产品市场竞争对公司代理成本和代理效率的影响

从总体上看,产品市场竞争能有效地降低上市公司代理成本,抑制管理层过度消费现象,同时激烈的市场竞争也能促使管理层更加努力工作,客观上提高了上市公司的代理效率。加入产权因素进行分析发现,产品市场竞争对不同产权性质背景的上市公司的治理作用存在差异性。相对于国有企业,产品市场竞争对非国有企业代理成本、代理效率影响更显著。面对激烈的市场竞争,非国有上市公司代理成本将会显著降低,同时代理效率将会显著提高。     

产融结合、投资效率与企业经营绩效——基于制造业上市公司面板数据的实证研究

本文以我国2009—2013年参股非上市金融机构的沪深A股制造业上市企业为研究样本,实证考察了产融结合、投资效率与企业经营绩效的关系以及三者关系在不同产权属性下的差异。研究发现,无论对国有企业还是非国有企业,产融结合都能够改善企业的投资效率;产融结合有助于企业的市场绩效提升,但不利于财务绩效提升,这一结果在非国有企业中显著而在国有企业中不显著;企业投资偏离"合理区间"程度越大,投资效率越低,国有企业的财务绩效和市场绩效越差,而在非国有企业中却相反。     

通货膨胀、上下游垂直生产结构与企业绩效——兼论通货膨胀在企业部门的再分配效应

本文运用2007—2021年中国A股上市公司的面板数据,基于上下游垂直生产结构,理论分析并实证检验了通货膨胀对不同类型企业的异质性影响。结果表明：(1)温和的通货膨胀能够显著地提升企业绩效;(2)由于上下游产业之间在企业资产结构与市场结构等方面存在显著的区别,通货膨胀对上下游企业存在相反的异质性影响,相对于下游非国有企业而言,上游国有企业多处于典型的顺周期行业,因此通货膨胀对其绩效水平的提升更高,但通货紧缩时的情况则完全相反;(3)这种再分配效应加剧了国有企业绩效的波动程度。受此影响,国有企业在金融危机之前经济高涨时期的业绩突出,绩效表现远高于同期非国有企业;而在金融危机之后受通货紧缩的进一步拖累,业绩下滑程度更甚于非国有企业。     

公司治理、产品市场竞争和企业绩效的交互关系——基于中国制造业上市公司的实证研究

产品市场竞争与公司治理机制存在互补关系。具体而言,竞争与中度集中的股权结构对公司绩效的提高存在着互补关系,即在股权结构中度集中的公司中,市场竞争更能提高企业绩效;而竞争与高度集中的股权结构对公司绩效的提高存在着替代关系,即在股权结构高度集中的公司里,竞争能够对这种股权绩效的不利影响形成一种制约作用。这些来自企业微观层面的实证结论,深化了我们关于竞争与公司治理对企业绩效作用的理解,表明在加强公司治理的同时,也应当建立有效的市场竞争机制。     

政府补贴、产权性质与战略性新兴产业创新绩效

政府补贴和产权性质作为战略性新兴产业发展的重要影响因素，其对创新绩效的影响已引起国内外广泛关注。采用Wind数据库中的中国战略性新兴产业上市挂牌公司面板数据，建立随机效应面板数据模型，科学评估政府补贴、产权性质对战略性新兴产业创新绩效的影响。结果发现：①现阶段中国战略性新兴产业政府补贴对企业绩效具有负向激励作用；②由于企业产权性质不同，政府补贴对非国有企业创新绩效的影响大于其对国有企业的影响。最后，提出完善政府补贴监管制度，营造合理透明发展环境，优化政府补贴政策，确保补贴方案因地制宜等政策建议，以期为政府制定更有效的补贴政策提供理论借鉴和决策支持。     

股权分置改革、产权属性、竞争环境与公司绩效——来自2005～2007年中国上市公司的证据

本文以股权分置改革以来的2005～2007年中国上市公司为研究样本,重点考察了股权分置改革、产权属性和竞争环境对上市公司绩效的影响。本文的研究发现：（1）股权分置改革显著提高了上市公司绩效;（2）股改前国有控股上市公司的绩效明显优于民营控股上市公司,而股改后国有控股上市公司的绩效却明显低于民营控股上市公司;（3）股改后,在高度竞争行业中,民营控股上市公司绩效优于国有控股上市公司,而在中度和低度竞争行业中两者则无明显差别;（4）股改后,高度竞争行业内民营控股上市公司绩效与股权集中度呈正相关关系。上述研究结果还表明,产权论和市场竞争论二者作用的发挥都是有条件的;在不同的市场竞争环境下,不同产权属性的公司绩效并不相同。根据上述分析结论,本文还就国有企业改革和民营企业发展问题提出了相应的政策建议。     

内部控制、研发投入与上市企业创新绩效

文章基于研发投入视角,采用2012—2020年我国上市企业的数据,实证分析研发投入在内部控制与企业创新绩效之间的关系,并且进一步分析了不同产权性质企业创新绩效的差异。研究发现：内部控制与企业创新绩效之间存在显著的促进作用;研发投入在企业的内部控制与企业的创新绩效之间存在着遮掩效应;相较于非国有企业,国有企业的内部控制对创新绩效的影响程度更大,在总体上支持“国有企业促进论”。     

超产权理论与中国企业融资绩效研究

一长期以来 ,对中国企业各方面运行绩效的研究一直在围绕产权与竞争进行。前者认为产权归属是决定企业绩效的决定因素 ,明晰产权会自动创造出竞争 ,后者相信有效的竞争在不改变产权制度的前提下仍能够保障相关治理机制的引入和企业运行效率的改善 ,竞争能够筛选出最有效的产权制度。超产权理论事实上是对这两种观点的一个综合 ,它承认产权变换在短期内对企业绩效的积极作用 ,但更强调从长期来看 ,竞争与企业绩效的直接相关性和决定性作用 ,故更偏重与“竞争派”的主张相一致。与传统产权模式比较 ,超产权论认为靠利润激励去驱动经营者的努力…     

不同所有制企业技术创新投入效应差异性研究——来自中国企业-劳动力匹配调查

技术创新投入对绩效的影响在不同所有制企业中是否存在显著性差异?基于2016年中国企业-劳动力匹配数据,研究发现:(1)技术创新投入对企业绩效具有促进效应,即技术创新投入效应存在;(2)国有企业和非国有企业的技术创新投入效应存在差异,其中,非国有企业表现显著而国有企业表现不显著;(3)产生差异的原因是两类企业的管理效率和政府支持力度不同。因此,研究建议:第一,鼓励技术创新,引导企业构建产学研相结合的技术创新体系;第二,完善政府补贴机制,创建更加透明的补贴评价机制;第三,在研发创新中注重提升管理效率。     

政府补贴、产权性质与战略性新兴产业创新绩效——来自上市挂牌公司微观数据的分析

政府补贴和产权性质作为战略性新兴产业发展的重要影响因素,其对创新绩效的影响已引起国内外广泛关注。采用Wind数据库中的中国战略性新兴产业上市挂牌公司面板数据,建立随机效应面板数据模型,科学评估政府补贴、产权性质对战略性新兴产业创新绩效的影响。结果发现:①现阶段中国战略性新兴产业政府补贴对企业绩效具有负向激励作用;②由于企业产权性质不同,政府补贴对非国有企业创新绩效的影响大于其对国有企业的影响。最后,提出完善政府补贴监管制度,营造合理透明发展环境,优化政府补贴政策,确保补贴方案因地制宜等政策建议,以期为政府制定更有效的补贴政策提供理论借鉴和决策支持。     

Corporate governance,human capital,and productivity: evidence from Chinese non-listed firms

This article analyses the effects of corporate governance (CG) and human capital on productivity by using the 1999–2006 data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The findings of this study are twofold. First, CG and human capital generate significant positive effects on the productivity of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Second, CG has significantly different moderate and mediate effects on the relationship between human capital and productivity. Our results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. This study provides clear policy implications by suggesting that the firms in emerging markets, especially SOEs, must improve their CG and their allocation of human capital for them to enhance their productivity.     

Bank competition and the cost of debt: the role of state ownership and firm size

The argument on the puzzling relationship between bank competition and the cost of debt remains inconclusive as the effects of state ownership and firm size are intertwined. We find that bank competition is negatively associated with the cost of debt and observe that the negative effect of bank competition is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and weaker for large-sized enterprises. Our findings accord with the market power hypothesis. State ownership strengthens the negative impact of bank competition on the cost of debt, but firm size tends to weaken it. SOEs and large-sized enterprises are associated with a lower cost of debt compared to non-SOEs and small- and medium-sized enterprises, respectively.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

中国国有企业民营化绩效研究

本文研究中国国有企业民营化是否有效的问题。我们通过对国企民营化进程的考察来对此问题作出经验解答。根据世界银行一份对中国五个城市、覆盖六个行业的近300家国有企业(SOEs)1996—2001年间的调查数据,我们发现:(1)绩效较好的国有企业优先被民营化;(2)总体上来说,中国的民营化是富有成效的,尤其是提高了销售收入,降低了企业的成本,并最终导致企业盈利能力和生产率的大幅提高;而且在获得这些收益的同时并没有带来大规模的失业问题;(3)由民营机构控股、彻底民营化的企业比那些仍然是国有控股、部分民营化的企业绩效表现更好。     

The role of state enterprises in the transition from command to market economies

In transition from command to market economies total privatization has proved to be impossible to achieve, and a substantial part of large enterprises are likely to remain in full or partial state ownership. Hasty privatization has in many cases even proved to be destructive. There is a need to reconsider the basic approach to transition. Contrary to conventional wisdom prevailing in mainstream economics state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not necessarily inferior to private firms in economic efficiency. J. Kornai's soft-budget constraint is reconsidered. Two models are suggested under which SOEs may prove to be viable in the long run and serve to promote a smoother physical transition. Under Model One (which is the general case) SOEs are largely separated from the state and operate on the basis of profit maximization. Under Model Two (which applies to certain industries) different objective functions are chosen for purposes of economic efficiency. Finally, preserving SOEs is seen as an alternative means of reducing inequitable income distribution at the source where primary incomes are created.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

China’s secondary privatization: new evidence on controlling shareholders tunnelling

This article utilizes the 2005 split-share structure reform (SSSR) in China as a natural experiment and conducts difference-in-differences (DID) tests to analyse corporate governance changes among Chinese SOEs compared to POEs. We show that tunnelling significantly reduced in both POEs and SOEs after the SSSR. More importantly, we find a significant and positive ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling activities during the post-reform period suggesting the reductions of tunnelling were smaller among SOEs than POEs following the SSSR. In contrast, excess returns around the SSSR indicate that investors expected a negative ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling. These findings suggest that the quality of corporate governance did not improve among SOEs as a result of the secondary privatization as the stock market expected without fundamental changes to firm ownership and control following the SSSR. The benefits of privatization accrue to the government controlling shareholders rather than minority investors.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.