Motivation matters: Corporate scope and competition in complementary product markets

Research summary : We argue that a pure capabilities‐based view does not accurately explain the competitive dynamics of increasingly common settings in which firms act as both complementors and competitors. We propose that the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability framework is more appropriate for these settings. We derive predictions from both a pure capabilities view and the AMC framework, and test those predictions in the U.S. auto leasing market, in which the leasing subsidiaries of car manufacturers directly compete with the same independent lessors who provide complements to the manufacturers. Although our results are consistent with capabilities playing an important role, motivation appears to be a critical factor explaining the competitive dynamics of the market. Managerial summary : Firms that compete with business units owned by larger corporate parents face additional considerations. Such subsidiary competitors can be motivated by broader corporate considerations, shifting their objectives, and consequently, their strategic actions. Expecting subsidiary competitors to pursue business unit profitability can mislead managers toward pricing, product mix, or market entry errors. We present an important example from consumer finance, where independent auto lessors, such as Bank of America (BoA), compete with captive leasing subsidiaries like Ford Motor Credit (FMC). Since FMC is motivated to subsidize and support vehicle sales for its manufacturer parent, a cost advantage is not enough for BoA to dominate the market. Understanding broader corporate motivations of competitors helps managers anticipate competition levels in potential markets, thereby improving decision‐making and performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unpaid crowd complementors: The platform network effect mirage

Platforms have evolved beyond just being organized as multi‐sided markets with complementors selling to users. Complementors are often unpaid, working outside of a price system and driven by heterogeneous sources of motivation—which should affect how they respond to platform growth. Does reliance on network effects and strategies to attract large numbers of complementors remain advisable in such contexts? We test hypotheses related to these issues using data from 85 online multi‐player game platforms with unpaid complementors. We find that complementor development responds to platform growth even without sales incentives, but that attracting complementors has a net zero effect on on‐going development and fails to stimulate network effects. We discuss conditions under which a strategy of using unpaid crowd complementors remains advantageous. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sorting, Selection, and Industry Shakeouts

This paper presents a model of industry dynamics in which worker abilities are complements in production, but frictions permit only gradual sorting among firms. As an industry matures, segregation by skill becomes more marked, the wage distribution widens, and so does the distribution of firm size. Eventually, firms that have ended up with predominantly low-quality workers will exit. The model generates shakeouts with characteristics similar to empirical observation only for intermediate values of entry costs.      

Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments

We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to complementary activities affect their decision to invest in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives and bureaucratic costs, firm‐complementor organizational form plays an important role in the firm's ability to coordinate accompanying changes in complementary activities so as to shape the benefits from investing early in the new technology. We test our predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995–2006. The study makes a strong case for viewing firms' competitive strategies in the context of their business ecosystems and for the existence of an important link between firms' coordination choices and their strategic investments. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Niche width revisited: organizational scope,behavior and performance

Although strategy research typically regards firm scope as a positional characteristic associated with performance differences, we propose that broad contemporary scope also provides insight into the routines that govern firm behavior. To attain broad scope, firms must repeatedly explore outside the boundaries of their current niche. Firms with broad niches therefore operate under a set of routines that repeatedly propel them into new market segments, expanding their niche. These niche expansions, however, involve risky organizational changes, behavior that disadvantages generalists relative to specialists, despite the positional value of broad scope. Empirical analyses of machine tool manufacturers and computer workstation manufacturers support this conjecture: (i) generalists introduce new products at a higher than optimal rate, thereby increasing their exit rates; and (ii) generalists also more frequently launch new models with novel features or targeted at new consumer segments rather than improving only incrementally on existing products, further accelerating their odds of failure. After adjusting for these behavioral differences, broad niche widths reduce exit rates, suggesting that they provide positional advantages. The paper discusses how this phenomenon may help to explain the diversification and multi‐nationality discounts. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry

This paper uncovers price asymmetries across oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that are seemingly identical in structure but different in competitive history. This is done by identifying “quiet life” markets that have not (yet) experienced a change in structure, and “non-quiet life” markets that have been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. Using a long panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry, we find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price significantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly. We show that the path towards a particular market structure matters for the determination of prices and explore several mechanisms that likely explain the price asymmetries, including engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, adjustment behaviour to market structure changes, and the cost heterogeneity of competing firms.     

Capabilities,technologies, and firm exit during industry shakeout: Evidence from the global solar photovoltaic industry

Research Summary: Explanations of entrants’ survival in an emerging industry are premised on pre‐entry capabilities or technology entry choices prior to the emergence of the dominant design. We consider how these drivers interact to strengthen or nullify firms’ pre‐entry advantage, and facilitate adaptation as the industry evolves. We also expand the treatment of exit by separating dissolution from acquisition, in which firms’ capabilities continue to be utilized in the industry. Studying a recent shakeout in the global solar photovoltaic industry, we find that pre‐entry capabilities and technology choices act in a complementary manner for some firms, thereby enhancing survival, and as buffers against exit for others. Nearly half of exits were via acquisitions, and technology choice at entry played an important role in determining how firms exited. Managerial Summary: New industries are often characterized by intense technology competition that culminates in a dominant technology followed by industry shakeout. Although prior research underscores the central role of technology choice and firm capabilities to survival, we do not actually know how firms with different capabilities and who have made competing technology choices survive an industry shakeout. In this article, we show how entrants’ capabilities and technology choices can act in a complementary manner for some firms, enhancing their chance of survival, and as buffers against failure for others. Moreover, we explain why some firms that do exit are acquired, when others are dissolved.     

Opportunity costs,industry dynamics,and corporate diversification: Evidence from the cardiovascular medical device industry, 1976–2004

This paper examines how demand conditions across alternative markets impact diversification decisions and firm performance by influencing the opportunity costs of deploying non‐scale free capabilities. Using data within the cardiovascular medical device industry, this study shows that: (1) firms with a larger stock of pre‐entry innovation experience are more likely to diversify; (2) firms in a current market with greater relative demand maturity are more likely to diversify; (3) diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the current market; and (4) diversification is associated with a performance increase at the corporate level. These findings shed new light on the self‐selection process of corporate scope, the conceptualization of firm capabilities, and the connection between industry dynamics and resource deployment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry into Nascent Industries: Disentangling a Firm's Capability Portfolio at the Time of Investment Versus Market Entry

Research summary : This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm's technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm's integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary : New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm's integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry, exit, and shakeouts in the United States in new manufactured products

During their early evolution, new manufacturing industries commonly experience a ‘shakeout’ period during which the number of producers declines by 50% or more. In order to gain additional insight into shakeouts, we develop new information on the patterns of entry and exit for 16 major new manufactured products from their commercial inception through 1980. We use a model in which entry and exit coordination problems can generate shakeouts to structure the analysis of the data. We find that shakeouts are distinguished by entry falling off sharply but rates of exit remaining steady or rising over time.     

Surviving the gales of creative destruction: the determinants of product turnover

Innovative industries are often characterized by rapid product turnover. Product longevity may be driven by both a product's position within a market as well as its position within a firm's larger product portfolio. However, we have little understanding of the relative importance of these factors in determining product turnover and how they interact as an industry evolves. Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing firm survival and turnover, there are far fewer studies of the determinants of product survival and turnover. We use hazard rate models and count regression models to describe the behavior of firms and their products with a new and detailed database on the laser printer industry. We show, first, that competition and market structure variables have a large impact on both speeding product exit and delaying product entry. Second, there is some evidence that firms that have maintained a high market share for a number of years keep their products on the market longer than those with lower market share. Finally, firms with high innovative capacity tend to enter markets frequently, but withdraw their products at average rates. Firms with strong brands tend to introduce few products and withdraw their products slowly. With these findings, the paper links product entry and exit decisions to the broader literature on firm strategic and product management. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Platform competition with complementary products

We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.     

MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit‐Stiglitz when firms sell multiple products. Both products and firms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case). We use it to determine the market's biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over‐entry.     

CREDIBLE RETALIATORY ENTRY AND STRATEGIC TOE‐HOLDS*

The anticipated profits from entry by an established firm into a new market will depend on how incumbents in that market are expected to respond. One possibility, suggested by cases and the literature, is that an incumbent may respond with ‘retaliatory entry’ into the first entrant's ‘home’ market. The model presented here describes conditions under which this can be a credible threat that deters the first entry. When the conditions are such that it is not credible, the paper shows how firms can provide credibility through the establishment of toe‐hold investments in other markets.     

Creating Growth in New Markets: A Simultaneous Model of Firm Entry and Price*

Sales in a new market generally follow a hockey‐stick pattern: After commercialization, sales are very low for some time before there is a dramatic takeoff in growth. Reported sales takeoffs across products vary widely from a few years to several decades. Prior research identifies new firm entry or price declines as key factors that relate to the timing of a sales takeoff in new markets. However, this literature considers these variables to be exogenous and only finds unilateral effects. In the present article, new firm entry and price declines are modeled as being endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous relationship between price declines and firm entry in the introductory period of new markets when industry sales are negligible is studied. Using a sample of new markets formed in the United States during the last 135 years, strong support for a simultaneous model of price and firm entry is found: Price decreases relate to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. Furthermore, a key driver of firm entry during the early years of a new market involves the level of patent activity, and a key driver of price decreases is the presence of large firms. In contrast to the recommendations from other research, these results indicate that rapid price declines may further delay sales takeoff in industries by dampening new firm entry. Instead, rapid sales takeoffs in new markets come from encouraging greater innovative activity and the entry of large firms.     

OPEN VERSUS CLOSED FIRMS AND THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRY EVOLUTION*

We develop a model of industry evolution in which firms choose proprietary standards (closed firm) or adopt a common standard (open firm). A closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces lower entry barriers: The odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely. While initially closed firms have better survival because they can offset losses in one component with profits from another, the situation is reversed when prices fall below a threshold. These entry and exit dynamics can lead the industry away from its long run equilibrium.     

Capabilities development and deployment activities in born global B-to-B firms for early entry into international markets

This paper sets out to understand how entrepreneurial founders of born global firms acquire, transform and deploy new knowledge resources for early internationalization. Adopting a dynamic capabilities view and using a sample of high-tech B-to-B firms, we report that the new firm's early entry into international markets is executed through three transitionary phases. Founders transform the operational capabilities they endow to the firm, develop dynamic capabilities for use in opportunity exploitation, and deploy these to develop knowledge-intensive products that they take to chosen niche markets. The paper contributes to the B-to-B global marketing literature by uniting it with born global and INV internationalization research, and elucidating the three phases through which founders manage early internationalization. The roles played by entrepreneurial founders and particular capabilities are discussed.     

Cannibalization and option value effects of secondary markets: Evidence from the US concert industry

We examine how reducing search frictions in secondary markets affects the value appropriated by firms in primary markets. We characterize two effects on primary‐market firms caused by intermediaries entering secondary markets: the “cannibalization” and “option value” effects. Separation between primary and secondary markets can drive which of the two effects dominates. Firms selling valuable and scarce products are more likely to have separate primary and secondary markets, and will therefore appropriate more value when secondary markets thicken. Firms selling products that are not valuable and scarce will be hurt. Further, we hypothesize that firms have incentives to engineer scarcity by limiting supply when secondary markets thicken to separate primary and secondary markets. We find support for these hypotheses in the U.S. concert ticket industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Product Portfolio Strategy on Financial Performance: The Roles of Product Development and Market Entry Decisions

Innovation is one of the most important issues facing business today. The major difficulty in managing innovation is that managers must do so against a constantly shifting backdrop as technologies, competitors, and markets constantly evolve. Managers determine the product portfolio through key decisions about product development and market entry. Key strategic questions are what portfolio strategies provide the greatest reward. The purpose of this study is to understand the relative financial values of each component of a product portfolio. Specifically, the paper examines the short‐term and long‐term financial impacts of product development strategy and market entry strategy. These strategies reflect two critical tensions that must be balanced in product portfolio decision making and essentially determine a firm's product portfolio. In doing so, the paper also investigates how a firm's capabilities drive each component of a product portfolio. From the empirical analyses in the context of the biomedical device industry, the paper found important insights regarding product portfolio strategies. First, a large product portfolio helps a firm's financial performance. In particular, the pioneering new products have strongest impacts on short‐term performances, and nonpioneering mature products do not provide significant contribution. Second, the results indicate a persistent first‐mover advantage. The first‐to‐market new products yield not only an immediate effect, but also persistent long‐term effects, suggesting that it is important to be first in the market even though there may be short‐term losses. Third, the results suggest the need to balance between “mature” and “new” products. Also, firms need to balance “first‐to‐market” and “late‐entered” products. Because a new or pioneering product requires more resource, it may hurt other products in the portfolio. Thus, without support from mature or follower products, new products and pioneering products alone may not increase firm sales or profit. Fourth, from a long‐term perspective, the paper found that the financial market only rewards a firm's overall capability to deliver new products first in the marketplace. Thus, short‐term performance is mainly driven by product‐level innovativeness, whereas firm‐level innovativeness enhances forward‐looking long‐term performance. Fifth, the paper also found that pioneering new products are driven by integrating both primary and complementary technological capabilities. And nonpioneering new products are mainly driven by the capabilities in primary technology domain. These results provide important insight into the relative value and timing of return on investment in radical versus incremental innovation and alternative market entry strategies. By understanding the performance trade‐offs of these different factors in the short and long term, one can develop better guidelines for optimizing innovation strategies, and their dependence on both external and internal environmental conditions.