Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect

This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand, in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context, the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’ contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’.     

Moments of truncated <Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis> distributions

Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric literature.      

Is the monetary policy rule responsive to exchange rate changes? The case of Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines,and Thailand

Extending Obstfeld and Rogoff (J Econ Perspect 9:73–96, 1995), Ball (Monetary policy rules, University of Chicago Press, pp. 127–144, 1999), Svensson (J Int Econ 50: 155–183, 2000), Taylor (Am Econ Rev 91: 263–267, 2001), Gali and Gertler (J Econ Perspect 21:25–46, 2007), and others, this paper finds that central banks in the Philippines and Thailand respond negatively to the current real exchange rate and positively to the lagged real exchange rate whereas central banks in Indonesia and Malaysia do not react to the current or lagged real exchange rate. For the Philippines and Thailand, the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the current and lagged real exchange rates is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Central banks in these four countries respond positively to the inflation rate and the output gap, suggesting that the concept of a simple or an extended Taylor rule would apply to these countries. Monetary policy reaction functions for Indonesia and Thailand are steeper than those for Malaysia and the Philippines and would be more responsive to a change in the inflation rate.      

Sustainable markets with short sales

Market objectives can conflict with long-term goals. Behind the conflict is the impatience axiom introduced by T. Koopmans to describe choices over time. The conflict is resolved here by introducing a new concept, sustainable markets. These differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in that traders have sustainable preferences and no bounds on short sales. Sustainable preferences are sensitive to the basic needs of the present without sacrificing the needs of future generations and embody the essence of sustainable development (Chichilnisky in Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257, 1996a; Res Energy Econ 73(4):467–491, 1996b). Theorems 1 and 2 show that limited arbitrage is a necessary and sufficient condition describing diversity and ensuring the existence of a sustainable market equilibrium where the invisible hand delivers sustainable as well as efficient solutions (Chichilnisky in Econ Theory 95:79–108, 1995; Chichilnisky and Heal in Econ Theory 12:163–176, 1998). In sustainable markets prices have a new role: they reflect both the value of instantaneous consumption and the value of the long-run future. The latter are connected to the independence of the axiom of choice at the foundations of mathematics (Godel 1940).     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Evolution of networks—an experimental analysis

It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.      

Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the “Coase theorem”

This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition.     

What can we learn from the distribution of trade patterns?

This paper proposes an empirical framework for analyzing the dynamics of trade specialization, using a symmetric transformation of the standard Balassa (Manch Sch Econ Soc Stud 33(2):99–123, 1965) index and the conditional density estimation methods suggested by Hyndman et al. (J Comput Graph Stat 5(4):315–336, 1996). The framework is implemented using data on the cross-sector export and import specialization of the four initial EU Cohesion countries over the last 40 years. We discuss the importance of studying both the distribution’s external shape and the intra-distribution dynamics and why it is interesting to include imports in the analysis. We find a reduction of the overall degree of export specialization in Portugal, Greece and Spain. Conversely, Ireland has the strongest export specialization and there is evidence of an increase over time. The export intra-distribution dynamics reveal persistence of the specialization status in the four countries, especially for high values of the index. In all countries, the degree of specialization is higher for exports than for imports and intra-distribution dynamics reveal more mobility of import specialization than that of exports.     

Regulatory economics and the journal of regulatory economics: a 30-year retrospective

Over the 30 year history of the Rutgers University CRRI Eastern Conference the regulatory scene has changed dramatically. In 1989 the first Issue of the Journal of Regulatory Economics appeared. This paper builds on Crew and Kleindorfer (J Regul Econ 21(1):5–22, 2002), which reviewed 20 years in the development of regulatory economics. In addition, this aricle outlines the history and assesses the significance of the JRE in the literature of regulatory economics.     

Excessive entry and the integer constraint with many firms: a note

This paper studies the excessive entry bias in a market with many firms. We show that the integer constraint may be relevant regardless of the number of firms. A more sensible interpretation of one of the assumptions proposed by Mankiw and Whinston (RAND J Econ 17(1):48–58, 1986) plays a major role in the importance of the integer constraint. Consequently, we reach different policy conclusions.     

Endogenous cost asymmetry and insufficient entry in the absence of scale economies

The paper by Ghosh and Saha (Econ Theory 30:575–586, 2007) shows that entry can be socially excessive even if there are no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if the slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high.     

Inflation and output in the long and short run in Turkey

This paper firstly discusses the impact of inflation on real output in different theoretical models and then investigates this impact empirically in an economy facing persistent high inflation. We find some evidence of Sidrauski’s (Am Econ Rev 57:534–544, 1967) superneutrality of money for Turkey in the long run. However, it seems that inflation affects real output negatively in the short run. These results are more compatible with a class of utility functions in which real money balances and consumption are perfect complements as Asako (Econometrica 51(5):1593–1596, 1983) elucidates.     

Spatial Welfare Economics Versus Ecological Footprint: A Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Strong Sustainability

The aim of this paper is a sensitivity analysis with the core-periphery model of ‘new economic geography’ put forward in Grazi et al. (Environ Resour Econ 38:135–153, 2007). This model comprises interregional trade, agglomeration advantages and resource (land) use or environmental externalities. Grazi et al. (2007, GBR) compare a social welfare (SW) indicator with the ecological footprint (EF) indicator for measuring spatial sustainability of a set of land use configurations. Their main result is that the SW and the EF indicator can yield completely different rankings and only for extreme parameterizations of environmental externalities the rankings coincide. We adapt the model by interpreting total natural land as a resource constraint and differentiate between weak and strong sustainability. In a sensitivity analysis we show that the main results of GBR (2007) correspond to the case of weak sustainability in our adapted model version. In the case of strong sustainability our adapted model version shows the same welfare rankings for both indicators without the extreme parameterization that is necessary to obtain the same results in the original GBR (2007) model.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

Financial intermediation and growth: causality and causes without outliers

In a seminal paper, Levine et al. (J Monet Econ 46:31–77, 2000) provide cross-sectional evidence showing that financial development has positive average impact on long-run growth, using a sample of 71 countries. We argue that the evidence is sensitive to the presence of outliers.

The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts

This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered in Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives.     

Econometric testing of the real option hypothesis: evidence from investment in oil tankers

This article presents an industry equilibrium framework for testing the real option hypothesis with aggregate data: uncertainty and irreversibility (Dixit and Pindyck, Investment under uncertainty, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994) raise the critical threshold at which it is optimal to invest, due to the option value of waiting. We propose and empirically test various structural models of investment for new ship orders in the oil tanker industry, which accommodate estimation of the implied real option value multiple. Because of the competitive characteristics of this industry, the property of myopic equivalence (Leahy, Quart J Econ 108:1105–1133, 1993) in a competitive equilibrium is applied, and the traditional serious problems of aggregation are foregone. The derived structural count specifications explain the data well, providing empirical evidence that investors systematically assign value in waiting.