negative credit events, which can be used to improve our understanding of portfolio credit risk models.     

Managerial characteristics and stock market investment: evidence from China

We examine the effect of managerial characteristics on investment in the stock market by listed firms in China. Our empirical findings suggest that higher levels of cash‐based compensation may increase both the propensity of investing in the stock market and the total amount of investment. On the other hand, managerial holdings discourage managers from investing in stock markets and also lead to a decrease in the amount of investment. This study sheds light on managerial risk‐taking incentives. Moreover, this study fills the gap in the literature by providing evidence for the determinants of listed firms’ stock market investment.     

Benchmark Bonds Interactions under Regime Shifts

In the present paper we examine the interactions among five benchmark ten year government bonds, namely those of the USA, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Our aim is to illustrate empirically a net of interactions existing among the major bond markets of Europe and the US market taking into account shifts in the underlying stochastic processes. For this purpose, differing from the rest of the relevant empirical literature, after specifying the long run equilibrium relations we estimate the linkages between the bond markets as subject to hidden Markov chains, by applying the Markov Switching Vector Error Correction framework (MS‐VECM). This formulation is found to efficiently reflect the shifts brought about by significant economic events, such as the European monetary unification. As a result we illustrate different short‐run relations referring to the periods before and after the monetary union. Overall, our empirical results indicate that stronger interactions among the markets of the system exist in the period after the EMU. Also, by means of a variance decomposition analysis we assess leader‐follower relations which indicate that the benchmark status of bonds has changed since the introduction of the common monetary policy framework in Europe.     

Leaders,followers, and equity risk premiums in booms and busts

We study an investment problem in which two asymmetric firms face competition and the regime characterizing the economic condition follows a Markov switching process. We derive the value functions and investment thresholds of the leader and follower. The option value of regime uncertainty is found to be quite important for the investment decision of firms. We also show the relationship between the equity risk premium and the economic cycle that has not been done in previous studies, which proxy economic conditions by the level of demand or other state variables.     

Aggressive leaders

I characterize the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competition and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of firms, when the investment increases marginal profitability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. For instance, under both quantity and price competition, a market leader overinvests in cost reductions and overproduces complement products. The purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the firm to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other firms. Contrary to the post‐Chicago approach, this shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily associated with exclusionary purposes.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

Product markets and corporate investment: Theory and evidence

Investment patterns often associated with agency and information problems can emerge as rational responses to product-market rivalry. We illustrate this result when industry players make simultaneous or sequential investment decisions in the face of two negative externalities. One externality arises when all competing firms invest, thus eroding the gains to investment accruing to any one firm. Another externality arises when some firms do not invest and lose out to rivals who do invest. The value of investment therefore depends on the investment’s intrinsic merits and the actions of all competitors. Our analysis can rationalize investment patterns that might appear suboptimal when such externalities are ignored. For instance, our simultaneous model can justify investment levels that might otherwise be interpreted as under- or over-investment. Our sequential model shows that value-maximizing firms might optimally herd in their investment decisions. We present evidence supporting key aspects of both the simultaneous and sequential models.     

Investment Dynamics and Earnings‐Return Properties: A Structural Approach

We propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short‐run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings‐return patterns absent accounting influences. We show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings‐return patterns documented in accounting research. Notably, our model generates a concave earnings‐return relation, similar to that of Basu [1997], and predicts that the earnings‐return concavity increases with the volatility of firms’ underlying shock processes and decreases with the level of firms’ investments. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Overall, our evidence suggests that our proposed benchmark is useful for understanding the joint dynamics of variables of interest to accounting research (e.g., earnings, returns, investment, market‐to‐book) absent accounting influences, a necessary precondition for inferring the effects of accounting from these dynamics.     

Estimating network economies in retail chains: a revealed preference approach

We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms’ comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill suited for this high‐dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to cluster their stores. In an application, we find that Wal‐Mart benefits most from local chain economies, whereas Target shows a greater ability to respond to rival competition. Kmart exhibits neither of these strengths. We explore these results with counterfactual simulations highlighting these offsetting effects and find that local chain economies play an important role in securing Wal‐Mart's industry leader status.     

Limits‐to‐arbitrage,investment frictions,and the investment effect: New evidence

This study comprehensively reexamines the debate over behavioral and rational explanations for the investment effect in an updated sample. We closely follow the previous literature and provide several differences. Our tests include five prominent measures of corporate investment and corporate profitability in q‐theory and recent investment‐based asset pricing models. Both classical and Bayesian inferences show that limits‐to‐arbitrage tend to be supported by more evidence than investment frictions for all investment measures. When idiosyncratic volatility and cash flow volatility are used in measuring investment frictions, the inference is more favorable for the rational explanation.     

Investment and financing decisions of private and public firms

We examine differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. This difference is not attributable to more severe financing constraints of public firms. Instead, because differences in investment‐cash flow sensitivities are only observed for the unexpected portion of firms’ cash flow, the empirical evidence supports an agency‐based explanation. Similar patterns are observable for the expected and unexpected portion of firms’ shareholder distributions. Our results are driven by firms from countries with low ownership concentration and more liquid stock markets, where shareholders have lower incentives to monitor. The results are also more pronounced for public firms with low industry Tobin's q and high free cash flow, which are more prone to suffer from agency problems.     

Optimal Timing of Real Estate Investment under an Asymmetric Duopoly

This paper examines the sub-game equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. The relative strength of the firms is found to have significant impact on the firms’ equilibrium strategies. Preemptive strategies are critical if difference in strength between the two competing firms is relatively small. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the asymmetric duopoly model. The model, however, predicts that the two phenomena occur in earlier phases of market cycles, rather than in the state of depression. In a depressed market with high volatility, the leader and the follower will both choose the waiting strategies. Construction cascade is, therefore, not an expected phenomenon in a depressed market in the asymmetric duopoly framework. Please forward your comments to the second author at rststf@nus.edu.sg. Your comments are appreciated. The authors wish to thank Stephen Cauley, Walter Torous, an anonymous referee, and participants in the Singapore–Hong Kong Real Estate Research Symposium on 14–15 July 2005 for their constructive comments and suggestions.     

Managerial Behavior and the Link between Stock Mispricing and Corporate Investments: Evidence from Market‐to‐Book Ratio Decomposition

We examine the impact of mispricing on corporate investments and its components: capital expenditures, research and development, acquisitions, and asset sales. By decomposing the market‐to‐book ratio into mispricing and growth components, we show that corporate investments are linked to mispricing through market‐timing and catering, after controlling for growth and financial slack. This investment‐mispricing link is more pronounced in financially constrained firms and in firms with short‐horizon shareholders. Overall, our study indicates that the sensitivity of investments to mispricing is a function of the nature of mispricing, the type of investment, and the firm's characteristics.     

Dynamic Competition,Valuation, and Merger Activity

We model the interactions between product market competition and investment valuation within a dynamic oligopoly. To our knowledge, the model is the first continuous‐time corporate finance model in a multiple firm setting with heterogeneous products. The model is tractable and amenable to estimation. We use it to relate current industry characteristics with firm value and financial decisions. Unlike most corporate finance models, it produces predictions regarding parameter magnitudes as well their signs. Estimates of the model's parameters indicate strong linkages between model‐implied and actual values. The paper uses the estimated parameters to predict rivals’ returns near merger announcements.     

The Dark Side of International Cross‐Listing: Effects on Rival Firms at Home

We analyse the stock price impact of firms' US cross‐listing on home‐market rival firms. Using an empirical event study approach we find negative cumulative average abnormal returns for the rival firms around both the listing and announcement of listing dates. The evidence suggests both positive and negative spillover effects on rival firms, where the dominant effect is that investors see rivals at a relative disadvantage to the cross‐listing firm. As firms cross‐list in the US and commit to the increased disclosure and investor protection associated with the US listing, they are better able to take advantage of growth opportunities relative to their non cross‐listing counterparts, and this results in negative spillover effects on rival firms. Our results are consistent with the idea that firms cross‐list as a means to reduce agency costs of controlling shareholders and thus are able to exploit growth opportunities as they have better access to external finance.     

Company investment announcements and the market value of the firm

This paper examines the stock market reaction to 402 company investment announcements made by UK companies during the 1991–1996 period. The market-adjusted abnormal returns are generally positive but small. Investment announcements are classified according to functional categories, and we find the level of abnormal returns to vary according to the type of capital investment being announced. In particular, we find the market to react more favourably to investments that ‘create’ future investment opportunities, than to investments which can be categorized as ‘exercising’ investment opportunities. The market reaction also varies with firm size, with large companies tending to experience smaller responses to announcements than do smaller firms. Chung et al. (1998 Chung, KH, Wright, P and Charoenwong, C. (1998). Investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22: 41–60.  ) reported that the quality of a company's investment opportunities is the primary determinant of market reactions to capital expenditure decisions. The findings presented here lend some support to a role for investment opportunities in market valuations. Project size is also found to have a significant positive impact on the level of abnormal returns.     

The Influence of a Credit Rating Change on Dividend and Investment Policy Interactions

We examine firms’ alterations in dividend and investment activities following credit rating changes. We find that downgraded firms reduce both dividends and investments more than no‐rating‐change firms. However, a silver lining of this doubly negative impact for shareholders is an increase in investment efficiency in firms that are most likely to overinvest. For upgraded firms, investments increase, but dividend outlays do not, compared to firms without rating changes. Our findings of asymmetric dividend stickiness and symmetric investment changes on a credit shock suggest that dividends and investments should not always be considered competing uses of funds.     

Corporate Governance and Corporate Financing and Investment during the 2007‐2008 Financial Crisis

We examine the impact of the 2007‐2008 financial crisis on nonfinancial firms’ financing and investment activities and the role of corporate governance in alleviating the adverse consequences of the external capital supply shock. Employing a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that better governance mitigates the disruption caused by the bank credit supply shock to firms’ financing and investment activities. A variety of robustness tests suggest that our findings are unlikely to be driven by an endogeneity problem. We obtain similar results when we extend the sample period to include the delayed spillover from the banking sector to other capital market sectors.     

Predicting European Takeover Targets

This article extends the Palepu (1986) acquisition likelihood model by incorporating measures of a technical nature, e.g. momentum, trading volume as well as a measure of market sentiment. We use the proposed model to predict takeover targets in a large sample of European and cross‐border merger and acquisition deals and validate its performance on an in‐ and out‐of‐sample basis. The robustness of the proposed model is investigated across several dimensions. In addition we explore the ability of the model to form the basis of successful takeover timing investment strategies. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that the proposed model predicts European takeover targets with relatively high accuracy and is able to determine portfolios that earn significant returns which are not explained by conventional risk factors.