Demand for insurance in a portfolio setting

This paper takes an additional step toward analyzing the demand for insurance in the context of a portfolio model. An investor is endowed with a portfolio containing a risky and riskless asset that can be augmented by purchasing insurance. Here, insurance is paid for by reducing the quantity of the risky insurable asset, holding the quantity of the riskless asset fixed. In the standard insurance demand model, insurance is paid for by reducing the amount of the riskless asset. This distinction leads to a different insurance demand function because the opportunity cost of purchasing insurance is now random.     

Optimal insurance contract and coverage levels under loss aversion utility preference

This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously and determines the optimal coverage levels with respect to deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance, and, by assuming that the insured has an S-shaped loss aversion utility, the insured would retain the enormous losses entirely. The representative optimal insurance form is the truncated deductible insurance, where the insured retains all losses once losses exceed a critical level and adopts a particular deductible otherwise. Additionally, the effects of the optimal coverage levels are also examined with respect to benchmark wealth and loss aversion coefficient. Moreover, the efficiencies among various insurances are compared via numerical analysis by assuming that the loss obeys a uniform or log-normal distribution. In addition to optimal insurance, deductible insurance is the most efficient if the benchmark wealth is small and upper-limit insurance if large. In the case of a uniform distribution that has an upper bound, deductible insurance and optimal insurance coincide if benchmark wealth is small. Conversely, deductible insurance is never optimal for an unbounded loss such as a log-normal distribution.     

农民工职业病保险补偿制度评价与优化研究

工伤保险是当前农民工职业病最主要的保险补偿方式,然而制度设计上偏重普通职业伤害、忽视职业病患者特殊需求的现实,导致大部分农民工职业病患者都无法从工伤保险中得到足额的赔偿金来维持自身及家庭的正常生活。为保障农民工职业病患者的合法权益、缓解因职业病而导致的致贫现象,建议根据当前外出务工农民的现实保险需求,完善这一群体的医疗和养老保险制度,引入商业保险参与农民工职业病患者的保险补偿,构建以工伤保险等社会保险为主体、商业雇主责任保险为补充的多元保险补偿模式。     

Subsidization and Choice in the Group Health Insurance Market

This study investigates the effect of group health insurance plan choice on insurance unit price. The empirical findings suggest that the unit price of insurance, as measured by the ratio of the premium to expected indemnity benefits, is lower in group plans that offer employees a choice of different insurance options and require a premium contribution than it is in plans lacking at least one of these two features. The analyses suggest that lower unit prices are related to an increase in indemnity benefits and that the reduction in the unit price is greater for lower risks. The findings indicate that although subsidization of high risks by low risks occurs with group health insurance, the degree of subsidization is less when employees are offered a choice of health insurance plans.     

To Insure or Not to Insure?: An Insurance Puzzle

The selection of a deductible level in insurance is governed by the willingness to limit the risk borne by risk-averse agents at an acceptable cost, given the deadweight insurance loading. We examine the demand for insurance in a simple lifecycle model with a liquidity constraint and no serial correlation in the insurable risk. This allows for consumers to follow a time-diversification (self-insurance) strategy by accumulating buffer stock wealth. We conclude that insurance would only be demanded for catastrophic risks, or by people that are currently liquidity constrained. The added value of the insurance sector is thus surprisingly low in such an economy.     

商业保险对居民消费影响研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据

当前中国经济社会处于快速转型期,伴随着改革进程的不确定性风险日趋凸显,成为制约居民消费进一步扩张的重要因素。本文采用2003~2017年中国省级面板数据,考察了商业保险对居民消费行为的影响效应及其作用机制。研究发现,以商业保险密度和保险强度为表征的商业保险发展对居民消费有着显著正向影响,相较于农村居民消费,商业保险对城镇居民呈现更强的消费效应,同时财产保险消费效应明显高于人身保险对居民消费影响,进一步地,中介效应检验发现,不确定性缓解可能是商业保险影响居民消费的一个重要机制。基于此,本文认为,构筑完善的商业保险服务体系对于启动居民消费具有重要意义。     

Risikomessung unter Solvency II

With the enlargement of the European Union in 2005 several countries with a particularly low level of corporate taxation entered the Single Market. Big differences in taxation provide an incentive for insurance companies to shift their business activity into countries with low taxation. This incentive is aggravated by falling transport costs for insurance products over the last decade. This paper outlines the main factors driving the location choice of firms in an agglomeration model and presents additional, tax- and insurance business-related factors. Due to the peculiar production process in the insurance industry this industry is especially well suited for an empirical test of the efficacy of tax-related incentives to shift production abroad. The shifting of value added across borders is usually associated with cover up costs. In the insurance industry profit shifting can be done at high volume and low costs through reinsurance at foreign subsidiaries. This paper tests the hypothesis that differences in taxation induce a shift of business activity into low tax countries indirectly by estimating a model for Austrian data on international trade with insurance services.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.     

Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance

This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.     

Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market

De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market.     

农业保险可以减轻自然灾害对农业经济的负面影响吗?

建立融合自然灾害、农业保险以及道德风险的动态模型.模型显示:自然灾害会降低农业产出,而农业保险可以降低自然灾害对农业生产的负面影响,但前提是道德风险的影响较小.实证表明,每增加1元农业保险保费对应的保障水平,可以降低由自然灾害导致的第一产业产出约8.19元的损失.同时,未发现农业保险市场在省级加总层面存在显著的道德风险.     

Das Nebeneinander von Sozial- und Privatversicherung

Statutory health insurance and substitutional private health insurance are involved in a competition between the systems, primarily because of the income-related contributions charged on the basis of the experience rating system in the former and the risk-oriented premiums charged according to the funding method in the latter. This difference in contribution/premium charging can lead to the selection of insureds at the time of switching, although this is more than compensated for by the fact that private health insurance makes a disproportionately high contribution to financing the health care system, owing to the insurance protection to be guaranteed for life and the absence of the privileges of the social insurance system. This selection would be eliminated and the contribution to financing even greater if, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity and following the example of the Netherlands, the group of persons with an income in excess of the compulsory insurance income ceiling were to be compulsorily assigned to the private insurance system. This competition between the systems is mutually beneficial, in terms of both the quality of health care services and the social elements of the protection — in old age, for example. However, convergence effects also arise from the competition between the systems, as indicated by the adoption of principles of private health insurance by the statutory health insurance system — from deductibles to reimbursement of expenses — and of elements of statutory health insurance by the private health insurance system which has introduced premium ceilings and elements of experience rating and financial equalisation. The dynamic German health insurance system is ready and able to face the future. The weakness of the statutory health insurance system with regard to provision for old age contrasts with the advantage that it is better equipped to cope with cost increases thanks to the support received from the legislature. European developments will be of particular importance in this context. Uniform regulation of the health care systems throughout Europe is unlikely for constitutional～ political and cultural reasons. However, location-based reasons will lead probably to changes in national regulations with the aim of improving efficiency. The chances of the system financed by premiums will essentially be dependent on avoiding state financing of any kind. If the currency union becomes a cradle of stability, the temptation to do so will be less and premium-financed arrangements will prove to be superior, particularly if they contain such dynamic elements as the structured health insurance system of the Federal Republic of Germany.     

Pooling and Separating Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Distribution Costs

In the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] model of a competitive insurance market with adverse selection, pooling equilibria cannot exist. However in practice, pooling contracts are frequent, notably in health insurance and life insurance. This is due to the fact that distribution costs are nonnegligible and increase rapidly when more contracts are offered. We modify accordingly the Rothschild-Stiglitz model by introducing such distribution costs. We find that, however small these costs may be, they entail possible existence of pooling equilibria. Moreover, in these pooling equilibria, it is the high-risk individuals who are rationed, in the sense that they would be willing to buy more insurance at the current premium/insurance ratio.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and stock price crash risk

We investigate the impact of directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) on stock price crash risk. We find that D&O insurance in China is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative sample, Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, fixed effects model, the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables, and bootstrap method. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on crash risk is more pronounced in firms with lower board independence, non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional shareholdings, and weaker investor protection; and the negative relationship between D&O insurance and crash risk is not driven by the eyeball effect. Moreover, we find that D&O insurance purchase is associated with less financial restatements and more disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports. Our findings provide support to the notion that D&O insurance appears to improve corporate governance.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and loan spreads

We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance.     

消费者投诉冲击与保险公司业绩北大核心

保险消费者权益保护是保险监管的目标之一,也是保险市场健康发展与成熟的标志。本文以中国保险监管部门开通首个保险消费者投诉热线作为外生政策变量,利用2009-2018年中国163家保险公司数据设计准自然实验,研究了保险消费者投诉热线的外部监督职能及其对保险公司业绩的影响。研究结果表明:保险消费者投诉热线的开通显著降低了消费者权益保护水平更差的保险公司业绩;佣金激励水平越高,保险消费者投诉冲击对消费权益保护水平更差的保险公司业绩的负向影响越显著;区分人身保险公司与财产保险公司后发现,保险消费者投诉冲击对消费者权益保护水平更差的财产保险公司业绩的负向影响更显著。本文研究成果丰富了消费者权益与保险公司治理理论,对保险消费者权益保护实践和保险市场高质量发展具有启示意义。     

Household Life Insurance Demand

Abstract

What types of households own life insurance? Who owns term life and who owns whole life insurance? These are questions of great interest to insurers that operate in a highly competitive market. To answer these questions, we jointly examine household demand of two types of insurance, term and whole life, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, a probability sample of the U.S. population. We model both the frequency and the severity of demand for insurance, building on the work of Lin and Grace by using explanatory variables that they developed. For the frequency portion, the household decisions about whether to own term and whole life insurance are modeled simultaneously with a bivariate probit regression model. Given ownership of life insurance by a household, the amounts of insurance are analyzed using generalized linear models with a normal copula. The copula permits the bivariate modeling of insurance amounts for households who own both term and whole life insurance, about 20% of our sample. These models allow analysts to predict who owns life insurance and how much they own, an important input to the marketing process.

Moreover, our findings suggest that household demand for term and whole life insurance is jointly determined. After controlling for explanatory variables, there exists a negative relationship for a household’s decision to own both whole and term life insurance (the frequency part) and a positive relationship for the amount of insurance purchased (the severity part). This indicates that the greater the probability of holding one type, the smaller the probability of holding the other type of life insurance. However, higher demand for both types of insurance exists when a household decides to own both. This mixed effect extends prior work that established a negative relationship, suggesting that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes for one another. In contrast, our findings reveal that the ownership decision involves substitution, but, for households owning both types of insurance, amounts are positively related. Therefore, term and whole life insurance are substitutes in the frequency yet complements in the severity.     

Can Insurance Activity Act as a Stimulus of Economic Growth? Evidence from Time-Varying Causality in China

This article investigates the nexus between insurance and economic growth in China with a dynamic interactive mechanism to study different time periods. Using quarterly data from 1999 to 2015, the rolling-window causality test provides evidence of bidirectional causality between insurance activity and economic growth. However, the “supply-leading” pattern tends to dominate the “demand-following” pattern, which implies that in China insurance acts as a stimulus of economic growth during most of the period. Property insurance is more effective than life insurance in stimulating economic growth. Some temporary negative impacts from the development of the insurance sector show that China is in the midst of a transition from a closed economy to a more open economy and policy interventions by the government to liberalize the insurance sector. These findings offer several useful insights for policy makers in transition economies and developing countries.     

论中国保险市场结构的调整

本文以中国保险业的市场结构现状作为逻辑起点,采用实证分析和规范分析相结合的方法,对我国保险市场结构变迁的原因进行了分析,得出结论:目前中国保险业市场结构属寡头垄断型,市场集中度极高。但高集中度与理论界的共谋假说和有效结构假说不相符,由此认为,我国目前的保险市场结构不合理,应由寡头垄断模式向垄断竞争模式转变,并提出了相关政策建议。     

中国财险业台风灾害偿付能力评估——基于Cummins模型的研究

发生频率高、致灾影响大的台风灾害已成为制约沿海地区生产生活正常运行的重要因素,而现行以政府为主导的单一救灾方式易造成巨大的财政负担.商业保险等市场机制的引入,无疑成为海洋灾害风险分散的有益尝试.对此,基于Cummins偿付反应函数模型,以台风频发、灾情较重的浙江、福建、广东、海南四省为研究对象,计算中国财险业对台风灾害损失的偿付能力.结果显示,中国财险业对台风灾害损失的实际赔付率仅为理论值的16％,保险市场对台风灾害损失有较充裕的偿付空间.