Commodity market reform in Africa: some recent experience

Since the early 1980s, dramatic changes in export commodity markets, shocks associated with resulting price declines and changing views on the role of the state have ushered in widespread reforms to agricultural commodity markets in Africa. The reforms significantly reduced government participation in the marketing and pricing of commodities. This paper examines the background, causes, process and consequences of these reforms and derives lessons for successful reforms from experiences in markets for four commodities important to Africa—cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar. The commodity focus of the paper highlights the special features associated with these markets that affect the reform process. The paper complements the current literature on market reforms in Africa, where grain market studies are more common. We suggest that the types of market interventions prior to reform are more easily classified by crop than by country. Consequently, there are significant commodity-specific differences in the initial conditions and in the outcomes of reforms related to these markets. However, there are general lessons as well. We find that the key consequences of reform have been significant changes in or emergence of marketing institutions, and a significant shift of political and economic power from public to private sector. In cases where interventions were greatest and reforms most complete, producers have benefited from receiving a larger share of export prices. Additionally, we conclude that the adjustment costs of reform can be reduced in most cases by better understanding the detailed and idiosyncratic relationships between the commodity subsector, private markets, and public services. Finally, while there are significant costs to market-dependent reforms, experiences suggest that they are a necessary step toward a dynamic commodity sector based on private initiative. Indeed, this is particularly true in countries and sectors where interventions were greatest and market-supporting institutions the weakest.     

Bank valuation in new EU member countries

This paper studies the role of institutional reforms in affecting bank valuation in new European Union (EU) member countries. It takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on banks’ Tobin's Q over the period of 1997–2008. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the paper shows that Tobin's Q increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions and liberalize banking. However, it decreases after stock market reforms. After further examination of the interactive relationships between different reforms and bank valuation, it is observed that when the banking reform is well implemented, legal reform can have a stronger impact on banks’ Tobin's Q. On the other hand, banking reform and security market reform has a substitutive relationship. The analysis also suggests that foreign ownership, market power, and asset diversification significantly affect Tobin's Q. These results are robust even after simultaneously controlling for equity risk.     

Market reforms in the time of imbalance

We study the consequences of product and labor market reforms in a two-country model with endogenous producer entry and labor market frictions. We focus on the role of business cycle conditions and external constraints at the time of reform implementation (or of a credible commitment to it) in shaping the dynamic effects of such policies. Product market reform is modeled as a reduction in entry costs and takes place in a non-traded sector that produces services used as input in manufacturing production. Labor market reform is modeled as a reduction in firing costs and/or unemployment benefits. We find that business cycle conditions at the time of deregulation significantly affect adjustment. A reduction of firing costs entails larger and more persistent adverse short-run effects on employment and output when implemented in a recession. By contrast, a reduction in unemployment benefits boosts employment and output by more in a recession compared to normal times. The impact of product market reforms is less sensitive to business cycle conditions. Credible announcements about future reforms induce sizable short-run dynamics, regardless of whether the announcement takes place in normal times or during an economic downturn. Whether the immediate effect is expansionary or contractionary varies across reforms. Finally, lack of access to international lending in the wake of reform can amplify the costs of adjustment.     

The eurozone crisis,German hegemony and labour market reform in the GIPS countries

This article argues that the eurozone crisis has led to Germany hegemony, a feature of which has been complete resistance to a genuinely European solution to the crisis. German political leaders have sought to make the eurozone a more stable currency area by demanding far reaching labour market adjustment in the debtor countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, GIPS countries. This article assesses why Germany's leaders elected to act as a coercive hegemon and examines the labour market reform pathways being travelled by GIPS countries. It argues that the austerity regime enacted under German hegemony has obliged the GIPS countries to introduce important labour market reforms. However, these reforms have not threatened the integrity of established national systems of industrial relations. As a result a Euro war of attrition has opened up between the European core and periphery.     

Property Rights Reform to Support China's Rural–Urban Integration: Village‐Level Evidence from the Chengdu Experiment

As part of a national experiment, in 2008, Chengdu prefecture launched a series of property rights reforms, among them complete registration of all land and measures to ease transferability and eliminate labour market restrictions. A comparison of villages inside and outside the prefecture's border using a difference‐in‐difference approach suggests that the reforms have reduced administrative reallocations; aligned land use closer to economic incentives, mainly through market transfers; and stimulated enterprise startups. These results, most of which are more pronounced for villages closer to Chengdu city, illuminate the potential gains from factor market reform.     

Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm‐specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm‐specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange‐listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two‐stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest—exactly as the logic of market competition predicts—that firms choose boards appropriate to them.     

Accounting for labor demand effects in structural labor supply models

When assessing the effects of policy reforms on the labor market, most studies only focus on labor supply. The interaction of supply and demand is not explicitly modeled, which might lead to biased estimates of potential labor market outcomes. This paper proposes a straightforward method to remedy this shortcoming. We use information on firms' labor demand behavior and feed them into a structural labor supply model, completing the partial analysis of the labor market on the microdata level. We show the performance and relevance of our extension by introducing a pure labor supply side reform, the workfare concept, in Germany and simulating the labor market outcome of the reform. We find that demand effects offset about 25% of the positive labor supply effect of the policy reform.     

Optimal pricing for new and remanufactured products

This work investigates the optimal pricing of new and remanufactured products using a model of consumer preferences based on extensive experimentation. The experimental investigation reveals two distinct segments of consumers. One segment is relatively indifferent between new and remanufactured products and displays high sensitivity to price discounts. The second segment shows strong preferences for new products—with an accompanying aversion to remanufactured products—and realtively low sensitivity to price discounts. The pricing analysis examines several scenarios involving a new product manufacturer, ranging from a simple monopolist scenario to a more complex scenario involving competition with third-party remanufacturers. In contrast to the usual finding that new product prices should decrease when competitive remanufactured products enter the market, the introduction of market segments reveals a robust finding across all scenarios: when remanufactured products enter the market, the optimal price of the new product should increase. Through appropriate pricing of new products, the OEM can mitigate the effects of cannibalization and increase profitability.     

INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS: TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT EVIDENCE

Abstract This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new empirical EU‐based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market adjustment. Although the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous, attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements. As a consequence, the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels. Although empirical evidence does not show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of the Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the euro, the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and increasing labour market adjustment.     

Are we there yet? On the convergence of financial reforms

Since the 1970s, there have been substantial financial reforms across the world, however little research has been devoted to studying the convergence path of these reforms. While Abiad and Mody (Am Econ Rev 95:66–88, 2005) find that there is movement towards a global ‘norm’ of financial reform, their findings are based upon a cross-sectional approach that has been widely criticized in the literature. In this paper we offer new time-series evidence on the convergence of financial reforms both across and within regions, which can also act as a metric to measure the degree of globalization among countries’ financial systems. We find that some regions of the world have fully converged, but the advanced economies and Sub-Saharan Africa are not converging. In addition, while most countries have fully converged within their own region, notable exceptions are also identified. These results suggest that while financial reforms have largely become homogenized, important distinctions still remain.     

COMPETITIVENESS WITHIN THE EURO AREA: THE PROBLEM THAT STILL NEEDS TO BE SOLVED

Unsustainable public debt, low competitiveness and high current account deficits are major problems for the so‐called PIIGS countries. These countries experienced consumer price and wage inflation above the euro area average in the first decade of the euro, basically fuelled by buoyant capital inflows. The resulting real appreciation against low‐inflation countries led to a deterioration in their competitiveness, but rigid labour markets now prevent a quick market‐based readjustment of real wages to the changed situation. Thus, both public expenditure cuts and structural labour market reforms are urgent to reduce the likelihood of a euro area break‐up.     

Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms

The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.     

Do labor market institutions matter for business cycles?

Using panel data of 19 OECD countries observed over 40 years and data on specific labor market reform episodes we conclude that labor market institutions matter for business cycle fluctuations. Spearman partial rank correlations reveal that more flexible institutions are associated with lower business cycle volatility. Turning to the analysis of reform episodes, wage bargaining reforms increase the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity and the volatility of unemployment. Employment protection reforms increase the volatility of employment and decrease the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity. Reforms reducing replacement rates make labor productivity more procyclical.     

Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications

To what extent can market participants affect the outcomes of regulatory policy? In this paper, we study the effects of one potential source of influence—campaign contributions—from competing interests in the local telecommunications industry, on regulatory policy decisions of state public utility commissions. Our work is unique in that we test the effects of campaign contributions on measurable policy outcomes. This stands in stark relief against most of the existing literature, which examines potentially noisier measures of policy outcomes—such as the roll‐call votes of legislators, to examine how private money may influence public policy. By moving to more direct measures of policy effects, and using a unique new dataset, we find, in contrast to much of the literature on campaign contributions, that there is a significant effect of private money on regulatory outcomes. This result is robust to numerous alternative model specifications. We also assess the extent of omitted variable bias that would have to exist to obviate the estimated result. We find that for our result to be spurious, omitted variables would have to explain more than five times the variation in the mix of private money as is explained by the variables included in our analysis. We consider this to be very unlikely.     

Quotas,Productivity, and Prices: The Case of Anchovy Fishing

I exploit a 2009 reform that introduced individual fishing quotas (catch shares) for Peruvian anchovy—the largest fishery in the world—to assess the causal impact of production quotas on within‐firm productivity and market prices. Unique features of the data allow me to create two alternative counterfactuals: (i) anchovy fishing operations in a region of the country that was mandated to implement quotas with a delay, and (ii) variation in quota allocations across ships. I find that quotas do not increase within‐asset or within‐firm productivity in quantities. Instead, a 200% increase in anchovy prices benefits extraction firms through higher revenues, consistent with two mechanisms enacted by individual fishing quotas: more orderly industry operations reducing excess supply and an increase in bargaining power of extraction firms with respect to fish‐processing. Several market characteristics across geographies differentially affect market prices after the quota regime. Supplementary evidence on fewer operational infractions, higher product quality, and a lower banking delinquency observed during the quota regime suggests the existence of efficiency gains rather than purely rent transfers.     

Explaining the Reactions of Swiss Municipalities to The ‘Amalgamation Wave’: At the crossroad of institutional,economic and political pressures

Abstract

Public sector organizations are simultaneously subject to three types of environmental pressure: institutional, economic and political. How do these pressures influence the strategic behaviour of public organizations when confronted with efficiency-oriented reforms? We focus on the strategic behaviour of Swiss municipalities facing the amalgamation wave: a reform characterized by a strong economic rationale. Results confirm that the success of reforms depends not only on its matching with economic underpinnings. It is also necessary to take the political leadership and the responsibility of reform implementation.     

FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES,INCOME INEQUALITY,AND POVERTY: EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The past two decades have witnessed widespread attempts to reform fossil fuel subsidies in developing countries. If the reforms are likely to improve economic efficiency, the expected effects on income distribution and poverty are more controversial. This paper reviews the recent literature that examines the impacts of fossil fuel subsidies and their reforms on income inequality and poverty in developing countries. It identifies the different channels that have been explored in the literature and surveys the empirical evidence on the importance of these channels in practice. Drawing on diverse country experiences, it also discusses why fossil fuel subsidies are particularly challenging to reform and highlights several ways in which efforts to reform may be feasible and successful.     

Paying for Pipes,Claiming Citizenship: Political Agency and Water Reforms at the Urban Periphery

This article interrogates the nature of political agency deployed at sites of market‐oriented water reforms. It presents a case study from Bangalore, India of a water project mandating significant ‘beneficiary’ cash contributions from lower‐middle‐class dwellers for the capital cost of extending piped water to the city's peripheries. Drawing on quantitative and ethnographic data, it illustrates why property owners who lack formal water access and land tenure — groups referred to in this article as the ‘peripheralized middle class’ — consent to paying for pipes rather than resist all together despite the high cost involved. It argues that far from reflecting an internalization of a ‘willingness to pay’ or ‘stakeholder’ ethos celebrated by development practitioners today, payment for water provides an insurgent means to bargain for greater symbolic recognition, respectability and material benefits from the state. In particular, payment for pipes enables peripheral dwellers to strengthen their claims to secure land tenure in an era of exclusionary and punitive spatial policies. Payment thus comprises a terrain of contested meaning making and political struggle, at the heart of which lie the stakes of urban citizenship. In documenting the process by which property related interests and tenure claims are advanced under a scenario of reforms, this article contributes to Gramscian political‐ecological conversations on subaltern political agency and the lived character of hegemony in urban environments.     

Comparing modes of privatisation: a study of the telecommunications sectors in Argentina and Mexico, 1990–2000

This article examines the variation in the post‐privatisation pattern of labour and employment relations in the telecommunications sectors of Argentina and Mexico. The findings suggest that the initial mode of privatisation—negotiated vs. imposed reform—shaped changes in employment, subcontracting and work rules in the period following privatisation. The research also suggests, however, that negotiated reform is more likely to emerge only when certain political incentives are present.