环境污染责任保险与企业创新:促进还是抑制

在绿色发展背景下,基于环保部公布的投保环境污染责任保险企业名录,实证检验环责险对企业创新的影响及其作用机制。结果显示：投保环责险能促进企业创新能力提升,其在企业创新治理方面发挥着积极作用;环责险通过缓解融资约束提高企业创新能力;环责险对非国有企业创新水平促进效果更显著;环责险与环境规制不能发挥协同作用。结论丰富了企业创新影响因素以及环责险经济后果的理论研究,对深化绿色保险改革、实现创新驱动发展具有重要现实意义。     

我国基本养老保险扩面的收入分配效应研究

文章基于一般均衡分析框架,通过构建“统账结合”制基本养老保险的异质性跨期交叠一般均衡动态模型,引入国发〔2005〕38号文的主要内容,利用政策仿真、参数估值和敏感性检验等方法,重点研究了养老保险制度覆盖面扩展的收入分配和再分配效应,并进行了理论推导和实证测算。结果发现：（1）我国基本养老保险扩面具有明显的收入分配和再分配效应,且再分配效应是累进的,发生了从城镇企业职工为代表的高收入者向以灵活就业人员和农民工为代表的低收入者的收入转移;（2）个人账户发挥了平滑作用,有利于改善不同类型劳动者终生的收入分配,但不利于收入再分配的改善;（3）社会统筹账户具有较强的收入再分配效应,有利于改善不同类型劳动者的收入再分配,缩小收入差距。参数敏感性检验表明结论是稳健的。因此,进一步优化社会统筹账户有利于减小收入不平等。     

A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1. JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81     

Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D64, J52     

Societal implications of medical insurance coverage for imatinib as first-line treatment of chronic myeloid leukemia in China: a cost-effectiveness analysis

Objectives: Imatinib (Glivec) and nilotinib (Tasigna) have been covered by critical disease insurance in Jiangsu province of China since 2013, which changed local treatment patterns and outcomes of patients with chronic myeloid leukemia (CML). This study evaluated the long-term cost-effectiveness of insurance coverage with imatinib as the first-line treatment for patients with CML in China from a societal perspective.

Methods: A decision-analytic model based on previously published and real-world evidence was applied to simulate and evaluate the lifetime clinical and economic outcomes associated with CML treatments before and after imatinib was covered by medical insurance. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was calculated with both costs and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) discounted at 3% annually. Different assumptions of treatment benefits and costs were taken to address uncertainties and were tested with sensitivity analyses.

Results: In base case analysis, both cost and effectiveness of CML treatments increased after imatinib was covered by the medical insurance; on average, the incremental QALY and cost were 5.5 and ¥277,030 per patient in lifetime, respectively. The ICER of insurance coverage with imatinib was ¥50,641, which is less than the GDP per capita of China. Monte Carlo simulation resulted in the estimate of 100% probability that the insurance coverage of imatinib is cost-effective. Total cost was substantially saved at 5 years after patients initiated imatinib treatment with insurance coverage compared to no insurance coverage, the saved cost at 5 years was ¥99,565, which included the cost savings from both direct (e.g. cost of bone marrow or stem cell transplant) and indirect costs (e.g. productivity loss of patients and care-givers).

Conclusions: The insurance coverage of imatinib is very cost-effective in China, according to the local cost and clinical data in Jiangsu province. More importantly, the insurance coverage of imatinib and nilotinib have changed the treatment patterns of CML patients, thus dramatically increasing life expectancy and quality-of-life (QoL) saving on productivity losses for both CML patients and their caregivers.     

Determinants of private health insurance coverage among Mexican American men 2010–2013

Abstract

Background: Private health insurance (PHI) represents the largest source of insurance for Americans. Hispanic Americans have one of the lowest rates of PHI coverage. The largest group in the US Hispanic population are Mexican Americans; they account for about two in every three Hispanics. One in every three Mexican Americans aged 64 years and under did not have health insurance coverage. Mexican Americans have the most unfavorable health insurance coverage of any population group in the nation.

Objectives: The objective is to determine the factors associated with the gap in PHI coverage between Mexican American and non-Hispanic American men.

Methods: This study used the National Health Interview Surveys (2010–2013) as the sample. A non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition was run, estimating the explained and unexplained gap in PHI coverage between the groups. Several robustness tests of the model were also included.

Results: This study estimates that 44.4% of employed Mexican American men are covered by PHI compared to 79.5% of non-Hispanic American men. Nearly 60% of employed Mexican American men were found to be foreign born, 35% have an educational attainment less than a high school degree, and 40% are likely to have language barriers. Decomposition results show that income, low educational attainment, being foreign-born, and language barriers diminished the probability of private health insurance coverage for Mexican Americans, and that 10% of the gap is unexplained.

Conclusions: Most of the difference in the PHI rate between Mexican American men and non-Hispanic men is explained by observable differences in group characteristics: education, language, and immigration status. About 10% of the difference can be attributed to discrimination under the traditional interpretation of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The PHI rate gap is large and persistent for Mexican American men.     

Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

Summary. This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D82, G22.Useful suggestions by Emmanuelle Auriol, Bernard Bensaïd, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson and the anonymous referee are acknowledged. Correspondence to: M. Jeleva     

Elicitation using multiple price list formats

We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects, they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental design. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C9, D81, D91 An erratum to this article is available at .     

农业保险制度对土地利用效应的经济学分析

本文通过建立农业生产局部均衡模型研究发现,农业保险制度的建立明显导致了粗放边际扩张,完全分开均衡精算公平农业保险制度不会对土地使用或其他任何生产决定造成影响.但是,在较现实的混同均衡精算公平农业保险制度下,农户将会把无农业保险时闲置的、边际质量更低劣的土地投入生产,而且农业保险补贴会进一步刺激农业生产在劣质土地上的粗放边际扩张并可能导致环境退化的问题.这对研究我国农业保险制度选择及其补贴政策对环境的影响具有一定的参考价值.     

The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games

Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C72, C92, H41     

On the Evaluation of Options on Lotteries: An Experimental Study

We present the results of a comparative experimental study of the evaluation of simple lotteries and call/put/insurance options on these lotteries. The main findings and conclusions are:

(a) The observed bidding patterns depend on the type of asset under evaluation. In particular, subject behavior when buying or selling a basic lottery seems much more cautious than their behavior when buying or selling options on that lottery.

(b) The observed bidding patterns also depend on subject positions with respect to the underlying asset. In particular, the bids for buying lotteries and options long are statistically uncorrelated with the bids for selling the same lotteries and options short.

(c) Subjects with extreme risk attitudes are more inclined to violate basic no-arbitrage conditions (like the call-put parity) when bidding for the different lotteries.

We demonstrate that it is difficult to reconcile the experimental evidence with mainstream theories on individual decision and choice (although we find strong support for prospect theory in some parts of the data). We conclude that the evaluation of options on lotteries is context-dependent and subtler than perceived by existing theories.     

On Rothschild–Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos (Q J Econ 117:1529–1570, 2002) have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique. We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

生育政策调整、退休年龄延迟与城镇职工基本养老保险最优缴费率

文章基于“十三五”规划建议提出适当降低社会保险费率的现实背景,从社会福利最大化视角,运用一般均衡模型对五种生育情景下不同退休年龄的城镇职工基本养老保险最优社会统筹缴费率进行测算,并分析降低社会统筹缴费率的经济效应。研究表明：（1）最优社会统筹缴费率随退休年龄的延长而下降,随人口增长率的上升而提高。0％－100％符合全面二孩政策规定的妇女生育二孩,使退休年龄为60岁时的最优社会统筹缴费率降到191．8％－196．3％,使退休年龄为65岁时的最优缴费率降到107．7％－116．4％。（2）除了受生育政策和退休年龄影响外,最优社会统筹缴费率对物质资本产出弹性、个人主观效用贴现因子和社会贴现因子的敏感性也较强。（3）降低社会统筹缴费率具有积极的经济效应,不仅能促进经济增长和增进社会福利,而且有助于完善我国多层次养老保险体系。因此,文章为降低城镇职工基本养老保险社会统筹缴费率的改革提供了依据。     

Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market

This paper examines the implications of minimum standards for insurance markets. I study the imposition of binding minimum standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly. The central estimates suggest that the introduction of the standards was associated with an 8 percentage point (25%) decrease in the proportion of the population with coverage in the affected market, with no evidence of substitution toward other, unregulated sources of insurance coverage. To explore possible factors contributing to the impact of the minimum standards, I develop comparative static predictions of the impact of imposing minimum standards in an insurance market with adverse selection. The observed changes in market equilibrium associated with the minimum standards are broadly consistent with these predictions, providing evidence of the existence of adverse selection in this insurance market. More importantly, they suggest that the presence of adverse selection—which in principle may provide an economic rationale for minimum standards—in practice may have exacerbated the declines in insurance coverage associated with the minimum standards.     

The effects of government intervention on the market for corporate terrorism insurance

Nine OECD countries presently have national terrorism insurance programs based on some type of public–private risk sharing. While such arrangements have helped provide the necessary insurance capacity in the post-September 11, 2001 era, little is known about the effect of such governmental intervention on terrorism insurance markets. This paper focuses on the United States, where the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) provides insurers with no cost federal reinsurance up to an industry-wide loss of $100 billion. We present an empirical analysis to compare how insurers' diversification behavior varies between property coverage (no governmental intervention) and terrorism coverage (with government intervention). We find evidence that insurers in the U.S. are much less diversified for terrorism coverage than they are for property lines of coverage. We interpret these findings as tentative evidence for moral hazard caused by the governmental intervention under TRIA.     

The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment

Recently, there has been a Renaissance for multi-level selection models to explain the persistence of unselfish behavior in social dilemmas, in which assortative/correlated matching plays an important role. In the current study of a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma experiment, we introduce two correlated matching procedures that match subjects with similar action histories together. We discover significant treatment effects, compared to the control procedure of random matching. Particularly with the weighted history matching procedure we find bifurcations regarding group outcomes. Some groups converge to the all-defection equilibrium even more pronouncedly than the control groups do, while other groups generate much higher rate of cooperation, which is also associated with higher relative reward for a typical cooperative action. All in all, the data show that cooperation does have a much better chance to persist in a correlated/assortative-matching environment, as predicted in the literature. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification B52, C91, D74     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

保险资金持股与股价崩盘风险——市场“稳定器”还是崩盘“加速器”?

现阶段,有关保险资金持股与资本市场稳定相互关系的讨论多止于推测,少有学者以大样本数据进行实证考察。在理论上,保险资金持股上市公司,一方面可以抑制经理人负面信息隐藏,作为市场“稳定器”降低股价暴跌风险;另一方面,也能引发投资者跟风炒作,导致市场情绪高涨和股价高估,成为股价崩盘风险的“加速器”。本文基于2007—2016年中国沪深两市A股上市公司的数据,实证分析保险资金持股上市公司是否加剧市场暴跌及其作用机制。结果显示:保险资金持股加剧了股价崩盘风险,是公司股价崩盘的“加速器”。这一结论在经过DID模型、工具变量回归、PSM+OLS等内生性分析,以及稳健性检验之后依然成立。进一步研究表明,相比于民营、小型和财产保险公司,在股市投资规模更大的国有、大型和人寿保险公司更能引发市场跟风炒作,加剧股价崩盘风险;不过,当保险资金作为前十大股东参与公司治理时则能够降低股价崩盘风险。本文不仅为保险资金持股与资本市场稳定相互关系的讨论提供了经验证据,也为规范保险资金股权投资,维护资本市场稳定提供有益借鉴。