Inflationary expectations and monetary policy: evidence from Bangladesh

This article first estimates inflationary expectations using a Blanchard–Quah VAR model by decomposing the nominal interest rate into expected inflation and the ex ante real interest rate. Then I utilize this expected inflation along with other macroeconomic variables as inputs to the monetary policy function in a recursive VAR model to identify exogenous policy shocks. To calculate inflationary expectations, I assume that ex ante real interest rate shocks do not have a long-run effect on the nominal interest rate. This article finds that the public expects lower inflation for the future during periods of high inflation. Estimated results from the recursive VAR suggest that a contractionary policy shock increases the real interest rate, appreciates domestic currency, and lowers inflationary expectations and industrial output. However, I find a lagged policy response from Bangladesh Bank to higher inflationary expectations.     

Interest on reserves and inflation

The payment of interest on reserves has been a common practice in inflationary economies. This policy may seem paradoxical since it involves returning part of the seigniorage, generated by the inflation process, with the intention to finance the fiscal deficit. This paper argues that the motivation for this policy can be captured by the discretionary regime, where the policymaker pays interest on reserves because he is concerned with the erosion of real liquidity by inflation, which is in part beyond his control. However, this policy is an unlikely outcome in the commitment regime, where the policymaker is in full control of inflation.     

NOMINAL GDP TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK CONSERVATIVENESS

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the ‘inflationary bias’ result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this ‘inflationary bias’. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an ‘inflationary bias’, and there also exists the possibility of a ‘dis‐inflationary bias’.     

Inflation persistence,inflation expectations,and monetary policy in China

This paper constructs a quarterly series of GDP deflator inflation for China from 1979 to 2009 and tests for a structural break with an unknown change point in the dynamic inflation process. Empirical results suggest a significant structural change in inflation persistence. Employing a counterfactual simulation method, we show that the structural change is primarily attributed to better conduct of monetary policy and the resultant better anchored inflation expectations. This finding implies that the quiescence of inflation in China over the past decade could well be followed by a return to a high inflation era in the absence of a determined effort by the monetary authorities in managing inflation expectations. Therefore, the use of a preemptive monetary policy to anchor inflationary expectations and to keep inflation moderate is warranted in China.     

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES OF STAGFLATION AN EXAMPLE: FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1971–79

Stagflation is a combination of an increasing rate of inflation with a decreasing rate of real growth. It appears when the inflationary gap of production costs raises faster than the inflationary gap of expenditures on Gross Domestic Marketable Product. The decomposition of these two gaps into their main elements gives then the possibility of determining the sources of the inflationary increase in costs and the causes of the relative retardation of the inflationary increase in expenditures. The main cause of stagflation in 1974 for France and Germany was the huge rise in oil prices which had not been immediately followed by an equal rise in prices of their exports. The inflationary rise in wages is an almost permanent factor of stagflation in France; in Germany its responsibility is involved only before 1975. In France the insufficient increase in the inflationary gap of expenditures was mainly due to the restrictive monetary policy and to the official price regulation. In Germany the restrictive monetary policy also contributed to the slowdown in demand in 1974 and 1975. In 1977, on the contrary, the main cause of stagflation was the slackening of export demands due to the world recession and the revaluation of the DM.     

中国货币供给与通货膨胀的关联性研究

关于货币供给与通货膨胀的关联性,学者们还没有形成一致的看法.理论上,货币供给与通货膨胀具有一定的关联性.通货膨胀有需求拉动型和成本推动型,在通货膨胀的原因中有“货币因素”,也有“非货币因素”.实证检验表明:中国货币供应量与物价指数不存在长期的稳定均衡关系,但货币供应量是物价指数的格兰杰原因,反之则不然.事实上,中国通货膨胀或通货膨胀压力一方面是与货币供给有关,另一方面还与结构性因素有关.因此,要实现中国经济的低通胀运行:一是实行总量均衡和结构合理的货币供给模式;二是采取更有效的货币政策;三是推进经济结构调整,实现国际收支平衡;四是深化金融体系改革,增强中央银行货币控制能力;五是进行汇率机制改革;六是通过财政政策调整供需结构.     

论我国货币政策效应

本文基于VECM模型对我国货币政策效应做实证分析.结果表明,我国货币政策效应主要体现为促进经济增长,经济系统对货币需求和物价水平缺乏显著的抑制作用.我国中央银行为应对国际金融危机而实施的一系列宽松的货币政策,一方面有效地推动了GDP的止跌回升,另一方面也产生了通货膨胀的预期,助长了股票市场和房地产市场价格的高涨.因此在后金融危机时期要逐步调整货币政策,注意通货膨胀的风险,防范股票市场和房地产市场的泡沫.     

Nonlinearity in monetary policy: A reconsideration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

The proponents of the ‘opportunistic’ approach to disinflation suggest that, when inflation is close to the target, the central bank should not counteract inflationary pressures. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) formalize this idea through a simple policy rule that prescribes a nonlinear adjustment to a history-dependent target for inflation. This embodies a regime change in monetary policy, which reacts to inflation only when this is far from the inflation target. Here we study the opportunistic approach in a New-Keynesian model with sizeable nominal and real rigidites in the form of a positive money demand and adjustment costs for investment. We find that the welfare gains delivered by the opportunistic rule arise from the time-varying inflation target, when welfare is measured by a quadratic approximation of household utility. The nonlinear zone of inaction on inflation improves welfare outcomes only when a central bank loss function with the absolute value of the output gap is used, as proposed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).     

IDENTIFYING THE SHOCKS DRIVING INFLATION IN CHINA

The time profile of inflation in China resembles the one experienced in major industrial countries. Given the uncertainty surrounding the sources of economic shocks, the present paper compares results from three sets of alternative identification conditions. Our principal finding is that inflation in China has been primarily driven by monetary factors. Although aggregate supply factors might have pushed inflation to cross the threshold leading to deflation, monetary policy is primarily responsible for Chinese inflationary outcomes.     

Do natural disasters affect monetary policy? A quasi-experiment of earthquakes

This study explores whether the economic consequences of earthquakes affect the policy interest rate set by the central bank. The direction of this effect is not immediately clear beforehand since earthquakes create a classic monetary policy dilemma: how to accommodate the real shock in the short-run with the objective of anchoring inflation when these two competing objectives demand opposite policy actions. One can therefore argue that the question of whether, and if so, in which direction natural disasters influence monetary policy is ultimately an empirical one. For this purpose, I estimate a dynamic panel model including about 400 major earthquakes from about 85 countries that occurred between 1960 and 2015. The key findings of this study clearly point out that on average the short-run policy interest rate falls in the first year after the earthquake. This result implies that monetary authorities prioritize short-run economic recovery above price stability. However, this interest rate effect is not the same across countries. It turns out that central banks that have a specific policy target, such as a fixed exchange rate, are more likely to raise the interest rate in the period following a disaster to fight the inflationary pressure. In turn, monetary authorities that have much freedom in their policy decisions are more inclined to lower the interest rate to stimulate economic recovery.     

Oil and the Euro area economy

We examine the macroeconomic effects of different types of oil shocks and the oil transmission mechanism in the Euro area. A comparison is made with the US and across individual member countries. First, we find that the underlying source of the oil price shift is crucial to determine the repercussions on the economy and the appropriate monetary policy reaction. Second, the transmission mechanism is considerably different compared to the US. In particular, inflationary effects in the US are mainly driven by a strong direct pass-through of rising energy prices and indirect effects of higher production costs. In contrast, Euro area inflation reacts sluggishly and is much more driven by second-round effects of increasing wages. The monetary policy reaction of the ECB to oil shocks is also strikingly different compared to the FED. The inflation objective, relative to the output stabilization objective, appears more important for Euro area monetary authorities than for the FED. Third, there are substantial asymmetries across member countries. These differences are due to different labour market dynamics which are further aggravated by a common monetary policy stance which does not fit all.
--- Gert Peersman and Ine Van Robays     

Monetary policy, oil shocks, and TFP: Accounting for the decline in US volatility

An equilibrium model is used to assess the quantitative importance of monetary policy for the post-1984 decline in US inflation and output volatility. The principal finding is that monetary policy played a substantial role in reducing inflation volatility, but a small role in reducing real output volatility. The model attributes much of the decline in real output volatility to smaller TFP shocks. We also investigate the pattern of output and inflation volatility under an optimal monetary policy counterfactual. We find that real output volatility would have been somewhat lower, and inflation volatility substantially lower, had monetary policy been set optimally.     

Labor contracts,informational discrepancies and the role of monetary policy

This paper examines output stabilization and inflationary consequences of short-run monetary policy. The macroeconomic framework incorporates informational discrepancies between the monetary authority and economic agents who form long-term labor contracts. Economic agents are assumed to form rational expectations of the rate of inflation. One result of the analysis is that optimal monetary policy rules for stabilizing fluctuations in output and inflation are independent of the structure of the wage contracts and the degree of informational discrepancy. A second proposition shows that the monetary authority can actually make use of specific knowledge concerning the contract structure to reduce fluctuations in the rate of change in output. In particular, the monetary authority can reduce fluctuations in output below those occurring in a frictionless system by increasing fluctuations in the rate of inflation.     

Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

RATIONALE FOR DISSENT: THE CASE OF FOMC MEMBERS

This paper investigates monetary policymakers' rationale for dissent to test for a hypothesized difference in policy preferences between bank presidents and members of the Board of Governors. The paper analyzes the cited reasons for dissent, the identity of the dissenter, and uses multiple regression to make inferences regarding the differences.
Examining the identity of dissenters and the given reasons for dissent yields four conclusions, (i) A broad base of bank presidents dissent for tighter policy because they want to control inflation by keeping monetary aggregates within targeted ranges. (ii) On the other hand, board members' dissent for tighter policy is dominated by one man–Henry Wallich—who apparently was disturbed by the inflationary outbreak during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Hi) Several board members dissent for looser policy to stimulate the real economy, (iv) But only a few bank presidents, primarily from the Northeast, dissent for looser policy with the same objective.
Regression analysis supports the assertion that bank presidents dissenting for tighter policy do so to keep monetary aggregates on target in order to control inflation. The analysis confirms Wallich's focus on inflation during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also allows for the possibility that the various board members dissenting for looser policy either have an inherent preference for looser policy or have diverse reasons for dissent.     

2011-2012年中国货币政策分析与展望

本文回顾了2011年中国货币政策操作的主要措施和金融运行情况,分析了2012年货币政策运行环境,提出了货币政策建议。本文认为,2011年,面对不断上升的通货膨胀压力,中国人民银行实行了稳健的货币政策,货币信贷条件向常态水平回归,有效遏制了物价过快上涨的势头。2012年,在经济增长下行压力和物价上涨压力并存的局面下,中国人民银行需要继续实施稳健的货币政策,进一步增强货币政策的针对性、灵活性和前瞻性,根据经济形势的变化,适时适度进行预调微调,保持货币信贷总量和社会融资规模的合理适度增长,更好地服务于实体经济发展。     

Inflation and the fiscal limit

We use a rational expectations framework to assess the implications of rising debt in an environment with a “fiscal limit”. The fiscal limit is defined as the point where the government no longer has the ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to fiscal spending or monetary policy must occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution over the various policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the fiscal limit is hit. One policy option that stabilizes debt is a passive monetary policy, which generates a burst of inflation that devalues the existing nominal debt stock. The probability of this outcome places upward pressure on inflation expectations and poses a substantial challenge to a central bank pursuing an inflation target. The distribution of outcomes for the path of future inflation has a fat right tail, revealing that only a small set of outcomes imply dire inflationary scenarios. Avoiding these scenarios, however, requires the fiscal authority to renege on some share of future promised transfers.     

US monetary policy shocks and the Chinese economy: a GVAR approach

Using a global vector auto regressive (GVAR) methodology, this article examines the impact of US monetary policy shocks on China’s major macroeconomic indicators. Our analysis reveals that a positive shock to the US money supply growth rate initially increases China’s inflation rate but after some time this effect completely disappears. This shock also raises China’s short-term interest rate and the Chinese currency appreciates against the US dollar. A positive shock to the US short-term interest rate increases China’s short-term interest rate but the real output growth and inflation rates decline and the Chinese currency appreciates.     

Inflation volatility,economic growth and monetary policy in Bangladesh

This article provides an overview of the trends and movements of CPI-inflation in Bangladesh since the early 1950s and examines the key issues in rule-based monetary policy for price stability, implying low and stable inflation, in this country. Under a fixed exchange rate system, inflation in Bangladesh was moderately high and volatile during the 1950s and 1960s. Since the country’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, inflation in Bangladesh has remained moderately high on average and highly volatile and persistent under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system or under a managed floating system since 2003. Using data from the early 1970s or earlier depending on data availability, the article undertakes both Granger-causality and the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis with two models. The first model is comprised of such variables as inflation, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate and output growth, and the second model is comprised of the volatilities of money growth, real output growth and inflation. Then, based on the empirical findings, the article concludes that a rule-based monetary policy, namely monetary targeting or inflation targeting, remains appropriate for Bangladesh provided that it adopts a more flexible, if not freely floating, exchange rate system. The article suggests that the use of monetary policy to achieve multiple objectives under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system creates a time-inconsistency problem, reduces monetary policy credibility and makes it (monetary policy) ineffective in lowering inflation and its volatility. Low credibility of monetary policy in particular raises inflation persistence. Within the present monetary-policy framework in Bangladesh, the article illustrates how the fixed-pegged exchange rate system has generated money growth volatility in the presence of large-scale inflows of overseas workers’ remittances and readymade garments export earnings. This does not seem to be a concern of the central bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank); rather, it (Bangladesh Bank) pursues monetary-base targeting to keep inflation low and stable after considering economic growth. The consequent diminishing credibility of monetary policy has kept inflation volatile and persistent, which has adversely affected economic growth.     

Not all international monetary shocks are alike for the Japanese economy

This paper examines the influence of monetary aggregates shocks in the U.S., China and the Euro area on Japan. China's monetary expansion has significant effects on Japan's economy that are quite different from those of the U.S. and Euro area. In line with the implications of the Mundell–Fleming model when there are capital controls in place, Chinese monetary expansion is found to primarily affect Japan through trade. The income absorption effect of China's monetary expansion is substantial for Japan. China's monetary expansion results in significant increases in Japan's industrial production, exports and inflation, and decreases in the trade-weighted yen. After 24 months, monetary shocks in China forecast 20% of the variation in Japan's real trade balance. In contrast, U.S. monetary expansion results in contraction in Japan's industrial production, exports and trade balance (expenditure-switching). Monetary expansion in the Euro area does not significantly affect Japan. Structural vector error correction models and a factor-augmented model are estimated to establish robustness of results.