Social Market Economy: origins,meanings and interpretations

This paper investigates various possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’—60 years after its political initiation in Germany. We focus on the variety of intellectual sources that influenced the formation and interpretation of the concept in Germany during the first half of the last century. Our particular attention is on Müller-Armack’s definition of a rather dualistic concept of ‘social’ versus ‘market economy’ and the subtle differences it has with an original (Freiburg School) view of ordo-liberalism that lends itself more easily to a constitutional economics perspective.

Imperfect competition and the modelling of expectations in macroeconomics

We show that when a model of the macroeconomy is based on imperfect, rather than perfect, competition, this may increase the problem of how to model agents’ expectations. We provide a simple example using an overlapping-generations economy with the potential for unemployment. Under certain assumptions about how consumers migrate between locations between the first and second periods of their lives, this extra issue regarding expectations arises. Imperfect competition may increase agents’ forecasting difficulties because they have to forecast not only future equilibrium prices, but also future out-of-equilibrium prices, and by definition the latter are never actually observed.

The evolution of IT innovations in Swedish organizations: a Darwinian critique of ‘Lamarckian’ institutional economics

Fundamental correspondence and analogies between the evolution of technological and biological innovations call for an ‘innovation Darwinian’, ‘universal Darwinian’ or ‘memetic’ approach to understanding technology innovation. Neo-institutional, in fact pseudo-Lamarckian evolutionary economic theory, represented by North, Nelson and Winter, Freeman and others, is criticized. Pseudo-Lamarckian (“by volition”) evolution is explained and analyzed on Darwinian grounds (as intentional and artificial selection), as is Schumpeter’s definitions of creative and imitative innovation. Data from a web survey among Swedish public and private organizations in 1999 are studied. Data show that Darwinian co-evolutionary interaction between producers and users or clients provide essential conditions and stronger influence on creative IT innovations than both ‘Lamarckian’ strategies and competition.

A simple note on herd behaviour

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

Entrepreneurial culture,regional innovativeness and economic growth

In this paper, we empirically study the relationship between entrepreneurial culture and economic growth. Based on a micro based comparison of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, we develop a measure reflecting entrepreneurial attitude at the regional level. We subsequently relate this newly developed variable, ‘entrepreneurial culture,’ to innovativeness and economic growth in 54 European regions. Extensive robustness analysis suggests that differences in economic growth in Europe can be explained by differences in entrepreneurial culture, albeit mostly in an indirect way.

Modeling Distribution Channel Dynamics of North American Cars in the Spanish Automobile Industry

Relations between manufacturers and distributors have been the center point of the distribution channel’s management. This study covers the effects of coercive, as well as non-coercive power on intermediary variables such as cooperation and conflict. It will also analyze the effects of cooperation and conflict on American car dealers’ satisfaction and performance in Spain. Due to the small sample size (46 dealers), the model based on causal modeling compelled us to use the optimization method based on the partial least squares (PLS) regression techniques coupled with a bootstrapping to enable some generalization of the results.

How useful is generalized Darwinism as a framework to study competition and industrial evolution?

The role of Darwinist concepts in evolutionary economics has long been a contentious issue. The controversy has recently been rekindled by the proposal of a “Universal” or “generalized” Darwinism, which holds that the ontology of all evolutionary systems accords to the Darwinist scheme of variation, selection and inheritance. This paper focuses on the application of the generalized Darwinist framework to the analysis of markets and industries. It argues that selection and inheritance concepts narrowly construed after the biological example are of limited usefulness. As an alternative to the ‘top–down’ approach of Universal Darwinism, the development of ‘bottom–up’ theories is advocated.

Situational logic in social science inquiry: From economics to criminology

Karl R. Popper proposed that the method of explanation in economics, or situational logic, should become the general model for analyses across the social sciences. This article makes good Popper's proposal by extending situational logic to a social problem outside the traditional scope of economics: crime. Specifically, the discussion reviews models developed by economist Gary S. Becker and criminologist Ronald V. Clarke. Becker's ‘economic approach’ to crime incorporates essential features of situational logic. Clarke's ‘situational crime prevention’ offers an even better demonstration; it explicitly incorporates the ideas of piecemeal social engineering and unintended social repercussions. Popper took situational logic from Menger and the Austrians, making this emerging area of criminology an extension of Austrian economics.

Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: The Case of Portugal

This paper analyzes the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon in Portugal. We show that the ‘hot issue’ market of 1987, coinciding with a speculative bubble in the stock market, is well explained by investor sentiment theories and that the issuing firms seized a ‘window of opportunity’ provided by excessive demand to offer and list their shares. In IPOs prior to the 1987 crash, underpricing is very high while there is a strong reversion to fundamentals in the long run. In the period 1988–2004, we find lower IPO underpricing and overall no evidence of long-run underperformance of IPO firms. Bookbuilding IPOs are more underpriced than other price setting systems IPOs, and firms with seasoned public offerings show abnormal returns in the long run.

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.

Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India

There has been a substantial erosion of the ‘right to property’ with respect to state takings in India, reflected in a progression of amendments to the Indian Constitution. Among other things, these amendments signify a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. To study the implications of this on governance in relation to state takings, this paper juxtaposes a narration of events that describe the progressive erosion of the ‘right to property’ against a heuristic analytical structure that seeks to capture the costs of violating the doctrine of separation of powers. This analysis is then utilized to point to the social costs that characterize the state acquisitions (takings) regime in India.

Complexity of economic structures and emergent properties

This concept revolves around differences of embeddedness of organizations in the macro patterns of routines (economic policy regimes), which in turn may differentially provide them–and the system as a whole–with ‘procedural rationality’ in dealing with identified problems in their relevant complex environment. Regularities of interdependence are specified between different regime patterns and the variety of coordination routines between and inside micro organizations. Corresponding regularities are also observed for internal governance routines of organizations, which in turn determine the behavioral adaptation by self-organization that may be rationally in a local perspective, but–contingent on the organization’s embeddedness in the coordination structure–not necessarily so in a comprehensive one.

Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

Routines, genes and program-based behavior

It is argued that the ‘routines as genes’ and the ‘routines as skills’ analogies are misleading in several respects. Neither genes, nor skills, nor routines program behavior, if this is taken to involve, first, that they do so in a way that excludes conscious, deliberate choice and, second, that they determine behavior. On a proper understanding of ‘gene’, ‘skill’ and ‘routine’, conscious, deliberate choice is not ruled out when genes, skills or routines are operating. Once we shift from analogy to ontology, genes and skills appear as basic constituents of routines. Routines cannot exist unless specific genes and skills are in place in the individuals involved in the operation of the routines. Both genes and skills can be said to act unconsciously as ‘If ..., then ...’ programs. Even complete knowledge of genes and skills of the individuals involved would fall far short of predicting individual and firm behavior, however. What would still be missing, it is argued, is knowledge about organization, the specific ways in which genes, skills and individuals are connected with one another, and knowledge of context-dependence, what environmental stimuli activate specific chains of genes, skills and individuals.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.

An evolutionary perspective on health innovation systems

This paper elaborates on the general properties of medical innovation processes. It begins with a critical review of different perspectives and methods of investigation used in various streams of research that have previously analysed technical change in the health sector. After profiling and discussing their characteristics, the paper proposes an evolutionary approach to change in medicine constructed around the notion of a ‘Health Innovation System’. Health innovation, it is argued, consists of complex bundles of new medical technologies and clinical services emerging from a highly distributed competence base. Health Innovation Systems are driven by the combination of (1) institutionally-bound interactions among agents (‘gateways’ of innovation) and (2) history-dependent trajectories of change (‘pathways’ of innovation) whose developments emerge from and feed back into the structure of the system through organised transfers of knowledge between research and clinical practice. After drawing examples from recent empirical work on clinical research in specific disease areas, the paper concludes by identifying implications for further research.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

The effects of mergers and acquisitions on the firm size distribution

This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the shape of the firm size distribution, by using data of the population of manufacturing firms in the Netherlands. Our analysis shows that M&As do not affect the size distribution when we consider the entire population of firms. When we focus on the firms involved in an M&A event, we observe a shift of the firm size distribution towards larger sizes. Firm size distribution becomes more concentrated around the mean, less skewed to the right hand side, and thinner at the tails as a whole. The shift toward higher sizes due to M&A is not uniform but affects firms of different sizes in different ways. While the number of firms in the lower tail decreased, the number of firms in the central size classes increased substantially and outweighed the increase in the number (and mean size) of firms in the upper tail of the distribution (consequently the overall market concentration measured by the Herfindahl index declines). M&As lead to a departure from log-normality of the firm size distribution, suggesting that external growth does not follow Gibrat’s law. Our counterfactual analysis highlights that only internal growth does not affect the shape of the size distribution of firms. On the contrary, it suggests that the change in the size distribution is almost entirely due to the external growth of the firms.

Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley’s benevolent despot

This paper is an assessment of Besley’s attempt to orchestrate a rapprochement between public choice theory and conventional public economics—with its characteristic normative orientation towards public policy. In this paper, I first try to set the Besley enterprise in the context of earlier work—focussing on my own work with Buchanan (The Power to Tax and The Reason of Rules). I then direct attention to three aspects of the Besley enterprise: whether selecting for competence depends on having solved the motivation problem (either by incentive or selection means), how selection mechanisms might be supported institutionally and the possibility that selection processes might create incentives at the ‘dispositional’ level.