试论我国涉外产品责任法律制度的不足

随着经济全球化，涉外产品责任案件也日益增多。因涉外产品责任是一种特殊的侵权之债，国际上尤其是西方各国相继立法就其法律适用问题予以专门规定。然而纵观我国的相关立法，却可谓付之阙如。实体法并无相关规定，而冲突法领域也仅有《民法通则》第146条的规定，过于原则、简单，缺乏可操作性。因此，我国的涉外产品责任法律制度亟待建立和完善。     

论我国涉外产品责任的法律适用

随着经济全球化的深入和我国进出口贸易的发展,涉外产品责任纠纷不断增加,由此产生的法律问题值得我们高度关注。本文运用法律解释学、比较研究、历史研究的方法对我国涉外产品责任的法律适用进行研究。文章在介绍涉外产品责任法律适用相关概念、法律适用原则、域外国家涉外产品责任法律适用制度和我国涉外产品责任立法现状及不足的基础之上,探讨如何完善我国涉外产品责任的法律适用,并提出相应的立法建议,即在实体法方面应当转变立法模式、明晰法律概念、统一归责原则及增加惩罚性赔偿规定;在冲突法方面应当引进新的适用原则以及加入海牙国际公约。     

海峡两岸产品缺陷责任法律制度比较

我国大陆涉及产品缺陷责任的法律法规以《产品质量法》为中心，包括《民法通则》、《消费者权益保护法》、《食品卫生法》、《药品管理法》、《缺陷汽车产品召回管理规定》等，而台湾地区则以《消费者保护法》为中心，包括(《消费者保护法施行细则》、(《药物药商管理法》、《食品卫生管理法》、《商标标示法》等。海峡两岸在法律定位、立法技术及保护措施方面存在共识。但由于两岸的立法模式、     

产品责任保险与《产品质量法》

《产品质量法》是加强质量管理 ,提高产品质量 ,维护消费者合法权益的重要法律 ;产品责任保险以其责任保险的特有功能 ,对于贯彻实施《产品质量法》具有多重的积极意义 ,必须大力加强产品责任保险制度的建设     

浅探EVA评价指标在供电分公司的应用

人类的消费行为与产品及产品质量问题存在客观必然的联系.因为有人类就有消费行为,有消费行为就有产品,有产品就有产品质量问题.而产品质量的法律责任则是产品的质量问题所导致的一种必然后果.因此,<产品质量法>在产品质量的法律责任方面的规定也不尽人意,还不够完善.我现仅就<产品质量法>立法中有关产品质量法律责任的有关问题简单的谈一下自己的认识.     

国际产品责任中"保护弱者原则"的适用

当代新的法律平等观要求实质上的平等,这就有必要规定对强者的适当限制和对弱者的特殊保护措施.在国际产品侵权责任中,传统国际民商事关系主体--消费者与生产商的不平等关系依然存在,而另一方面,弱方当事人还包括发展中国家的地方企业.海牙《产品责任准据法公约》法律适用的条款更强调优先适用被害人(原告)的惯常居所地及损害发生地国家法律,这一法律适用规则非但没有保护弱国利益,反而是严重损害了弱国的利益.因此我国目前还不适宜加入海牙《产品责任准据法公约》.     

公司社会责任的程序保障

公司社会责任的特殊性及法律程序的特有价值决定了公司社会责任的实现有赖于恰当的程序控制。国内外公司法都规定了一些有利于公司社会责任实现的程序,但直接针对公司社会责任的程序较少;其他一些法律中也有一些法律程序与公司社会责任的实现相关,但不完整。为了保证我国公司社会责任的落实,我国现行的《公司法》有必要增加规定针对公司的公益诉讼程序,完善派生诉讼程序,增加一些非诉讼的内部控制程序。     

《企业所得税法》关于公益性捐赠税前扣除规定研究——从落实公司社会责任的角度谈起

《公司法》对公司承担社会责任的规定,是我国有关公司社会责任的重要法律条款,也是今后寻求落实公司社会责任的有效途径。不可否认,公司管理者、股东和非股东利益相关者以及社会公众的公司社会责任意识对落实公司社会责任至关重要,但要真正将公司社会责任落到实处,还需要通过具体的法律规定。我国新近颁布的《企业所得税法》关于公益性捐赠支出税前扣除的规定,无疑是落实公司社会责任的重要法律规定。     

论侵权法上的无过错责任

无过错责任原则是指依照法律规定不以当事人的主观过错为构成侵权行为的必备要件的归责原则,即不论当事人在主观上有没有过错,都应当承担民事责任。通过对无过错责任发展沿革及产生的利弊分析,着重研究无过错责任的损害赔偿。在比较法上,常有最高赔偿额的限制,以免无过错者的责任过重。中国《侵权责任法》第77条规定,＂承担高度危险责任,法律规定赔偿限额的,依照其规定。＂目前,中国在铁路损害、航空损害、民用核设施损害等三个领域有相关的赔偿限额规定,但其效力状况值得研究。     

论我国产品责任制度的完善

产品责任制度出现在19世纪的英国司法判例中.伴随着20世纪生产社会化的不断扩大,各国有关产品责任制度的立法也逐步走向了成熟和完善.而至今我国没有关于产品责任的专门立法.文章立足于我国现行相关产品责任制度的立法.并结合我国十几年来有关产品责任制度的研究成果,尤其是在借鉴外国产品责任立法的相关规定的基础上,来探讨我国产品责任制度的完善问题.     

Limited liability effect on product safety

This paper analyses how limited liability and capital size affect a firm's investment for product safety. Firms become bankrupt when their products cause accidents and they cannot compensate for the damages incurred. Relatively small firms obtain greater expected profit because they do not need to pay full damage when their products cause accidents and they become bankrupt. Thus, smaller firms may have greater incentives than larger firms to participate in risky projects. But relatively small firms may invest more for product safety because increasing their investments is not costly in case of bankruptcy.     

Employer liability in the managed care setting

Managed care may present legal risks for employers. To avoid potential liability, employers should engage in due diligence and carefully draft plan documents, vendor contracts and employee communications.     

传统负债理论的拓展

负债被称为“负债产”,是资产负债表的重要构成部分。对负债正确的确认与计量是财务会计的基本要求之一。由于近年来企业经营的复杂化和多元化,人们对负债的认识有了更深刻的理解,与负债有关的确认、计量和披露原则仍需不断地完善和发展。     

Fraud and fiduciary liability

All employee benefit plans are potential targets of fraudulent schemes. Smaller plans are targeted by unscrupulous brokers and promoters selling fraudulent policies; plans large enough to be self-insured face greater risks of fraud by providers and participants misrepresenting claims. Plan trustees, administrators and consultants should be alert to the many ways fraudulent schemes manifest themselves and to the legal remedies available; establish investigative programs to detect and discourage fraud; and promote education and plan incentives for participants to report fraud.     

Piracy and limited liability

This paper analyzes the effects of end-user piracy on a monopolized software industry with network effects in which consumers have heterogeneous income and limited liability. Limited liability produces a piracy cost which increases with income. The monopolist thus may be able to exploit the network effect brought about by the piracy of low-income consumers to charge a higher price to high-income consumers thereby earn a higher profit, especially when the monopolist can prevent the network effect from spilling over to the high-income consumers. If intellectual property rights policies are severe enough, then the monopolist can avoid the spillover. Otherwise it may become a case where each high-income buyer benefits from the piracy but the monopolist is hurt. However, a severe policy may bring about a high piracy rate since it invites the monopolist to raise the price.      

论共同保证中的保证人责任

经济的高速发展需要一个良好的法律秩序保证市场的运行，其中最重要的是要对市场经济中产生的债权加以保护。作为对债权有效保护的担保应被加以规范，担保中人的担保由于其设置成本低、设置灵活而被广泛运用，人的担保中最核心的问题即是保证责任，在单个保证中的保证责任相对简单，但当有两个以上的人作保证（共同保证）时，保证责任就比较复杂了。从我国目前在共同保证法律规定中的不足谈起，再结合国外的相关规定，以期能对共同保证中保证责任的完善提出个人意见。     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Joint liability among bank borrowers

Summary. A common feature of financial intermediaries is that the welfare of one borrower is adversely affected by the poor performance of other borrowers. That is, there exists a degree of joint liability among the borrowers of a financial intermediary. This paper provides an explanation for this observation. It demonstrates that in Krasa and Villamil's [14] formalization of a financial intermediary as a delegated monitor, intermediation with joint liability between borrowers Pareto dominates intermediation without joint liability.Received: 4 September 2002, Revised: 21 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, E5, G2, G3.I am particularly indebted to Douglas Diamond and Robert Townsend for their advice on this paper. I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

This paper analyzes a two-period setup in which firms differ with respect to costs of care and may use care-taking to signal type to consumers, who are able to observe precaution taken only ex post. Applying the refinement of the intuitive criterion to the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we establish a unique separating equilibrium for every share of harm borne by firms. For low levels of victim compensation, we show that (i) firms choose weakly higher care in a setting in which customers do not know the firms’ type than in a setting in which they do, and (ii) the deviation in precaution taken due to asymmetric information on firm type is welfare-improving.