Heterogeneous Preferences, Education Expenditures and Income Distribution

This paper introduces heterogeneous preferences to a growth model which incorporates human capital, accumulated through either public or private education. The implications of heterogeneous preferences for income and its distribution are the focus of the paper. Public education expenditure is determined through a voting mechanism where the median preference rather than median income household is the decisive voter. The paper extends the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows first, that heterogeneous preferences increase income inequality in the private education model and second, public education can overcome the added heterogeneity and reduce income inequality. The results strengthen the arguments for public education as a redistributive mechanism.     

The political economy of public education

I study the relationship between income inequality and public spending in education in a voting model. Voters collectively choose the uniform quality level of public education, the amount of a public good, and the tax rate on labor income. Parents can decide to opt-out of the public education system by purchasing private education at the desired quality level, and children’s expected income is assumed to be increasing in the quality of education. I show that higher income inequality is associated with higher governmental spending in education if and only if the expected marginal returns to education are larger for the children of relatively low income parents. In turn, better public education tends to reduce future inequality. These results are consistent with most findings in the empirical literature about public investment in education. Lastly, I show that for other kind of publicly provided goods, such as health care, the relationship with income inequality exhibits an ambiguous or opposite sign.     

公共教育、社会保障与收入分布

本文使用一个世代交叠模型揭示了公共教育与社会保障调节收入分布的作用机制。研究发现,公共教育能够有效地缩小家庭教育投资差距,从而降低收入差异;社会保障则通过减少低收入家庭的劳动供给、增加其有效家庭教育时间来降低收入差异。本文的数值模拟结果显示,在同样的支出水平下公共教育调节收入差异的能力比社会保障更强。并且当存在财政预算约束时,从降低收入差异的角度来看,若财政预算规模较低则应当将资金优先用于公共教育;若财政预算规模较高则应当在公共教育与社会保障之间保持平衡。     

教育体系、收入分布与经济增长

本文使用一个包含物质资本与人力资本积累的世代交叠模型,研究不同的教育体系对经济增长的影响.我们发现,在公立教育体系下,最优的教育投资水平高于私立教育体系,收入差异也将会比在私立教育体系下下降得更快.因此,与私立教育体系相比,公立教育体系更有利于人力资本积累,在公立教育体系下一个国家将会有更高的经济增长率与更为平等的收入分布.     

Heterogeneity in Ability and Inheritance,Disparities, and Development

This paper investigates the impact of income inequality on economic growth. A two-period overlapping generations model is developed where agents are heterogeneous in innate abilities and inheritance. In the first period, they receive their inheritance and their abilities are revealed. There are only two types of abilities: high and low. Individuals decide on their education level, and divide their inheritance between spending on education and saving. In the second period, individuals supply their labor and allocate the labor income and the return to their saving between consumption and bequests to their offsprings. Initial capital stock is owned entirely by the capitalists. In this context, a more equal distribution of income enhances economic growth if the economy is lower than a threshold capital-labor ratio, while income inequality has an insignificant effect above this threshold. The predictions of the model are tested empirically using the Hansen (1999) threshold estimation. The results, using a panel of 70 countries for the period 1971-1999, suggest that there is a statistically significant threshold income per capita, below which the coefficient on the relationship between inequality and economic growth is significantly negative and above which the estimate is not significant.     

Public Education, Occupational Choice, and the Growth-Inequality Relationship

This article develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the occupational structure of the economy drives a wedge between the social and private returns to schooling for some workers. I study the impacts of alternative allocations of public resources between basic and higher levels of education on enrollments, income distribution, and growth. In particular, I illustrate how the growth-inequality relationship depends on the tension between two forces: (1) the "trickle-down" effects of expenditures on higher education and (2) the positive impacts on secondary enrollments generated by high-quality basic education and reduced parental inequality.     

Why is free education so popular? A political economy explanation

This paper analyzes the political support for different funding regimes of education in a one‐person, one‐vote democracy. We focus the analysis on four systems that have had a preponderant presence in the political debate on education: a private system, a public system that delivers the same resources to each student (universal‐free education), a public system that intends to equalize results, and a public system that aims to maximize the output of the economy. We show that a system of universal free education is the Condorcet winner. The level of income inequality and the degree to which income distribution is skewed to the right are key factors behind this conclusion. We also show that the voting outcome of public versus private funding for education depends crucially on the type of public funding under consideration.     

Effects of Changes in Family Composition and Employment Patterns on the Distribution of Income in Australia: 1981–1982 to 1997–1998

We examine income distributions over the last two decades, presenting both non-parametric kernel density estimates and summary measures. Standard errors of summary measures are also reported to facilitate statistical inference. We find a significant increase in private income inequality, but only a modest increase in disposable income inequality, implying an increase in the inequality-reducing effects of income taxes and transfers. Using a semi-parametric procedure developed by DiNardo et al. (1996), we then examine the effects of changes in family characteristics on the distribution of private income, finding that half the increase in inequality is explained by changes in the distribution of employment.     

Intergenerational Mobility under Private vs. Public Education*

Intergenerational earnings mobility is analyzed in a model where human capital is produced using schooling and parental time. In steady states more mobile societies have less inequality, but in the short run higher mobility may result from an increase in inequality. Starting from the same inequality, mobility is higher under public than under private education. A rise in income shocks, for example due to increased returns to ability, or a switch from public to private schooling both increase inequality. However, increased shocks raise mobility in the short run and do not affect it in the long run, whereas an increased role for private schooling reduces mobility in both the short and long run. That these differences may help to identify the source of changes in inequality, and other real‐world implications, are illustrated in a brief discussion of time trends and cross‐country differences.     

Educational systems,growth and income distribution: a quantitative study

This study sets out to develop a dynamic model within an economy characterized by the coexistence of public and private schools, under imperfect credit market conditions, in an attempt to provide a clearer understanding of the evolution of economic growth and income inequality. We find that any government wishing to reduce income inequality should adopt policies aimed at increasing the enrollment rate in public schools. However, whilst high enrollment rates can be sustained in private schools, and thus create enhanced economic growth, this can only occur if accompanied by the liberalization of the credit markets.     

Higher education, elite institutions and inequality

We develop a model of higher education to analyze the effects of elite institutions on individual educational decisions and aggregate labor market outcomes. Elite institutions allow the most talented of a given population to separate themselves from the larger pool of agents enrolled in higher education, and to earn the associated wage premium in the labor market. As elite institutions engage in cream skimming, the returns to publicly accessible education decrease, and enrollment in public higher education declines. The resulting effect on income inequality is ambiguous, since elite education increases income dispersion at the top of the income distribution, and decreases income dispersion at the bottom.     

A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform

A recent education policy Turkish government is wishing to undertake is to shut down all private supplementary education centers (SECs) unless SECs manage to convert into a private school. With this policy, the government is willing to increase equality of opportunity among students. We show quantitatively that the policy, in fact, leads to a decrease in equality of opportunity since SECs are given the option to convert into private schools. We use a political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously set income, choose among a continuum of private schools differentiated by tuition and a public school. Households choosing the public school can privately supplement their child's education spending in any amount. Public school is free of charge, and its spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households. Income tax rate is determined by majority voting. Achievement of a child depends only on educational spending. We calibrate the model's parameters by matching certain targets from 2013 Turkish data. We then exogenously restrict the supplemental education spending to zero in a counterfactual experiment. We find that variance of achievement (or inequality of opportunity) increases by 23.51% and mean achievement decreases by 1.74%.     

Ability transmission,endogenous fertility and educational subsidy

In this study, we attempt to investigate how educational subsidy, childcare allowance and family allowance affect economic growth and income distribution on the basis of simulation models which incorporate intergenerational ability transmission and endogenous fertility. The simulation results show that financial support for higher education can both increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, especially if the abilities of parent and child are closely correlated. In contrast with educational subsidy, raising childcare allowance or family allowance has limited impacts on growth and income inequality.     

Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is.     

INEQUALITY OF WAGE RATES,EARNINGS AND FAMILY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975–2002

This paper analyzes distributional changes over the last quarter of the twentieth century. We focus on four distinct distributions: the distribution of hourly wage rates, the distribution of annual earnings of individuals, the distribution of annual earnings of families, and the distribution of total family income adjusted for family size. Both male wage rate inequality and family income inequality accelerated during the early 1980s, increased at a slower rate through the early 1990s and then stabilized at a high level through the early 2000s. The similarity in the timing of changes in these two distributions has been used as evidence that increased family income inequality primarily reflects increased inequality of wage rates. We show that other important factors were also at work.     

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for human capital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.     

A COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME: SWEDEN AROUND 1970.

The concern with income distribution has always mainly existed because of a concern with individuals' economic welfare. In recent years, the question has arisen whether the distribution of annual income—the distribution most often studied—is the best proxy for the distribution of economic welfare. Other measures, such as lifetime income, have been proposed instead.
The paper starts with a discussion of how to define and measure the distribution of lifetime income. By using a simulation model, which partly consists of estimated functions and partly of tax functions taken directly from tax laws, distributions of lifetime income, variously defined, are then constructed. These distributions are compared with each other, and with distributions of annual income. The simulations indicate that the distribution of lifetime income is considerably less unequal than the distribution of annual income. Whether inheritances are included or not seems to be of no importance for the inequality of lifetime income. If, on the other hand, we include the value of leisure time in lifetime income, inequality increases by about 10–15 percent. Distributions of income after tax have Gini coefficients which are approximately 25 percent less than the Ginis for the before-tax distributions. We thus find that the picture of inequality we get is very much dependent on which income concept we use.     

The existence of non-elite private schools

We provide an explanation to the puzzle of the existence of paid-for private schools that offer lower quality education than some tuition-free public alternatives. We consider a model of a city composed of two communities: the urban area and the suburbs. The suburban public school provides higher quality education at an implicit price: the higher tax burden plus a housing rent premium. If that price is high enough and the urban public school has a sufficiently low quality, intermediate income households live in the urban area and use a private school. Intermediate quality private schools, then, exist to serve these households' demand. Lower and higher income households use different quality public schools. Therefore, perfect income stratification across public and private education does not characterize this equilibrium.     

Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

This paper examines the academic soundness of the Pareto welfare criterion as a normative rule for evaluating alternative economic inequality scenarios and suggests that the criterion has several weaknesses, which weaken its usefulness. First, the Pareto principle is of limited use in the inequality debate because labor markets hardly satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, the pivotal assumption of the theory. Second, the proposition that competitive equilibrium leads to the “common good” of society is difficult to defend. Third, the Paretian welfare economics barely answers the questions society demands, because perfect competition does not guarantee fairness in the determination of relative prices in the initial situation of income distribution. Fourth, in the distribution theory, the marginal productivity principle determines the rewards to the factors of production. If we assume that rent, wage and interest incomes are determined by this theory, then questions arise about how profits, the potentially huge surpluses generated by the businesses, are distributed. Fifth, income distribution, being a public policy topic, is a political issue. However, Pareto's primary motivation in formulating the principle was to alienate the income distribution debate from political and policy discourses. Finally, by invoking the Pareto principle, economists are in fact avoiding the real issues of the public debate on personal distribution of income. Personal income distribution truly refers to division of income generated by a group of people working together and therefore, ought to be analysed with reference to the sector of employment. Thus, Tommy Franks' earning should be compared with that of a private, while an ordinary worker's salary should be compared with that of the CEO. History testifies that the public earning structure is much more equitable than that of the private sector. This poses a very serious question: Which earning structure reflects improvement in social welfare: public or private?     

The Impact of Health, Education and Housing Outlays upon Income Distribution in Australia in the 1990s

The distributional impact of public expenditure on such programs as health, education and housing is frequently ignored in studies of income distribution. This may bias assessment of both the relative living standards of different types of families at any particular point in time and of trends in income inequality over time. This article provides estimates for the 1990s of the combined distributional impact of public outlays on health, education and housing. The analysis indicates that the major beneficiaries of public outlays on these services are families with children and the aged. The pattern of receipt shows a strong life-cycle effect, with the value of non-cash benefits peaking in the 30s and 40s and rising again in retirement. Non-cash benefits are also shown to have an equalising effect upon income distribution.