Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision

How do households make optimal borrowing and default decisions when they have the option to borrow in multiple ways? In this paper, I analyze households’ optimal mortgage and unsecured loan borrowing and default decisions in the context of the recent recession. I model households as able to default on mortgage debt to walk away from capital losses, at the price of foreclosure. However, a household can also default on unsecured debt to maintain its home, in exchange for a longer exclusion from credit markets following default. Depending on the costs of each alternative, financially constrained households exhibit heterogeneity in optimal default decisions.Next, I analyze how mortgage loan modification policies, after a sudden drop in house prices, affect household choices in the mortgage and unsecured loan markets. The quantitative exercise shows that the government-driven mortgage modification program, initiated in 2009, reduces the mortgage default rate by 0.27% points. However, this increases the unsecured loan charge-off rate by 0.66% points.     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

WEARING OUT YOUR WELCOME: EXAMINING DIFFERENTIAL MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY OF NEW ENTRANTS AND CONTINUING RECIPIENTS

Until recently, states were permitted to have different “new entrant” and “continuing recipient” income limits for parental Medicaid eligibility by implementing income disregards that changed with spell length. Some states utilized this option—either tightening income limits for the same family over time or loosening them. In this article, we construct a theoretical model of utility‐maximizing workers facing different time‐dependent eligibility thresholds to predict the Medicaid participation and employment behavior of workers with varying wage levels. The model reveals some inter‐temporally perverse incentives created by linking eligibility thresholds to Medicaid duration. Then, we empirically test these predictions using the Survey of Income and Program Participation and a unique compilation of state‐by‐family size Medicaid thresholds for both new and continuing recipients. We find that patterns of Medicaid participation and spell duration are consistent with the predictions of our model. There is also evidence that the individuals predicted by our model to lower their work hours may supply fewer hours of labor. As of January 2014, the Affordable Care Act disallows time‐varying income disregards; our findings suggest that states previously using this strategy will experience an adjustment in Medicaid caseloads and possibly labor market outcomes because of the change. (JEL H4, I1, J2)     

Credit limits and bankruptcy

Credit cards offer a limit, rather than a specific loan size, at a pre-approved interest rate. This paper studies the determination of these credit limits jointly with default in the presence of one-period debt. I adapt the standard incomplete markets macroeconomic model of one-period unsecured debt with the optimal choice of credit limit. Endogenous limits and positive default coexist. A numerical exercise illustrates the consequences of various factors for indebtedness, credit limits, and bankruptcy.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Optimal Loan Loss Provisions and Welfare

We study the welfare implications of optimal loan loss provisions in a New Keynesian model featuring endogenous default risk and inflationary credit spreads. A unique link between provisions, credit spreads and inflation can be employed to enhance macroeconomic stability. Optimal provisions are most effective when dealing with cost-push financial shocks inherent in volatile spreads and the zero bound problem of monetary policy. Relaxing provisioning requirements following a recessionary financial disturbance consistently achieves the first-best outcome while nullifying the value of monetary policy under commitment. In contrast, deflationary demand shocks warrant an optimal rise in provisions, which inflate prices yet mildly contract output.     

基于委托代理理论的信用违约互换最优契约模型分析

本文阐述了信用风险互换及其委托代理关系．分析了信息不对称下引起信用违约互换道德风险问题，运用委托代理理论建立了相应的信用违约互换契约分析模型．对道德风险下的最优信用违约契约性质进行研究．并提出了解决道德风险、优化信用违约互换的激励机制．确保信用违约互换在我国的健康发展。     

Equity market valuation,systematic risk and monetary policy

This study examines the relationship between equity market valuation and risk indicators that portend economic downswings. The indicators are implied options volatility, Treasury-Eurodollar (TED) spread and exchange rate. While implied volatility captures market risk in that it reflects the fear factor embedded in the price of an option, TED spread reflects the default risk premium that is priced into a key short-term credit instrument. Equity markets often show a tendency to reflect the incidence of these risk factors. And because they provide valuable information about the health of the economy, many have argued that equity market valuation be taken into account in the formulation of monetary policy. Results of this study not only show a statistically significant inverse relationship between the stock market and these risk factors, but also evidence of a cointegration. In a variance decomposition of the series, we find that equity valuation is a major contributor to the forecast error variances of each of the risk indicators, a finding that lends tacit support to the argument that risk indicators associated with the equity market be considered in monetary policy decisions.     

Insurance,credit, and technology adoption: Field experimental evidencefrom Malawi

Does production risk suppress the demand for credit? We implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology. The study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in Malawi, where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall. We randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high-yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the November 2006 crop season. The other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package, but were also required to purchase (at actuarially fair rates) a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall. Surprisingly, take-up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan. Take-up was 33.0% for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan. There is suggestive evidence that reduced take-up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract: insured loan take-up was positively correlated with farmer education, income, and wealth, which may proxy for the individual's default costs. By contrast, take-up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics.     

Credit Chains and Mortgage Crises

Here I examine a production economy with a financial sector that contains multiple layers of credit. The latter constitute credit chains that include a simple mortgage market. The focus is on the nature and contagion properties of credit chains in an economy where the financial sector plays a real allocating role, and agents have a serious choice of whether to default on mortgages or not. Multiple equilibria with different rates of default are observed, due to the presence of strategic complementarities. A liquidity crunch is associated with higher rates of default that can trigger a financial crisis as well as constrain the purchase of production factors, leading to reductions in welfare, together with potentially serious effects on real economic activity with the potential of causing deep and widespread recessions.     

UNIVERSAL ACCESS,PARALLEL TRADE AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyse the optimal income‐based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that universal access is less likely to arise when price arbitrage prevents international price discrimination. When this is not the case, under some income ranges, bilateral universal coverage can be supported by equilibrium subsidies together with bilateral partial provision. In such a case, international health policy coordination becomes relevant. We also show that asymmetric universal access to medicines across countries can arise, even when countries are ex ante symmetric, when international price discrimination is possible and governments cannot design subsidies proportional to either income or quality.     

A natural experiment of the effect of advertising on sales: the SASOL case

China's so-called ‘reform and opening up’ policy (Gai Ge Kai Fang), implemented nearly 30 years ago, has led to tremendous economic development. China's nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 3.25 trillion US dollars in 2007, making it the fourth largest economy in the world. At the same time, income inequality has become quite skewed in China, inviting considerable criticism. Moreover, the trend towards greater income inequality persists. Of particular public policy relevance is the effect of income inequality on health disparities in China, particularly for low-income households. This study addresses this issue using a longitudinal dataset from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1997 to 2006. Our central finding is that income inequality affects health differently by socioeconomic status: income inequality harms individual health among low income households by more than it does among high income households. More specifically, health is more adversely affected by greater income inequality for households with low incomes. China's central government is committed to making further investments in the health care system. As part of that effort, attention should be directed at low income households to reduce health inequality, possibly providing them with a health insurance safety net similar to Medicaid in USA.     

Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

Transfer Pricing and Strategic Taxation of Globally Joint Inputs

This paper models strategic taxation policy of home and host governments when a multinational enterprise sets transfer prices on globally joint inputs such as research and development. Tax credit and deduction allowances, as well as no taxation of foreign-earned profits, result in identical optimal transfer-price solutions and national income effects in both countries. An equilibrium home-tax solution is to tax foreign-earned profits at a higher rate than domestically earned profits. The multiantional responds by shifting profits abroad through transfer-pricing mechanisms.     

Growth and crisis,unavoidable connection?

Periods of economic boom with rapid credit and GDP growth can be followed by sudden busts. In the presence of financial market imperfections, a simple modification of a neoclassical growth model can fully account for this behavior. I study a growth model for a small open economy where decreasing marginal returns to capital appear after the country has reached a threshold level of development, which is uncertain. Limited enforceability of contracts allows borrowers to default on their debt. Lenders optimally choose to suddenly restrict the supply of credit when the threshold is reached and decreasing marginal returns appear. Borrowers default, and a boom–bust cycle is generated.     

Default and aggregate income

This paper studies how default varies with aggregate income. We analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed, idiosyncratic income by allowing for default. Default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance. Default penalties ensure that only these agents default. We show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income. We provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous.     

Estimating the Percentage of the US Population without Health Insurance: An Ecological Approach

This ecological study identifies factors that affect the percentage of a state’s population without health insurance. Even with the Medicaid program, over 15% of the US population is without health insurance and understanding reasons why people are uninsured is an important first step in remedying this problem. Results presented here indicate an income policy or a piecemeal approach to the problem will probably be unsuccessful.      

Delivering Public Health Care Services: Substitutes,Complements, or Both?

In this article we investigate how the availability of public health care providers increases (complement) or decreases (substitute) the likelihood of having public or private health insurance. The probability of each of three insurance alternatives (uninsured, Medicaid, private insurance) is modeled as a function of the availability of public programs in the respondents'community along with individual characteristics including family income, health status, and family structure. Using population-based estimates, public hospitals are associated with a crowd-out rate of 3.5 percent to 8.6 percent. Federally qualified health centers were associated with a net complementary effect (additional public insurance take-up) of 7.1 percent. (JEL I11 , I18 , I38 )     

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.     

Unilateral CVA for CDS in a contagion model with stochastic pre-intensity and interest

Price of a financial derivative with unilateral counterparty credit risk equals to the price of an otherwise risk-free derivative minus a credit value adjustment (CVA) component, which can be seen as a call option on investor's NPV with strike 0. Thus modeling volatility of NPV is the foundation for CVA valuation. This paper assumes that default times of counterparty and reference firm follow a special contagion model with stochastic pre-intensities that allows for explicit formulas for default probabilities. Stochastic interest rate is also incorporated to account for positive correlation between pre-intensity and interest. Survival measure approach is employed to calculate NPV of a risk-free CDS, and semi-analytical solution for CVA is obtained through affine specifications. Numerical analysis shows that contagion has more significant impact on CVA than diffusion of pre-intensities, and the positive correlation between interest and reference firm's pre-intensity has monotonic decreasing impact on CVA.