民主与民粹如影相随

在西方普选制民主中,民主与民粹如影相随,须臾不可分离。而主导话语权的精英们,将同一事物根据自己的需要变换着"民主"、"民粹"的称呼,本质上就是精英们从心底里认为:"我需要的才是民主,我不需要的便是民粹"。①西方民主理论一方面把大众民主当成合法性的唯一来源,另一方面又要维护精英的社会地位,民主被赋予不可能完成的历史使命。     

论市场民主

文章认为市场民主是作为一种社会管理体制的民主在市场领域的贯彻,是市场领域中的一种公众参与机制。文章从参与主体的视角出发,探讨了市场民主的评价尺度问题;并分析了实现市场民主的三项基础性条件。     

抽签与民主代表:一个温和建议

选举往往导致富人和特权阶层享有过多代表权,而穷人和弱势公民则得不到充分代表,抽签从候选人库中随机遴选,每个人都有被选中的平等机会,可以矫正这种民主的缺陷.抽签广泛应用于早期民主国家和共和国:古雅典和文艺复兴时期的佛罗伦萨和威尼斯城市国家.才能与知识的障碍不应成为将普通大众排除在民主过程之外的借口,现代大众民主国家应考虑将抽签制度化,并扩大其适用范围,这样才能让自己的政治制度更加民主.如果理所当然地接受受过教育的精英支配一切,并满足于他们仅仅只是每隔几年接受一次选举制约,那我们就不能再自称为民主主义者,我们所喜好的实际上就是带有自由、民主和技术专家统治特征的“寡头混合体制”.     

两种民主模式与第三波民主化的稳固北大核心CSSCI

为什么第三波民主化进程中,有些新兴民主国家实现了民主稳固,而另一些却走向了民主倒退甚至崩溃?在常见的"经济水平论"、"制度选择论"、"社会结构论"、"政治文化论"和"国际环境论"之外,本文提出了一个新的视角——"精英行为论"。本文认为,对民主观念存在两种理解("程序性的理解"与"实体性的理解"),而这两种理解导致了两种政治精英行为方式,进而构成了两种民主模式("多元制衡式民主"与"赢者通吃式民主"),后者往往带来民主的倒退甚至崩溃。换言之,在民主转型这样一个历史的"关键时刻",一定观念下的精英行为与选择很大程度上塑造了新兴民主国家民主稳固的前景。在理论阐释之外,本文还选择了南非与委内瑞拉两个案例对此进行详细说明。     

民主及民主的质量

民主被认为是一种相对于家族统治、军人独裁、寡头治理的政治体系和制度安排,它通常与限任制度、选举制度、协商制度以及政策辩论相联系。随着教育的普及,公共领域的扩大,公民权利意识的增强,民主体制和实践在各国得到了不同程度的应用。但是,由于各国历史基础、传统观念、社会结构以及社会力量对比的不同,民主实践不仅在各国采用不完全相同的方式,而且,其绩效也有很大不同。在有些国家,民主运行良好,而且"正效应"显著,显示了"好民主"的特征;而在有些国家的特定时段,民主不仅运行不畅,而且还显示了"病态"特征和"负效应"。这就促成了有关"民主质量"的讨论。文章认为,一种理想的民主政治应该在法治进步、经济发展、政治自由、人才选拔、公民参与、社会福利、政府效能方面发挥积极作用并具有优良表现。因此,法治水平、经济发展、政治自由、绩优选拔、公民参与、社会福利、政府效能应该成为评价和测量民主质量的七个方面。     

民主的质量--来自印度的比较经验

本文以印度为案例分析了民主的形式、实质和有效性三个维度的动态关系。印度53年的民主历程对于减少大众的政治、社会和经济的边缘地位收效甚微。而喀拉拉邦是个例外。在那里，民主制度有效地管理了社会冲突并确保了底层阶级受益。相对于众多民主转型文献，喀拉拉邦的经验说明，动员和再分配呼声有助于深化民主。     

三种民主理念与儒家思想资源

本文把当前中国学界所持的三种不同的民主观念概括为“平等主义民主”、“贤人主义民主”和“自由主义民主”,挑出三位代表性学者进行例证研究,探讨它们同儒家思想资源的关系.本文论证,秦晖所推崇的自由主义民主执著于一种过于单薄的自由观,未能认识到儒家文化体系中的家庭乃是个人追求积极自由的必然方式和条件；王绍光所倡导的平等主义民主过于看重彻底平等的价值,忽视了追求这种价值势必付出的沉重代价；蒋庆所提出的“王道政治”包含一种极具特色的民主观,即全面的民意不应由简单多数来决定,而是取决于具有超越神圣、历史文化和现时人心的三个维度的民意之间的平衡,并由有德有才的人来代表.     

代表型民主与代议型民主

民主就是人民当家作主。既然如此,一国人民如何看待"当家作主"的含义、一国体制如何落实"当家作主"就至关重要。本文从理论上区分了两类民主:代表型民主与代议型民主。依据实证材料,本文提出三个论点:第一,中国人民期待一种不同形式的民主,即实质性民主,而不是形式上的民主。这是民主的需求方。第二,中国已在理论和实践发展出一种不同的类型的民主,即代表型民主,而不是代议型民主。这是民主的供给方。第三,尽管中国的政治体制有这样那样的问题,但它基本上符合中国人民对民主的期待,使得中国现在的体制在老百姓心中享有较高的正当性。     

企业经济民主的马克思主义分析框架

企业经济民主不仅是企业管理的发展趋势,而且也是创建和谐劳动关系的重要手段。文章运用马克思主义唯物史观,提出了一个以社会化大生产为物质基础、以企业内部劳动关系为核心内容,以民主的政治和意识形态为外部条件的企业经济民主理论分析框架。阐述了生产者权力是社会化生产条件下企业经济民主的理想状态;企业内部主、客体分工的结合方式是区别企业经济民主不同发展程度的关键特征;社会化大生产与旧式分工之间的矛盾是推动企业经济民主发展的动力等观点。     

电子民主与信息时代的政府职能定位

在信息通讯技术的推动下,世界范围内出现了一股政府信息化的潮流。围绕着信息时代的政府职能定位、西方出现了强势型民主、大众型民主以及消费型民主等三种比较流行的民主理论。由消费型民主的主流地位所决定,信息时代的政府职能定位可能是一种以服务为核心,以个性化为特点的服务型政府。     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

The Role of Nonattenuated Rights in Positive Economics: A Critical Appraisal

This article assesses the institutionalist elements of Friedrich Hayek's neoliberal political economy by presenting his views on the entangled relations between the state and markets in capitalism. Through the analysis of Hayek's work, the article contributes to further consolidating the view that neoliberalism is an ideological project of institutional transformation which, despite some enduring myths, has an irreplaceable role for a state with many important functions in a more limited democracy. Markets, for their part, are politically contested social constructions that depend on previous non-market institutions for their existence and legitimation. This paper argues that Hayek's work corroborates this institutionalist claim.     

Does economic openness affect liberal and electoral democracy in a different way? Empirical evidence from developing countries

The focus of this paper was to empirically analyze the impacts of economic liberalization on the liberal and electoral democracy in a sample of 106 less developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2016. The economic relationship between these countries and the global trade and the financial system generates a crucial question of to what extent political conditions are affected by this changing relation. To test these relationships, this paper uses V‐Dem's liberal democracy and electoral democracy indices and nine economic liberalization variables. Utilizing two‐step system dynamic panel GMM estimation indicates that trade openness and economic globalization, de facto strongly affects electoral democracy.     

论经济全球化对世界民主化进程的推动作用

20世纪90年代以来,经济全球化进程不断加快,世界各国各地区之间的经济联系更加密切,世界各国日益强调平等互利原则,相互竞争的同时注重协调与合作,多元化、宽容、妥协与合作,成为各国经济国际化进程中的基本共识。经济全球化发展,还使更多国家选择了市场经济体制。各国市场经济体制的建立与发展,使得推动民主化进程的民主力量不断发展壮大。作为世界民主化进程的基本内容,民主的制度化与权力运作的法制化,相应地也得到各国普遍认同,在实践当中进一步丰富和发展。     

Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation

Does democracy affect trade? There are several channels by which democracy may affect trade, with differing implications. First, democratization in the exporting country can improve product quality and reduce trade costs, increasing bilateral trade. Second, democratization in the importing country may increase trade barriers and thus reduce imports. In this paper, I analyze the effect of democracy on trade by augmenting the gravity equation with democracy. Using a rich panel data set and controlling for the endogeneity of democracy, I find empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that democracy fosters trade. This finding is robust to various econometric methods and to the use of disaggregated specifications.     

Does democracy foster financial development? An empirical analysis

This paper examines whether democracy promotes financial development. While cross-section results show a positive association between democracy and bank development, this relationship disappears in panel regressions. The data also reveals that democracy is not positively related to stock market development.     

The Limitations of Karl Marx' Social Economics ∗

Studies of the relationship between political democracy and economic inequality have produced diverse findings. This study attempts to mitigate some conceptual and methodological problems inherent in such studies by using multi-indicator concepts of inclusive democracy and economic inequality. Data from the five major historically and culturally homogeneous South Asian countries covering 1980–2003 suggest some bidirectional, positive relationship between inclusive democracy and economic inequality indicating that democracy and equality may not be fully compatible in this region. The paper offers contextual explanations and some mechanisms that may have led to these findings for the region, somewhat deviating from the conventional arguments.     

Does precipitation and runoff variability affect treaty cooperation between states sharing international bilateral rivers?

Elevated world temperatures, as forecasted by the 4th IPCC report, are expected to increase the hydrological cycle activity, leading to a change in precipitation patterns and increase in evapotranspiration. These in turn are expected to affect river runoff and water variability, depending on basin latitude. In this paper, we assess the impact of water supply variability on ‘treaty cooperation’ (defined here as the likelihood of treaty formation and number of treaties formed) between international bilateral river basin riparian states. The water variability measure that we use captures both annual runoff variability and precipitation variability. We employ additional control variables adopted from economic and international relations theories on international cooperation. The main results suggest that water supply variability in international bilateral basins creates an impetus for cooperation. Our results support an inverted U-shaped relationship between water supply variability and treaty cooperation. Similarly, interactions between the states in the form of diplomatic and trade relations support cooperation. Various measures of democracy/governance suggest different impacts on cooperation. Uneven economic power between the riparian states inhibits treaty cooperation. The geography variables we use are insignificant in all the estimated relationships.     

Democracy and Development: Cruel Dilemma or Symbiotic Relationship?

The paper dissects the hypothesis that democracy is inimical to economic development. The historical origin of this perspective is presented and its key theoretical and empirical assumptions are examined and assessed. The chief conclusion is that there is no necessary tradeoff between democracy and development. When compared to authoritarian regimes, democracy is more likely to foster an environment that facilitates the innovative and entrepreneurial process so essential for sustained development. On the other hand, democracy is better for development only when accompanied by an expansion of markets and competition. Democracy without markets is unlikely to deliver significant growth. In this context, liberalized international trade can act in a productive symbiosis with democratic institutions to promote development by facilitating bilateral flows of ideas, knowledge, goods, services, and technology.     

Income Shocks,Inequality, and Democracy*

In this paper, motivated by contradictory evidence on the effect of income on democracy, we investigate the hypothesis that it is income shocks – major income fluctuations relative to the trend – rather than marginal year‐on‐year variation in income levels that lead to non‐trivial changes in the quality of political institutions. Empirical results provide support for this hypothesis, and show how income inequality plays a crucial role in the effects of economic shocks on democracy. In particular, negative income shocks reveal a positive effect on democracy in countries with high inequality, and vice versa.