The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

The Information Content of Ratings: An Analysis of Australian Credit Default Swap Spreads

We examine the information content of Australian credit rating announcements by measuring the abnormal changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. CDS spreads provide a direct view of credit quality and thus should impound information quickly when investors receive new credit risk related information via a rating event. Using an event study methodology, we show that watch downs and rating upgrades contain valuable information even after controlling for sources of contamination. We find that watch downs elicit statistically significant market reactions, while subsequent downgrades are anticipated. Upgrades are associated with a significant but small abnormal reduction in CDS spreads, whereas watch ups appear to contain no new information.     

Information in CDS spreads

We investigate how public and private information affects corporate CDS spreads prior to rating announcements. First, CDS spreads of firms with high news intensity change significantly earlier and more strongly prior to negative rating announcements than those of firms with low news intensity. Second, the contents of daily corporate news significantly influence the direction in which the CDS spreads move. Third, CDS spreads change more strongly for firms with more bank relationships and days with no news but large abnormal CDS spread changes are more frequent prior to negative rating announcements than prior to positive ones. The study provides new evidence on the informational efficiency of the CDS market, the impact of credit rating announcements, and insider trading.     

The impact and the spillover effect of a sovereign rating announcement on the euro area CDS market

This paper analyzes the impact and the spillover effect of a sovereign rating announcement on the euro area CDS market. Through the event study technique, we demonstrate that downgrades and upgrades considerably affect financial markets. The relevance of the impact is due to the introduction of “new” information after a rating change announcement (information discovery effect) and to the role of rating in the current financial regulation (certification effect). Conversely, the CDS market does not seem to react significantly to rating warning (outlook and review) announcements. Furthermore, we find evidence of a spillover effect only after a downgrade announcement. Our results show that the size of the spillover effect is influenced by economic and financial conditions of analyzed countries and that international bank flows between EMU Members represent an important transmission channel of the spillover effect.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices

This paper examines daily excess bond returns associated with announcements of additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, and to rating changes by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Reliably nonzero average excess bond returns are observed for additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List when an expectations model is used to classify additions as either expected or unexpected. Bond price effects are also observed for actual downgrade and upgrade announcements by rating agencies. Excluding announcements with concurrent disclosures weakens the results for downgrades, but not upgrades. The stock price effects of rating agency announcements are also examined and contrasted with the bond price effects.     

Effect of the Sovereign Credit Ratings in East Asia Countries: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregression

We study the effect of the sovereign credit ratings on the economies of seven East Asian countries, applying panel vector autoregression (VAR). We find that rating has less effect than outlook of rating on the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, the stock indexes, and the GDP growth rates. Rating upgrade and positive outlook have stronger effects than rating downgrade and negative outlook, and the effects of positive outlook and rating are greater after the financial crisis. There is evidence of contagion in that the economic variables of a country seem to have been affected by the outlooks of the other countries.     

Corporate financing and anticipated credit rating changes

Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make timely revisions to their ratings, thereby increasing information asymmetry between firms and the market. We examine whether firms time the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its decision to change a firm’s credit rating. Using quarterly data, we show that firms adjust their financing structures before credit rating downgrades are publicly revealed. Specifically, firms on average increase their debt financing by 1.29 % before the disclosure of a rating downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, firms do not take significant financing actions before credit rating upgrades.     

The CDS market reaction to restatement announcements

I investigate the credit market's reaction to restatement announcements through changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. I document an overall positive association between CDS returns and restatement announcements. Specifically, I find that more positive CDS returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) affecting more accounts. Moreover, these reactions are sensitive to the underlying entities’ credit ratings and the market‐wide investor sentiment. Next, I compare CDS and stock market reactions and find that more negative stock returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) decreasing reported income.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

The (un)informative value of credit rating announcements in small markets

This work examines the information value of local Israeli credit rating announcements. This matter is also important to other small markets, in which a debt issuer may take advantage of a “rating shopping” process or choose to avoid a rating procedure altogether, because the agencies do not carry out unsolicited rating. We analyze the bond and equity markets response to various rating announcements at different time periods. We find that except for downgrades in 2008–2009 the rating announcements have no information value. It seems that generally the market internalizes most of the information prior to the rating announcements.     

The Impact of a Rating Agency's Private Information and Disclosed Causes of Rating Downgrades on Insurer Stock Returns

Existing studies document that bond and insurer rating downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns but generally do not consider the reasons for the downgrade disclosed or implied in the downgrade announcement. Using hand-collected press releases (downgrade announcements) of A.M. Best Company (Best) for a sample of publicly traded insurance firms during the period 1996–2012, we classify and analyze downgrades based on the disclosed causes of the downgrades and whether the rating agency has implied reliance upon unfavorable private information or opinion. We find that during the three-day event window (?1, +1), rating downgrades overall generate a statistically significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of negative 7.76%. A significantly more negative CAAR of negative 11.46% is found for “financial-prospects-deterioration” downgrades with the perceived presence of Best's private information or opinion. For downgrades without any indication of Best's private information or opinion, the CAAR is negative 3.35%, which is significantly different from zero but significantly less negative than the CAAR of downgrades where private information or opinion is indicated. Downgrades with reported causes other than deterioration of a firm's fundamental financial performance or condition, such as increases in financial leverage and increased business risk taking, produced statistically significant CAAR of negative 3.19% during the (?1, +1) three-day event window, which is also significantly less negative than the CAAR of downgrades where private information or opinion is indicated. Our results provide evidence that downgrades where private information or opinion is likely and downgrades due to a decline in fundamental financial profiles contain more value-relevant information than other types of downgrades.     

THE DYNAMICS OF BOND YIELD SPREADS AROUND RATING REVISION DATES

We examine the effect of rating revisions on sterling Eurobond yields using a panel model with conditional heteroskedasticity that controls for event‐induced changes in the variance of spreads. Positive rating revisions are fully anticipated by the time the upgrade occurs. Negative revisions are only partially anticipated, and spreads on downgraded bonds rise for some time after the downgrade has been announced. This asymmetry is not apparent in a conventional event study model. All ratings announcements are accompanied by a temporary fall in yield volatility. We attribute this to the resolution of uncertainty about the true rating of the bond.     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

信用评级变动能反映企业真实财务信息吗?——基于财务重述的视角

本文以2007-2018年拥有主体信用评级的A股上市公司为研究对象,利用企业财务错报在未来被重述这一场景,检验主体信用评级变动能否反映企业真实财务信息。研究发现,评级机构在发债企业财务错报年显著下调了主体信用评级,而在重述公告发布年没有上述现象,这表明主体信用评级下调反映了企业的真实财务信息。在控制内生性影响后,结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,发债企业当期财务错报涉及盈余时,主体信用评级被下调的幅度更大,说明评级机构更加关注与盈余相关的财务信息。机制分析表明,评级机构维护自身声誉是主体信用评级变动能够反映企业真实财务信息的主要机制。此外,主体信用评级被下调还导致了资本市场投资者的负面反应。本文的研究结果为主体信用评级变动反映企业真实财务信息提供了直接的证据支持,揭示了主体信用评级的信息含量,也对理解中国情境下评级机构调整主体信用评级的行为动机提供参考。     

The intraday timing of rating changes

Using time stamps of Standard & Poor's rating changes, we examine the timing of rating changes in an intraday setting. Our evidence shows that although most rating changes occur during trading hours, the proportion of downgrades announced after regular trading hours is higher than that of upgrades. In addition, unexpected after-hour downgrades are associated with more negative stock returns and lower trading volume in comparison to those announced during trading hours. We also find that Standard & Poor's is more likely to announce downgrades after hours when downgrades are released on busy days with many concurrent rating announcements, when they concern financial firms, and when they are unexpected. In addition, Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR), an investor-paid credit rating agency, demonstrates a similar tendency in announcing downgrades after trading hours. This is the first study to document systematic differences in the timing of credit rating changes announced before and after the market closes. Our findings suggest that Standard & Poor's announces downgrades after trading hours to better disseminate information, and thus have important policy implications.     

Measuring changes in credit risk: The case of CDS event studies

This paper examines the size and power of test statistics designed to detect abnormal changes in credit risk as measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads. We follow a simulation approach to examine the statistical properties of normal and abnormal CDS spread changes and assess the performance of normal return models and test statistics. Using daily CDS data, we find parametric test statistics to be generally inferior to non-parametric tests, with the rank test performing best. A CDS factor model based on factors identified in the empirical literature is generally well specified and more powerful in detecting abnormal performance than some of the classical normal return models. Finally, we examine abnormal CDS announcement spread changes around issuer's rating downgrades to demonstrate the effect of different CDS spread change measures and normal return models on event study results.     

The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes

This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.     

The use of earnings and operations management to avoid credit rating downgrades

Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year following the credit watch period, the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of private information about future firm performance.     

Measuring Sovereign Risk: Are CDS Spreads Better than Sovereign Credit Ratings?

Using data for 54 countries over a 12‐year period, we find that the variation in average sovereign ratings in a given year can be explained by average credit default swap (CDS) spreads over the previous three years. In a horse race between CDS spreads and sovereign ratings, we find that CDS spread changes can predict sovereign events, while rating changes cannot. The predictability of CDS spreads is greater when there is disagreement between Moody's and the S&P for a country's rating.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Changes and New Ratings on UK Stock Returns

This is the first study to use daily data from a major capital market outside of the US to examine the role of corporate bond and commercial paper rating changes on common stock returns. Using data published by Standard and Poors' credit rating agency between 1984 and 1992, we examine the impact of new credit ratings, credit rating changes and Credit Watch announcements on UK common stock returns. We find significant negative excess returns around the date of a downgrade and positive returns close to the date of a positive CreditWatch announcement. Hence, the financial markets would appear to place some importance on rating agency pronouncements in the UK. New ratings, whether short or long-term, have no significant impact on returns. We also attempt to quantify the impact of a new credit rating upon firm cost of capital through measures of conditional volatility and systematic risk. However, we find only weak evidence to suggest that a stock's cost of capital is reduced after a long-term credit rating is awarded for the first time.