Strategic choices of quality,differentiation and pricing in financial services

Two financial services firms (FSFs) produce information on future returns from risky assets, incorporate this information in a report and sell the reports to investors. The FSFs make strategic choices of the quality, differentiation and prices of their reports. Their optimal strategic choices of quality and differentiation divide the market for the report into three segments. Each FSF has a monopoly in its own segment, and the two compete head-to-head in a duopoly segment. The sizes of the monopoly segments increase with increases in quality and differentiation. An increase in differentiation reduces the size of the duopoly market, while an increase in quality has an ambiguous effect on the duopoly market: for high enough equilibrium differentiation, the size of the duopoly market decreases with an increase in quality. The non-cooperative FSFs pursue niche strategies, each focusing on a different related set of risks, in order to coordinate the contents of their reports to achieve the equilibrium degree of product differentiation. Recent years have seen a worldwide wave of financial-firm mergers and acquisitions. This paper’s model suggests that in equilibrium FSFs differentiate their products and develop profitable niches; in principle, however, sufficiently strong economies of scope could lead to a small number of FSFs with little differentiation that dominate all financial services markets.     

Is globalization a road to duopoly?

In global markets, the market shares of the two or three biggest firms sum up more than 90 percent and firms do marketing efforts. However, the classical neo-walrasiano theoretical framework only is able to justify these stylized facts with particular firms’ cost structures, being one reason the presumption that there are no information costs. Towards the rationalization of those stylized facts, I study the evolution of the market structure in a model of price advertising with a variable that controls the degree of openness of regional markets. The main result of the model is that in equilibrium the structure of a global market is the duopoly.     

Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints

We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits is skewed in favor of the more efficient firm. Consumer surplus and social welfare also increase in many cases, although those effects are generally ambiguous.     

Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the largest market share. To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium of the coordination game played by consumers for given prices. The equilibrium allocation differs from the efficient one for two reasons. First, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to the networks is too balanced, because consumers fail to internalize network externalities. Second, if access to the networks is priced by strategic firms, then the product with the highest expected quality is also the most expensive. This further reduces the asymmetry between market shares and therefore social welfare.     

Product market competition and credit risk

This study theoretically and empirically investigates effects of product market competition on credit risk. We first develop a real-options-based structural model in a homogeneous oligopoly and show that credit spreads are positively related to the number of firms in an industry. The disparity of firm size in an industry is relevant to both product market competition and credit risk, and we therefore extend the model to an asymmetric duopoly case. In particular, we demonstrate that credit spreads of relatively small (large) firms within an industry are positively (negatively) related to Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the relative firm size in an industry is an important determinant of credit risk. The models’ implications are empirically scrutinized by a reduced-form hazard model and generally supported. By performing out-of-sample analyses, the results demonstrate that firm size together with the interaction terms between intra-industry firm size dummies and competition intensity can effectively predict default.     

Optimal Investment Decisions for Two Positioned Firms Competing in a Duopoly Market with Hidden Competitors

This paper extends the literature dealing with the option to invest in a duopoly market for a leader‐follower setting. A restrictive assumption embodied in the models in the current literature is that investment opportunities are semi‐proprietary in that the two identified or positioned firms are guaranteed to hold at least the follower's position. More competition is realistically captured in our model by introducing the concept of hidden rivals so that the places in the market can be taken not only by positioned firm but also by these hidden competitors. The value functions and the optimal triggers for the positioned firms differ materially in settings with(out) the presence of hidden rivals. Unlike existing models, our model allows for (a)symmetric market shares and investment costs for the leader and the follower. Cooperative entrance by the two positioned firms is also modelled.     

An application of the Black–Litterman model with EGARCH-M-derived views for international portfolio management

This paper provides an application of the Black–Litterman methodology to portfolio management in a global setting. The novel feature of this paper relative to the extant literature on Black–Litterman methodology is that we use GARCH-derived views as an input into the Black–Litterman model. The returns on our portfolio surpass those of portfolios that rely on market equilibrium weights or Markowitz-optimal allocations. We thereby illustrate how the Black–Litterman model can be put to work in designing global investment strategies.      

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

To what extent are investment bank-differentiating factors relevant for firms floating moderate-sized IPOs?

One explanation provided for the relatively high and increasingly stable spreads for moderate-sized IPOs ($20–$80 million) documented in Chen and Ritter (J Finance 55:1105–1131, 2000) is that issuing firms focus less on price and more on a combination of investment bank-differentiating factors (such as underwriter prestige, analyst coverage, industry expertise, under-pricing, price stabilization activities, liquidity provision, and so on), and banks use industry-based differentiation as a source of market power. Using a new approach developed in a model of firm location choice due to Ellison and Glaeser (J Politi Econ 105:889–927, 1997), this paper presents some evidence on the combined relevance of such bank-differentiating factors, over and above bank size, for firms choosing investment banks for floating IPOs. For moderate-sized IPOs, there is a little, but not much evidence that such factors are a good explanation for high and increasingly stable spreads. Other than in a few of the largest industries, bank-differentiating factors are not significantly relevant for a large proportion of industries. Moreover, one aggregate measure of differentiation is declining over time. We are grateful to Preston McAfee for suggesting this approach to the problem, to Jay Ritter for providing an updated list of IPOs, and to Robert Anderson and anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We are grateful to seminar audiences at the University of Texas at Austin and Macalester College for helpful comments.     

Have Equity REITs Experienced Periodically Collapsing Bubbles?

This paper uses the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model and the residuals-augmented Dickey–Fuller (RADF) test to examine the possibility of Evans’ (1991) periodically collapsing bubbles in the equity REIT market. The results are mixed. The MTAR model indicates that overall real equity REIT prices and dividends are cointegrated with asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. However, the estimated coefficients of the MTAR model do not indicate the presence of periodically collapsing bubbles. Adjustment in the standard cointegration tests of bubbles for skewness and excess kurtosis via the RADF test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, leaving the possibility of periodically collapsing bubbles. The MTAR and RADF results with respect to equity REIT sub-sectors are mixed. Lodging is the only sub-sector in which both the MTAR and RADF results support periodically collapsing bubbles. Moreover, market fundamentals proxied by two alternative measures of capacity utilization do not explain either real equity REIT prices or dividends.     

Generalised Rational Bias in Financial Forecasts

Laster et al. (Q J Econ 114(1):293–318, 1999) built an economic model in which forecasters have incentives to generate forecasts that differ form the consensus. It is shown that the dispersion of the equilibrium distribution of forecasters, depends on the relative importance given on the intensive forecast users’ loss versus the publicity gain from occasional users. These results depend heavily on the assumption of symmetry for the loss and density functions. In this paper we examine the effects of generalising loss preferences and probability densities to allow for asymmetries through the LinEx loss and the Skewed Normal density, respectively. We derive the generalised equilibrium distribution of forecasts which contains the results of Laster et al. as a special case. The presence of asymmetric preferences is shown to cause a movement of the distribution away from the conditional mean, towards the optimal forecast under loss asymmetry. Furthermore, forecasts now tend to cluster around this quantity in an asymmetric way. These effects tend to be further strengthened or partially offset by the presence of skewness in the distribution of data, a result consistent with the conclusions of Christodoulakis (Finan Res Lett 2:227–233, 2005).The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments that have improved the paper. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and should in no part be attributed to the Bank of Greece.     

Irreversible investment in oligopoly

We take a general perspective on capital accumulation games with open loop strategies, as they have been formalized by Back and Paulsen (Rev. Financ. Stud. 22, 4531–4552, 2009). With such strategies, the optimization problems of the individual players are of the monotone follower type. Consequently, one can adapt available methods, in particular the approach of Bank (SIAM J. Control Optim. 44, 1529–1541, 2005). We obtain consistency in equilibrium by proving that with common assumptions from the oligopoly literature on instantaneous revenue, equilibrium determination is equivalent to solving a single monotone follower problem. In the unique open loop equilibrium, only the currently smallest firms invest. This result is valid for arbitrary initial capital levels and general stochastic shock processes, which may be non-Markovian and include jumps. We explicitly solve an example, the specification of Grenadier (Rev. Financ. Stud. 15, 691–721, 2002) with a Lévy process.     

Entrepreneurship and asymmetric information in input markets

Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets, and entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. The market equilibrium can involve an excess supply of workers entering the entrepreneurial sector, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of both entrepreneurs and workers opting for the entrepreneurial sector. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and on wages can improve efficiency, but a second-best optimum can only be achieved if it is optimal to induce an excess supply of workers to enter the entrepreneurial sector.     

Endogenous Information Acquisition with Cournot Competition

This paper studies information production in a model where both entry of analysts and their optimal information quality is endogenous. We show existence of the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and solve for it in closed form. The model displays rich behavior. In particular, we find that the precision of an individual signal will always be bounded from above by the precision of the prior belief on payoff uncertainty. Furthermore, we give examples that contradict the naive intuition about information acquisition. For instance, we show how a change in the cost structure that makes information cheaper decreases price informativeness, while at the same time market liquidity and the amount of resources society spends on information acquisition can change either way. The model gives a simple, fully rational explanation on why the number of analysts following a stock can be quite large. Endogenizing the cost of information by allowing the manager to choose an optimal informational policy, we find a variety of optima that depend discontinuously on the model parameters. As a consequence, among two similar firms, one may find it optimal to attract many analysts, the other will cooperate with only a few.I am greatly indebted to Antonio Bernardo and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, whose support, encouragement, insight, and many valuable comments made this paper possible. In addition, I also thank Justin Chan, Sudipto Dasgupta, Jason Hsu, Martin Nielsen, and Elena Sernova, the editor and an anonymous referee.     

金融监管信号传递与金融市场有效运行

金融市场是金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间动态博弈、合作共生的信息不对称系统。通过把信号博弈和重复博弈思想引入金融监管理论研究,构建以金融市场有效运行为反馈信号的金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间的监管信号传递模型,分析金融市场治理中有效监管信号的传递机制。结果表明：金融监管力度与金融市场有效运行水平之间存在分离、混同两种均衡关系;在金融监管声誉效应的驱动下,金融监管当局倾向于选择混同均衡策略,而不是分离均衡。因而只有建立通畅的金融监管信号传递及反馈机制,强化并放大金融监管信号显示,增大监管乘数效应,形成良性的监管声誉效应,才能保障金融市场的有效运行。     

Strategic Decision Making of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper develops a simple signaling model whereby high valuation firm uses levels of investment, debt and dividends to convey information to the market regarding its valuation. Conditions are determined under which investment, debt and dividends are employed in a separating Nash equilibrium. Unlike many other signaling models where the source of asymmetric information concerns only the mean of the firms' cash flow, our model allows for two sources of asymmetric information: the mean and the variance of the cash flow. This paper finds that the choice of signals depends on the relative importance of these two sources of informational asymmetry. For example, we show that high valued firms signal their values by decreasing their debt if the source of asymmetric information is mainly driven by the variance of the cash flows. This latter result differs from the debt signaling models found in the literature. The findings of this paper are consistent with extensive empirical evidence.     

Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance

We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer's risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer's experience rating, computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer's history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has strategic incentive to withhold information about losses. We construct an insurance market information equilibrium model and show that a variety of reporting strategies are possible. The results are illustrated with explicit computations in a two‐period risk‐neutral case study.     

Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle-model

The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle’s model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been shown for the case in which the random variables are independent and have finite second moments. Here we extend this result to the case in which the underlying random variables are not necessarily independent and their joint distribution is determined by its moments. We thank two anonymous referees for their comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB-TR 15, is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly

This article investigates the interaction between market entry,company foreclosure, and capital structure in a duopoly. Wefind that the order in which firms foreclose is determined notonly by differences in firm-specific factors, but also by commoneconomic factors, such as the interest rate and the market profitvolatility. We extend the exit model by allowing financiallydistressed firms to renegotiate their debt contracts througha one-off debt exchange offer. We find that firms with highbankruptcy costs or with prospects of profit improvement canget bigger reductions on their debt repayments. Investigatingmarket entry, we find that financial vulnerability of the incumbentinduces earlier entry.