中国卫生筹资的再分配效应

利用2006年中国健康与营养调查(CHNS)数据和类似于税收再分配的分解方法,将卫生筹资的再分配效应分为三部分:累进效应、水平平等效应和再排序效应。卫生筹资增加了收入不平等,表现出了亲富人的再分配,主要原因在于水平不平等和再排序效应,如果相同收入的人群进行相同的卫生支付,再分配效应将会降低64%,另一原因在于卫生筹资系统的累退性。在同为从穷人到富人的再分配中,农村卫生筹资亲富人的再分配程度高于城市;农村卫生筹资的累退程度大于城市;农村卫生筹资的水平不平等小于城市。     

信贷约束、再分配及不平等对增长的影响

当信贷对那些禀赋较少的当事人是完全可获取时,再分配对长期增长无影响.当信贷不可得时,再分配可以促进经济增长.富人与穷人之间的不平等程度越高,越容易刺激穷人掠夺富人的财富,并牺牲了总的投资与增长.恰当的再分配政策设计可以有利于禀赋少者并促进总的产出,并使社会朝着增长与和谐的方向努力.     

财税政策对不平等和贫困的影响研究

财政是国家治理的重要支柱，优化财税政策以更好地支持再分配及减贫作用，是缩小收入差距、提升人民福祉的重要手段，也是我国制定政策的长期目标之一。利用中国家庭追踪调查数据和财税政策宏观统计数据，文章计算了我国财税政策对不平等和贫困的边际贡献，测度累进性、税率和规模对边际贡献的集约边际影响，并设置不同政策情景，探究财税政策变动对不平等和贫困的影响。研究结果显示：提高税收政策累进性有助于减少不平等，税率在特定条件下才能减少不平等；视为政府转移支付的养老金减少不平等和贫困的边际贡献最强，政府补助的边际贡献相对较弱，但提高政府补助的瞄准率有利于减少不平等和贫困；义务教育和公共医疗对减少不平等和贫困发挥积极作用；财税改革可能会因政策间的交互作用产生反直觉的兰伯特难题现象。文章认为，财税政策改革不仅需要考虑各政策工具的自身属性，还需要考虑其他政策工具对再分配效应的共同影响。     

我国居民收入不平等的主要原因：市场还是政府政策？

市场因素和政府收入再分配政策是决定一国居民收入不平等程度的两个重要因素。本文采用中国家庭收入调查（China Household Income Project ,CHIP）住户数据,计算出我国居民市场收入基尼系数与可支配收入基尼系数,并同发达国家进行比较,借此探讨目前我国居民收入不平等是由市场力量造成的,还是政府收入再分配政策力度不足的结果。研究发现,从市场收入基尼系数来看,我国与发达国家之间的差距并不大。由此认为,政府收入再分配政策效果不明显是导致我国居民收入分配不平等状况较发达国家严重的主要原因。加大转移支付等再分配政策力度是缓解和改善目前我国居民收入不平等的主要途径。     

地区差距、要素流动与财政分权

本文在财政分权框架下引入不完全人口流动和内生劳动供给选择 ,针对两个不对称的地方经济 ,研究了政府的最优税收、最优公共支出和最优转移支付政策。我们发现了零中央政府收入税和逆向财政缺口 ,在有限政策工具的约束下 ,对应性转移支付也具有缩小区域差距的功能。不同级别政府间的服务竞争和税收竞争极大地影响了个人和政府的最优决策 ,拥挤效应和实际禀赋效应放大了通常意义上的收入效应水平。人口流动和财政分权提高了低生产力地区的福利 ,数值模拟分析结果表明高生产力、高禀赋地区对低生产力、低禀赋地区存在隐性的区域间收入再分配 ,中央政府的干预措施一般具有协调区域发展、补贴低生产力低禀赋地区的性质。结合我国东西部的经济现实 ,我们认为中央政府应该打破已有的利益分配格局 ,优化转移支付资金的结构 ,提高财政政策效率     

政府再分配政策对城镇居民收入不平等作用的实证考察

笔者运用泰尔指数对城镇居民初次分配收入、总收入和可支配收入的不平等状态进行衡量,并分析了政府再分配政策对区域间与区域内城镇居民收入不平等状况的调节,考察了直接税和转移支付这两个工具对城镇居民收入不平等的调控作用.结论表明,2005年一2007年,问直接税与转移性收入对缩小收入不平等状态都有一定效果.其中转移性收入的作用接近直接税作用的两倍;在不同区域,直接税与转移性收入的调节作用有较大差异.     

高度警惕收入分配不平等对经济增长的负面影响

1.从政治经济机制的角度来分析不平等对经济增长的损害。因为税前收入分配不平等会导致政府对资源的再分配和政策的再调整(包括以税收等形式的直接再分配、政府公共项目、立法管制)活动,或者富人为阻止政府再分配而进行的院外活动等浪费经济资源的活动,这将使得经济信号发生扭曲,投资减少,最终损害经济增长。2.从社会冲突与产权保护机制角度来分析不平等对经济增长的损害。一般认为不平等会导致穷人从事犯罪、暴乱等破坏性活动,同时富人需要花费资源来保护财产,这加剧了社会不安定从而导致国家法规不稳定,增加了整个社会的不确定性,投资产权…     

劳动力流入和地方政府收入再分配政策研究

文章引入收入分配边界概念,结合劳动力流动的市场均衡模型,研究外来劳动力对某一地区收入分配水平的影响.分析表明,如果流入者是某一地区收入再分配政策的净受赠者,那么,劳动力流入使得该地区的收入分配边界收缩,至少部分居民的收入水平降低.如果此时给予流出地劳动力转移支付,将使流入劳动力的数量减少到一个合理水平,劳动力流入地区的所有居民都会获益.此结论不仅对发达地区政府针对外来劳动力流入采取的限制政策提供了一个合理解释,也为发达地区和不发达地区进行财政合作,利用收入再分配手段合理配置劳动力、提高社会福利水平提供了理论支持.     

走向共同富裕：再分配政策对收入分布的影响分析

本文基于微观数据并构建反事实分解模型研究2010—2018年中国再分配政策的变化对收入分布的影响。研究发现，党的十八大以来，政府再分配调节职能进一步强化，城乡居民基本养老保险和公共转移支付政策的改革在提升中低收入家庭收入增长率、缩小收入分配差距方面取得了显著成果。机制分析发现，这一时期居民养老保险的再分配效果主要来自于其覆盖面的扩大，其次是养老金水平的提高。公共转移支付政策变化的效果则主要来自于对低收入群体更好的瞄准和支付水平的提升。政策模拟显示，若进一步增加居民养老保险和公共转移支付支出，提高覆盖面比增加给付水平具有更强的再分配效果。     

财政转移支付调节居民收入差距的对策

财政转移支付是调节初次收入分配不合理的重要工具。以辽宁省为个案的研究表明,近年来财政转移支付数额不断增加,但居民收入差距并未因此而缩小,财政转移支付甚至出现逆向调节现象。城乡二元经济结构的城市指向、财政转移支付的分配理念和制度设计偏差、地方政府事权与财权不匹配是造成财政转移支付政策宗旨与实际效果偏离的主要原因。因此,缩小居民收入分配差距除应扩大财政转移支付规模外,还要在转移支付的分配设计、分配结构、分配效率上进一步加以改进。     

Income distribution,fiscal policy,and delays in stabilization

This paper presents an explanation of the cycles of large fiscal expansions and macroeconomic stabilizations that are frequently observed in developing countries. In the model, different coalitions form and change depending on the position of three groups over the degree of redistribution and the timing of debt repayment. I show that seemingly unsustainable fiscal policies arise from a coalition of the poor and the rich when the distribution of income is highly unequal. When income is distributed more equally, instead, the patterns of fiscal policy and of the trade balance are consistent with the standard predictions of representative agent models. These features of the model seem consistent with available empirical evidence.     

影响收入分配关系的五个问题与八点建议

基于与收入分配密切相关的五个重要问题的分析,文章认为,我国现阶段收入分配的症结不在于雇员薪酬比重、政府收入规模(宏观税负)、国有经济比重等带有总量特征的指标出现了什么严重问题,而在于收入分配的结构存在较为显著的不合理,差距扩大,公正性不足,转移支付和直接税的再分配优化机制构建不到位、作用发挥不够,以及对财产性收入的影响缺乏有效的引导与约束,国有企业的资产收益对公共福利贡献较弱,等等。文章从政府与财政的职能定位出发,考虑全局的可持续发展和社会和谐,提出了八点完善收入分配关系的建议。     

Minimum wage or negative income tax: why skilled workers may favor wage rigidities

In this article, we analyze the political choice of the extent and means of income redistribution between high and low-skilled workers. Redistributive tools encompass both fiscal transfers (a negative income tax) and a minimum wage requirement. We assume the use of fiscal instruments alone to be the first-best means of redistribution. We show that high-skilled workers may favor a second-best, minimum wage requirement because it increases unemployment, hence raising the marginal cost of redistribution, and creates a justification for them to moderate low-skilled workers’ claim for redistribution.      

Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications

The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to the fiscal policy debate.     

General Equilibrium Impacts of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Welfare of Households in South Asia

Impacts of fiscal and monetary policies are assessed in an open economy two sector multi‐household general equilibrium tax model with money for South Asia. Despite impressive growth rates there is evidence for alarming gaps in the distribution of income among households that require very careful design of economic policies. Generally the impacts of fiscal expansions are positive for all categories of households under the flexible price system but the gains are much higher for households in the upper income group than for those in the bottom. In theory the equilibrium relative prices guarantee the optimal allocation of resources in such economy. Simulation results show that demand, output and employment are sensitive to the preferences of consumers, confidence of producers and sector specific production technologies. Monetary policy is super‐neutral under flexible price regime but can complement fiscal policy well when aggregate prices are made sticky. Combination of monetary and fiscal policies in this manner can have extensive impacts in efficiency and redistribution. Higher taxes distort incentives to work and investment from richer households slowing down the economy. This reduces the welfare level of both rich and poor. Flexibility in prices enhances the market mechanism and makes the fiscal policy more effective and efficient.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

Fiscal Policy, Congestion, and Endogenous Growth

We devise an endogenous growth model with private and public physical capital, and human capital, which allows for relative and absolute congestion. According to empirical evidence, long-run growth is invariant to fiscal policy. Despite its complexity, the dynamics of the market economy and the centralized economy are analyzed in detail. We show that an increase in absolute congestion reduces the long-run growth rate of output. In contrast, relative congestion does not affect long-run growth. In the absence of congestion, it is optimal to use lump-sum taxation, and with congestion it is optimal to also tax income.     

Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions

A fiscal programme that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favourable shock to regions hit by an unfavourable one. Centralised fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region-specific shocks. In this paper, we argue that a centralised fiscal policy, while reducing the uncertainty on the tax base, may create additional uncertainty on the tax rate. Using a simple model we show that the higher uncertainty on the policy instrument might more than offset the lower uncertainty on the tax base.     

Fiscal Policy and Equitable Growth

This paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by exploring a case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures with distortionary tax finance: public production services, public consumption services, and state-contingent redistributive transfers. The paper shows that in a general-equilibrium model with given exogenous fiscal policy, a nonmonotonic relation exists between the suboptimal long-run growth rate in a competitive economy and distortionary tax rates. When fiscal policy is endogenously chosen at a social optimum, the relation between the rate of growth and tax rates is always negative. These two properties suggest that an alternative set of government policy instruments affects the response of private sector investment to fiscal policy. Moreover, the different properties of exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy theoretically account for the difference in the relation between economic growth and fiscal policy in empirical studies.