Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession.     

CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework

There is widespread concern about whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are appropriately punished for poor performance. While CEOs are more likely to be forced out if their performance is poor relative to the industry average, overall industry performance also matters. This seems puzzling if termination is disciplinary, however, we show that both absolute and relative performance-driven turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes in a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers' equilibrium pay and performance. We document CEO turnover events during 1992–2006 and provide empirical support for our model.     

CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board

Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we call Retention Light. Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO's decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO. We find that when prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is more likely to be retained on the board (Retention Light) than to exit the firm. However, this relation is weaker when the CEO reaches normal retirement age at which time CEO power becomes more important. We also provide evidence on how the nature of the CEO's bargaining power varies with his personal attributes and board characteristics in its influence on the Retention Light decision. Retention Light firms are more likely than CEO‐exit firms to select a successor CEO with relatively weaker bargaining power. Finally, Retention Light involving a nonfounder CEO is negatively associated with the firm's postturnover financial performance. Overall, Retention Light is a distinct CEO turnover option that has important consequences for board decisions and firm performance.     

CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand‐collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90^th to the 10^th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.     

Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.     

CEO tenure and the performance-turnover relation

In a broad cross-section of US firms, we document that the likelihood of a CEO’s performance-related dismissal declines in his tenure. This finding is consistent with both firm performance revealing information about a CEO’s uncertain executive ability and CEO tenure reflecting weak firm governance choices that reduce the likelihood of performance-related dismissal. In a sample of CEOs who begin their appointment during our sample period, we find evidence more broadly in favor of the former explanation. Specifically, we find that (1) CEO survival is associated with superior firm performance, (2) this relation is unaffected by firm governance choices, (3) the intensity with which a firm monitors its CEO declines over his tenure, and (4) firms’ monitoring intensity increases following CEO turnover. Collectively, our results suggest that periodic performance reports increasingly resolve uncertainty regarding executive ability, thereby lowering firm owners’ demand for monitoring their CEO over his tenure.     

Corporate governance when founders are directors

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.     

CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies

Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.     

Do Delaware CEOs get fired?

Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable. We argue that Delaware corporate law attracts firms with particular financial and governance characteristics. We find that Delaware attracts growth firms in industries with more takeover activity. Delaware firms have smaller boards, and their directors are paid more and serve on more boards. In addition, Delaware firms attract greater institutional ownership. We also provide a bottom-line test of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis by examining forced CEO turnover. After controlling for differences in firm characteristics, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware are more likely to terminate CEOs. We also find that that termination decision is less sensitive to poor performance. Overall, we see no clear pattern supporting the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

The timing of changes in CEO compensation from cash bonus to equity-based compensation: Determinants and performance consequences

This study examines the determinants and performance consequences of changes in CEO compensation structure. The study uses the unique setting when Australian companies have changed from cash bonus to equity-based compensation. While most US CEOs receive some form of equity-based compensation, Australian CEOs have not always been paid equity-based compensation. According to efficient contracting theories, we argue that the change to equity-based compensation is driven by changes in firm characteristics and by the occurrence of CEO turnover, the latter of which provides a less costly opportunity for such change. Our results are consistent with the above arguments. We also document a significant negative association between changes in compensation structure and subsequent firm performance in the following year, even after controlling for CEO turnover and poor governance environments. Overall, our results suggest that the initial change to equity-based compensation is part of an error learning process made by firms that leads them towards efficient CEO compensation contracts.     

CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

Corporate social responsibility and inside debt: The long game

We examine the effect of CEO inside debt on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and CSR. This positive relation is attenuated not only when firms face high risk, but also when firms have high short-term institutional ownership. Our evidence supports the view that CEOs with large inside debt holdings are more concerned about firm sustainability and, are therefore more likely to prefer CSR for long-term firm benefits, i.e., the long game. We also find that CSR and CEO inside debt jointly exert a significantly positive impact on long-run stock performance, particularly in the presence of a low level of short-term institutional holdings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of aligning institutional investor preferences with CEO incentives in order to maximize shareholder benefits from CSR investment.     

CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare.     

Demographics of dividends

Using seventeen observable demographic characteristics, we investigate the impact of six CEO profiles on dividend policy. Firms headed by married, Republican, Christian CEOs with children maintain higher dividend yields and are more likely to considerably increase their dividend payout. Following substantial dividend hikes, firms led by CEOs with these more traditional personal lives exhibit deteriorating performance. Potential explanations include managerial optimism coupled with dividend signaling and the possibility that CEO profiles proxy for an unobserved firm effect such as firm maturity. However, the associations above continue to persist in both mature firm and turnover sub-samples. Overall, this suggests that these relationships are related to characteristics of the CEOs themselves.     

Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.     

The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers

This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.     

Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

CEO DIRECTORS,EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES,AND CORPORATE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

I study how directors who are chief executive officers (CEOs) of other firms affect board effectiveness. I find that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve as directors. This is not an employment risk premium because CEO directors are not associated with higher turnover‐performance sensitivity. Also, CEO directors have no effect on corporate innovation but are associated with higher acquisition returns, especially for complex deals. My results suggest that the advisory benefits of CEO directors must be balanced against the distortions in executive incentives associated with their board service.     

Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?

We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.