Market value,market share,and mergers: Evidence from a panel of U.S. firms

Improving shareholder value has often been cited as a merger determinant. Because mergers create larger firms and less competition, they may increase shareholder value through higher market share and stock‐market value. We investigate merger impacts on firms' stock‐market value and market share. We construct panel data from 4 different data sources on public merging and non‐merging U.S. manufacturing firms for 1980–2003. Instrumental variables and factors such as R&D, patents, and citations control for endogeneity. We find that mergers are positively correlated with stock‐market value and market share.     

Is economic efficiency the driving force behind mergers?

Some economists routinely argue against government regulation that limits the number of mergers and acquisitions. They believe that, as a matter of empirical fact, almost all mergers enhance economic efficiency. The possibility that some mergers do not create wealth but merely redistribute it is ignored. We study all companies delisted from the New York Stock Exchange for reason of merger since 1926. We find that economic efficiency cannot easily explain merger waves. Contrary to the disciplinary hypothesis, acquisition targets are not, in large majority, poor stock market performers. We also report evidence consistent with stock market undervaluation as a merger motive.     

我国总体并购活动与宏观经济变量的关联性研究——对我国并购浪潮成因的分析

本文对我国总体并购活动与GDP增长率、货币供应量、利率、股价及汇率的关联性实证研究结果表明，并购周期与经济周期具有较强的相关性，具有长期均衡关系；货币供应量、利率、股价和汇率等与总体并购活动具有长期稳定的关系，但短期内，利率与并购活动显著地负相关；货币供应量对总体并购活动有微弱的正相关关系；股价指数和汇率对总体并购活动有负影响，且影响程度很弱。这说明，经济周期和利率是我国并购浪潮形成的主要原因。     

Market Optimism and Merger Waves

We argue that stock and bond market booms and merger waves are both driven by increases in optimism in financial markets and discuss two behavioral hypotheses, the managerial discretion and overvaluation hypotheses that claim that merger waves are driven by market optimism. Empirical support for the managerial theory is provided by evidence that the amounts of assets acquired increase as optimism in financial markets increases and that the returns to acquiring companies are inversely related to market optimism at the time of mergers. Our measures of market optimism also explain managerial choices of finance for mergers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The international drivers of domestic airline mergers in twenty nations: integrating industrial organization and international business

The domestic airline merger phenomenon of the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked a great deal of Industrial Organization (IO) literature; yet, that literature neglected non‐US domestic mergers and potential for international competitive gains. Using an International Business perspective to complement an IO analysis, I argue that factoring international competitive incentives helps explain domestic airline merger activity. A Cournot model of airline competition illustrates that domestic mergers, via enhanced domestic networks and reduced domestic competition, generate international competitive gains. Further, empirical tests—using a structural equations approach on panel data covering interhyphen‐national city‐pair market segments—support domestic mergers improving international competitiveness. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market reaction to large bank merger announcements in oligopolies

This paper evaluates the individual and rival stock price reactions to large bank merger announcements and subsequent regulatory rejection in an oligopoly. The results show that the announcements produce significant positive abnormal returns for the merger candidates. Regulatory obstacles and denial of the proposed mergers produce significant negative returns. Analysis of the rivals’ reactions doesn’t produce consistent significant results. This suggests that the market reactions for the merging banks results are driven by expected increases in efficiencies. The rivals’ reaction is explained by the fact that the market would remain contestable after the mergers since the offered products are homogeneous.(JEL G14, G34)     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

并购中的业绩承诺条款与股价崩盘风险

本文以2008—2016年有业绩承诺的A股上市公司为样本，研究了并购中业绩补偿承诺条款的设置与兑现对并购业绩的影响，以及并购业绩未达预期产生的经济后果。研究发现，设定高增长率的业绩目标对并购业绩完成具有负面作用，采用股份补偿、非累计补偿、减值测试补偿以及双向业绩对赌对并购业绩实现具有积极作用。在承诺兑现过程中，承诺后期业绩目标压力更大，业绩完成率更低。在业绩承诺完成的经济后果方面，本文发现，未完成业绩承诺的并购相对于完成承诺的并购具有更高的股价崩盘风险，进行盈余管理的并购相对于未进行盈余管理的并购具有更高的股价崩盘风险。     

Performance of bank mergers and acquisitions: a review of the recent empirical evidence

This review provides a comprehensive analysis of the literature on bank mergers and acquisitions with an emphasis on the last decade. The study identifies and analyzes more than 135 publications focusing on this subject. The publications are grouped along their regional focus and the three main empirical methodologies utilized in the literature. The results are documented in detail and their evolution over time is discussed. The key factors influencing the performance of bank mergers and acquisitions, as identified in the relevant literature, are grouped into three categories and evaluated according to their contribution to the success of a merger. This paper concludes with a brief discussion of the influence of managers on the performance of mergers and acquisitions and evidence on regulatory arbitrage through bank mergers and acquisitions.     

Acquiring firms' stock returns: Methods of payment,change in leverage,and management ownership

This study examines the effects of the method of payment, change in leverage, and management equity ownership on the acquiring firm's stock returns around the initial announcement date of the merger. Results indicate that stockholders of mergers financed with stocks suffer significant losses. These losses are larger when management ownership is low and smaller in mergers that resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases. Stockholders of acquiring firms involved in cash mergers gain significant abnormal returns, provided that acquiring firms increase their leverage and that managerial ownership is high. When management equity ownership is low, leverage has no effect on stock returns. When management ownership is high, mergers which resulted in acquiring firm leverage increases have significant positive effects, and those which resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases have negative but insignificant effects.     

An Analysis of the Inward Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.K.: A Macroeconomic Perspective

The incidence of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) has accelerated over the past two decades. Yet previous empirical work relating to CBM&As has been confined to firm‐specific factors. This is against the backdrop that researchers have not been able to develop a coherent theory explaining the increasing trends of CBM&As activity. Building on prior studies, this study attempts to extend the few existing studies by using a simple empirical nonlinear framework to analyse the number of CBM&As inflows between 1987 and 2008 into the U.K. from a macroeconomic perspective. The main findings are that the response of the inflow is asymmetric as there is more persistence during stock market booms versus recessions. There are asymmetries with respect to relative prices suggesting that merger inflow activity appears to be higher once the stock prices rise above a threshold level of 8 per cent. Other factors which have significant bearing on CBM&As inflows are the rate of inflation and growth in real GDP.     

The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger

It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement date. We also find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, 'future acquisition probability' does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. Further, we find the positive (or non-negative) abnormal returns of rivals to be robust when considering heterogeneity in merger and rival characteristics.     

Quality-improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria

We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.     

Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers?

This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out‐of‐market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Business cycle and aggregate industry mergers

This paper tests the relationship between industry-level mergers and business cycle using panel tests that allow us to control for macro-economic and industry-level determinants of merger activity. We find robust evidence that both related and unrelated industry-level mergers are pro-cyclical. However, the evidence is asymmetric between related and unrelated mergers. We also find strong evidence in support of two major theories of merger activity that have been proposed and tested in the existing literature, namely, neoclassical theory and behavioral theory. The proxies of both neoclassical and behavioral theories explain merger activity in general; however, the pro-cyclicality of mergers is not fully captured by any of these proxies, individually or collectively.     

Gender segregation in the making of a merger

Although recent literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has looked exhaustively at a variety of issues embracing organizational systems, practices and people, it has ignored the gendered nature of merging. The aim in this article is twofold. First, to demonstrate how segregation according to gender is determined in the merger process by the organizational histories of the two merger partners. Second, to specify how gender operates in connection with certain integrative mechanisms developed by top management to coordinate and control the merger as it unfolds. A longitudinal, in-depth analysis of the making of the Merita Bank in Finland suggests that mergers represent a particularly well-defined arena for the reproduction of gender segregation, due to a complicated weave of intended and unintended consequences of managerial actions during its formulation and implementation. It is suggested that the gendered career implications of mergers represent a particularly timely theme for further research.     

The Impact of the Big 8 Mergers on Market Power: Evidence from the Hong Kong Market

This study examines the impact of the Big 8 mergers on market power in an audit market where the merging firms have little presence. Audit fee changes for each merger participating firm are identified and fee changes for several post‐merger years are examined. The pre‐merger differential market power between the merging and non‐merging long‐established Big 8 firms (Price Waterhouse and KPMG Peat Marwick) in Hong Kong provides a unique opportunity to examine whether the mergers could help the merging firms to increase their market power. The results are consistent with the hypotheses that the audit fees of the merging firms were significantly lower than that of the non‐merging, long‐established Big 8 firms before the mergers, but the audit fees of the merged firms increased significantly to a level comparable with that of the latter group after the mergers. In addition, the market share of the merged firms increased significantly after the mergers. However, no association is found between market concentration and market power. Overall, the results show that the Big 8 mergers have helped the merged firms increase their market power and market share in the Hong Kong audit market where they had little presence.     

Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: mergers among parking lots

To analyze the effects of mergers among firms facing capacity constraints, we develop a numerical model of price-setting behavior among multi-product firms differentiated by location and capacity. We perform a number of computational experiments designed to inform merger policy, with specific reference to the Central Parking–Allright merger of 1999. The experiments show that capacity constraints on merging firms attenuate merger effects by much more than capacity constraints on non-merging firms amplify them. The experiments also highlight the dependence of merger welfare effects on parking demand. In preparation for further industry consolidation, we propose estimators of parking demand to more precisely estimate the costs and benefits of future mergers.     

The Boundaries of the Firm: The Choice Between Stand-Alone and Integrated Firms

This study presents a theory of corporate structure selection. It outlines when economic units should be structured as stand-alone firms versus an integrated firm (conglomerate). The theory suggests that an integrated firm better controls agency problems through yardstick competition between managers for project acceptance. However, this structure reduces the ability to receive division-specific project information from the market. Based on this trade-off, we show that divisions within a conglomerate have different characteristics and, thus, different valuations than "similar" stand-alone firms. Our theory also explains differences in the required rate of return between stand-alone firms and conglomerates and how they relate to relative valuations of conglomerates and "similar" stand-alone firm. It also predicts when stock price reaction to divestiture and merger announcements will be positive or negative.     

Merger Failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre‐ and post‐merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre‐merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any post‐merger effort, counting on the other partner to make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are more likely to fail.