不同力量对比供应链中制造商竞争策略研究

笔者采用纳什博弈和斯坦伯格博弈结构,分别表述力量对等和力量不对等供应链中零售商和制造商的决策过程,分4种情形探讨了2个制造商在不同竞争策略下,供应链中成员的最优决策。从制造商的角度出发,着重分析在不同力量结构的供应链中制造商的竞争策略选择。研究结果表明:制造商竞争策略的选择依赖于产品的差异性及生产成本的大小。     

强制减排和碳偏好影响下的制造商产能决策

为了研究在政府给定碳排放总量的约束下,面临随机需求的制造商的产能决策问题,在改进报童模型的基础上,比较了碳排放总量约束前后的制造商最优产量和单位产品减排量的变化,发现了排放总量约束使得最优产量减少。然后,在市场减排努力函数拉动需求的前提下,给出了制造商的最优产量和单位产品减排量之间的关系式,并且证明了减排努力函数可以是任意线性函数或者非线性的凹函数。最后通过算例分析印证了结论。     

供应链中断对制造商库存策略的影响分析

研究了在供应中断情况下,制造商库存系统的订货提前期与外部系统、订货成本、惩罚成本之间的关系。结果表明,最优库存策略对供应中断持续时间更加敏感。     

考虑处置和延迟交货的混合系统库存决策

对存在旧产品处置和采用延迟交货策略的混合系统库存决策问题进行研究。在混合系统中,有制造与再制造两种产品供应模式。产品使用后从顾客处返回,但因再制造能力的不足,返回的旧产品仅有部分用于再制造,其余的被处置。旧产品通过再制造得到再制造品,原材料和零部件通过制造得到制造新品,再制造品具有与制造新品完全相同的质量。可翻新品库存由用于再制造的旧产品组成,服务性产品库存由制造新品与再制造品组成。顾客的需求恒定且由服务性产品来满足,允许缺货但需完全拖后补足。利用（P,1）策略构建库存决策模型,给出了确定最优制造与再制造策略的求解方法,得到了制造和再制造准备次数、制造和再制造批量、模型周期长度、制造与再制造期的最大缺货量等决策变量的求解公式。算例表明,可以找到最优的制造与再制造策略。     

基于无缺陷退货下的易逝品供应链协调问题研究

本文通过将销售努力对需求和退货率的影响引入易逝品供应链,建立了需求不确定环境下顾客退货及制造商回收模型,指出分散式供应链下制造商简单地回收顾客的退货产品并不能实现供应链协调,而基于回馈与惩罚策略下制造商回收顾客的退货产品及销售季节结束后零售商的剩余产品能够实现供应链的协调。     

风险偏好的供应链再制品生产和定价决策问题研究

本文通过建立一个由制造商、再制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链,分别研究了再制造商和制造商不同风险厌恶程度下供应链的最优决策问题。结果表明：新产品市场容量扩大时,再制造商应实施扩大生产的策略,而不是调整价格策略;制造商再制品生产成本的增长会损害再制造商的利益;制造商再制品处于市场扩张期间,再制造表现出较高的风险厌恶水平时更有利;风险厌恶型再制造商产品的批发价格高于风险中性型再制造商产品的批发价格;再制造商再制品生产成本较高时,制造商应显示出较低的的风险厌恶程度。     

基于无缺陷退货下的易逝品供应链协调问题研究

本文通过将销售努力对需求和退货率的影响引入易逝品供应链,建立了需求不确定环境下顾客退货及制造商回收模型.指出分散式供应链下制造商简单地回收顾客的退货产品并不能实现供应链协调,而基于回馈与惩罚策略下制造商回收顾客的退货产品及销售季节结束后零售商的剩余产品能够实现供应链的协调.     

考虑成员主导行为的 闭环供应链定价决策研究

本文在闭环供应链（Closed-loop Supply Chain, CLSC)系统中考虑了成员的主导行为,分别在集中决策定价 模式、快递包装制造商主导模式以及快递企业主导模式这三种情况下研究快递包装制造商、快递企业以及整个闭环供 应链的最佳定价策略以及最优利润。结果表明,在集中决策定价模式下,能够使闭环供应链利润最大化。快递企业与 快递包装制造商之间的利润关系和快递企业在回收活动中赚取的差价关系密切,快递企业所获得的利润也与回收差价 密切相关。     

基于制造商的家电产品以旧换新定价策略研究

以旧换新政策促进了家电市场的发展,以旧换新活动逐渐为消费者所认可,成为其在购买产品时选择的方式之一。然而国家优惠政策终会逐渐取消,当政府推动力度逐渐减弱时,制造商将逐渐承担起以旧换新角色。如何制定有效的定价策略以进一步延伸以旧换新的效果,将成为制造商需要思考的问题。文章在制造商直接负责以旧换新活动的情况下,建立了产品以旧换新活动下的二手市场定价模型。分析了采用翻新再制造处理方式下的制造商最优定价策略,并通过模型推导和数值模拟仿真,验证了模型的有效性。     

考虑制造商竞争的绿色供应链政府补贴策略研究

为研究不同政府补贴策略对存在消费者绿色偏好以及两制造商横向竞争的绿色供应链的影响,分别建立和求解了三种补贴策略:无补贴策略、高成本制造商补贴策略、低成本制造商补贴策略。比较研究及数值仿真表明:政府补贴会提高直接受补贴产品的绿色度和需求量,但会降低无补贴产品的绿色度和市场需求量;制造商利润在直接受补贴下最高,补贴竞争者时最低;零售商和供应链总利润均在低成本制造商补贴策略下达到最高,其次是高成本制造商补贴策略;政府补贴只有在补贴力度适当时才能对供应链自身渠道利润产生正向作用。     

Pricing decisions in a dual channels system with different power structures

This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions under different power structures of a dual exclusive channel system where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer but two goods are substitute. A linear demand based on the utility function of a representative consumer is assumed, and three game scenarios(Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelbeg and Vertical Nash) are examined under symmetric and asymmetric related channel status. It is shown that no power structure is always the best for the entire supply chain though all members on supply chain have incentive to lead the Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the vertical Nash game is an equilibrium for the members, however, a Prisoner's dilemma necessarily incurs for the entire supply chain because the Retailer Stackelberg or the Manufacturer Stackelberg can gain the better performance than that in vertical Nash for the entire supply chain when the product substitutability is moderate or higher and the asymmetric relative channel status is moderate, while consumers always get the most welfare from the vertical Nash game.     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

基于收益共享契约的三级供应链如何应对突发事件

本文针对一个由供应商-制造商-零售商构成的三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求基础上,探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响,同时改进了协调供应链的收益共享契约,使之能够应对突发事件。     

基于响应时间的供应链协调策略研究

在市场需求价格和响应时间敏感下,本文以一个供应商和一个制造商构成的两级MTO供应链为背景,通过建立供应链收益函数模型,分析响应时间对供应链企业决策的影响。给出了供应商和制造商在分散决策下的最优响应策略,得出了供应链双方在分散决策下无法实现供应链完美协调的结论。而后,对供应链协调问题进行了探讨,发现两部收费制契约在满足一定条件下能够实现供应链完美协调,并通过数值实例对上面的结论进行了释义和说明。     

政府补贴下区分制造商类型的合约设计

考虑政府补贴下由一个供应商和一个制造商构成的绿色供应链.供应商通过对原材料和产品生产过程的控制来提供绿色产品,也因此能够获得政府补贴.政府依据供应链的最终产品数量向供应商提供补贴,供应商选择制造商以完成最终产品的生产过程,并除采购价格以外按一定比例与制造商分享政府补贴,制造商有生产成本等私人信息.在分析供应商和制造商成本、收益的基础上,建立了一个逆向选择模型,其中供应商提供包括供应数量和补贴分享比例的合约菜单,制造商从中选择一个合约或者拒绝全部合约,依据成本制造商可分为两种类型:较高机会成本和较低机会成本,通过优化合约设计,供应商对不同类型制造商提供不同的供应数量和补贴比例,以实现供应商收益最大化.     

A multi-echelon supply chain model for reworkable items in multiple-markets with supply disruption

The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-echelon supply chain model for multiple-markets with different selling seasons. Here, two suppliers are involved to supply the raw materials to the manufacturer where the main supplier may face supply disruption after a random time and the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive than the main supplier. In this article, the manufacturer produces a random proportion of defective items which are reworked after regular production and are sold in a lot to another market just after completion of rework. The retailer sells the finished products in different markets according to seasons. Finally, an integrated expected cost per unit product of the chain is minimized analytically by considering the lot-size ordered as a decision variable. An appropriate numerical example is also provided to justify the proposed model.     

拉动式库存策略的闭环供应链回收模式研究

在制造商延伸责任制类环境制度的压力下,制造商要进行产品的回收再制造并构建闭环供应链,回收模式的选择是影响闭环供应链效率的关键。回收库存持有成本率对回收模式的选择影响不大,关键影响因素是产品市场需求价格参数,当参数大于2时制造商回收模式较优,当参数小于2时制造商联合回收模式较优。算例验证了研究的正确性和可行性。     

The bullwhip effect on inventory: a perspective on information quality

In recent years, there has been a vast increase in the quantity of information shared across supply chain. We investigate how the timeliness and accuracy of information quality affect the value of information sharing. We use the inventory bullwhip effect (BWE) to measure the value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer. The retailer faces a price-sensitive demand and the price is an AR (1) process. Our study shows if customer demand and retailer’s immediate order are delayed, using retailer’s historical order quantity to forecast can decrease manufacturer’s BWE. If information errors happen, during delivery and utilization, information sharing is not always valuable for the manufacturer. Sometimes, no information sharing can decrease much more of BWE. If information errors occur when the retailer collects demand information, value of information sharing is more significant than when there are no information errors.     

需求和路途损耗扰动下双渠道供应链的应急决策

构建了一条由一个零售商和一个拥有线上渠道的生产商组成的易逝品双渠道供应链,假设商品在流通过程中发生一定的路途损耗。建立了突发事件导致市场需求和渠道流通过程的损耗比例同时发生扰动状态下的市场需求模型,求出最优渠道销售价格、销售数量以及生产数量,并设计了改进收益共享契约协调分散决策下的双渠道供应链。研究结果表明:当突发事件导致市场规模和路途损耗同时发生扰动时,供应链具有一定的鲁棒性,改进收益共享契约可以实现双渠道供应链的应急协调。     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.