The impact of family-CEOs and their demographic characteristics on dividend payouts: Evidence from Latin America

We investigate the effect of family-CEOs and CEO demographic characteristics on firms’ dividend policy in Latin America. We show that family-CEO firms pay less amount of dividends and invest more in capital expenditures than nonfamily-CEO firms do. Direct family ownership (ownership concentration) negatively (positively) affects dividend payouts. Among the CEO demographic characteristics, CEO tenure has a consistent and significant negative effect on the dividend payout. Firms in a strong corporate governance environment pay more dividends and are less likely to appoint family members as CEOs, suggesting that strong corporate governance forces firms to pay more dividends and restrains firms from appointing CEOs based on family ties.     

CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies

Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

Star CEOs or Political Connections? Evidence from China's Publicly Traded Firms

This paper studies China's “star CEOs” defined as members of the National People's Congress (NPC) or the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and “politically connected” CEOs who have previous government or military experience. We evaluate the effect of “star CEOs” and “politically connected” CEOs on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find that announcement date returns, CEO compensation and incentives are all higher in firms that appoint “star CEOs”. However, the mechanism explaining these various premiums is largely political connectedness of these star CEOs. Our study finds only modest evidence that star‐CEO status directly determines firm performance. Our analysis strongly suggests that compensation and performance premiums are mostly driven by CEO political connections, as opposed to CEO talent/star effects.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.     

CEO power,M&A decisions,and market reactions

In this study we examine the relationship between CEO power, corresponding acquisition activities and market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements with a Canadian M&A dataset (1997–2005). We use CEO excess pay as a proxy for CEO power. Our empirical results show that the market reactions to M&A announcements are not related to CEO power. It implies that powerful CEOs do not necessarily make value destroying acquisitions. Our results further show that CEO power levels are significantly higher for acquiring firms compared to the CEOs of non-acquiring firms. In other words, CEOs with more relative power make more acquisitions. Such acquisitions will increase the size of the firm and will allow CEOs to demand a higher compensation level for managing larger asset pools and to derive higher performance incentives that are also generally tied to firm size.     

Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession.     

The death of the deal: Are withdrawn acquisition deals informative of CEO quality?

To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to a larger firm than a control group of CEOs. The finding that the market attaches value to CEO-specific information suggests that unobservable manager characteristics can meaningfully impact firm outcomes.     

A note on assessing the relation between CEO characteristics and stock performance: Alpha Above Replacement

Many studies examine the relation between stock performance and CEO characteristics. We approach the topic in a different way, using the alphas generated by the Fama‐French three‐factor model as the dependent variable in a CEO characteristic model. We find several traits are significantly related to alpha. CEOs who are younger, own a larger fraction of firm equity and hold a graduate degree provide greater alphas. CEOs who are also the founder of the firm deliver larger alphas. Our results provide useful information for boards assessing the performance of CEOs and considering CEO succession.     

CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board

Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we call Retention Light. Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO's decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO. We find that when prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is more likely to be retained on the board (Retention Light) than to exit the firm. However, this relation is weaker when the CEO reaches normal retirement age at which time CEO power becomes more important. We also provide evidence on how the nature of the CEO's bargaining power varies with his personal attributes and board characteristics in its influence on the Retention Light decision. Retention Light firms are more likely than CEO‐exit firms to select a successor CEO with relatively weaker bargaining power. Finally, Retention Light involving a nonfounder CEO is negatively associated with the firm's postturnover financial performance. Overall, Retention Light is a distinct CEO turnover option that has important consequences for board decisions and firm performance.     

The costs and benefits associated with inventor CEOs

This paper examines various firm policies that highlight the potential tradeoffs associated with hiring CEOs with hands-on innovation experience. In addition to generating more patents, innovative CEOs also convert those patents into new services and products, as proxied by new trademark registrations. On the other hand, innovative CEOs do not receive higher pay compared to non-innovative CEOs, suggesting that innovative CEOs may receive other nonpecuniary benefits. Furthermore, innovative CEOs invest more in R&D leading to lower efficiency, hold more cash, and utilize less debt. In spite of these costs, it appears that hiring innovative CEO is still optimal for firms. We find that the improvements in corporate governance do not lead to changes in firm policies, suggesting that shareholders are willing to tolerate the potential costs associated with innovative CEOs.     

CEO mobility and corporate payouts

We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) mobility affects corporate payouts. We exploit US state courts’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) to obtain exogenous variation in mobility. We report several findings. First, we find that firms in IDD-adopting states increase dividend payouts, whereas the effect of IDD on share repurchases is insignificant relative to firms not in IDD-adopting states. Second, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by CEOs having high ability. Third, CEOs increasing dividends are less likely to be forced to leave their jobs. Fourth, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by early-career CEOs rather than retiring CEOs. Last, CEOs increasing dividends receive more favorable shareholders’ say on pay votes for higher pay. Our evidence supports the notion that restricted mobility induces CEOs to choose a dividend policy that enhances their positions with their shareholders.     

CEO gender and managerial entrenchment

This paper investigates the effect of gender on managerial authority and control over firms. The study examines S&P 1500 firms for the period of 1999–2014. Our findings suggest that accounting performance, firm value, CEO age, firm age, and board size reduce the likelihood of appointing female managers. On the other hand, the appointment of female CEOs is directly associated with the percentage of female directors, board independence, and beta. The study confirms the notion that female CEO appointments are generally associated with firms facing adverse conditions, and shows that female CEOs are more entrenched as compared to male CEOs. We find that the presence of female CEO decreases the turnover-performance sensitivity, increases the E-index, and inflates CEO compensation. Our research suggests that the level of female CEOs’ entrenchment provides them with greater job security, higher level of control, and inflated pay that compensate the risk of accepting the appointment in a high risk and poor performing firm.     

Outsider CEOs and corporate debt

We examine the extent to which outsider chief executive officers (CEOs) influence corporate financial leverage policies. We define an outsider CEO as one who appears in the reporting year and became CEO either immediately upon joining or within 3 months of joining a firm. There are arguments in the literature that the selection of an outsider CEO can either increase or decrease financial leverage. We investigate this issue using 11,118 Australian firm-year observations from 1216 firms listed during the period 2001–2015. Our findings suggest that, in the short-term after their appointment, outsider CEOs reduce firm dependence on debt. This result is robust to several additional tests and four measures to minimize endogeneity concerns. However, with an increase in their tenure at the firm, outsider CEOs revert to greater dependency on corporate debt. After supplementary analyses, we determine that the outsider CEOs short-term strategy of reducing financial leverage involves using cash reserves and restricting dividends to reduce existing debt. Instead, outsider CEOs finance capital expenditure projects thus providing a positive signal to the market that such CEOs are more creditworthy. Our results also suggest that outsider CEOs exercise more control over financial leverage when they have specialist attributes.     

Disagreement-induced CEO turnover

We propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover, and examine its implications for the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on optimal decisions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Theory suggests that such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms; we document that this induces them to sometimes replace CEOs who investors disagree with, controlling for firm performance. A lower level of CEO-investor disagreement serves to partially “protect” CEOs from being fired, thus reducing turnover-performance sensitivity, which we also document. We also show that firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Using various empirical strategies, we rule out other confounding interpretations of our findings. We conclude that disagreement, independently of firm performance, affects forced CEO turnover.     

CEO DIRECTORS,EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES,AND CORPORATE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

I study how directors who are chief executive officers (CEOs) of other firms affect board effectiveness. I find that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve as directors. This is not an employment risk premium because CEO directors are not associated with higher turnover‐performance sensitivity. Also, CEO directors have no effect on corporate innovation but are associated with higher acquisition returns, especially for complex deals. My results suggest that the advisory benefits of CEO directors must be balanced against the distortions in executive incentives associated with their board service.     

When CEOs adapt: An investigation of manager experience,policy and performance following recessions

We examine changes in corporate policies following recessions during CEO tenures to evaluate the value of learning. CEOs with recession experience demonstrate expertise in risk-shifting strategies that can contribute to higher firm value and performance during subsequent recessions. Specifically, Recession CEOs use conservative capital structure and allocation during expansions, providing excess capacity and financial slack to accumulate additional cash reserves during economic contractions, resulting in lower bankruptcy risk. As a result, Recession CEOs are equipped to raise more capital in recessions, which results in higher asset growth fueled by investments in acquisitions and capital expenditures. We also examine prior recessions and find poor performers learn to invest more and perform better in subsequent contractions. Our results are strengthened through cumulative recession experiences, when downturns are deeper, and at cyclical firms, where economic cycles are most impactful and Recession CEOs are more relevant. Finally, we use time-varying industry downturns, matching, and CEO turnovers for inference. Overall, we offer novel evidence of valuable CEO learning around risk-taking following direct managerial experience as a firm policy determinant across economic conditions.     

External Networking and Internal Firm Governance

We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO‐director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. Moreover, firms with more CEO‐director ties engage in more value‐destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.     

Value or Glamour? An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and firm performance

In this study, I investigate the impact of managerial reputation, as proxied by high‐profile awards to CEOs, on financial reporting practices and firm performance. Using a sample of 269 awards given to 189 celebrity CEOs (CEOs who win awards) from 1987 to 2003, I compare within‐firm changes in financial reporting practices and firm performance before and after each CEO wins their first award. I find that celebrity CEOs engage in more conservative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks. In addition, firm performance improves after celebrity CEOs win awards.