CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.     

CEO power and its effect on performance and governance: Evidence from Chinese banks

This study investigates whether CEO power matters in Chinese banks. We find that the effects of four power dimensions on banks' performance and board structure vary in their own unique ways. The CEOs with structural power are negatively related to performance but positively related to gender-diversified boards. Moreover, CEOs with ownership power enhance performance but are negatively associated with professionalism and diversification in the boards. Banks that have CEOs with expert power perform well and have gender-diversified boards. Meanwhile, CEOs with prestige power are likely to appoint politically connected directors to the board.     

CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover

We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.     

CEO turnover,political connections,and firm performance: Evidence from China

In our analysis of 5738 CEO turnover events among A-share listed companies in China over the period of 1993 to 2019, we find that CEO turnovers on average hurt companies' market performance with significant negative abnormal returns in the event window. We then group the companies into four types based on whether the outgoing and successor CEOs have political connections, and then calculate the abnormal returns in the event windows of CEO turnovers once announced. We find that companies generally enjoy positive abnormal returns if they replace politically non-connected CEOs with connected ones. Such a positive effect is more evident among non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), companies with worse performance, and companies with higher financial constraints. However, abnormal returns derived from hiring politically connected successor CEOs turn to negative following China's massive anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Our findings provide direct estimations of the economic value of CEOs' political connections for A-share listed companies in China and reveal boundary conditions that moderate the influence of hiring politically connected CEOs.     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

商业“她时代”萌芽下的中国“裙子CEO”资本初探

对于"裙子CEO",早已引起社会广泛关注。研究显示:人力资本、社会资本以及人丽资本三者共同促成了女CEO这一特殊人才的形成。其人力资本与企业绩效是成正相关,发挥作用最大;社会资本这把双刃剑对于女CEO来说还是处于一个"凸弧"的上升阶段,还未发挥其最大的效用,有待开发;人丽资本对女CEO工作是有帮助的。研究同时表明:人力资本的形成过程中,IQ比EQ起的作用要稍大一些,说明在社会资本的组成里,情商要比智商更加重要。研究成果进一步表明,不仅人们不能带着有色眼镜看待女CEO,而且为正在奋斗成为女CEO路上的女高官以及普通女职员们指明了一个正确的职业导向,即加强学习,努力增强自己的人力资本,才能尽快地化茧成蝶。     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

This study draws on agency and stewardship theory to evaluate the relationship between alternative governance regimes (founder versus non-founder CEO) adopted at the time of going public on post-IPO economic outcomes in the market for corporate control. We find that the presence of founder CEOs reduces the likelihood of post-IPO change of control but enhances target IPO firm wealth by increasing acquisition premiums. Additionally, we examine whether measures of CEO power over the board moderate the relationship between founder management and target IPO firm wealth. Our results suggest that CEO duality is the most effective instrument of CEO power available to founder CEOs to positively influence target firm wealth. Further, we find that while founder CEOs utilize power derived from CEO duality to increase acquisition premiums, non-founder CEOs use board leadership power to expropriate shareholder wealth.     

CEO personality and language use in CSR reporting

We explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) personality traits and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Upper echelons theory indicates that the values, experiences, and personalities of top organizational managers influence their organization's strategic decisions and effectiveness. We utilize IBM Watson Personality Insights software to infer CEOs’ personality traits based on their responses to questions raised by analysts during year-end conference calls; we obtain CEOs’ Big Five personality traits—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism—from which we compute a measure of their risk tolerance. Using a longitudinal dataset of Standard and Poor's 500 firms for 2008–2015, we document that high CEO risk tolerance is related to lower CSR report readability and smaller CSR disclosure volume. This finding indicates that executives who are comfortable with greater risk are more willing to supply stakeholders with reports that are shorter and require greater effort to understand. Exploration of the association between CEO Big Five personality traits and CSR report readability and disclosure volume allows key stakeholders to better comprehend CSR disclosures and connotations thereof. Overall, our results contribute to the debate on how CEO personality traits affect organizations’ CSR disclosure reporting strategies, and support upper echelons theory in the CSR setting.     

Locality Stereotype,CEO Trustworthiness and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

Journal of Business Ethics - Exploring the locality stereotype with respect to CEO’s trustworthiness, we find that firms whose CEOs are from more reputable hometowns have a higher likelihood...     

Narcissus Enters the Courtroom: CEO Narcissism and Fraud

This study explores the aspects of the relationship between possible indicators of CEO narcissism and fraud. Highly narcissistic CEOs undertake challenging or bold actions to obtain frequent praise and admiration. The pursuit of narcissistic supply may result in a stronger likelihood of a CEO to undertake bold actions with potential detrimental consequences for the organization. The sample consists of all S&P 500 CEOs from 1992 till 2008 with more than 3 years of tenure. The measurement of CEO narcissism is based on 15 objective indicators and fits the main conceptualization of narcissism. This data collection provides a score for all S&P 500 CEOs according to their narcissistic tendencies. The Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases on the SEC’s website are the indicators of managerial fraud. The findings confirm the expected influence of plausible proxies for CEO narcissism on fraud by showing a positive relationship. This confirms the psychologic perspective of CEO narcissism as a potential cause of fraud.     

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles

This paper examines the influence of CEO career horizon problems on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We assume that as CEOs are getting older, they tend to disengage in CSR due to their shorter career horizons. We further argue that high levels of industry-level discretion (ILD) and blockholder ownership amplify the negative effects of CEO age on CSR. Using a panel sample of US-based firms over 2004–2009, we do not find the main effect of CEO age on CSR, but find support for the moderating effects, such that CEO age is negatively associated with CSR when there are high levels of ILD and blockholder ownership. Therefore, results suggest that CEO career horizon problems matter for CSR when (1) CEOs have sufficient discretion over the firm’s strategic decisions and (2) outside blockholders put more pressure on CEOs to engage in financial earning management.     

CEO International Assignment Experience and Corporate Social Performance

Research suggests that international assignment experience enhances awareness of societal stakeholders, influences personal values, and provides rare and valuable resources. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that CEO international assignment experience will lead to increased corporate social performance (CSP) and will be moderated by the CEO’s functional background. Using a sample of 393 CEOs of S&P 500 companies and three independent data sources, we find that CEO international assignment experience is positively related to CSP and is significantly moderated by the CEO’s functional background. Specifically, CEOs with international assignment experience and an output functional background (e.g., marketing and sales) are positively associated with greater CSP.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept Less Green?

We examine the relationship among CEO political alignment, compensation, and pay disparity (relative to other high‐earning executives) and find that Democratic CEOs accept less pay and a significantly lower pay slice. That is, left‐leaning CEOs put their money where their mouth is regarding the Democratic ideology of economic and social equity. This smaller pay gap is not a function of variations in managerial ability; if anything, Democratic CEOs are more talented than Republican CEOs. Results suggest that Democratic CEOs may be more effective at running firms in which collaboration among top executives is more valuable than are the potential gains from tournament incentives.     

CEO's Total Wealth Characteristics and Implications on Firm Risk

We study the connections between firm risk and the CEO's personal wealth characteristics, using a unique dataset on CEO wealth and its components. Consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion, we find that wealthier CEOs are associated with higher risk firms. Riskier firms tend to have CEOs whose wealth is more independent of the firm. We also find that CEOs with high personal portfolio betas run firms with higher betas. CEO's tenure is negatively associated with firm risk measured either as beta, idiosynchratic risk, or volatility of accounting profitability. A possible interpretation is that risk‐averse managers are better able to imprint their risk preferences on the firm over time. Stronger corporate governance weakens the connection between CEO wealth characteristics and firm risk.     

Stock options,restricted stock,salary, or bonus? Managing CEO compensation to maximize organizational performance

CEO pay has gone through remarkable changes over the past two decades. The most striking new features have been the increased use of stock options in the early 2000s, and of restricted stock since then. Both forms of stock-based compensation are intended to resolve the agency problem that occurs when CEOs do not act in the best interests of stockholders, but each has its advantages and limitations. In this instalment of Organizational Performance, we discuss the history of their use and similarities and differences between the two, and argue that both are often overused. Bonuses based on strategic goals, on the other hand, may be underused. We conclude with a contextual approach to guide boards of directors in making choices among the forms of CEO compensation—stock options, restricted stock, salary, and bonus—to incentivize CEOs to work toward maximizing organizational performance. Briefly, stock options are most appropriate for growth firms, and restricted stock for stable firms. Both forms of stock-based compensation are more appropriate for new than for long-tenured CEOs.     

Internationalization and firm performance of SMEs: The moderating effects of CEO attributes

This paper examines the impact of CEO attributes on the internationalization–performance relationships of SMEs. Based on the upper echelons and information processing theories, we argue that CEOs play an important role in the internationalization of SMEs. Furthermore, some of the attributes of CEOs who have a greater information processing capability have positive moderating effects on the internationalization–performance relationship. Using panel data of 187 Taiwanese SMEs that expanded abroad, we find that age, educational level, international experience, and duality of the CEO have moderating effects on the relationship between internationalization and firm performance.     

高管权力强度、 股权激励与高管显性腐败

文章以2006～2015年我国上市公司高管腐败案件为对象,从高管权力强度视角考察股权激励与高管显性腐败之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)高管权力越大,其发生权力寻租行为的概率越大,同时代理成本也越高;(2)我国上市公司的股权激励计划,未能有效调节企业高管权力强度与高管显性腐败之间的关系,尤其是国有控股上市公司实施的股权激励计划,反而加大了高管腐败发生概率;(3)货币薪酬越少、 激励有效期越长,发生高管腐败行为概率越高.这些结论对公司决策层完善股权激励计划设计、 优化公司治理、 监督和约束高管权力具有参考意义,也能为证监会、 国资委制定政策提供借鉴.