Strategic Product Choiceand Niche Markets

This paper presents a model of strategic product choice when consumer preferences combine features of both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Consumers disagree on what amount of a "special" characteristic makes for a better product, but those who prefer more of this attribute are willing to pay more for it. Within this demand structure, I examine the advantages of first-mover firms. I find that such firms typically do best in markets where the maximum degree of product differentiation is limited by preferences rather than technology. These are "niche markets". Follower firms do better in markets in which the range of preferences is broad relative to the span of feasible goods.     

Monopoly,product diversity and welfare

The more homogeneous its customers the easier it is for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus. Offering a range of product varieties (or spatial locations) sorts consumers into groups with similar preferences. The profit opportunities this yields may result in a monopoly providing more product choice than is socially optimal. Nevertheless, monopoly may be socially preferable to a free entry imperfectly competitive equilibrium.     

Dynamic Competition with Experience Goods

This paper considers dynamic competition in the case in which consumers are only able to learn about their preferences for a certain product after experiencing it. After trying a product a consumer has more information about that product than about untried products. When competing in such a market firms with more sales in the past have an informational advantage because more consumers know their products. If products provide a better-than-expected fit with greater likelihood, taking advantage of that informational advantage may lead to an informational disadvantage in the future. This paper considers this competition with an infinite horizon model in a duopoly market with overlapping generations of consumers. Two effects are identified: On one hand marginal forward-looking consumers realize that by purchasing a product in the current period will be charged a higher expected price in the future. This effect results in reduced price sensitivity and higher equilibrium prices. On the other hand, forward-looking firms realize that they gain in the future from having a greater market share in the current period and compete more aggressively in prices. For similar discount factors for consumers and firms, the former effect is more important, and prices are higher the greater the informational advantages. The paper also characterizes oscillating market share dynamics, and comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to consumer and firm patience, and the importance of the experience in the ex post valuation of the product.     

Nonparametric Bayesian modelling of monotone preferences for discrete choice experiments

Discrete choice experiments are widely used to learn about the distribution of individual preferences for product attributes. Such experiments are often designed and conducted deliberately for the purpose of designing new products. There is a long-standing literature on nonparametric and Bayesian modelling of preferences for the study of consumer choice when there is a market for each product, but this work does not apply when such markets fail to exist as is the case with most product attributes. This paper takes up the common case in which attributes can be quantified and preferences over these attributes are monotone. It shows that monotonicity is the only shape constraint appropriate for a utility function in these circumstances. The paper models components of utility using a Dirichlet prior distribution and demonstrates that all monotone nondecreasing utility functions are supported by the prior. It develops a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for posterior simulation that is reliable and practical given the number of attributes, choices and sample sizes characteristic of discrete choice experiments. The paper uses the algorithm to demonstrate the flexibility of the model in capturing heterogeneous preferences and applies it to a discrete choice experiment that elicits preferences for different auto insurance policies.     

When should a firm set its selling price to cope with gray market trade?

This study investigates the problem of timing for firms that must cope with gray market in setting its prices by applying an observable delay game. We consider a case in which a multinational firm sells a product in two countries, and a parallel importer buys the product in one country and resells it in the other country. We show that the multinational firm never sets its price at the same time when the parallel importer sets in equilibrium, and that the multinational firm's optimal timing depends on the degree of variation in consumer preferences for product quality.     

Which factors distinguish the different consumer segments of green fast-moving consumer goods in Germany?

Consumer segmentation is an important tool for dealing with the often strongly differing consumer preferences in many markets for fast-moving consumer goods. Therefore, this study analyses the factors that can distinguish the different consumer segments for green all-purpose adhesives in Germany. On the basis of an online survey with 709 respondents, we performed a choice experiment and segmented consumers based on their preferences for this product. We identified six consumer segments of which in particular Green Consumer Value, Perceived Consumer Effectiveness and Trust separate eco-friendly consumers from the other groups. Our results give a deeper insight into the different consumer segments for green fast-moving consumer goods and facilitate the development of business and marketing strategies in a more targeted way.     

The economics of retail firms

This paper identifies retail firms as an economic institution which delivers explicit products or services to consumer together with a variety of distribution services that determine the levels of distribution costs experienced by consumers in their purchase activities. The demand for the retailer's product is derived from a household production model in which the levels of distribution services provided by the retailer play the role of fixed inputs in the household's production functions. The supply of the retailer's product is derived from a joint cost function which is non-decreasing in the levels of distribution services provided. Profit-maximizing behavior in monopolistically competive markets shows that retail firms have special economic incentives to become complex organizations by integrating backwards, offering multiple explicit products and operating in more than one market. In addition, monopolistically competitive retail firms in long-run equilibrium will exhibit excess capacity, price dispersion and product choice in distribution services.     

Reference Dependence and Market Competition

This paper examines the implications of consumer reference dependence for market competition. If consumers take some product (e.g., the first product they consider) as the reference point when evaluating others and they exhibit loss aversion, then the more “prominent” firm whose product is taken as the reference point by more consumers will randomize between a high and a low price. We also find that consumer loss aversion in the price dimension intensifies competition while that in the product dimension softens competition. With consumer reference dependence, asymmetric prominence can arise as an equilibrium outcome when firms advertise before engaging in price competition.     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

Departures from marginal-cost pricing in the American automobile industry: Estimates for 1977–1978

How are prices set in the American automobile oligopoly? This paper seeks empirical estimates of the extent of departure from marginal-cost pricing and of the effects of foreign competition. The model estimated has product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The estimation presumes that product type (proxied by engineering specifications) is exogenous to the price/quantity market equilibrium. Cross-section results for the 1977 and 1978 model years yield price-cost margins around 10%. Import competition has the effect of lowering equilibrium margins for compact and subcompact models.     

Heterogeneous preferences and non-central agglomeration of firms

This paper examines the locations of firms (such as restaurants), when consumers live in five towns that are equally spaced along a roadway. If heterogeneity in consumer preferences is large relative to the distance between towns, all firms agglomerate at the center. If heterogeneity in consumer preferences is moderate relative to the distance between towns, most firms agglomerate in the second and fourth towns.     

Postsearch uncertainty,product heterogeneity,and price divergence

We develop a consumer search model in which consumers may remain uncertain about product quality even after inspecting the product. We first consider the postsearch uncertainty regarding vertical quality, and characterize the separating equilibrium in which firms with different quality levels charge different prices. If quality information is not sufficiently transparent after the search, then prices between the low- and the high-quality products can either diverge or converge as the search cost decreases, depending on the degrees of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. We further extend the model to include the postsearch uncertainty about the horizontal match value and to endogenize the firm's quality choice.     

Matching the characteristics of a service to the preferences of customers

The central task of any market-oriented firm is to ensure that its product provides a mix of attributes that is consistent with the preferences of its customers. Attempts to measure the extent to which products meet consumer needs are often fraught with difficulties associated with eliciting and analysing the responses. We propose a simple index that can be applied to ordinal or cardinal data and will provide a convenient summary of the extent to which a product meets consumer expectations. The index, though simple, is shown to be robust, and is applied to the problem of analyzing the quality of banking services provided to small firms in the UK.     

Can strategic flexibility help firms profit from product innovation?

Although it is generally acknowledged that product innovation is critical for firms to sustain their competitive advantages, innovating firms sometimes fail to obtain economic returns from product innovation. This study focuses on the moderating effect of strategic flexibility (composed of resource flexibility and coordination flexibility) on the relationship between product innovation and firm performance, in order to address an important but previously unexplored question: Can strategic flexibility help firms profit from product innovation? Our empirical test, utilizing a sample of 607 Chinese firms, reveals that the moderating effect of resource flexibility on the positive relationship between product innovation and firm performance is negative, while that of coordination flexibility is positive. Further, such moderating effects are especially likely to be profound for firms confronting a high level of competitive intensity. We conclude by discussing our contributions, the implications, and possible future extensions.     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

Does Competition Make Firms More Flexible? A Study of Limited Managerial Cognition

A model of procedural decision making in firms is combined with an oligopoly model to study the effect of limited managerial cognition on firm flexibility. It is argued that a firm may vary its flexibility, and, hence, that there exists a trade-off between decision-making costs and costs due to imperfect adjustment to the environment. The main conclusions are the following: (1) The level of flexibility chosen by firms tends to be too low, from a social welfare point of view. (2) Entry reduces firm flexibility. Aggregated flexibility in the market may, however, increase in which case consumers are unambiguously better off. (3) Integration of isolated markets increases firm flexibility and consumer welfare.     

Product-Line Length as a Competitive Tool

The increasing number of consumer goods and services offered in recent years suggests that product-line extensions have become a favored strategy of product managers. A larger assortment, it is often argued, keeps customers loyal and allows firms to charge higher prices. There is disagreement, however, about the extent to which a longer product line translates into higher profits. We develop an econometric model derived from a game-theoretic perspective that explicitly considers firms' use of product-line length as a competitive tool. On the demand side, we analytically establish the link between consumer choice and the length of the product line. Based on our derivations, we include a measure of line length in the utility function to investigate consumer preference for variety using a brand-level discrete-choice model. The supply side is characterized by price and line length competition between oligopolistic firms. For the empirical analysis we use market-level data for the yogurt category. We find that there are decreasing returns to product-line length. Based on a series of "what-if" experiments, we derive recommendations for effective product line decisions in a competitive environment.     

Robust firm pricing with panel data

Firms often have imperfect information about demand for their products. We develop an integrated econometric and theoretical framework to model firm demand assessment and subsequent pricing decisions with limited information. We introduce a panel data discrete choice model whose realistic assumptions about consumer behavior deliver partially identified preferences and thus generate ambiguity in the firm pricing problem. We use the minimax-regret criterion as a decision-making rule for firms facing this ambiguity. We illustrate the framework’s benefits relative to the most common discrete choice analysis approach through simulations and empirical examples with field data.     

Estimating U.S. consumer preferences for meat with a flexible utility function

Direct and indirect translog utility functions provide budget share equations which are both flexible and consistent with the theory of utility maximization. These forms are attractive for modelling consumer behavior. Because of their flexibility they are ideal for testing hypotheses such as additivity of preferences. In this paper we use the translog methodology to analyze U.S. consumption of the four principal categories of meat-fish, beef, poultry, and pork. We decisively reject the hypothesis of additivity. However, further testing for partial additivity reveals that (beef) and (fish, poultry, pork) are additively separable subgroups of meat.     

Spatial Cournot competition and economic welfare: a note

We investigated welfare implications in location-quantity models in a symmetric linear city. We found that when firms are not agglomerated in equilibrium, increasing the distance between firms raises (reduces) producer surplus and social welfare (consumer surplus). Moreover, central agglomeration is always optimal for consumers among symmetric locations, but not necessarily for producers. Central agglomeration can be inefficient even if it is the unique equilibrium outcome. In short, the firms are more likely to agglomerate or locate closer than what welfare maximizers would dictate, whereas they locate farther apart than what consumer surplus maximizers would recommend.