辨别与防范开放式基金的特殊风险

开放式基金是目前我国金融市场推出的创新品种，然而与其它证券投资活动一样，收益与风险是结伴而行的，在实行操作中，开放式基金有其自身独特的风险，对于这个全新的金融品种，本结合国外经验，着重从开放式基金特有的风险 类与防范措施两个方面进行较深入的探讨。     

培育开放式基金职业经理人

开放式基金的本质是一种委托一代理关系，契约是不完全的，存在剩余索取权问题、隐藏行为道德风险和隐藏知识道德风险，使基金经理人的行为偏离投资的利益。运用信息经济学的声誉理论和层次分析方法，通过建立开放式基金职业经理人市场、开放式基金经理人的激励约束机制和开放式基金经理人业绩评价体系来培育我国第三代市场化的基金经理人，以保护投资的利益。     

解读行为金融学

行为金融学是在评论数理金融学的基础上建立的，能够解释金融市场中的异常现象，研究投资心理与行为的关系。它把投资的心理区分为理性趋利与价值感受，把心理学纳入投资行为分析，提出了研究投资行为的两种主要模型。因此，行为金融学成为一个引人注目的新兴学派。     

中小投资者羊群行为的多阶段模型探究

在中国的股票市场中,中小投资者虽是弱势群体,但其数量却占了股市投资者总数的大部分,其投资行为将直接决定着大盘走势和股票市场的波动情况。文章借鉴传染病模型,建立金融市场上中小投资者羊群行为的多阶段模型,就金融市场信息的不对称性与投资者的认知水平等影响金融市场上中小投资者羊群行为的阶段行为特征进行了深入分析,并有针对性地提出相关建议。     

基金投资行为与股票市场稳定性

本文实证研究了我国开放式基金的羊群行为及反馈行为,并检验了这种投资行为对中国股票市场的影响。结果表明,开放式基金具有明显的羊群行为及反馈行为,这种投资行为提高了股市上涨期间的上涨幅度,加剧了下跌期间股票市场的波动。加强市场及产品创新,改变基金投资范围狭窄、缺乏做空机制、产品同质化严重、投资管理模式雷同的现状,是解决这种不利局面的根本措施。     

开放式基金“赎回困惑”:基于行为金融学的成因分析

行为金融学以投资者的有限理性作为前提假设,在解释金融市场的异常现象上比传统金融学更有说服力。与国外基金业相比,我国开放式基金存在“赎回困惑”现象:即随着基金业绩增长,赎回率不降反升;相反有些业绩比较差甚至亏损的基金的净赎回率却相对较低。文章从行为金融学的角度出发,分析我国开放式基金的“赎回困惑”现象及其成因。     

证券市场中的"羊群行为"

“羊群行为”(herd behavior)是金融市场上的一个令人困惑的现象：一段时间以内，投资者不约而同地买卖相似的股票或进行相同方向的买卖，理智、信念、常识都失去了约束力，人嬗变为一种疯狂的动物。从个体意义上来说，如果一个投资者原本实施某项投资决策，但由于观察到其他的投资者没有进行这项投资，因而自己也取消了这项投资，这种行为就是一种个体的“羊群行     

开放式基金信息披露的国际比较

一、我国开放式基金发展态势良好 放眼全球金融市场,开放式基金早已成为基金业发展的主流。根据美国投资公司协会(ISI)的统计数据,目前全球开放式基金的资产规模大约相当于全球主要股票市场总市值的1/3。全球开放式基金管理的资产规模在1995年到2000年的5年内翻了一番,从1995年的5.4万亿美元增长到2000年的12万亿美元,年增长速度保持在两位数以上。横向比较来看,我国开放式基金的发展空间无可限量。 二、开放式基金的信息披露现状与问题     

基于行为金融理论的投资研究

行为金融理论是西方国家金融研究和实践的前沿领域,它的出现弥补了现代金融理论在个体行为分析上的不足。文中从行为金融理论产生的背景出发,着重分析了基于该理论的投资行为理论模型和投资策略及其投资风险的测量方法,简要评价了行为金融理论是从学科之外寻求推动金融学发展的新动力,为人们理解金融市场提供了一个新的视角。     

大丰市的"天丰模式"

江苏省大丰市是国家级生态建设示范县、全国生态农业建设先进县、全国林业百强县。近年来，大丰市把大力发展开放式林业作为农业和农村经济结构战略性调整、增加农民收入和加强生态环境建设的重要措施来抓，变政府行为为市场行为，变封闭式为开放式营林，加大招商引资力度，深化林业产权制度改革，吸引和调动各方投资造林的积极性，形成了资金来源多渠道、投资主体多元化的营林造林新格局，开创了全市林业大发展、大推进的良好局面。2001年10月，全市已营造绿色通道281km，栽植苗木297万株，退耕还林32680亩，合同订购苗木560万株，拍卖林地…     

On the dynamics of an endogenous growth model with learning by doing

Summary. The paper studies the local dynamics of an endogenous growth model with externalities of investment. It is demonstrated that, in case of sustained per capita growth, the competitve economy is characterized by a situation with a unique balanced growth path which is saddle point stable or by a situation with two balanced growth paths. If there are two balanced growth paths, the one with the higher growth rate is a saddle point whereas the path with the lower growth rate is either completely stable, with convergence to a rest point or limit cycle, or completely unstable. In the social optimum the existence of a balanced growth path implies that it is unique and that this path is a saddle point. Received: May 15, 2000; revised version: December 14, 2001     

Expectations and intertemporal separability in an empirical model of consumption and investment under uncertainty

An intertemporal model of consumption and investment under uncertainty is formulated, and compared with the existing literature; it is argued that an assumption of myopia is necessary for its empirical applicability. It is estimated by maximum likelihood with quarterly British data. A specification search for a satisfactory form of expectations is made, and the estimated model is compared with a static demand system. Strong intertemporal separability is formulated as a nested hypothesis, and strongly rejected by a likelihood ratio test.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium

Summary. In this paper, I develop an applied general equilibrium environment with peer group effects. The application I consider is schooling. The framework used here is general equilibrium with clubs. I establish the existence of equilibrium for the economy with a finite number of school types. This result is then extended to the case where the set of school types is a continuum. The two welfare theorems are shown to hold for both economies. To compute the equilibrium, I construct a Negishi mapping from the set of weights on individual type's utility to the set of transfers that support the corresponding Pareto allocations as competitive equilibria with transfers. Because this mapping is a correspondence, a version of Scarf's algorithm is used to find a competitive equilibrium. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000     

Convex Games and Stable Sets

It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a finite set of players is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set of the game. We extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex simple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. We also show that a game with a countable (possibly finite) set of players which is inner continuous is convex iff the core of each of its subgames is a stable set.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71.     

The enfranchisement of women and the welfare state

We offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico-economic model where men are richer than women, women display a higher preference for public goods, and women's disenfranchisement carries a societal cost. Men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process. We derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes: a males-only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime. The latter is associated with a higher tax rate but, as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor, women's relative wage increases, thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates. When the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement, the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women. A consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement.We empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870–1930 period. We proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism, which is associated with a more traditional view of women's role and thus a lower cost. The gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women. Consistently with the model's predictions, women's suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce, while women's suffrage increases the size of government only in non-catholic countries.     

基于耦合理论的旅游业与新农村建设协调发展研究

建设中国特色社会主义新农村是我国现代化进程中的重大历史任务,也是国家十一五规划中解决三农问题的战略方向。旅游业符合新农村建设中的资源节约、环境友好型和谐社会的国策取向。我国是一个农业大国,建设新农村任务艰巨。为了发挥旅游业在加快新农村建设方面的主要作用,文章提出基于耦合理论的旅游业和新农村建设协调发展研究,构建旅游业和新农村建设的耦合模型,并进行评价,最后得出结论。     

Information at equilibrium

Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation. Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments. Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

Using Angler Characteristics and Attitudinal Data to Identify Environmental Preference Classes: A Latent-Class Model

A latent-class model of environmental preference groups is developed and estimated with only the answers to a set of attitudinal questions. Economists do not typically use this type of data in estimation. Group membership is latent/unobserved. The intent is to identify and characterize heterogeneity in the preferences for environmental amenities in terms of a small number of preference groups. The application is to preferences over the fishing characteristics of Green Bay. Anglers answered a number of attitudinal questions, including the importance of boat fees, species catch rates, and fish consumption advisories on site choice. The results suggest that Green Bay anglers separate into a small number of distinct classes with varying preferences and willingness to pay for a PCB-free Green Bay. The probability that an angler belongs to each class is estimated as function of observable characteristics of the individual. Estimation is with the expectation–maximization (E–M) algorithm, a technique new to environmental economics that can be used to do maximum-likelihood estimation with incomplete information. As explained, a latent-class model estimated with attitudinal data can be melded with a latent-class choice model. Edward Morey and Jennifer Thacher are equal authors and rotate authorship across articles.