Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

Optimal payout ratio under uncertainty and the flexibility hypothesis: Theory and empirical evidence

Following the dividend flexibility hypothesis used by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), Blau and Fuller (2008), and others, we theoretically extend the proposition of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) optimal payout policy in terms of the flexibility dividend hypothesis. In addition, we also introduce growth rate, systematic risk, and total risk variables into the theoretical model.To test the theoretical results derived in this paper, we use the data collected in the US from 1969 to 2009 to investigate the impact of the growth rate, systematic risk, and total risk on the optimal payout ratio in terms of the fixed-effect model. We find that based on flexibility considerations, a company will reduce its payout when the growth rate increases. In addition, we find that a nonlinear relationship exists between the payout ratio and the risk. In other words, the relationship between the payout ratio and the risk is negative (or positive) when the growth rate is higher (or lower) than the rate of return on total assets. Our theoretical model and empirical results can therefore be used to identify whether flexibility or the free cash flow hypothesis should be used to determine the dividend policy.     

Financial reporting quality and dividend policy: New evidence from an international level

This study examines the link between financial reporting quality and dividend payout across 76 countries. We find that financial reporting quality increases dividend payout after controlling for firm and country specifics. We also investigate different channels that moderate the relation between financial reporting quality and dividend payout. We find that the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and dividend payout is more pronounced when firms have free cash flow problems, face severe information asymmetry, and are located in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection rights. Interestingly, we find evidence that high reporting quality enhances firms' payment of dividend even when these firms already overpaying their shareholders. However, the relation becomes weaker when firms overpass the optimal level of dividend payout. The findings remain consistent after several robustness checks, thus highlighting the effectiveness of more transparent disclosure of financial information in reducing information asymmetry related to firms' internal agency costs and their relationships with external parties.     

A Note on the Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements

In this paper, we examine the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. A sample of dividend increases and decreases is partitioned by payout ratio increases and decreases. Previous research has examined the differential reaction to payout ratio increases and decreases only for dividend increases. In addition to an event study, cross-sectional regressions are estimated using the percent changes in payout ratio and dividend to explain abnormal returns. We conclude that payout ratio changes appear to be only an artifact of an earnings stream that is more variable than the dividend stream, rather than revealing any significant shifts in managerial policy.     

Issue Costs in Fisher's Two-Period Model

This paper analyzes the impact of issue costs on firm investment and dividend policies within the context of the two-period Fisher model. Consistent with its pedagogical tone, the paper illustrates graphically the loss in value stemming from a high dividend payout by a firm subject to issue costs in its external financing. Two components compose the overall loss in value. The “substitution effect” results from a shift in the investment opportunity set, while the “wealth effect” stems from the loss in value owing to issue costs. The paper suggests that the firm, when increasing its dividend payout, must weigh the marginal loss in firm value against the offsetting benefits, which may take the form of reduced monitoring costs.     

Taxes and dividend policy under alternative tax regimes

This paper examines changes in corporate dividend policy around the introduction of a dividend imputation tax system. This represented a significant change to the Australian tax framework and allows us to test the effect of differential taxation on corporate dividend policy. Consistent with the tax preference for the distribution of dividends, we find dividend initiations, all dividend payout measures and dividend reinvestment plans increased with the introduction of dividend imputation. Similarly we find that gross dividend payouts are more volatile under dividend imputation. Finally, we find that the increase in dividend payout and initiations differs across firms. In particular, we find that the higher the level of available franking tax credits the higher the firm's gross dividend payout and the more likely the firm is to initiate a dividend.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

Bhattacharyya (2007 ) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high‐quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low‐quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

Using a sample of 22,839 US firm-year observations over the 1991–2012 period, we find that high CSR firms pay more dividends than low CSR firms. The analysis of individual components of CSR provides strong support for this main finding: five of the six individual dimensions are also associated with high dividend payout. When analyzing the stability of dividend payout, our results show that socially irresponsible firms adjust dividends more rapidly than socially responsible firms do: dividend payout is more stable in high CSR firms. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions and model specifications, alternative measures of dividend, additional control, and several approaches to address endogeneity. Overall, our results are consistent with the expectation that high CSR firms may use dividend policy to manage the agency problems related to overinvestment in CSR.     

In search of a residual dividend policy

We survey 309 sample firms exhibiting behavior consistent with a residual dividend policy and their matched counterparts to learn how they set their dividend policies. The findings reveal that the sample firms are more likely than their counterparts to maintain a long-term dividend payout ratio, use long-run earnings forecasts in setting the dividend, and be unconcerned about the cost of raising external funds. Yet, firms behaving as though they follow a residual dividend policy generally do not profess to follow the policy. At best, the sample firms follow a “modified” residual policy in which they carefully manage their payout ratio and dividend trend. Although it may not be an explicit goal of such a dividend policy, consistently low free cash flow typically results.     

The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China

We investigate the impact of State ownership on Chinese corporate dividend policy. We find that Chinese firms' dividend payout rates respond fairly quickly to earnings changes, and the average actual payout ratio for Chinese firms falls between the payout ratios for emerging-market and developed firms. These results are consistent with the dividend policies of developing economies in general. We also find that dividend payouts among dividend-paying firms, and the likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend, are increasing in State ownership. Our findings are consistent with the State's need for cash flow as a partial motivation for continued State ownership of a significant portion of the corporate economy, and support the agency and tax clientele explanations for dividend policy.     

Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy

This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that “dividend-averse” institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relation between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy may reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating towards low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax cost of institutional investors receiving dividends results in changes in firm dividend policy.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

Shareholder Protection,Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

This article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.     

Sustainable growth rate,optimal growth rate,and optimal payout ratio: A joint optimization approach

This study investigates the investment decision and dividend policy jointly from a non-steady state to a steady state. We extend ,  and  sustainable growth rate model and develop a dynamic model which jointly optimizes the growth rate and payout ratio. We optimize the firm value to obtain the optimal growth rate in terms of a logistic equation and find that the steady state growth rate can be used as the benchmark for the mean-reverting process of the optimal growth rate. We also investigate the specification error of the mean and variance of dividend per share when introducing the stochastic growth rate. Empirical results support the mean-reverting process of the growth rate and the importance of covariance between the profitability and the growth rate in determining dividend payouts. The intertemporal behavior of the covariance may shed some light on the fact of disappearing dividends over decades.     

An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy

Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the principal/agent relationship. Distributing resources in the form of cash dividends forces managers to seek outside capital, thus causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of the capital marketplace. Under this scenario the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising needed funds. A test of this theory employing time-series cross-sectional analysis and more direct measures of the agency cost structure shows that these tenets of agency theory may be valid. Managers do appear to adjust the dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, both through time as well as across firms.     

半强制股利政策与股权融资成本

在一些国家,强制股利支付是改善公司治理和弥补法律保护不足的重要手段,我国自2001年起陆续出台了类似的半强制股利系列政策。然而现有部分研究却发现,半强制股利政策可能会产生监管“悖论”。那么,事实是否如此？以往这些研究主要从监管成本角度来分析,可能忽视了监管带来的收益,我们认为虽然半强制股利政策提高了融资门槛,但也可能实现股东之间的利益共享,并有利于投资者形成稳定的股利预期,从而实现治理的“溢价”。本文利用2008年监管政策提供的良好自然实验机会,主要从半强制股利政策的治理效应角度来评估政策产生的经济后果。研究发现,从总体平均意义上看,半强制股利政策有助于降低受影响公司的股权融资成本。进一步研究发现,在代理成本高的公司,半强制股利政策的治理作用更为明显,存在一定的治理“溢价”。当然,半强制股利政策也存在一定的局限性,在公司的信息披露质量差和外部融资约束较大的公司,半强制股利政策的治理效应被削弱。     

Dividends and economic policy uncertainty: International evidence

We provide the first international evidence on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on dividend policy. Using data from 19 countries, we find that a high level of EPU is positively associated with dividend payout. This evidence is robust to using alternative dividend payout measures, to controlling for other sources of uncertainty, and to addressing endogeneity. We further find that the effect of EPU on dividend policy is moderated by firms' free cash flows and governance quality, and by the quality of country-level indicators of shareholder protection, disclosure, enforcement, and creditor protection. Collectively, our novel evidence suggests that dividends help mitigate agency problems during high-EPU periods.     

CEO and CFO equity compensation and dividend payout over the firm lifecycle

We examine the separate and joint effects of CEO and CFO equity compensation on the dividend payout decision, taking into account changes in the relationship over the firm's lifecycle. Compensation contracts and dividend payout both are used to reduce agency costs, which change over a firm's lifecycle. Studies report a negative association between CEO equity compensation and dividend payout, suggesting a substitutionary relationship. Our results show that when the two are considered jointly, CFO equity compensation dominates CEO compensation, indicating the need for sophisticated financial expertise in the dividend decision. The relationship appears only in mature firms, signifying that agency problems are of most concern during the mature stage of the firm lifecycle.     

Dividends: Relevance,rigidity, and signaling

This paper uses a dynamic partial equilibrium model to explain a puzzle of dividend smoothing. In contrast to the Modigliani–Miller theory, I show that firm value depends on payout policy. The analysis implies that firms with more stable dividend stream are more valuable. This explains why dividends are rigid over time. A volatile component of dividends is introduced to reduce the likelihood of dividend omission in bad times while keeping the same historical average dividends. I show that the empirically observed positive relation between dividends and future firm performance is a statistical artifact driven by dividend smoothing. Thus, the empirical tests of dividend signaling theory might be misspecified.