Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literatureconcludes that firms will optimally differentiate inorder to alleviate a tendency toward competitivepricing. However, it has recently been shown thatfirms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly)anticipate an absence of price competition. Thispaper examines the relationship between productlocation and the sustainability of cooperativepricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiatedmarkets. Further, it describes equilibrium locationswhen firms are able to choose their locations jointlyand when they must choose independently.     

Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly

This article refines an established explanation of how multimarket contact facilitates collusion when firms enjoy reciprocal advantages across markets: When there are reciprocal asymmetries between firms, multimarket contact allows them not only to develop spheres of influence, but also to implement attractively simple strategies that are subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation proof. Hence, collusive equilibria are supported by fully credible punishments. A significant implication is, multimarket contact involving reciprocal differences between firms may be more facilitating to their cooperative efforts than multimarket contact based on other factors. The article discusses existing empirical work as it relates to this implication. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE CLASSROOM: A REPEATED GAME OF MULTIMARKET OLIGOPOLY

This article describes a repeated game of multimarket contact, designed to be played throughout an entire term. Besides enjoying reciprocal advantages in their home markets, firms are perfectly informed after every round about each other's decisions. For most of the game, it appears there is always a future in which to punish deviations, and (with the game's parameters) zero-cost punishments can always be implemented. Thus the game provides all the elements for an escape from the prisoner's dilemma. Theoretical foundations, predictions, and some results are also discussed.     

Crowding,satiation, and saturation: The days of television series' lives

The performance of firms depends not just on the structure of the industries in which they compete but also on their relative positioning within those industries, in terms of operating within particular niches. We propose that demand for these niches depends endogenously on the historical ecology of the products offered: Niches become saturated—reduced in their ability to support products—as a large number of previous offerings allows the audience to satisfy its desire for products of a particular type. Analyzing the survival rates of television series aired in the United States from 1946 to 2003, we found that the survival rates of future entrants fell with the extensiveness of recent offerings in the niche, and that the negative association between crowding and survival also weakened with this saturation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.     

以价值为基础的维修管理——用OEE作为关键性能指标

介绍挪威工业界使用OEE作为考核设备效率的关键性能指标,以及实际使用OEE指标的4个层次生产损失的模式和15个生产损失要素。     

National pricing with local quality competition

We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.     

How Economists Form Their Views: Reaction to Professor Pryor's Millennium Survey

This comment is in response to Frederic L. Pryor (2000). "The Millennium Survey: How Economists View the U.S. Economy in the 21^st Century." The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 59 (January), pp. 3-33.